Barry Finger (“Questioning the call for a ceasefire”, Solidarity 689) wants us to support Israel in its immediate military conflict with Hamas. But if there is an abstract case for supporting a state in a war against a clerical-fascist militia, the means by which Israel carries out its side of that conflict puts it beyond support. Israel’s military strategy, which aims to reduce Gaza to a “city of rubble”, means it is not merely making war on Hamas, but on the population of Gaza as a whole. How many Palestinian lives are acceptable collateral in the pursuit of the destruction of Hamas?
And how many especially when there is little chance of the war “destroying” Hamas? Eric Lee, in a column this week arguing a similar conclusion to Barry’s, writes that the Israeli armed forces may be within days or even hours of finishing off Hamas. They are not.
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon with the aim of “finishing off” the PLO and any military threat from the north. It had advantages which it does not have in Gaza. The Beirut government was also hostile to the PLO, and a thousands-strong Lebanese militia would ally with Israel in controlling south Lebanon. The Palestinians were a ghettoised minority in Lebanon.
Hezbollah
The PLO leadership fled to Tunis. But the net result by the time that Israel withdrew from south Lebanon in 2000 was to generate a fascistic-Islamist anti-Israeli force in Lebanon, Hezbollah, many times stronger and more intractable than the scrappy PLO of 1982, and to help make Hamas strong in Gaza (and even, it seems, Lebanon too).
Hamas probably does not have majority support in Gaza, but it has wide support. Young boys who survive in Gaza are now being trained by Israel to want to become Hamas “martyrs” when they grow up. Hamas has an apparatus outside Gaza, and strength in the West Bank. It is not a force that can be neatly packed off to Tunis, or wherever. Netanyahu’s war is not, and could never have been, a war to surgically remove an external military tumour with minimal damage to the civilian body.
Israel has not seriously contested the Hamas-run Health Ministry’s figures of over 10,000 dead (over 4,000 children), and has claimed only a fraction of those deaths as killings of Hamas cadre. The war will kill many more if it extends to the West Bank and the northern border. It will not finish off Hamas. Only political efforts will do that.
Workers’ Liberty supports a ceasefire because it will pause the slaughter, and could allow space for mobilisation for a more lasting peace. We have also consistently and prominently supported the demand to free hostages. The front page of the edition of Solidarity with the editorial Barry objected to said: “Ceasefire — End Siege — Free Hostages.” Support for a ceasefire — from both sides — also makes clear that we oppose Hamas’s rocket attacks on Israeli civilian targets — mostly ineffective, but wholly reactionary in their aims.
Barry justifies his support for Israel’s war partially on the basis that, in Hamas, it is fighting a force like Daesh (“Isis”) or Boko Haram, an army with a globalist project for a worldwide caliphate, rather than a nationalist movement. But the Israeli attack on Gaza is not like the US-Iranian operation to drive Daesh out of Mosul in 2016-7 — and we did not endorse even that (although we didn’t campaign to stop it). US officials have been at pains to tell the Israeli government that it took nine months to drive out Daesh, and 10,000-plus civilian deaths. And that was much “easier”. Daesh had arrived from outside to take Mosul, and succeeded because the Iraqi army ran away. There was wide opposition to it in the civilian population. The US and Iranians could hand over to the Iraqi government, with grudging assent from the people.
There have been protests against Hamas in Gaza, including very recently before the current war, and opinion polling shows them far from universally popular. But, having razed Gaza and killed thousands, Israel can hardly count on any, even grudging, assent for whatever “post-Hamas” arrangement it envisions.
Hamas
Barry’s assessment of Hamas’s political character also seems wrong to me. Islamist currents, even those at the fascistic end of the political range, are not all the same, and the situations where they gain control are not all the same. Hamas did not arrive in Gaza as an external military force. It does not proclaim a caliphate as its aim; Hamas’s nationalism is an ultra-reactionary religious nationalism, but it surely is nationalism. In both its 1988 and 2017 charters, it describes its project in terms of an effort to reconquer the territory of (pre-1948 British Mandate) Palestine for Islam.
Barry asks what Workers’ Liberty’s support for Israel’s right to self-defence means in practice, if we oppose what Israel is doing now. I’m not a military strategist or security expert, and it’s not our job to pose as security advisers to the Israeli state. But, in brief, had the Israeli military, on 7 October, been less focused on providing security for armed settlers in the West Bank, and more alert to the threat to civilians on the Gaza border, it could have taken action to save their lives. Of course we would support that; only those who see all Israeli Jews as legitimate targets could possibly have opposed it.
Deflect
If the Israeli military strengthens protections for civilian communities on the border — it is surely easier to fend off bulldozers and trucks than to fend off rockets, which Israel already does — then that will protect Israelis much better than the current atrocities. Netanyahu wants to deflect inquiry into why the border defences failed, but why should we?
The definition of “self-defence” cannot be stretched to cover any action taken “against Hamas”, no matter how high the number of Palestinian civilian deaths, without becoming unmoored from morality, or even from realistic calculation, if one wishes to think solely in those terms. Nor can support for this war be deduced from our support for Israel’s right to exist. Hamas aims at the destruction of Israel, but is not capable of achieving it in the current war. That would only be in prospect if Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, and others also intervened against Israel. If that happened, it would surely trigger a wider, possibly global, conflict: a different war, in which, moreover, specific questions of national self-determination, both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab, would likely be drowned.
Meanwhile Israel’s actions make the widening of the conflict, and thus the risk of a more direct existential threat, more likely, not less.
Barry has, although I’m sure he’ll baulk at the comparison, become a kind of mirror image of some of those on the left who apologised for the 7 October massacres. Not those who uncritically cheered them on, but those whose apologism was subtler, arguing that while civilian deaths were shocking, Hamas’s attacks were an inevitable lashing-out against Israeli oppression. “Yes, the violence is regrettable, but ultimately it’s self-defence” is a formulation that apologists for Hamas or Israel’s war could both use, and have used.
Barry ends his critique by saying that socialists can not “opt out of selecting between the only horrible alternatives that actually do exist.” But I put it to Barry that “selecting between horrible alternatives” is not the business of revolutionary socialist activists. The “lesser evil” outcome Barry presumably wants, a relatively “surgical” operation to uproot Hamas and free the hostages, was never in prospect, and we cannot hope to counsel Netanyahu’s government to achieve it even if it was. The illusion that we can will stop us doing what we can and must do; striving, even when our resources are small, to change the conditions that produce “only horrible alternatives.” We will inhibit our ability to do that if we cannot, in the face of wanton slaughter, even bring ourselves to say “stop”.