Climate interventions and workers' agency

Solar Climate Intervention Techniques

Expanded and updated 11th November


“If we could come up with a geoengineering answer to this problem, then Copenhagen wouldn’t be necessary. We could carry on flying our planes and driving our cars.” — Richard Branson, 2009

“[A]ddressing climate change risks SRM [Solar Radiation Modification] cannot be the main policy response to climate change and is, at best, a supplement to achieving sustained net zero or net negative CO2 emission levels globally. SRM contrasts with climate change mitigation activities, such as emission reductions and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), as it introduces a ‘mask’ to the climate change problem by altering the Earth’s radiation budget, rather than attempting to address the root cause of the problem, which is the increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.” — IPCC report, 2022, reflecting “high agreement”

Most consideration and advocacy of “geoengineering” falls somewhere between these two. For every move needed to seriously halt the deluge into the carbon cycles, and other GHG pollution, much of the ruling class fight tooth and nail  against the curbing of their profit and power that would be required. The temptation of an excuse, a "get-out-of-jail" free card for inadequate action, is strong. Much of the prominence of "geoengineering" technologies, and even research into it, is pushed by fossil capitalists. Belief in these “geoengineering answers” is often sincere, as even is the usual ostensible recognition that emissions reductions remain the critical response. Solace still serves to subdue. This applies even with many on the left, and indeed the IPCC itself.

A more radical argument for “geoengineering” can be made. Past critiques we made of “geoengineering”, of its dangers and drawbacks, are not so much wrong as one sided. The same can be said, in broad brushstrokes, of many of the issues flagged in the wider reading we’ve engaged with: of the many proposals dismissed in “The Big Bad Fix”; and the more focussed critiques of SRM found in Hulme’s “A case against climate engineering”. More measured and balanced critiques found in Elizabeth Kolbert's book and Holly Jean Buck’s three useful books on the topic. More on some of these issues below.

Suppose workers’ revolution sweeps the globe tomorrow. What may an international federation of workers’ states, a democratic rational worldwide organisation, decide to do? This isn't the most important question, nor adequate for considering what we should advocate or do now. But I am using it as a device to "bracket out" some of the wider political questions for the next section, to bring them in again after.

This isn't an attempt to depoliticise climate interventions, but the exact opposite. In the literature, and I think in what some comrades have said, distinct political and other considerations frequently get confused.

In our agitation and activism on many topics, we often aim to analyse what is needed, setting our aims high, and fighting for it, or for steps towards it. We think in terms of "transitional demands" — in the Trotskyist rather than ecological sense — when doing so. In doing so, even though the demands are often unlikely to be fully realised under capitalism, we try to fight to win improvements in that direction, simultaneously helping to build up the working-class power which will make possible the replacement of capitalism with a more rational society; thereby making possible the full realisation of our demands.

These demands are not however just abstract good ideas. They are shaped by our means and aims: working-class struggle, and a workers' revolution. Not everything which we might advocate for a workers' state do we emblazon on our banners now, by some way.

Those advocating climate interventions often make arguments based on what may be a rational approach, and leave it there. But we are in a context where the main immediate agents which would be asked to carry it out are competing capitalist states, driven not by democratic and rational consideration of what would be the best course of action for all of humanity, but by capital's insatiable drive for accumulation. With many of the proposed climate interventions, that profoundly impacts what we can call for and how.

Those critical often make the opposite mistake. They consider how climate interventions, and the promises of them, may operate in today's conditions. They rightly recoil in horror at much of that. But they leave it there without considering how a fight over these technologies might relate to our central aim: the global liberation of the working class from wage slavery and state oppression.

What might a global federation of workers’ states do?

It should go without saying that this is not an attempt at a blueprint: a workers' state would have expertise that would make any such attempt redundant. But what might it do?

Ending fossil fuels and other contributors of greenhouse gases would be the alpha and omega of tackling global warming. Doing so as fast as workable would be necessary.

The impact of the climate crises to date have been devastating. Wildfires have wiped towns off the map and burned people alive in the USA. Across Europe, last year’s heatwaves, attributable to climate change, killed over 60,000 people. The same year, floods in Pakistan impacted over 30 million people, with over two million left homeless, and over five million forced to rely on unsafe drinking water. Five of the Solomon Islands in the Pacific have disappeared under the waves. Hurricane Katrina ravished New Orleans in 2005, causing shock internationally and setting several records: most Atlantic tropical storms in one year, costliest Atlantic hurricane, and other records besides. The former record was surpassed in 2020, the latter met by Hurricane Harvey in 2017. Besides the bleaching of iconic coral reefs, climate change is propelling wildlife loss and extinctions worldwide. Droughts, warming, and ecosystem disruption are impacting food production around much of the planet. Disturbing and reconfiguring of ecosystems, aided by climate change, has abetted an “age of pandemics.”

All this, and more, at a little over 1.1ºC. Bourgeois climate politics have coalesced around a compromise of (purportedly) aiming to limit global heating to 1.5-2ºC above pre-industrial levels, and with activities and plans which will take us far beyond that. But if 1.1ºC brings the nightmares to date, 1.5ºC promises a far worse hell. We should aim to curb temperature rises as much as possible. 1.1ºC is 1.1 too many, but is worlds better than 1.2ºC, let alone 1.5ºC or 2ºC. The horrors of 2ºC would in turn be eclipsed by 2.5ºC…

And not just the nightmares to date. If workers’ states coming into being tomorrow phased out fossil fuels and other net contributors of greenhouse gases the day after, historic emissions would have worse still locked in. (Even with increased ambitions and full control of the means of production at our disposal, phasing out fossil fuels couldn’t be done literally overnight, of course.) Sea levels would continue to rise, species to go extinct, ecosystems to degrade, and the other time-lagged impacts of global warming would make the impacts of the last few years seem relatively minor.

Desisting from making the situation worse would remain the most effective, important, and reliable climate measure. It would require a huge amount of work, and even then will come at a social cost. The biggest individual cost, perhaps, may be limiting flying: high speed rail and increased time off can partly compensate, but only partly. But desisting from making the situation worse would not be sufficient.

If we stopped adding carbon to the carbon cycle, adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, the contributions from the past decades and centuries would still remain there, wreaking havoc. We would need to try to remove much of that.

Restoration

Ecosystem “restoration”, including restoration of carbon sinks — soil, forests, peatlands, ocean ecosystems — would be necessary and desirable. Supporting ecosystems and biodiversity is important for the wider health of the biosphere, for food security, limiting pandemics, and more. It is beneficial in supporting biodiversity and slowing mass extinction, and supporting ecosystems which often play — frequently unknown — important roles in the wider biosphere and weather systems. “Reforestation” and “rewilding” aim to do this. (“Pleistocene rewilding” advocates “reintroducing” megafauna, but is hotly debated and many advocate “rewilding” without that.)

Such restoration is generally only partial. Better to protect existing ecosystems where workable than restore them once degraded.

Restoration of carbon sinks promises some “Nature-based” Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR). Doing so would come at a cost — in terms of land availability and labour, at least. But despite its use and necessity, it wouldn’t be sufficient. To first approximation, it wouldn’t be able to sequester much more carbon than was released by the degradation of these ecosystems in the first place. "Restoration" may not be able to manage that much even, and would take some time. But the excess carbon from the burning of fossil fuels is on top of, and far exceeds that released by ecosystem or soil degradation, or by wood or peat burning. Straightforward restoration provides essentially one-time CDR. Once ecosystems are restored, they don’t take in any more net carbon: they release it at a similar rate to which they take it in.

Such “natural” CDR could not compensate, “offset”, or make good of greenhouse gas emissions. At best it could take the edge off secondary contributions to climate change. Promises of it as an excuse, licence for novel pollution — whether as “carbon credits” to be traded, or in balancing the books — even where adequately planned and funded, is incoherent and inexcusable.

To start making a dent in carbon in the atmosphere from fossil fuels, mass carbon sequestration on a scale comparable to existing fossil fuel infrastructure would be necessary. That industry is currently ubiquitous, one of the world’s biggest industries. Mass CDR would need to be too — with major ecological side-effects.

“Geoengineering” is defined by some as “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of an environmental process that affects the earth's climate, in an attempt to counteract the effects of global warming.” It is not the best word, though it is the most common umbrella term for CDR and SRM and other things which might be better termed “climate interventions”.

Our past critiques of “geoengineering” sometimes conflated the flawed umbrella-term with SRM in particular, sometimes called “solar geoengineering”, and sometimes conflated with “Stratospheric Aerosol Injection” (SAI) within that. They were also often one-sided — combining valid concerns with overlooking the possible importance of "climate interventions" regardless of how far and how fast the burning of fossil fuels could be ended.

Whatever the term, Buck convincingly argues that any method of CDR on the kind of scale necessary to remove fossil scale quantities of CO2 from the atmosphere would count as such a "climate intervention".

Mass CDR

The most widely advocated is mass afforestation. But turning huge areas of the planet into forests that weren’t previously would be a drastic intervention into the climate, with significant repercussions. So too would another “natural” sounding method for CDR: increasing soil carbon content far and wide beyond previous.

Mass afforestation would require vast areas of land, replacing existing ecosystems, with wider ecological and weather impacts. There may be trade-offs between different methods of doing so: some would better promote and support biodiversity, others may better perform CDR. In some cases, afforestation could cause soil degradation, and a loss of soil carbon into the atmosphere. It would take some time: we can’t be sure how fast or how much it could sequester. The land use would have various implications on human activities, in particular for food production. In some cases at least, it may supplant existing ecosystems, damaging biodiversity and even endangering species. Once forests are fully grown, they would no longer absorb further net carbon — less net carbon would be removed than caused by fossil burning to date. Similar issues are raised by mass “afforestation” of kelp “forests” of seaweed or algae.

Increasing soil carbon in practice would mean turning deserts into savannas, turning savannas into the kind of “loamy” soil we’re used to in the UK. “No till”, “low till”, or other methods aiming to improve soil health would be valuable, and could sequester some net carbon. “Biochar” (more below) or other methods may also help increase soil carbon. The replacement of ecosystems in itself would have wider impacts. Deserts and savannas play a significant role in modulating global weather patterns, and are important ecosystems in their own right. How feasible it is, and how much could be removed? We don’t know. Soil ecology is complex: some research suggests that when you add biochar to soil, it sequesters less carbon, that the soil bacteria release more. Like afforestation, increasing soil carbon would at best be a one-time CDR: the soil would reach capacity, and before removing all fossil-origin carbon.

“Ocean fertilisation” uses nutrients such as iron to try to increase marine photosynthesis. Some resultant carbonates would then end up at the bottom of the ocean. This would likely deplete nutrients other than those added from marine ecosystems, increase acidity lower in the ocean, and have secondary impacts. It would take some time to bring impacts, and some research suggests that most of the carbon supposedly removed would re-enter the atmosphere after not too long.

As discussed biomass — trees, seaweed, algae, crops — removes carbon dioxide from its surroundings, as it photosynthesises and grows. These organisms build some carbon into new growth, store some as part of sugar molecules, which re-release the carbon as the sugar is used for energy. The net removal tapers off as the organism or ecosystem is fully grown. And as the organism or parts of it die, it breaks down or is eaten, and surrenders its carbon back to its environment. This is why new growth is essentially one-time CDR, with fixed capacity.

But suppose some biomass were removed from the ecosystem and its carbon stored elsewhere? New plants could then grow in the original location, sequestering yet more carbon there. The two major proposals for that are “BECCS” and “Biochar” (plus the limited and bulky long-term use of wood for construction and furniture).

“Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage” (BECCS) would seek to remove carbon from the atmosphere through growing plants such as trees, crops, or seaweed. These are then burned for energy, some of the carbon dioxide is captured (carbon capture to date captures less than 90%), and is stored (mostly underground). This means that you can carry on removing carbon once a forest has fully grown: chop the trees down and plant replacements. For speed at scale, this would require vast areas of land or ocean, as above, and there are questions about how far and how fast it would be feasible. Pumping such vast quantities of carbon dioxide underground has wider impacts. How much could be stored, and how long it would stay there, is debated.

One alternative to burning this organic matter would be to heat it at high temperatures without oxygen, leaving high-carbon liquid, gases, and solid “biochar”. “Biochar” could be used on soils, in building materials, and elsewhere. This is energy intensive, only so much biochar could be used, and it creates pollutants in the process.

Direct Air Capture (DAC) extracts CO2 directly from the air. It does not currently exist on any significant scale; it is not “proven” at scale. It would use huge quantities of energy, and perhaps a lot of certain minerals. To remove all fossil-origin CO2, it would require quantities of energy comparable to all that released by fossil fuels from before the industrial revolution began until when we stop burning them. Such gargantuan energy production as would be needed, would come at significant ecological costs. But, to clear up historic emissions after fossil fuels have been phased out, such costs may well be the lesser evil.

For the transportation and storage of carbon captured via BECCS, DAC, and other methods, we would need to repurpose the expertise, technology, and trade secrets currently to a large extent in the hands of fossil fuel corporations. We do not yet know how much carbon could be stored worldwide, nor for how long, nor what the wider longer-term impacts may be.

“Enhanced weathering” seeks to speed up certain natural processes, whereby minerals in rocks react with carbon dioxide dissolved in water, to form other minerals which will hold onto it for longer. When carbon dioxide dissolves in water, it forms carbonic acid. Most comes out again as carbon dioxide. But the acid can react with minerals in some rocks to create molecules which hold onto the carbon for longer. This is part of what is referred to by some as the “slow carbon cycle”: in the “fast carbon cycle” plants absorb carbon, which travels through the food-chain and is released again by respiration. By spreading finely ground rocks over large areas of land or into the ocean, speeding up one leg of the slow carbon cycle, carbon could theoretically be removed from the fast cycle — staying out of the atmosphere for, perhaps, millions of years.

To happen at scale would be a colossal undertaking. It would require spreading huge amounts of fine rocks over large areas of land or in the ocean. As well as the mining of rocks, the fine rock dust could be harmful if breathed in, the minerals formed could impact the ecosystems it is spread through, and it may introduce heavy metals into food. It’s not clear how feasible it would be at scale, nor how fast it could actually sequester carbon.

To summarise, there are various possible methods for large-scale CDR, those which go beyond restoration. This includes mass afforestation. None of them are “proven” for the necessary scales. All have significant ecological costs, many unknown. Each is more difficult than leaving the carbon in the ground in the first place. But some, or all, may be necessary evils to deal with historic emissions.

Even if all of these methods were pursued as far and as fast as workable, they would take some time. In the meantime, locked-in global warming would continue to force changes irreversible on a human timescale. Global temperatures would continue to be much higher than their pre-industrial average, and would continue to rise for a bit. More species would be driven into extinction and more ecosystems would degrade and collapse. Glaciers would melt and ice sheets shatter, pushing up sea levels and swallowing coastlines. People would die and suffer. All of this would be less bad with less initial emissions, and with faster removal. But even if atmospheric carbon is brought all the way back down, species will remain extinct, water won’t flow from the sea to regrow land-based icecaps, people won’t be resurrected.

Solar Radiation Modification

Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) proposals would seek to take the edge of some of these impacts, to limit global warming while atmospheric carbon is brought back down again. They would aim to decrease the energy brought into the earth as solar radiation, by increasing the quantities reflected back into space. This aims to offset the impacts of GHGs. As an IPCC report noted in 2022:

“A number of SRM options have been proposed, including: stratospheric aerosol interventions (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ground-based albedo modifications (GBAM) and ocean albedo change (OAC). Although not strictly a form of SRM, cirrus cloud thinning (CCT) has been proposed to cool the planet by increasing the escape of longwave thermal radiation to space.... SAI is the most-researched proposal. Modelling studies show SRM could reduce surface temperatures and potentially ameliorate some climate change risks (with more confidence for SAI than other options), but SRM could also introduce a range of new risks.” — IPCC

Albedo is the fraction of sunlight that is reflected by something. SAI is the most studied SRM method, followed by “Marine Cloud Brightening” (MCB). Space-based methods, such as space mirrors, are currently generally taken less seriously. Painting roofs white could have a very small offsetting impact, with larger but still limited contributions from albedo changes due to re- and afforestation. “Cirrus cloud thinning”, through attempting to disperse cirrus clouds, would aim to increase successful re-radiation of heat back into space.

There are many known and unknown negative side-effects of SAI and MCB — from disrupting weather systems and impacting ecosystems, to, in the former case, depleting the ozone layer and causing acid rain. Nonetheless it may be, now or in the future, that the impacts and risks of these technologies when administered well could be a lesser evil compared to not implementing them.

A global federation of workers’ governments would likely pursue serious research into different extents and ways of implementing SRM, and the different impacts. Given that different approaches would have significantly divergent impacts on different places and people around the world, this would likely be something which would require a particularly high and wide level of democratic engagement. It might be that the net decision would be that pursuing some forms of SRM would be the lesser evil; others may be decided against; and yet others may be abandoned because of very divergent opinions.

This would still not be sufficient to fully or mostly negate global warming’s devastating impacts. SRM could lessen those impacts, while bringing other harms. The higher the level of historic GHGs to be dealt with, the more devastation would be unavoidable.

An extremely oversimplified model of what CDR and SRM may (at best) hope to offer is shown in this graph:

Geoengineering graph

Aggressively cutting emissions is top priority, CDR is an important complement if workable, and SRM should if anything be phased in then out again to lower the peak.

Beyond SRM

There's a third, less talked about category of climate intervention, beyond CDR and SRM: interventions that try to deal with the effects of heating on a planetary scale or for ecological systems. That is, "downstream" of SRM, but "upstream" of direct, focussed, human-scale adaptations.

One set of proposals are "glacier stabilisation" attempts to slow the speed that glaciers enter the sea by various methods. This could, among other things, limit sea level rise. For example, draining water pooling under glaciers may slow their speed, or modifying their albedo may slow their melt. How viable these methods may be, and what impacts they may have, are open questions.

Another set of proposals are "assisted migration" or "ecosystem pushing". Global warming is extremely rapid on an evolutionary timescale, wiping out many ecosystems and species as they aren't able to adapt fast enough. Interventions seek to aid ecosystems in migrating to more favourable or just different climates, or to assist selection and propagation to speed up evolution and adaptation. This is currently particularly discussed for coral reefs, which are ecologically important and hit hard by ocean heating and acidification.

"Marine Cloud Brightening" when on a local scale, aiming only to preserve particular ecosystems, may arguably fit into this third type of climate intervention.

The biosphere, global and regional weather systems, and related phenomena, are incredibly complex. Human understanding of much of it, let alone predictive modelling, remains limited. Aside from any value we may see in species, ecosystems, or natural phenomena in themselves, many play crucial wider roles beyond that which we understand. Over the longer history of the earth, the evolution of many species and ecosystems have carved out slots and roles for themselves and each other in a given geological epoch, biosphere, and climatic conditions. The relative climatic stability humans have experienced can be impacted by changes not appreciated in advance, if ever. So avoiding ecosystem destruction, species extinction, and disruption to other natural phenomena has a potential importance to human wellbeing far beyond that which we may immediately recognise.

Workers' governments would surely pursue research and likely implementation of such interventions on glaciers and ecosystems.

Despite any such interventions, adaptation proper would remain necessary to a changing world, for human survival and flourishing. From defences against storms and increasing sea levels; to cities and residents relocating; to adaptation of crops, buildings, and working hours to changing heat; and beyond.

These all have major downsides: defences often leave cities more vulnerable if breached, or shift issues elsewhere. Mass organised migration has always been messy and painful: democratic and rational control of society would lessen this, but is no panacea. Some adaptations can have bad ecological impacts — cooling systems to make it easier to live and work in a warming location require significant energy inputs. Many adaptations wouldn’t work. But some adaptations would be better than none.

Take a medical analogy. A very serious alcoholic’s crisis comes to a head one night when they have binged very hard. They are taken to A&E. They need to stop drinking. They have acute alcohol poisoning, so need their stomach pumped, to remove it from their system. That’s not enough, so they are hooked up to dialysis, to filter more alcohol from their blood. With that wakeup call, they go t-total, which is difficult. But their liver is so damaged that they soon need a liver transplant. Even with all of that, they still develop chronic pancreatitis, and will have to restrict their activities to adapt to that. And yet, even with this adaptation, they still end up suffering more if they hadn’t abused alcohol so much or for so long.

The earth is that alcoholic. As things get worse, the interventions further down that list become more necessary. But the fact that these interventions are, or may be, possible, would be no reason to carry on bingeing or drinking, to push back stopping even further.

Class society

The problem, of course, is that we don’t yet have a global federation of workers’ states: nor is workers' revolution close, anywhere. Neither are the humans of this planet the brain of a single human being, with the capacity for rational collective decision-making.

We cannot have, as Mike Hulme puts it, “a view from nowhere, ...a metaphorical cockpit for Spaceship Earth in which benign and wise experts manipulate the planetary controls for the betterment of humanity.” We need to take into account political considerations, and class forces. To simply consider the — indispensable — scientific and technological considerations and draw conclusions divorced from the political, economic, social context would be technocratic.

It is worth emphasising that almost nowhere is the radical argument for the potential need for climate interventions, sketched in the section above, made. Despite statements which might imply otherwise, IPCC modelling, and official planning to meet climate targets, relies significantly on mass CDR or "negative emissions technology". Targets such as 1.5-2°C, or previously 350ppm CO2 or 1°C, were formulated as compromises given assumptions of continued capitalism-as-usual, and the needs both for "cost effectiveness" and for avoiding infringing on either the rights and power of corporations or economic orthodoxy. It has become increasingly clear that the steps necessary to limit warming to 1.5-2°C are not being taken, and the necessary steps to do so only get harder with every delay. Promises of speculative CDR methods are offered as more "cost effective" ways of continuing to meet — or pay lip service to — those goals than rapidly phasing out fossil fuels.

Even left proponents of climate interventions often set CDR against future, ongoing (residual or other) emissions. Reducing processes, such as burning fossil fuels, which add net GHGs to the atmosphere, and pursuing processes which seek to remove net carbon from the atmosphere, should both be done as fast as possible. Neither will be done adequately to avert many horrific disasters. So the former should not be set against the latter, they should be pursued independently. You would not say to the patient hooked up to dialysis and at risk of (further) brain damage, that they can have a shot of vodka for every litre of their blood processed, even if, numerically the latter would "offset" the former.

The psychological impacts of "risk compensation" can apply even to those who recognise and seek to guard against the phenomenon. Few would argue explicitly that seatbelts justify driving less carefully, but wearers nonetheless do. Reassurance encourages recklessness even though they don't reduce the risk to those outside the car, and even if a driver's seatbelt, unknowingly, is defective and so does not hold. That said, few argue against seatbelts on this basis.

On the other side, left critics of such CDR proposals and other interventions point out that we could and must end fossil fuels and emissions rapidly, rather than kicking the can down the road. On top of that, they generally argue that we could meet climate targets simply by doing so, with the implication that what can be achieved that way is acceptable, adequately ambitious. It isn't. Some do advocate or recognise the need for "nature-based" CDR, but generally vastly overstate its capacity.

Some dismissal of CDR and other climate interventions, or of CDR beyond the more "natural" solutions of "restoration" or "rewilding", comes from valid but one-sided recognition of the problems and limitations of these interventions, overlooking the impacts of not intervening. But some is motivated by a less grounded suspicion of technology in itself — as opposed to how it is used — that is significant factor on the left, and the ecological left in particular. "Primitivist" currents go beyond apt criticism of industrial capitalism, of inequality and pollution in contemporary cities; beyond valuable appreciation of nature and respect for indigenous people and subsistence farmers, hunters, and gathers, and their rights. These currents idealise and yearn for a fictionalised understanding of a hunter-gatherer existence, sometimes offensively so, and at an extreme call for a nihilist destruction of civilisation, industrial society, and all technology from agriculture onwards. As well as dismissal of geoengineering, this leads many to blanket oppose nuclear power, even when the immediate impact is more coal power.

We must denounce attempts to dilute emissions reduction plans or aims on the grounds of CDR or SRM. This includes talk of “carbon offsets”, “carbon markets”, and schemes to meet certain climate goals which rely heavily on CDR or SRM. Such attempts to water down climate ambitions are widespread.

Nonetheless, we cannot simply oppose all CDR, SRM, or other climate interventions, for the reasons explained above.

We must support and demand attempts at “restoration” (or "rewilding") of forests, peatland, soil health, other land and ocean ecosystems — for the multiple benefits covered above.

We should advocate a massive programme of critical and cross-disciplinary research and development into different CDR methods. This should be funded by taxing the rich, through public institutions with democratic oversight. All research should be open access, and unpatented. It needs to involve critical research to document the limitations (and over-selling of promises) that many CDR proposals have in terms of their carbon sequestration potential, and also the often serious ecological and human side-effects.

We cannot trust private capital to do the necessary research and development, nor to be transparent about the possibilities and damaging side-effects.

We support mass afforestation, and should continue to do so (though not as an alternative to other CDR methods). It should be done in the least ecologically damaging way workable: supporting biodiverse ecosystems rather than monocrops, preserving as far as possible rather than degrading soil health. We must recognise that it inescapably brings problems. We must also recognise the impacts that such widespread land-use would have on humans, in particular on food production. Methods such as "forest farming" may allow some food production to be combined with CDR and with promotion of biodiversity — but with trade-offs in each.

We have long recognised the ability of the ruling class to screw up something which seems good on paper, to make bad from a good idea. The biggest really existing bioenergy plant in the UK, Drax, even with proposed CCS, is not “net negative”, but seriously harmful. Ancient North American forest is clearcut, which cannot easily regrow, plus brings extra releases of carbon via soil degradation. It’s then brought across the ocean on fossil-powered ships. Without changing how they source their fuel, Drax will remain ecologically destructive, even if their pilot CCS schemes become fully active and scaled up. We cannot offer blank support to “BECCS”. On the other hand, we cannot generalise from one destructive “BECCS” scheme to blanket opposition to “BECCS”. BECCS, if done in a more rational way, may still offer CDR, or failing that a low-carbon energy source.

Drax's worse-than-useless implementation of BE(CCS) is not accidental. Currently, biofuel and bioenergy are driven by the profit motive. The incentive is to acquire biomass to burn as cheaply as possible. The "green" incentive is to tick certain boxes, allowing government subsidies, the selling of carbon credits, or a "green" image. Even if tightened up, boxes, subsidies, or 1-dimensional carbon credits could not hope to capture the complexity of environmental considerations. What is needed is democratic decision making in which the multifaceted environmental considerations are centre-stage. As it stands, it is possible for companies to advertise themselves and receive money for supposed green credentials, while actually carrying out ecocidal activities.

Such issues plague all forms of CDR under capitalism. As sketched above, even if done well there are various potential ecological and human downsides to each CDR method, and many may not even draw down any net carbon, or may not when done badly. Driven by the desire to present as sequestering carbon as cheaply as possible, the incentive is to dishonestly big-up how much is sequestered, and ignore other human and ecological costs.

Monocrop afforestation may replace ecosystems and drive land grabs, degrading soil and leading to net increases of atmospheric CO2. But on paper it may be sellable as CDR, and so profitable — and more lucrative than healthier afforestation. Ocean fertilisation may cause algal blooms, devastate ecosystems, and not work — but it may offer quick carbon-credit cash. Enhanced weathering may be cheap and profitable in the global south, where it may poison the lungs of workers and locals, poison the soil it is spread on, and may even not work. The profit motive spurs companies to pursue it anyway and big it up.

DAC is sold as green, as offering net carbon sequestration, but in a context where a majority of world energy production — and a growing amount — is from fossil fuels, at scale DAC is generally useless or worse. Even if "powered by renewables", if those renewables could instead power something else, supplanting fossil fuels burned, that would be better. DAC requires more energy to recapture the CO2 released by burning coal or oil than was generated by burning the coal or oil in the first place. Better to use less energy and burn less of them. And all this before even considering the carbon and ecological impacts of either the chemicals used in the DAC machines or the attempts to store vast quantities of carbon. But accounting needn't capture all the above. Or, indeed, the human cost of pushing up energy prices. DAC may be more useful once fossil fuels have been phased out globally, or in isolated local regions where surplus energy cannot be exported. Research now may be useful to those ends.

On top of all of these hidden ecological costs and dishonest accounting current CDR is generally pursued for "carbon offsetting", as part of "carbon markets", to be sold as "carbon credits" or the like. Even if the CDR functions well, this is used to license ongoing pollution: so is little better than useless, and often worse than.

As more research and development is done, the labour movement should evaluate different CDR methods and intervene accordingly. That may, for example, mean drawing up plans for the least harmful and most effective workable mass CDR methods, and demanding implementation. In our present state as a small revolutionary propaganda group, we cannot substitute for that, nor should we try. The labour movement, environmental movement, and left should not dodge difficult questions. But working-class agency remains key, and without it to breathe life into environmental aspirations, even the best sketched programmes for halting and reversing climate chaos will remain aspirations, existing only on paper. It is also necessary to recognise the limitations to our expertise, and the limited existing expertise of anyone, on many of these questions. I have personal opinions on which forms of CDR currently seem more promising, which seem more damaging. But aside from the broadest of brushstrokes, it would be presumptive and premature to make demands in great detail.

“Carbon Capture (Usage) and Storage”, CCS/CCUS, is sometimes incorrectly seen as a form of CDR, for sequestering or drawing down carbon. It isn’t. In itself it doesn’t remove carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere, it just prevents a proportion of carbon dioxide created by a given process from entering the atmosphere. A coal-fired power station with CCS still emits a lot of carbon dioxide, just (theoretically at least) less than it would without CCS, as some of that created is stored (or used). BECCS, if done well, promises to deliver net CDR through sequestration when the plants and biomass are grown and photosynthesise. The CCS, by reducing the net (re)emissions when the biomass is harvested and burned, aims to keep them below the amount that was sequestered in the first place, allowing net sequestration.

CCS does not make good of the burning of fossil fuels. In itself we do not oppose it, but it does not lessen the urgency or importance of demanding the end to fossil fuel use.

Really existing “Carbon Capture”, aside from often being used to license further pollution, is very often used for “Enhanced Oil Recovery”, pumped underground to squeeze out more oil, with additional ecological problems on top of the further emissions released. We must unconditionally oppose EOR.

We'd need to take on the fossil fuel and energy companies, and big agriculture, to implement many of these things at scale.

We have written much on adaptation. For the third subcategory of climate interventions — glacier stabilisation, ecosystem pushing, assisted migration, etc. — the considerations vary case-to-case and technology-by-technology. But in general the approach we may need to take is likely more analogous to CDR than SRM. Many approaches will be invaluable if done well, but could well be done badly. Much of it would need widespread coordination, and consideration of conflicting considerations.

Class and SRM

There are many known and unknown negative side-effects to SAI and to MCB. These are laid out in "The Big Bad Fix", and the books by Hulme, Kolbert, and Buck (et al), and elsewhere, and are well worth consideration — though I won't reproduce them here. Nonetheless it may be, now or in the future, that the impacts and risks of these or other SRM technologies administered well could be a lesser evil compared to not implementing them.

The impacts of SAI and MCB are variable beyond on or off, beyond one-dimensional extent of SRM. Depending on where it is deployed and other technical details, it could be done to (aim to be) very beneficial to certain interests or geographic areas, while devastating to others. This could be very contested, leading to conflicts over whether to deploy SRM, how much, where, and how (with what impacts). As the 2022 IPCC report put it:

“The effects of SRM fundamentally depend on a variety of choices about deployment, including: its position in the portfolio of human responses to climate change, governance of research and potential deployment strategies, and technical details. The plausibility of many SRM scenarios is highly contested, and not all scenarios are equally plausible because of socio-political considerations, as with, for example, CDR. Development of scenarios and their selection in assessments should reflect a diverse set of societal values with public and stakeholder inputs, as depending on the focus of a limited climate model simulation, SRM could look grossly risky or highly beneficial...”

Much early interest in such types of climate interventions was military. In the current global geopolitical context, large-scale SRM interventions may very likely be used to (attempt to) further particular national and class interests, for geopolitical or military gain. See Hulme for a useful exploration of this. (Even the book Hulme is a reply to, the useful though limited and SRM-focussed A Case for Climate Engineering by David Keith, recognises this and many other draw-backs besides.) This could cause significant harm in itself. It would also potentially cause great instability in the implementation of such interventions, with competing attempts at different interventions and prevention of. That in turn could have devastating climate impacts.

Aside from the risks in SRM itself, if mass SRM is started but then stops suddenly, this could cause "termination shock". The suppressed heating impacts from greenhouse gases could lead to very significant warming at an even faster pace. This would push some ecosystems over the edge and may cause other devastation beyond that which might have been caused by the same warming over a longer time period. SRM is something which would need to be phased up, and then down again. The timescale would need to be many decades at least, and is normally modelled for in excess of a century.

The last century, from 1923 to now, does not inspire confidence in the kind of political stability and long-sightedness that would be necessary to implement such a huge and long-lasting intervention. Marxists have a good understanding of the instabilities and chaos built into the cell-structure of capitalism. The difficulties in negotiations would be significantly more complex than those to date over reducing emissions, in which the direction of ecological necessity — reducing greenhouse gas emissions — is clear and mostly one-dimensional. In an age with the rise of the nationalist right, the prospect seems even more fantastic. Conspiracy theories, isolationism, aggressively nationalist geopolitical ambitions, conflict, and cost-cutting considerations: each could have significant impacts on states' approaches to SRM (and all climate interventions). Climate change continuing to bite will not improve political stability.

The flooding of the atmosphere with greenhouse gases at an increasing rate over the last couple of centuries is, arguably, an accidental analogue to "geoengineering", to SRM. The choice then is not, so some argue, between "geoeningeering" and not. The choice is between accidental Solar Radiation Modification, and accidental SRM mitigated by countervailing deliberate SRM. Such a presentation risks oversimplifying the technical and political complexities.

We're used to "global temperature" being a measure of how hard climate change is biting. On a computer screen, for different global models, this estimated current or future metric can seem like a simple one-dimensional slider. Good is the pre-industrial average temperature, zero degrees above it; bad is it being slid upwards. Currently it is 1.1°C above, and we want to stop pushing up the thermostat within the even worse range of 1.5-2.0°C. Higher still would be worse yet. To first approximation that is correct. But the global climate system isn't a room with a simple temperature control system, where we can just turn the thermostat back down, turning off the radiator and turning on the air con. It is much more complex, more analogous to tinkering with a living organism full of positive and negative feedback loops, delicate and volatile parts. As David Keith, researcher and proponent of SRM put it:

"Climate change from carbon dioxide cannot be so accurately offset because the radiative forcing by carbon dioxide is qualitatively different from radiative forcing by geoengineering. The positive radiative forcing from increased carbon dioxide, for example, acts during both day and night, whereas the negative forcing from reduced sunlight acts only in daylight. If one warms the climate up by adding carbon dioxide, one can cool it down to the original temperature by selecting the appropriate amount of geoengineering, but the resulting climate will have warmer nights and cooler days than the original unperturbed climate."

"The same line of argument applies to the seasonal cycle because carbon dioxide’s warming is felt about equally in summer and winter whereas cooling from geoengineering is strongest in summer when solar heating is most intense."

There are many other differences, besides. Plants use sunlight, not heat, for photosynthesis. SRM, reducing sunlight and hence photosynthesis, may cause impacts to cascade through ecosystems. The increased GHGs that the SRMs seek to abate would not mitigate the latter's impact here. It would also impact human ability to harness solar energy: whether solar photovoltaic, concentrated solar power, or solar thermal.

The history of medicine is full of treatments which sound good on paper but in practice don't work, have devastating side-effects, or are more complex than expected in other ways. There's a reason treatments are extensively tested in increasing equivalents to the real world situation before being rolled out. The "precautionary principle" in medical practice is well-founded. Take a folk treatment, one widely and self-medicated treatment for sleeping issues: an alcoholic nightcap. Drinking can make you drowsy, and can help you fall asleep. So it should be a good cure for insomnia? Not so simple. It may help you to fall asleep, but often disrupts sleep later in the night, causing wider tiredness, and — if done to excess, every day — with bad knock-on impacts.

Politically, SRM is more complicated still. With limiting greenhouse gases, everyone is agreed on the direction we must go: globally, there is basically one dimension. Less greenhouse gases emitted is better, more greenhouse gases sequestered is better. But SRM isn't as simple as an equivalent; no X quantity of SRM is simply identical in impact to Y quantity of CDR. How it is implemented will shape the details of regional and global impacts. That brings the political "governance" issues sketched above.

The risks with SRM of "termination shock" and the need for tight international coordination have no close equivalent in the limiting or removing of greenhouse gases. Ideally the phasing out of fossil fuels would happen as fast as workable everywhere, continuously, followed by widespread and rapid CDR. There is arguably, between states, what some call "the free-rider problem" with GHG emissions. But if a state, or indeed the whole world, were to start a rapid reduction in GHG emissions, in fossil fuels burned, and then were to suddenly stop, that would undoubtedly be better than if they hadn't started. Emissions would continue initially from the level they were when the reduction stopped, i.e. considerably lower than they had been or would have been without reduction. Indeed, even if policies were for some strange reason rapidly reversed, so that emissions returned past what they had been to what they would have been with no intervening reduction, the reduction in emissions in those intervening years would nonetheless result in less net carbon in the atmosphere. There is no "termination shock" from decarbonisation policies.

Or suppose, for example, that between three different climate policies, the UK's emissions in the coming years could increase, could stay the same, or could decrease. Suppose, too, that unbeknownst to us now, the USA will continue pumping out carbon at an increasing rate for decades to come. The USA's emissions would remain bad, regardless of the UK policy; the UK pursuing maximum emissions reductions would remain good, regardless of known or unknown continued USA pollution.

Research, and profit motives

Considerations of immediate financial cost in implementation often play a central role in considerations of different types of SRM and climate interventions, in much research and writing. For capitalist states, such factors may be decisive in making particular interventions — arguably including SAI, which is cheaper upfront than MCB — seem more attractive. But there is plenty of wealth in the bank accounts of the wealthy! The wider human and ecological costs, including in the longer-term and on the world's poorest, are more important than cost effectiveness. We cannot trust judgements made, as so often, on the latter basis.

Research into the negative impacts of CDR and in particular SRM has so far been very limited in scope. Several factors contribute to this. The funding model for research in universities, the world over, increasingly relies on external sources. Those interested in CDR and SRM research — whether carried out in universities or privately — include many who have particular interests. Fossil fuel companies, automobile companies, or billionaire techno-optimists, for example, want the promises from these interventions, to permit continued pollution. They and others engaged in development of these technologies see selling them, or for CDR selling credits reaped from them, as a potentially profitable venture. Schneider and Fuhr argue (ch. 4) that "[f]ive incumbent industries can be identified that stand to profit from geoengineering in particular: fossil fuels, agrochemicals, mining, the aerospace defence complex, and big data." This is on top of those who gain from watering-down commitments, or may gain from future investments in the technologies.

Negative research cuts against all those interests.

I think Schneider and Fuhr significantly overstate the impact of future profit possibilities for those five industries, and simplistic "military/medical/prison/X-industrial complex" thinking often flattens complex sociopolitical and economic driving forces in capitalism. All these industries can chase huge immediate profits in the here and now, against which far-off speculative prospects of SRM pale into insignificance. Additionally, acquiring funding for speculative technologies can often be done on the basis of spin, and lucratively without actually carrying it out (think decades of talk of self-driving cars, green aeroplanes, the metaverse). Finally, SRM isn't something which makes a directly vendable good: profit would be down to privately procurement of government-funded schemes.

While it is true that negative research is particularly lacking, and the profit motive cannot be trusted to motivate rounded research, so far there has just been relatively little research in general. That's a problem.

From the other side, many who are more critical of "geoengineering" fear that researching its impacts somehow legitimates it, so avoid doing the research (a not wholly ungrounded fear). The biggest researcher advocates of climate interventions reportedly tend to come from particular sub-disciplines, so others are underrepresented. This leads to unbalanced and simplified assessments of SRM's impacts.

Even without deliberately favouring particular national interests the fact that most of the research, and most of the data that that research uses, originates in the richer countries in the world brings some built in bias.

Different class interests also imply different relations to the kind of risks SRM brings. Suppose SRM's projections and positive impacts hold good on a global level, but have very bad impacts in particular regions. Capital, the ruling class, and their wealthy hangers on generally find it much easier to relocate than people in the exploited classes. Additionally, the wealthy are better able to weather particular crises, and so take risks of crises in their strides. Risks deemed acceptable for the ruling class may not be for us.

SAI in particular can only be researched and modelled so far without some degree of implementation. There hasn't been enough modelling, or critical modelling to date. But local and computer modelling aren't sufficient to accurately evaluate SAI's impacts. In medical R&D, tests in cells and computer modelling are vital. But so are tests on wide numbers of subjects: animals and humans. Sometimes it goes wrong, but statistically, it can be evaluated overall. We don't have test earths, we only have one: even with major SRM over many years, distinguishing its impact from background climatic "noise" will be difficult. But more research could help reduce risks.

On top of this, research, even if not to be deployed, may arguably be helping to develop dangerous military and geopolitical weapons. This provides difficulties not just in potential deployment, but in research.

On the other hand, less research may not, in time, mean less deployment. It may instead mean more blind deployment.

On balance, and especially given our political aims to win democratic rule by the working-class, I’d argue that we should advocate a massive programme of cross-disciplinary and critical research of "solar radiation modification" and other such climate interventions (for now, SRM "phase" 1, theory and laboratory; and 2, "local" tests in atmosphere). Particular emphasis should be placed here on researching side-effects and negative impacts. We cannot trust private capitalists to direct such research; nor to fund adequate research. We should demand that it be carried out with democratic oversight, in public institutions, transparently with open access. 

We do not want any industry around SRM to develop driven either by corporate profit, or around furthering the interest of particular states or groups of states. Our general opposition to intellectual property applies in that sense here. Developments should not be patented or closely guarded in a way which seeks to further the interests of either corporate profit or particular states. On the other hand we shouldn’t relish an expansion and sharing out of additional potential military powers, with the military possibilities facilitated by weather control; nor empowering any old maverick state or billionaire to start SRM on their own.

If mass SRM was carried out by private companies, this would — as even SRM champions recognise — create another group of people with a compelling profit motive to encourage more expansive and long-running SRM, and reliance upon it.

Learning from our traditions?

SRM is not likely to be seriously attempted in the very near future (aside from on a research scale, "phase" 1 and 2, or at a push 3 — minimal global deployment for research only). Nor, with the current level of research, would it be correct to demand it.

But what do we say of technical interventions on a potentially global scale or with global consequences, which may be the lesser evil if done well, but which we have no trust in a world of competing capitalist states to implement well, and for which there is currently so much technical complexity and uncertainty that we cannot currently reasonably hope to make detailed prescriptions?

With such thorny political questions in particular, it can be important and useful to consider what our movement and tradition has said and done in the past, to take inspiration from it when it was larger and more powerful, and from its greatest thinkers. We see ourselves as in a tradition that we trace through “heterodox (third camp) Trotskyism”.

Obviously until recently the exact issues of SRM haven’t confronted our tradition. What partial equivalents may there be? We must bear in mind, of course, that politics by analogy is severely limited: ultimately we must deal with the concrete facing us.

Military questions, questions of war — potentially global-scale war — within a world of competing capitalist states, perhaps. Our movement has often analysed competing forces without simply seeing our job as deciding upon what would be the lesser evil between different bourgeois policies or victors and supporting the lesser evil accordingly. There are clearly many differences between war and SAI/SRM, so we shouldn’t take this analogy too far.

Note that I’m not making the more common analogies between climate crises and war. Some look to the methods of capitalist states in the emergency of the second world war: the taking of more direct control of the means of production, and the other drastic economic and social measures. The climate crisis, so it is suggested, is an issue of comparable importance and urgency, and must be treated similarly. While we recognise the urgency and importance of curbing ecological catastrophe, and we support great incursions into the wealth and control of capitalists, that is not our model. Andreas Malm, it seems, attempts to give a more left-sounding gloss on the same theme. He talks of “war communism”, desperate policies of an isolated and impoverished workers state in Russia facing civil war and invasion. But Malm has no hope of workers’ revolution, and does not look to workers as the agent. Instead, he advocates that bourgeois states ape weapons originally forged by an exploited majority against an exploiting and counter-revolutionary minority. It is as confused, reactionary, and authoritarian as it is reformist.

A few perhaps relevant approaches sketched below:

1) Against those who advocated that Trotskyists sided with some imperial powers for military/geopolitical tactical considerations, Trotsky (1939) wrote:

“We are not a government party; we are the party of irreconcilable opposition… . Our tasks... we realize not through the medium of bourgeois governments... but exclusively through the education of the masses through agitation, through explaining to the workers what they should defend and what they should overthrow. Such a “defense” cannot give immediate miraculous results. But we do not even pretend to be miracle workers. As things stand, we are a revolutionary minority. Our work must be directed so that the workers on whom we have influence should correctly appraise events, not permit themselves to be caught unawares, and prepare the general sentiment of their own class for the revolutionary solution of the tasks confronting us.”

“Only those methods are permissible which do not conflict with the interests of the revolution. … A tactic is subordinated to a strategic goal and in no case can be in contradiction to the latter.”

There are plenty of wars, or threatened wars, in which we analyse the situation and consider certain outcomes as preferable to others, or of different elements requiring different critiques. That does not oblige us to advocate or even defend direct military intervention by bigger imperialist states. We don’t even advocate sending arms to the “side” we support in every case, though sometimes we do. We rightly have — and preach — no trust in the imperialist powers or often the involved capitalist states to intervene in a way which doesn’t make things worse.

With SRM there are issues of international “governance”, the potential for it to be used to further particular aims against others, to even escalate into conflict. We may well consider, at least for certain technologies, in certain contexts, that we must similarly preach no trust.

2) In May 1940, Trotsky's “Manifesto of the Fourth International on Imperialist War and the Imperialist War” opposed the war. But it critiqued “pacifism”, not — so far as I can see — because of supporting one side of the war against another (e.g. against the Nazis). Rather, as a means of organising towards international social revolution, he advocated state funded military training in connection with trade unions. (Subsection: “Workers must learn military arts”.) I think there’s much wrong with the document, and it came the month after a split in the American Trotskyists, in which Trotsky sided, wrongly, with what we’d call the “orthodox” Trotskyists, in the SWP (USA, no relation).

If we wanted to take inspiration from this, a (very tenuous) equivalence to Trotsky's demands might be demands for any research into SRM to be under the oversight of trade unions, or at least to be disseminated to the workers.

3) That September, the month after Trotsky’s death, the orthodox Trotskyists adopted a “Resolution on Proletarian Military Policy” (PMP), This, as Sean Matgamna put it in The Fate of the Russian Revolution Vol. 2:

““telescoped”, so that they would be “carried out simultaneously”, the tasks of defeating Hitler’s fascism and those of overthrowing the US bourgeoisie… It would no longer oppose conscription, as it had done up to then… . Rather, it would support military training but demand that it be done under the control of the trade unions, and that union-run, government-financed schools for officers be set up. This was, the Orthodox said, the extension into military affairs of the daily struggle of the unions in the factories with the bosses. In fact it was a proposal that the trade unions contend with the government for control of the army. So they would back the USA in the war against fascism? No, they explained. It was an inter-imperialist, not an anti-fascist, war. The ruling class could not properly wage an anti-fascist war or be trusted with doing so.

“In practice the shift meant that the Orthodox dropped their once-vociferous opposition to conscription and softened their opposition to the war into one of de-facto political acquiescence, but with the caveat of a “demand” for trade-union controls that could not possibly be realised without an advanced state of dual power in the country and in the armed forces. In the SWP’s daily reality, what was left was acquiescence in the war, with big caveats, and glorying in the victories of the USA’s ally Russia.”

Sean, and the heterodox Trotskyists of the time, were right to be heavily critical of the PMP.

But if we were to try to take inspiration from it, perhaps a call would be, in the face of proposed or actual SRM, to support research into SRM and some implementation of SRM, but questions of what SRM and how to be under the control of trade unions.

4) Aside from general limitations of the war analogy, the above situations are limited in similarity to SRM in that they are questions of how socialists should relate to existing conflicts. Solar Radiation Modification on the other hand is not currently happening, nor are there any plans for it: but it may be good if done well.

Perhaps a better, though crude analogy can be found in Lenin arguing for support for anti-colonial wars even in a world of big imperialisms (emphasis in all Lenin quotes in original):

Junius is quite right in emphasising the decisive influence of the “imperialist background” of the present war…

But it would be a mistake to exaggerate this truth; to depart from the Marxian rule to be concrete; to apply the appraisal of the present war to all wars that are possible under imperialism; to lose sight of the national movements against imperialism. The only argument that can be used in defence of the thesis... is that the world has been divided up among a handful of “Great” imperialist powers, and, therefore, every war, even if it starts as a national war, is transformed into an imperialist war...

The fallacy of this argument is obvious. Of course... there is not a single phenomenon which cannot under certain conditions be transformed into its opposite. A national war [for self-determination] can be transformed into an imperialist war, and vice versa…

Only a sophist would deny that there is a difference between imperialist war and national war on the grounds that one can be transformed into the other. ...

The national liberation politics of the colonies will inevitably be continued by national wars of the colonies against imperialism. Such wars may lead to an imperialist war between the present “Great” imperialist Powers or they may not; that depends on many circumstances. ...

[W]hen people argue haphazardly that a war waged by a small state against a giant state is hopeless, we must say that a hopeless war is war nevertheless, and, moreover, certain events within the “giant” states — for example, the beginning of a revolution — may transform a “hopeless” war into a very “hopeful” one.

SRM is not "anti-colonial" but if done well, it could be good. Lenin here is politically better than the comrades in (2) or (3) are being. One analogy here would be that with SRM we should relate to concrete specific proposals, rather than endorsement or opposition of abstract generalities. In some cases, the positive climatic impact would be significant, and the potentially imperialist aspect not significant, and we could support that intervention. In others, the furthering of particular geopolitical goals would be the overriding consideration for Marxists, who should oppose the given intervention.

5) Further, on anti-colonial struggles, Lenin recognises that there are other considerations, and that we should retain our critical facilities towards those who often advocate and fight for it:

"But insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for its own bourgeois nationalism, we stand against. We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation."

Perhaps I stretch this analogy too far. But we could support SRM in concrete situations, while remaining critical of how the bourgeois institutions carrying it out will probably do it, and remaining critical of most champions of it.

In one concrete current war, we support Ukraine's war of national self-determination against Russian imperialism, while criticising many things the Ukrainian government is doing, and supporting the Ukrainian left and workers' movement against the government. We call on Western governments to arm Ukraine, while warning that we can have no trust in these governments, who may among other things aim in future to force Ukraine to make concessions to Russia for peace. We call on Western governments to give Ukraine the arms it has been demanding and needs to win the war, which is more than to date. We do that while recognising the risks of escalated international conflict that a defeat of Putin's Russia may bring. We oppose direct military intervention of wider powers in the war; and if it did break out into a wider inter-imperialist war, we would call for an end to the war.

There are no current concrete proposals for SRM implementation, with the actors to carry it out as well as the technical details planned.

6) Some seek to consider SRM through the lens of "national self-determination".

That is an important principle for Marxists. We support the right of nations to self-determination, even where we disagree with particular choices. We support the right of small nations to self-determination, even against the wishes of larger ones. We support the right of Scotland, of the people within Scotland, to opt for "independence" from the rest of the UK. We support their right to hold a referendum, and for the results of that referendum to be carried out. We do so even though we oppose Scottish independence; we campaigned and would campaign for a "no" vote to independence. We support their right for unilateral independence: England, Wales, and Northern Ireland should have no right to veto such a referendum or decision, even though the majority of the UK's population is in England.

How would national self-determination relate to SRM?

As a global programme which will impact everywhere, does that mean that every nation has a right to opt out of it? Which means in fact that every nation has a veto? While we should surely place great value on many different perspectives, such a principle would in reality almost certainly mean that SRM will never be implemented, even if the vast majority of people support it. Don't other nations have a right to shield themselves from the worst impacts of global warming, i.e. implement SRM?

With a clash of "right against right", does this take us back to some majoritarian world view? Surely that must be some consideration, but with very strong opposition from a significant minority, a global SRM programme would likely be so unstable as to be potentially unworkable.

All in all, I think this abstract principle of national self-determination can only take us so far on SRM questions. It is not quite an absolutist principle, applicable mechanically in every case. It also is a consideration reasonably far from the here-and-now. Lenin again:

"The several demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but only a small part of the general-democratic (now: general-socialist) world movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected. It is possible that the republican movement in one country may be merely an instrument of the clerical or financial-monarchist intrigues of other countries; if so, we must not support this particular, concrete movement, but it would be ridiculous to delete the demand for a republic from the programme of international Social-Democracy on these grounds."

"[N]o democratic demand can fail to give rise to abuses, unless the specific is subordinated to the general; we are not obliged to support either “any” struggle for independence or “any” republican or anti-clerical movement. Secondly, no formula for the struggle against national oppression can fail to suffer from the same "shortcoming"."

7) What about bourgeois treaties seeking to provide international governance of SRM, and its research? We have long been critical of institutions such as the UN or IPCC (§2C.27) in their ability to carry out the laudable claims they claim to aim for. That does not mean we oppose the existence of them. Trotsky, 1934, wrote:

“...Against the politics of imperialist blocs, against the pacifist lie of the League of Nations, against the secret diplomacy of the war and the madness of armaments! Throughout the aged European continent, divided, militarized, bloodstained, threatened with total destruction by a new war, we raise the only banner of liberation, that of the Workers’ and Peasants’ United States of Europe, the fraternal Federation of Soviet States!”

8) There may be other better analogies than war, more persuasive arguments and angles, that some readers may suggest.

John Bellamy Foster critiques "geoengineering" through (arguably selective) reading of Marx and Engels, building upon metabolic rift theory, ideas about meaning of and human relation to "nature", critiques of "prometheanism", etc. While there is some value in these critiques, I believe they don't engage adequately with the political and thorny practical questions at hand. Kohei Saito, too, starts from similar themes, and builds critique or rejection of geoengineering upon it.

Some tentative suggestions on SRM implementation

We demand more research, as outlined above. Even if we may in the end only trust workers' states to implement SRM, research now would be valuable for that later use.

We should oppose (beyond research scale) unilateral implementation of SRM, by any capitalist state or corporation, or small group of them. (That is, oppose unilateral actual if gradual deployment — phase 4; and probably oppose unilateral "phase 3" global-scale research.)

We should not trust bourgeois international treaties and institutions to effectively manage SRM. We should not oppose all such treaties, and indeed some are positive (though some currently may even be too strong). But they cannot be relied upon.

In the near future, in response to any concrete proposals or attempts to start large scale SRM (phase 4), we must criticise its problems: insufficient research, specific impacts, and the rest. We must reaffirm that at best it is palliative. We should preach a lack of trust in the world’s competing ruling classes to plan or carry it out well. We should however not simply blanket oppose it. Nor could we actively endorse or support it without significant qualifications.

That said, it does not seem likely that there will be serious attempts in the near future for phase 4 SRM. Even if, in the near future, research, development, and understanding of impacts get to the point where starting phase 4 SRM may be the lesser evil, it seems likely it wouldn't be started anyway. Capitalist governments may deem it too economically or politically costly, at least without significant pressure on them. At such a point, the labour movement campaigning for it to be started, with qualifications and criticisms, may be the best course of action. (It may reach a point that even SRM carried out by untrustworthy and unstable actors — the world's capitalist governments — would seem the lesser risk compared to no SRM.)

We aren't there yet. Immediately, more research is the most important demand the labour movement should be making, as outlined above. We'll surely have to re-evaluate new situations and proposals in the future. After a revolution, we'll be in a different situation. But before the revolution, as we fight to transform and rebuild the labour movement, and win it to fighting for ecological and social transformation, we organise for it to evaluate SRM and intervene accordingly. For that, and for immediately posed questions, engaging with the debates technically and politically is important. But we shouldn't seek to be "experts" on SRM, rather we organise for the labour movement to take informed leadership in campaigning on SRM.

As more research and development is done, the labour movement internationally should evaluate different SRM methods. It should engage with peasant, indigenous, environmental and other movements, and scientists, and seek to formulate positions or demands around SRM. This might mean opposing certain proposals, supporting others, proposing modified combinations of different proposals, or other approaches. We should organise to make that happen.

Comments

We've had and will have several discussions on these topics, with the below as readings. Get in touch if you want to join one.

“Geoengineering” is an umbrella term that few think is ideal, but is nonetheless widely (and inconsistently) used: defined by some as “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of an environmental process that affects the earth's climate, in an attempt to counteract the effects of global warming.” This includes carbon drawdown (sequestration), solar radiation management (primarily stratospheric aerosol injection), and various other proposals.

Please read at least this article on “geoengineering”. You may also like to read this draft motion.

See this review of two books on the topic: Holly Jean Buck’s After Geoengineering and Elizabeth Kolbert’s Under a White Sky. In a previous reading group, we discussed both, alongside the more critical publication, The Big Bad Fix. See also this review of Has It Come to This? edited by J. P. Sapinski, Holly Jean Buck, and Andreas Malm. Mike Hulme’s Can Science Fix Climate Change? is also a valuable critical text.

If you can read some or all of the five publications themselves, please do. If you can only read one, read one of the Buck’s; if only two, add Hulme’s. If you need help accessing these publications, get in touch.

There are a series of short articles on linked topics that would also useful to read: on CCS/CCUS (here and here), which plays a role in some proposed carbon drawdown schemes; as does biofuel and BECCS; carbon drawdown often comes up in discussions about “carbon offsetting” and related things, such as carbon markets (here, a reply to the previous article, plus here) and many schemes for net zero. Adaptation is relevant because some similar issues are posed (responding to already existing carbon emissions), and because prospects for each impact the other.

Extracts from previous conference documents are collated here, along with an additional comment.

There are more articles for additional reading and reference on all of these different things in “further reading”, if you like.

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