The war in Sudan is now moving into a new and maybe even more dangerous phase. It appears that the UAE, the main external sponsor of the RSF army, which is at war with the official Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), is increasingly winning the US to its position.
After RSF atrocities in El Fasher in late 2025, the US blamed the SAF for not agreeing to a pause in fighting that would have required it to withdraw from some contested territory. The US already feared a rise of Islamism in Sudan. It had outlawed the ibn Malik Brigade in September 2025. In March 2026, it went on to list the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, generally aligned with the SAF, as a terrorist organisation. No equivalent terrorism designation has been made against the RSF or its Tasees project.
The likelihood is the normalisation of partition of Sudan, with the UAE in a stronger regional position.
The SAF could be considered the lesser evil. The RSF are far more unrestrained in their brutality. The humanitarian activist Alex de Waal, who has worked on Sudan for 40 years, has spoken of the dangerous “revolutionary nihilism” exhibited by the RSF and their belief in a new Sudan being built only through genocidal violence.
But there is an existing third, positive, alternative. The revolutionary movement threw up local Resistance Committees. The spirit of these continues in the Emergency Response Rooms, which now number more than 700 in Sudan, mobilising more than 26,000 volunteers. They are education and health workers, along with community activists, filling in for social functions of the state that have been abandoned by the purely military machines of the SAF and RSF. They were originally funded by the Sudanese diaspora and have some NGO and Western development aid, although support from USAID has all but dried up under Trump.
Welfare
These community-based institutions of mutual aid have become the country’s real welfare infrastructure, working under bombardment, hunger, arrest and threat from both sides. An estimated 160 have been killed, and hundreds more detained or tortured. As a representative of the ERR stated, “We are not victims waiting to be saved. We are citizens building Sudan’s future, and we have [our] own vision.”
Those institutions are the legacy of the popular movement of 2018-19, which succeeded in overthrowing the 30-year rule of Omar al-Bashir and raised the possibility of civilian democratic rule, workers’ organisation and the dismantling of Sudan’s old military-Islamist state.
That was first thwarted by compromise with the generals, then crushed by the joint coup of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in October 2021. Since April 2023, the two armies have turned on each other in a war waged without regard to the civilian population.
The worst of the violence comes when SAF or RSF forces (or their local allies) attempt to ensure the loyalty of the local population by driving out, starving or killing those whose loyalty is suspect, a judgement often based on ethnicity. In March and April 2026 alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported an SAF drone attack on El-Daein hospital in East Darfur which killed 70 people, and an RSF attack on Al-Jabalain hospital in White Nile state which killed at least 10, including medical staff. Aid convoys have been similarly attacked. These are part of a deliberate strategy to make life impossible for civilians in these areas.
The worst of this was the fall of El Fasher in October 2025 after an 18-month siege of the last redoubt of the SAF and its allies in Darfur. The RSF considered all the remaining 260,000 inhabitants of the city combatants, although half were children. The March 2026 UN Fact-Finding Mission report, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher, found that RSF crimes against Zaghawa and Fur communities showed genocidal intent. A July 2026 supplementary report and OHCHR statement strengthened this, describing mass killings, abductions and gang rape in El Fasher as distinct markers of genocide.
There is now a risk that this will be repeated in El Obeid, the SAF-held capital of North Kordofan (in central Sudan, to the east of largely RSF-controlled Darfur), which is now under siege by RSF forces. In late June, the UN Security Council warned that this could be “another El Fasher”, and on 6 July the Human Rights Council ordered an urgent inquiry into alleged RSF abuses around the city, including summary executions, abductions, torture and sexual violence.
On the back of its strong grip on Darfur, its increasing strength in Kordofan and the Blue Nile region in the south-east of Sudan, the RSF has renewed its efforts in building a military state. It announced its Sudan Foundation Council (Tasees) in 2025 and established the “Government of Peace and Unity”, which was not a government and promoted neither peace nor unity. Recently, the RSF has been attempting to give this more of the functionality of a real state to create a de facto partition of Sudan, although so far not even its allies have recognised it as such.
In this, the RSF may have been encouraged by its increasingly favourable regional and international environment.
Leverage
Since the start of the war, the SAF has used its status as the recognised government of Sudan as a key source of diplomatic leverage. It is supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia despite its continuity with Bashir’s Islamist state, based on the political rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. After restoring links with Iran in 2023 and using Iranian drones in 2024, the SAF has more recently distanced itself from Iran in order to make itself more acceptable to Washington, Cairo and Riyadh.
Nonetheless, there are openly Islamic militias in the SAF’s network (indeed, the al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade was instrumental in retaking Khartoum alongside the SAF in 2025), and these have resisted being integrated into a unified command structure. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt back the SAF because they see it as the main hope for regional stability, while hoping that, like al-Bashir after 1999, it will subordinate its Islamist networks to state and regional-security priorities.
The UAE, the major backer of the RSF, is not simply less tolerant of the SAF’s roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist allies. The RSF is part of the UAE’s attempt to build a broader alliance in the region, including a key alliance with Ethiopia.
More broadly, the UAE is keen to build alliances with the USA and Israel in the region, and to distance itself from other Gulf states, for example by leaving OPEC in May 2026. The main international diplomatic body focused on Sudan is the Quad of the USA, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In this, the USA has previously been seen as playing the role of “honest broker” between the two SAF-aligned states and the UAE. It has never been willing to damage its economic relationship with the UAE to pressure it to stop arming the RSF, and now looks to be swinging more pro-UAE. §
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