Why isn’t Hamas like the Algerian FLN?

Black and white photo showing FLN troops standing in a line next to the Algerian flag.

The Algerian nationalist movement, the Front de Libération Nationale, (FLN), from the beginning of its military campaign (1954-62) launched terrorist attacks on civilian as well as military targets within Algeria, and sometimes also on the French mainland (although there they did not target cafés and so on, as they did in Algeria).

Yet Trotskyists supported both the aim of full independence and those fighting for it. The FLN, incidentally, although it had some links with Arab nationalists elsewhere, especially the Egyptian government, was more self-consciously “Islamic” than many other such movements.

So shouldn’t we support Hamas, defend their actions, in the same way?

Chauvinism

Hamas’s actions are not only chauvinistic towards Jews, but are aimed at the destruction of the Israeli Jewish national entity. The existence of France itself was never in question in the Algerian revolution.

That is not all. Hamas’s programme here has significance because of the history of the region and because of previous attitudes towards Israel on the part of the Arab bourgeoisies. Also, its significance depends on an assessment of modern Islamism.

In Algeria, the collective rights for the pieds noirs (European settlers) necessarily entailed denying democratic rights to the majority. The pieds noirs, like the South African whites, were fighting for their privileges.

In the Middle East, it is perfectly possible for the Israeli Jews to have collective, national rights without denying those same rights to the Palestinian Arabs (and vice versa).

There are many ways in which the militant Islamists are not different from old-style bourgeois nationalists. However the differences between groups like Hamas and the old-style bourgeois nationalists are decisive. These are some:

• Old-style nationalist movements, even if in practice they created undemocratic (even, outside the Middle East, Stalinist) states, drew their legitimacy from “the people” and some notion of popular sovereignty. The movement of masses of people under the banner of nationalism — in oppressed nations — is fundamentally and profoundly democratic, because it is about the establishment of popular sovereignty. Militant Islamism claims to draw its legitimacy from God.

• As a result, even though their practice might be quite different, nationalist movements articulate their demands in terms of “democracy”, claim to be fighting for democracy, promise democracy in some form. The word “democracy” is sometimes used by Islamists; but their programme is for a theocratic state.

• Even where religion is an aspect of nationalist ideology (as it was in Algeria), it is used as a cultural reference, or medium of popular mobilisation, not as an alternative source of legitimacy to the people.

• Nationalists were, even when they had shades of religion in their ideology, avowedly secular in terms of the types of laws they wanted, and were sympathetic to secular thought. They were generally in favour of broadly progressive ideas towards, for instance, women’s rights. The Islamists are implacably opposed to women’s rights in any sense that has meaning for us.

• Ideologically, the Islamists are closed off from any form of debate which is not posed in Islamic terms. Of course Stalinism and bourgeois nationalism can be narrow-minded and closed to rational debate. But with the Islamist movements, the blinkeredness is to a qualitatively greater degree.

• In the Palestinian context specifically: the old “secular democratic state” slogan was an Arab nationalist and implicitly chauvinist formula — but it was also an attempt to relate to the Jews, and other non-Muslims. An Islamic state (or rather, an Islamist one as they see it) would oppress religious as well as national minorities, not to mention secular individuals, etc.

• Even the most dogmatic advocates of the democratic secular state among the Palestinians attempted some kind of relationship with Israeli Jews. The Islamists often pedal antisemitism of a European, fascist kind.

• In the Palestinian national movement there were, from at least the early-mid-seventies, powerful voices in favour of recognising the national rights of the Jews. Mainly these were Stalinoid; but their attitude was not simply determined by Moscow. The Islamists will not countenance the right of Israel to exist.

• The targets of military action, including the suicide bombings of Israeli civilians which first made Hamas prominent, in 2002, at least at first, reflected different attitudes towards the Israeli Jews, and towards the programme of Israeli withdrawal, and two states.

• The growth of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are an expression of popular despair. The symbol of “martyrdom” — the notion that the best thing young militants can do in the cause of their people’s freedom is blow themselves up — is a measure of the depths of hopelessness among the Palestinians. A movement for freedom can’t be built on hopelessness in this way, promising glory in an afterlife.

That is radically different from the civilian-targeted terrorism of the FLN. Those were actions with concrete objectives (and French withdrawal from Algeria was a rational objective in a sense that the disappearance of the Israelis is not).

One of the measures of the nature of the Islamists, here as elsewhere, is that beyond what are in fact rather vague notions of Islamic law, it is extremely unclear what they will do to improve the lot of the dispossessed poor who support them. They certainly have no programme at all to address social and economic inequality. As opposition movements they typically build through grass-roots programmes of education and social welfare, often through local mosques. But where Islamists have taken power their primary policy is repression.

In Iran, the Islamic Republic had plenty to say about women, thieves, homosexuals and Americans, and knew that it was continuing a violent campaign against the old regime and the left, but its economic policy was ultimately just old-fashioned capitalism.

Today the secular Palestinian nationalists have extraordinarily little to offer: they can’t get Israel to grant them meaningful independence, and they can’t deliver economically. They can’t even get foreign powers to hand over substantial aid, never mind develop the Palestinian economy independently. And so Islamism represents despair. It is not an alternative economic and political programme, but a retreat from having one, trusting instead in God.

Old-style nationalism was for something positive and concrete in the real world. The Islamists of course have their ideology (or ideologies, plural, ranging from that of Sayyid Qutb to that of Khomeini) — but what it represents is essentially negative.

Independence

The FLN’s programme was for independence — the end of colonial rule, the constitution of Algeria as an independent nation, and for national development. From a socialist point of view there was much to criticise in these bourgeois nationalist conceptions of development. But with all the qualifications the national development, from a socialist point of view, was progressive.

There’s another way of looking at this question. Economic and social progress depends on relaxing the tensions between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Equality will be best served by a just, democratic peace. Blowing up restaurants in West Jerusalem does not help advance towards that goal.

The FLN’s actions were in a context where Algeria was considered by France to be part of France. The Algerians throwing bombs in settler cafés did not want to be equal citizens in a French state (still less to incorporate France into an Islamic state). They wanted separation from France. To stop the grenades, France needed only to accept Algeria’s independence.

The dynamic in Israel/Palestine today is quite different.

• Abridgement of an article in Workers’ Liberty 2/3, 2002

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