

Lenin got it right!

By D.R. O'Connor Lysaght

IN three articles Sean Matgamna has made it very clear that he does not consider Lenin to be a satisfactory guide to the Irish question. From this it follows that he disapproves of my collecting Lenin's and other contemporary writings on the Irish revolution*. Please allow me space to defend myself and, as far as possible, Lenin.

Firstly, however, I must state that Matgamna and I are agreed on one point. The time is long overdue for all Lenin's writings on the right of nations to self-determination to be collected in a single volume. Every attempt made by Moscow and Beijing has excluded one or more of the key texts, and, for obvious reasons, Moscow is unlikely to do better. This should be rectified. It is time, too, for all Trotsky's much-maligned writings on the same question to be published in one volume.

This leads to the first justification for my collection. Despite a clear inference in Matgamna's attack, it is not aimed at supplanting Lenin or Trotsky's overall teachings on national issues. Rather, it is aimed at leading Irish people and supporters of the Irish cause into looking more closely at these general teachings. As these are currently less popular than they should be, this can do no more than good.

This leads to the second justification. The great weakness in Marxist (and alleged Marxist) teaching on Ireland has not been the easy availability of Lenin's and/or Trotsky's collected works on that country. It has been, rather, the existence of out of context quotations by such as BICO¹, by the Armchair Socialists, Bew and Patterson (before they dumped their alleged Marxism in the grave with their guru, Althusser) and by the 26 County Irish Workers' Party (now part of the all-Ireland Communist Party of Ireland) which produced in 1970 the centennial collection, *Lenin on Ireland*, including only the main articles of 1913-16 and an introduction suggesting that Lenin's article on the Easter Rising was in reply to Trotsky rather than Radek. *Communists and the Irish Revolution* provides a full, inclusive and accessible collection for reference against such text-ripping as the above. Indeed the Irish question needs more. It needs all the texts of Marx and Engels (the present collection covers about half of their Irish writings) and all Connolly's works (the official *Collected Works* include less than half the total). It might also be therapeutic for Matgamna to have republished all the *New Internationalist's* Irish articles from the 1940s.

Furthermore, this collection is valuable

* *The Communists and the Irish Revolution*, Littereirc, Killiney, Co. Dublin, 1993. Sean Matgamna's review of along with an examination of Lenin's writings on Ireland appeared in *WL* nos. 22 and 23.

because (though Matgamna may deny this) it shows how a group of Marxist revolutionaries revised their views from experience. So far from Lenin parroting the line given by Marx and Engels, he begins by assuming that in Ireland "the land has, after all, passed to the hands of the farmers", and that, accordingly, the Irish national demands had shrunk to 'Home Rule' and no protective tariffs. (In his polemic with Rosa Luxemburg, he quotes Marx's 1867 programme for Irish nationalists without its demand for such tariffs.)

Even in 1916 he does not challenge Trotsky's assertion that "the experiment of an Irish national revolution... is over", although elsewhere in the same pamphlet as that in which he defends the Easter Rising, he does not hesitate to attack Trotsky for less. Only after 1916 do both he and Trotsky (and implicitly Radek) come to recognise the continuing potency of Irish national revolution. To carp about the 'scraps' reprinted here, as does Matgamna, is to ignore the fact of the cumulative effect of these 'scraps' in revealing the development of the Irish policy of what was then the leading body of revolutionary Marxists in the world.

Finally, and in the circumstances most extensively, it must be said that this collection shows Lenin to have, for all his flaws, a far better understanding of the Irish question than does Matgamna with his benefit of hindsight.

Matgamna is handicapped by his dogmatic denial of the relevance of Permanent Revolution in Ireland. He reinforces his position with disingenuousness, denying that it has ever been presented to him — several times — that in Ireland the process and strategy of Permanent Revolution involves the nationalist struggle of the minority in the Six Counties spreading into the Republic as a revolutionary struggle of the industrially disaffected working class (the only way it can spread) and then, in strength, with a programme of secular socialism, winning the mass of Ulster Protestant workers, not just to socialism but to democracy. Matgamna has stated several times that he will controvert this. In practice, he sneers.

Of course, he can state that the present situation is a far more eloquent rebuttal than any he can make. The trouble is that the defeat of the IRA's campaign was not the defeat of a Permanent Revolution strategy, but of the same old armed struggle that had its greatest success in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. Nor has defeat stimulated thought towards anything superior to Permanent Revolution. Rather, there is Sinn Fein's alliance with established bourgeois nationalism to negotiate a settlement, the Socialist Workers' Movement's — Irish affiliate of the British SWP — principled refusal to formulate any sort of perspective, Militant's abandoning its lip-service to

Irish union to try to attract the most lumpen elements in Unionism, and, of course, Matgamna himself learning to stop worrying and love the British Army.

One last point must be added to this section. Matgamna has discovered a significant omission. This printer's error (caused, I think, by the repetition of the word 'nations' six times in the sentence concerned) is indeed more significant than most printer's errors, but it has less weight than Matgamna imagines. In calling for "workers of the oppressed nations" to merge "with those of the oppressor nations" (the six missing words), Lenin was only signalling an approach which did not equate (despite Matgamna) the struggle against oppression within the oppressor nation with a struggle against "chauvinism on the part of the workers of the oppressed nation." Had Lenin made such an equation, he would not have written other passages in this book and others of his writings on the right of nations to self-determination. It is necessary only to cite his *Remarks on the Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions* passed by the Comintern in 1920. His support for alliances with revolutionary nationalist movements is compatible with a broader outlook than Matgamna's simple anti-chauvinism (revolutionary nationalism tends to be more chauvinist than reformist nationalism), but it can be compatible with democracy. Lenin's approach fits the strategy of Connolly (and that of Trotsky). Matgamna's is more like that of labour leader Thomas Johnson, who, during Ireland's war of independence (1919/21) kept the organised Irish working class as such out of the national struggle (all in the name of workers' unity) with results that have remained to this day. This is where closer historical examination is needed.

II

MATGAMNA'S bias leads him to a distorted version of history. Elsewhere, he denounces very properly the charlatanism of BICO, yet his historical analysis of Irish nationalism and unionism has more rather than less in common with that sect's.

In both cases, Irish uneven development, as instanced by the success of Ulster industry under the parliamentary union compared to the industrial weakness of the rest of Ireland, is held to justify Ulster's Protestant majority rejecting the aims of Irish nationalism. Why the Catholics of Ulster were nationalists is not examined but ascribed implicitly thereby to their religious bigotry. Indeed, the reason for Ulster industry doing so well is neglected, also. Britain's reason for occupying all or part of Ireland is to be accepted as a fact, like the rain that falls on the smaller island. Three

1. British and Irish Communist Organisation, a Maoist sect that became ardently unionist, championing the Six Counties as a democratic entity [Editorial note].


core questions are airbrushed out of consideration. It is necessary to paint a picture that includes them.

To answer the last of these questions first; Britain held Ireland, as Trotsky remarked in 1916, to keep anyone else from holding it. The occupation has lasted eight centuries. It established vested interests, royal, feudal and commercial, in rifling the country and stunting its economic growth, in keeping it divided against itself, eventually on the religious lines that have produced partition.

Before this, in the nineteenth century Britain had Ireland united and united to itself as an integral part (colonialism's most sophisticated formula) of the parliamentary union of these islands. This provided a mask of equality over a reality of Irish oppression. Rackrent and absentee landlordism continued until after their greatest achievement, the Great Famine, began a process of land reform that ended, helped by declining food prices, in the elimination of the rural landlords altogether. The fate of industry was less immediately catastrophic but more decisive. Free trade between Britain and Ireland was introduced in such a way as to maintain for as long as possible the restrictions that it was supposed to kill. One of the last commodities freed of customs duties was British coal in 1841. Yet coal was vital for industry and Ireland had few native reserves. Industry declined. After a major slump at the time of the famine, the Irish population declined steadily, too. Irish nationalism continued to grow in fertile soil.

Although united in opposition to British domination, that nationalism was divided in its aims. By 1913 the traditional programme of nationalism, full independence and tariffs, came to be upheld only by the smaller bourgeoisie and artisans, the "Men of No Property" ("Property" = Real Estate), whose livelihoods were most endangered by Irish economic stagnation. The larger ("properly") national capitalists and professionals had reconciled themselves to free trade. They sought to improve their position by interpreting the vague formula of 'Home Rule' as a demand for an Irish parliament which would not have powers to impose protective tariffs, but which would be able to liquidate the system of patronage that sustained Unionism outside Ulster, as the landlord interest declined. From the top of the civil service to suppliers of the British Army in the garrison towns a mainly Protestant interest depended on the grace and favour of the colonial power. To end this was the aim of the main party of constitutional nationalism. Those who wanted more either went along with it or became revolutionary nationalists, Republicans.

That the main issue between constitutional nationalism and Unionism was a sordid dispute about patronage should not fog the political issues. The boycott (developed from English trade union practice) was used mainly against landlords and their creatures. The nationalists were fighting



Oppression in Ireland: a poor family is evicted

for a level playing field and the traditional demand of the career open to the talents. The Unionist interest depended on positive discrimination in favour of the privileged.

Of course, Ulster was different. It has a working class with a sizeable Protestant majority. As Sean Matgamna emphasises, it was an industrial working class: Ireland's largest. Based on industries that had survived and prospered under the union, it was understandable that a majority should defend the connection with Britain. This did not make this opposition the equivalent of the national agnosticism of the workers of Poland's "Warsaw-Lodz-Dombrowski" region whose position influenced Luxemburg and Radek. The Unionist workers' consciousness was under-, rather than over-developed. Its industries had been maintained at the price of a divided community. Linen was revived by impoverishing the Ulster textile workers more than their comrades elsewhere in these islands, and relying on religion to divide the workers who might oppose this otherwise. From the 1850s, Belfast shipbuilding kept these divisions in the workplace. Successive riots, most notably those of 1864, 1886, 1912 and later, of course, 1920 involved demands to purge the growing industry of Catholics. The resultant practice of 'Protestant trades' has been ascribed to the unions, but they upheld positions established by extra-union (and originally anti-working class) forces. The industrial working class that emerged from this process was not as hostile to socialist ideas as it was to democratic ones, let alone ideas of revolution that threatened the state that protected it from its Catholic rivals. The difference between Irish and Ulster Unionism was that in Ulster the state patronage that nurtured Unionism elsewhere was privatised and self-maintained. It was nonetheless real.

This is not to say that the Catholic Church was not an issue. It had been growing in power since the Emancipation Act of 1829. From 1890, this power could be seen increasingly to be abused. This appeared in the fall of Parnell, the Limerick anti-Jewish pogrom, the increasingly inadequate education system, the application to Ireland of the Ne Temere decree on mixed marriages

and the restriction on the Irish clauses of the 1912 Insurance Act. What its conservative opponents ignored was the fact that his strength arose in part from the need of the men of property to keep in check those of no property. What is more, although Unionist propagandists were able and willing to use incidents listed except the Insurance Act as arguments, they tended to use the centuries-old atrocities of the counter-reformation just as readily. They worked to keep their own support united rather than to broaden it. In the last resort, they looked to the colonial state to impose any necessary reform on the Irish majority.

Most Irish constitutional nationalists ignored the problems posed by Unionism, particularly the Ulster variety.

They tended to believe that it would wither away with the passing of the Home Rule Act. A breakaway was realistic. The All for Ireland League recognised the desirability of winning Unionists. For this reason, Sean Matgamna has described two of its leading figures, William O'Brien and William Martin Murphy as 'progressive nationalists'.

How they sought to win Unionists requires examination. Their main plank was opposition to mainstream nationalism's concentration on patronage; this did not win them enough support to be a credible alternative. There was, however, a further strategy that, if no more popular, would have had the virtue of being democratic. This would have involved a firm secular vision of the prospective Irish Home Rule entity. This was not unthinkable. Michael Davitt had demanded democratic control of schools and James Connolly maintained the same position consistently. It would have lost clerical support, but it could have won backing from the teachers.

All for Ireland could not do this. O'Brien, Murphy and their ally Timothy Healy had supported the Catholic hierarchy against Parnell; the two latter had campaigned particularly for what James Joyce summarised as "God and the Bishops over Ireland". Instead of religious pluralism, they supplemented their attacks on nationalist patronage aims with demands for new talks to end landlordism and the policy that led to the 1913 Dublin lockout.

Matgamna regards Lenin's *Class War in Dublin* as his best work on Ireland. Like CD Greaves, he ignores the fundamental weakness that makes it more misleading than Lenin's other Irish writings. This goes beyond ascribing a non-existent peerage and landed estate to Carson or making James Larkin the grandson of a Manchester martyr.

Basically, the 1913 lock-out was not "the Irish nationalist bourgeoisie... declaring a war to the death against the Irish labour movement". It was, rather the bigger Dublin capitalists, nationalist and unionist, attacking their organised, unskilled employees: All for Ireland, Nationalist and Unionist capital allied in labour relations behind Murphy. This nationalist employer had been inspired by the Belfast Unionist employers' suc-

cessful opposition to Larkin in 1907 and by the founding of the Cork Employers' Federation by another Unionist, Sir Alfred Dobbyn, to do the same in 1909. Indeed, though Murphy himself was founder and first Chairman of the Dublin Employers' Federation, the Chairman during the lock-out was Maurice Dockerell, later Sir Maurice and Unionist MP for Rathmines.

The Ulster Unionist Press was similarly supportive. In just one of many such editorials, the *Northern Whig* declared:

"A propaganda like Larkin's may catch the imagination and fire the energies of ignorant and foolish men for a time, but such leadership can never have any useful result or do any good to its victims and the Dublin working men are finding this out, just as the Belfast men did a few years ago." [29 October 1913.]

The nationalists were less united. The constitutionalist majority was unenthusiastic until Larkin's attempt to evacuate strikers' children was denounced by the Catholic hierarchy and provided an excuse to attack Larkin without supporting Murphy. Most of the (then few) Republicans opposed the employers. (Arthur Griffith supported them, but he was not, then, for a Republic.)

Unionist solidarity with the Dublin employers may have influenced Lenin to amend his analysis of Irish class forces as he did in his articles on the Curragh crisis in 1914. Believing as he does in the prime need to reconcile the one unionist body, Matgamna considers this change as being for the worse. In particular, he denounces Lenin's comparison of Unionism and the Black Hundreds in Russia. As far as their class base goes, Matgamna is correct, but it would be correct, too, to attack Lenin's comparison of the same Black Hundreds with Italian fascism some years later from the same standpoint. In each case, Lenin is talking programme rather than class base, and he is accurate. Since the first Home Rule Bill of 1886, the Unionists had represented the intertwined nature of the two. These forces had suffered a major defeat in 1909-12 when the Liberals succeeded by constitutional means in ending the absolute veto of the House of Lords. Now that body could only delay the passage of such terrifying reforms as a land tax and Home Rule by a parliament itself threatened by a wave of labour unrest, which the Liberals seemed unable to end.

It was these fears and doubts about their ability to overcome the dangers electorally that led the Unionists into moving away from constitutionalism, strengthening their links with the army officer caste and stirring up extra-parliamentary support on a greater British chauvinist programme. These islands were saved from a reactionary coup only by a greater evil that enlisted together all Unionists and most Liberals and Labourites in its maintenance. This was, of course, the First World War.

In Ireland, the sop of the enactment of Home Rule, although postponed until one year after any peace treaty, allowed the majority nationalists to join All for Ireland

in recruiting for the British war effort partly as payment for the new act and partly to appease Unionism. Against them were organised Labour, still weak after 1913, and the Republicans. In 1916, a group of Republicans with 'a section of the workers' struck the biggest blow against the war in these islands: the Easter Rising. Then, despite doubts by Radek, Trotsky and perhaps even Lenin, but with their full support, the surviving Republicans pushed aside the constitutionalists and won an overall majority of Irish Parliamentary seats in the post-war election of December 1918.

With this mandate, they began to build in opposition to the colonial administration the most democratic regime that had been seen in these islands. They made a move towards the Irish Unionists in the only democratic direction possible. The automatic right of Catholic priests to attend constitutional nationalist conventions did not exist in the new ruling party.*

By now, organised labour had recovered from 1913 and grown threefold. In 1919, the Irish strike rate exceeded Britain's, even excluding political stoppages mainly against the colonial state. Had it sought to win lead-

"Northern Ireland was produced by straight counter-revolution... a breakaway province justified by continuing Protestant privileges and its potential threat to renewed revolution in the south."

ership of the national struggle, proletarian revolution could have united workers from both traditions in a non-sectarian workers' state. Instead, with Connolly dead and Larkin in the USA, that single syndicalist identity of the Irish Labour Party and TUC encouraged its leadership, with Thomas Johnson as ideologist, to seek immediate working class unity rather than use the opportunities for it to take state power.

Without the political stiffening provided by organised labour, the government of the Republic drifted towards seeking support from the lukewarm bourgeoisie and Catholic hierarchy. It had not gone far this way before the colonial power counter-attacked. By the end of 1920, the Black and Tans and British Army allied to Ulster Protestant pogromites (Johnson's strategy had failed to win Unionist Labour) had reduced the Republic to its armed force.

The result was partition, treaty and civil war. By 1924, Ireland was divided between two reactionary state powers. The nature of their reactions differ. The 'southern' twenty-six county state is 'Thermidorean', established by revolutionaries who feared to continue the revolution and won to them their former constitutionalist rivals and defenders of the union. Though the Treaty

had provided for protective tariffs (unlike Home Rule), the new front postponed using them until the 1930s depression and a new government. Catholic teaching was given state backing, particularly a new intensive literary censorship. (The divorce ban, now a major grievance, did but consolidate the union position; Ireland has had no divorce courts since the destruction of the old native laws.) Against this the state remained radical enough to give women equal voting rights to men six years before the rest of these islands.

Northern Ireland was produced by straight counter-revolution. It is a successful Irish Vendee: a breakaway province justified by continuing Protestant privileges and its potential threat to renewed revolution in the south. Formally secular (even there, it had to bow to Catholic as well as Protestant clerical demands), it compensated by discriminating against all opponents of its one party regime. Though Britain had provided safeguards against this, including Proportional Representation, it allowed them to be eliminated. Later, though the government moved 'step by step' with Britain on welfare reforms, it moved the other way to British moves towards greater political democracy.

The 1960s exposed the decisive difference between the state powers. The Republic ended permanent literary bans in 1966. Meanwhile, as the demand grew for civil rights, the Northern Irish government discussed plans to reform local government by abolishing it and placing Unionist and non-Unionist areas under total Unionist control. The reactionary Republic is being reformed; Northern Ireland could not be reformed without provoking revolutionary struggle. It is still an open question whether it can be reformed at all.

There is one further point. The Republic is economically weaker for the loss of Northern Ireland. That province's continuing link to Britain has been politically even more effective. At Westminster, the Ulster Unionist MPs have been a consistently poisonous influence. Wooed by successive Labour ministers, from Clynnes to Morrison to Foot, the Ulster Protestants have elected MPs who have used their pro-union credentials to block their suitors' aims, with, at times, decisive effect. Those who want independence for the six county area are at least halfway correct in that the British workers would benefit: British Labour should consider moving for the British peoples to exercise their right of self-determination.

III

SO it is time to ask the question that matters now. Even if the Bolsheviks got Ireland correct, have matters changed so much in the seventy-odd years since Lenin's and the fifty-five since Trotsky's deaths that their analysis is obsolete. There has been more time for matters to change than there was between 1916 and the death of Engels,

*Arthur Mitchell, *Revolutionary Government in Ireland*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1995 gives a valuable account of the Republican administration.

after all.

It might be argued that little has changed precisely because Sean Matgamna does not argue that anything much has. Against this is the fact that Matgamna has made too many mistakes to be taken as correct even in his evasion.

Indeed, much has changed. Britain is no longer the major power it was in Lenin's time. Its economic interests in Ireland are not tied to any military presence and its real military interest has been weakened during the last decade, with the closing of the west Scottish submarine bases, Bishopscourt radar station and the Ballykelly naval base. It has equal status with Ireland in the European Union. Both islands are pluralist bourgeois democracies. While more of the people of the Republic are employed now in industry than in agriculture, the decline of Northern Ireland's staples has tended to weaken the base for Protestant sectarianism. Overall, too, Northern Ireland Protestant job prospects are now better than Catholic ones by just under 2:1 after being 2.5:1 and the ratio could be further reduced if the British military presence (and its employment) falls after a settlement. Such a settlement seems possible because the IRA has failed sufficiently to maximise or extend its support.

None of this is enough. Since the ceasefire, it has been clear that, even assuming sophisticated manoeuvring, the British are not preparing to leave, let alone unite Ireland and certainly not unite the workers of Ulster or of Ireland as a whole. The British government is not going to abandon a 900,000 strong garrison on the far shore of the North Channel, the narrowest, shallowest stretch of water between these islands. (In addition, a disproportionately large section of Britain's rulers favour Unionism, precisely because of its undemocratic nature.) This would not be so bad if Britain could or would extend or guarantee a fully democratic Northern Irish policy, except under pressure. Yet the peace process is aimed at negating this pressure. Britain cannot uphold a fully democratic six county province that might use that democracy to break the connection. Moreover, to create such a society means ending the disparity in jobs and making up for the fall in employment due to the decline in security. With the ending of the EU's gravy train in three years, the lion's share of the costs would fall on the British economy. It is not accidental that the Downing Street Declaration avoids any guarantees for a democratic Northern Ireland pending unity, and that the guarantees of the Framework Document are subject only to qualifications that negate them.

From the opposing point of view, it remains true that there are no other Irish political flashpoints that have the mobilising power of the cause of ending partition.

Compared to other world problems, the partition of Ireland seems small. Yet it is intractable enough to require more consideration (and reconsideration) than appears in the prolix but superficial analysis of Sean Matgamna. ■

The ABCs: 3

Was Stalinism progressive?

By Jackie Cleary

IN the 19th century European capitalism developed industry, cleared away feudal restrictions, and also developed the working class. Marx and Engels argued for a recognition of the progressive role of capitalism and an alliance between the working class and middle-class revolutionaries.

By analogy many would-be Marxists — Trotsky's biographer Isaac Deutscher, for example, and, most crudely and shamelessly in Britain, "Militant" — have argued that Stalinist forces (that is, bureaucracies like the one that ruled in Russia from the 1930s, or the one that rules in China still) developed industry, developed the working class, cleared away old restrictions of landlord or colonial rule, and were therefore progressive.

When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, for example, Militant and many other "Trotskyists" argued that we should critically support the Stalinists' efforts to drag Afghanistan into the 20th century.

After that stage, so Militant believed, would come the "political revolution" — a revolution in which the working class would oust the Stalinists and create socialist democracy. But in the meantime, for them, the "totalitarian deformations" were a secondary aspect of a fundamentally progressive phenomenon.

Why was this approach wrong?

Under Stalinism the working class is bound hand and foot, deprived of all rights by a highly conscious and militantly anti-working class state apparatus which concentrates the means of production in its own hands, together with immense powers of oppression and terror. The workers have no freedom to discuss, speak, publish, or organise. Instead of having their own trade unions and political parties, the workers are forced into state-controlled "fronts" called "unions" and "workers' parties".

It was possible, within developing capitalism, for Marxists to look to a capitalist evolution and still relate to the working class, support its struggles, and organise it independently. The prospect was not that if the bourgeoisie established their regime, then the working class would be held in a totalitarian vice. On the contrary, even in the worst and most repressive capitalist hell-holes, the working class retained individual rights and could take advantage of loopholes to organise itself.

Bourgeois society offered the possibility of the workers organising

themselves and developing politically and culturally. This did not happen without struggle and setbacks — but it could happen and it did happen even under very repressive regimes like Russia before 1917. And otherwise the Marxist policy would have been a nonsense.

A specific repressive and terribly reactionary regime is inseparable from Stalinism. Economic development was separable from the often repressive early capitalist regimes because the exploitation of the working class did not rest on its legal status but on economic (market) transactions and the bourgeois ownership of the means of production.

Stalinist economic development is inseparable from totalitarian oppression of the working class: the economics are not separable from the regime, and to opt for one is necessarily to opt for both. For this reason, the analogy with the capitalist development of industry is nonsense.

But in the broad sweep of history is it not true that the development of industry lays the basis for progress? In the broad sweep, yes — on condition that the working class liberates itself and seizes the control of the means of production from the hands of the bureaucracy.

But politics is necessarily concerned with a more immediate, sharper focus. In that focus the idea that the suppression (and slaughter, deportation, etc which has been the stock-in-trade of the Stalinist bureaucracies ruling the ex-USSR and other countries) is a detail in the broad sweep of history, is a nonsense.

It loses the viewpoint of the militant who stands with the working class and with the oppressed peoples, trying to organise them to make themselves the subjects of history, not its passive objects. Indeed it adopts the viewpoint of the historian, the man in the ivory tower.

Militants must have an entirely different set of values, priorities, concerns and considerations from people who content themselves with general perspectives as seen, so to speak, from a watchtower above the struggle. Of course Marxist militants inform their work with the general historical considerations. They do not allow them to override their goal of mobilising, organising and rousing up the oppressed. They do not allow the goal of industrial development on the back of the masses to replace that goal. If they do, they break with the real traditions of Lenin and Trotsky. ■