At the meeting of the NC immediately after the December NC, Jo Jones rather bitterly expressed resentment and anger at the fact that the NC voted against his opposition to raise the slogan of self-determination for Poland. This was, he said, a case of "hi-jacking" the line of the organisation. I was "pushing" issues too quickly, he said.

The term "hi-jacking" is an idea that has come up again and again, also in comments from Col. Smith. Jones declared that from then on he was going to fight (perhaps he said, "fight back!).

Smith expressed general agreement with that.

I was taken aback a little by this, for a number of reasons.

At the NC Jones had had as much time to oppose the slogan as I had had to advocate it. It was a properly convened meeting of the NC, Jones did not even allege that there had been anything underhand. Jones or others had every possibility of proposing a longer discussion in the NC (we were in the first day of a two-day meeting), and I would have supported this. They did nothing of the sort, though they had ample time and opportunity. Therefore, the notion that a NC vote should be seen as "hi-jacking" the line of the organisation was a rather bizarre one (especially since there was no ex-I-CL vs ex-WCL line-up on the matter).

The political substance of the issue in dispute in relation to Poland was (and is) somewhat obscure, in that Jones and Smith favour the call for opposition to any Russian invasion, and on the "living" political issues there are, as far as I know, no differences. Poland was not one of the issues we agreed to leave open at the fusion and take slowly thereafter.

In no sense could it be said that I raised this question of Poland's right to self-determination suddenly, or without warning. Quite the contrary. I had raised the matter on leading committees repeatedly in the period before the December NC. At the joint WSL/I-CL public meeting at Conway Hall in autumn 1980, at which both Jones and I spoke, I expressed my opinion with extreme sharpness so that there would be no hint of ambivalence such as afflicts all sorts of pseudo-Protasytists.

I said that Polish nationalism was justified, was progressive vis-a-vis the USSR, and that Great Russian Chauvinism was the reactionary nationalism holding Poland in subjection. I expressed my support for Polish national independence and for those fighting for it.

At an NC on September 25 I raised the question of what our attitude would be if a Russian invasion led to full-scale war, and if the USA etc. were running guns and other help, perhaps through Czank, to the Poles fighting the "Red" Army. There was unanimous agreement at the NC that this would inhibit our support for Solidarnosc and the Polish. At the NC of October 22 I raised the Polish question again, asking comrades to consider the call for blacking of Russian goods in the event of an invasion. I raised the matter as clearly and sharply as I could at the October NC.

Obviously I focused on this question because in my understanding of what was happening in Poland, the fact of Poland's lack of national rights played a central role. It was the looming shadow of the Warsaw Pact armies that made the Czank side diminish and downgrade itself, and attempt to become a trade union, in August 1980.

I kept on about it because I wanted the organisation not to be caught unaware and politically unprepared by likely events, and I thought that the Polish national question, and its possible relation to the defence of the USSR, and the 'restoration of capitalism' in Poland would be controversial and might blow up the organisation. I knew that the leadership of the old WSL came from a tradition (the SLL) which in my opinion - basically for reasons of its relations with factional opponents over the years - taught its recruits to regard 'defence of the USSR' and 'defence of nationalised property' as something of a fetish outside of time and place. The SLL divorced these slogans from concrete assessment of the question which is central in determining what place in our political concerns defence of the USSR must actually hold at a given time; the real balance of international blocs. It had very curious political assessments of supposed dangers of 'restoration of capitalism'. In 1968 the SLL's paper appearing immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia had a headline saying 'No restoration of capitalism' — given more or less equal weight with opposition to the invasion.
In fact I had been agreeably surprised that the ex SLL comrades seemed to have emancipated themselves from such Healyite nonsense.

But what was Jones' (and Smith's) objection to self-determination? That has never been quite clear to me. Jones has never actually explained it clearly other than to express unease and reservations, and to say that it has or may have implications for the dispute on Afghanistan. He had both time and suitable access to spell out his reasons. For the TILC meeting, which discussed Poland at length, he was specifically authorised to argue his view on self-determination by Kimbell, a supporter of the self-determination position. At the EC on December 25, when Jones expressed discontent with the paper's coverage on Poland, I expressly proposed that he should write - and the result was agreement that Jones should draft the TILC resolution. But Jones did not, while talking about the impermissibility of the BC vote to 'hi-jack' the line of the organisation, find the time or energy to spell out concretely what his objection was to self-determination - it was all hints, half-thoughts, reservations, and the need to take it slowly.

Now, does the raising of self-determination for Poland have implications for Afghanistan? It might have. Certainly I am in favour of self-determination for the peoples of Afghanistan. The point however is that it is possible to find reasons which counterbalance the right of the Afghans to self-determination. Certainly it is a very different country and situation from Poland.

Jones' concern and approach is the opposite of the proper one. We are for basic democratic rights, and thus for self-determination for every people. However, democratic rights, including self-determination, are for us subordinate, where they need to be, i.e. where there is a real conflict, to working class interests. For example, the Bolsheviks, having broken down the walls of the feudalist prison-house of nations, then had occasion to subordinate the self-determination of the Poles to the class struggle in 1920, when they invaded Poland. It is a matter of concrete assessment and of showing in a given case what outweighs the elementary democratic programme of revolutionary socialism. It might be possible to argue that there are considerations which outweigh self-determination for Afghanistan - defence of the USSR, or the Stalinist/Militant idea that the Afghans are too backward to be free of foreign domination and that the Russian bureaucracy is therefore right to act, so to speak, in loco parentis for them - for those who survive the slaughter and the bombings, and those who don't join the two million who have fled.

Each case is separable. The theoretical 'domino' notion of Jones - that self-determination raised for Poland would necessarily lead to it being raised for Afghanistan - is conceivable only as a result of a fundamental confusion about the basic, axiomatic, right, about the possible considerations that might outweigh it.

The approach is impermissable for two other reasons.

In the first place it is a miserable and self-diminishing idea that we refrain from raising self-determination for the Polish people in the situation where the most tremendous achievements of the working class in many years are undergoing murderous assault from the Polish bureaucracy, the spawn, stooges, and proxy of the Great-Russian chauvinist bureaucracy within whose 'sphere of influence' Poland lies by agreement with imperialism. If self-determination has no application to Poland now, then there are few conditions when it has or will have meaning. The national oppression of the Irish is trivial compared to what Poland has suffered at the hands of the USSR and the national oppression of the Irish is in fact a long way from being trivial. To drop self-determination for fear of implications for Afghanistan is to go a long way to dropping it generally - to jettisoning this basic notion of revolutionary Marxism. And if that was far from the comrades' minds, that is only because they have not thought things through.

In the second place, it is utterly sectarian in method to let what we say about
poland, our championing of the Poles in a labour movement asehe with Stalinist
conciliationism, to be determined by considerations about something else - about
possible implications for Afghanistan, - by fear of 'giving something away' for
a different discussion, It expresses an irresponsibility towards Poland's
struggle which is truly sectarian because motivated factionally.

(Also, from my point of view, of course, even though the Poland and Afghanistan
questions are distinct, the refusal to support self-determination for Poland is
a good example of the bad consequences that flow from a grievous political error
like Jones' on Afghanistan - an error now persisted in long after the major
serious would-be Trotskyist organisation sharing that error, the USFI, has
rectified itself and raised the call for troops out, leaving Jones and his
co-thinkers virtually alone with the Spartacists and Granites).

In fact, however, all this does not adequately explain the attitude of Jones and
his co-thinkers. The hints and half-thoughts and unexpressed reservations are,
in my view, more important than the references to Afghanistan, and point to the
real problem. Jones has only managed to tell us about Afghanistan and Poland,
but the reason he does not want to express his and my politics of Russian troops
out in terms of the elementary and axiomatic Marxist principle of self-determi-
nation is that his reservations, unexpressed hints and half-thoughts concern
just this - that he does not rule out, or part of his mind does not, the possibili-
ty that there may be a drive to restore capitalism and that the Russian
bureaucracy may be the only force to stop it. I do not know that this is how
Jones' thinking runs. But I cannot make any other sense of what I do know
-including the failure to think through the possible distinctions between Poland
and Afghanistan.

I say plainly that I am for the right of the Polish labour movement to live,
even if (improbably) it were to make the grave mistake of restoring capitalism.
There are no conditions in which I can condense of any good Marxist reasons arising
to outweigh the right of the Polish people to self-determination. I have made
my position as plain as possible, and often. In response there have been
mutterings about 'the defence of the USSR'.

In fact:

• The present world situation is characterised by the strength of the USSR and
the relative weakness of imperialism. (The comrades seemed to accept this view when
it was expressed by Peter S at the TILO meeting and underlined by me. I had made
the same point at the August NO).

• Even if it were the opposite, and the defence of the basic property forms of the
USSR were posed in real military terms, it would inconceivable that Trotskyists
should accept the bureaucratic perspective in the light of which alone the
suppression of a labour movement could be seen as a contribution to 'defending' the
USSR. We defend the USSR with the methods of world revolution, and we counterpose
to bureaucratic 'defence' the labour movement and the methods of class struggle.

I believe this attitude to the class struggle is common to Jones and his co-
thinkers and to me: the problem is that Jones and his co-thinkers carry a certain
ideological baggage as well as their proletarian responses.

Why does Jones not spell the issues out? Why does he want time, though he has
had months since I first posed the question as sharply as I could - over a year
if we count the Conway Hall meeting? Because he is torn in two directions.

His (and Smith's) living response to the events in Poland is, as far as I can
make out, indistinguishable from my own. That was one of the things that
convinced me that despite the range of formal differences (e.g. the theory of
'structural assimilation') and the somewhat anachronistic and fetishistic (as it
seems to me) way of relating to the question of the defence of the USSR, a
fusion of our two organisations was actually possible. Right down to the open
letter to Bean and Scargill in the paper, and the call for the blocking of
Russian goods in the event of invasion, there are no practical disagreements.

The disagreements only emerge - with surprising bitterness - when it is a
matter of summing up the common position in basic Marxist terms, so sharply that
it rules out the half-thoughts and (this was my intention) separates us from
what Jones and his co-thinkers call 'the Pabloites' of various tendenciness. At
this point, as far as I can see, Jones' Healyite conditioning, rose in revolt.
The fetishistic way of relating to defence of the USSR held him back from the
logical conclusion and from a sharp feminist expression of that conclusion,
expressed without ambiguity.

'Healyism' here relates to the fact that for the Healyites in the '60s, the
way the 'defence of the USSR' was raised and given prominence was not derived
from the objective reality - real threats, or real vulnerability of the USSR -
but from considerations of fighting the Cliffites in the '60s and afterwards outside
it.

From the declaration about 'hi-jacking' at the EC followed the events at TILC.
The EC gave Jones the job of drafting a resolution on Poland. I was in favour
of this, and no-one opposed it. I passed him a note saying that I had written a
detailed analysis of the events of August 1980 (30 to 35,000 words long) and a
set of 'theses' on the experience of the mass strike and the political revolution.
I asked if he would 'accept my collaboration' on the resolution. He made no
response. Naturally I didn't try to press it.

During the TILC meeting I approached Jones twice (at least) to discuss
amendments. He was usually 'busy'. Plainly he did not want to discuss these.
I did not press that, either. Diffidence and things like that play their part
in such affairs, and until things go badly wrong, it does not seem out of place
that they should. There was still the scheduled EC.

At the 8.30 on the Thursday night, and again at a specially convened meeting
on the Friday morning, Chris Upliffe, Smith, Jones and Levy took up a completely
formalistic and factional posture and attitude. They had a resolution and they
were the majority; my proposed alterations were 'individual positions', 'not those
of the movement' (Upliffe). On both occasions, but especially on the Friday,
I felt myself in the presence of factional opponents who felt they had the whip
hand, not of comrades collaborating in the leading bodies of the WSL.

Of Upliffe adopted the tone and manner of a petty bureaucrat; he launched
into a mildly abusive characterisation of the 'hi-jacking' at the NC and seemed
to be making a case that the decision was not binding. Levy seemed in agreement
(though my memory of his contribution is less sharp). Jones and Smith firmly
terminated that notion.

But an amendment I proposed spelling out the self-determination slogan in more
detail as part of the programme of political revolution was rejected out of hand,
the meeting refusing even to consider it. (Kinnell proposed that the meeting
vote on the political substance of the amendment, irrespective of whether and how
it might be integrated with Jones' resolution, and the majority of the meeting
refused). A longer amendment, spelling out why self-determination was an issue,
was rejected by three votes to four.

I came away from that meeting unable to avoid the conclusion that the leadership
of the new WSL had broken down as a united body.

I want the comrades to be clear about what I mean. It was an accidental majority
of 4/3, but it was nevertheless a majority, and there was no formal obligation to
accept my amendments. I should have raised them earlier, with better notice, etc.
But:
a) The commission to write the resolution was not given on a factional basis.
If Jones felt so strongly about the self-determination decision, perhaps he should
not have undertaken to write the resolution. As noted above, other ways for him
to express his views publicly had been proposed.
b) The most elementary notion of building a united leadership would imply
maximum efforts to get as much agreement as possible for the resolution. (My amendment expanding the self-determination slogan as part of the programme of political revolution, which met such a hostile response, was in fact aimed to do that.)

But one section - the minority at the NC on the matter - in the first place treated the resolution as its sectional property (or supported Jonas and Cunliffe treating it as their property), and used an accidental majority of one to 'hi-jack' (to borrow an expression) the resolution.

Smith wanted to make an effort to incorporate some of my second amendment, but when forced to it voted with those who adopted a harshly factional line (which, apart from on the issue of abiding by the NC decision, included Jones).

There was in addition the question of democracy. The draft resolution included the call for self-determination. The notion that this call should be argued (or, in the event, not argued) in a way determined by those who disagreed with it, is contrary to democracy.

It would not have been acceptable that the entire details and balance of the resolution should exclusively be determined by the side that had won the vote on the contentious issue of self-determination (though that would have been less undemocratic than what happened). What was in order was that the resolution should be shaped and arranged in line with the NC's majority view. Instead the comrades treated it as private property.

The resolution was a passable resolution. It summarised the NC discussion and did include the self-determination call. I think it was inadequate in at least the following ways:

a) It was journalistic and impressionistic - essentially an article.

b) It was unstructured and unsystematic.

c) Ideas were thrown together higgledy-piggledy and with no notion of proportion.

For example, the lack of self-determination is not a small feature of the Polish situation. If Poland's domination by the USSR is important at all, it is an overweening fact: it is not enough to just throw it in, without concern for proportions and balance.

d) It exists below the level of the theoretical questions posed by the appearance of events (which it accepts) - of a military coup by the bureaucracy. Either we look to the strength of the Russian and Warsaw Pact bureaucracy to explain the seeming strength of the Polish bureaucracy in face of a mass labour movement, or to some latent strength of the Polish bureaucratic formation. All the known facts and circumstances seem to me to point to the former as a major part of the explanation.

But if we look to the latter, as the resolution mainly does, then the theoretical problems raised for our theory of the bureaucracy as an inherently unstable, fragile and vulnerable social formation, for which a totalitarian regime is an irreplaceable scaffolding and protection from the working class masses, should at least be indicated. They are not, though the comrades have muttered darkly about 'the defence of the USSR' - the aspect of the same complex of problems that has least to do with it.

The amendments would not have made all this good, only some of it (or so I believe).

The world won't stop for the deficiencies of this resolution. The point is that if the comrades thought they could behave like that, then the message that got through very forcefully to me, at least, was that collective leadership in anything resembling the sense in which we tried to build from last July - and need to build it - had stopped and broken down.

Collective leadership does not exclude political differences and the submission of differences to a vote (indeed, if it did it would be cliquism). It rules out seizing of accidental advantages and the undemocratic exclusion of some comrades in the shaping of the supposedly common work. Kinnell, Hill and myself in the
EC discussions at TILC represented one side in a parity-balanced organisation
fused less than 6 months previously: we represented the position decided by the
EC, consisting of people from both the previous organisations. The resolution
was going to have an international circulation.

The comrades say - or, certainly, think - that I 'hi-jacked' the line at the
EC. Tit for tat...? Are the events I have described above at the TILC meeting the
equivalent of a vote in the highest body of the organisation outside conference,
prepared for in a number of discussions over 3 months or more?

The idea of hi-jacking in this situation is in fact the notion, or the
infringed and perhaps subconscious assumption, that cd Jones and his close
associates have special rights: that is exactly what their behaviour in the
EC meeting expresses, too. The notion that even against the background of the
attempt to murder Solidarnosc, the line of the WSL should evolve in line with
Jones' and Smith's thinking and not according to the urgency of events, I find
singularly unattractive and self-centred.

There is no reason whatsoever why the WSL EC should wait, despite events in
the outside world, for Jones and others to reach firm conclusions before publicly
assuming its responsibilities as a revolutionary organisation and raising the
Trotskyist banner of independence for Poland.

I had given ample warning that I considered the Polish national question a
major issue; I moved to get a decision only when events in Poland demanded that we
speak out as clearly as possible, as people who understand with Trotsky that the
national question is a major living issue under Stalinism, or else reveal
ourselves as people shut through with ambivalence about Stalinism.

In passing: are these comrades who treat as private a resolution commissioned
by the EC and containing a major qualifying idea carried against their
opposition, the same ones who get in a state at the idea that signed articles
are not 'accountable'? Yes, it seems they are. Perhaps we might clear a few
things up by discussing the difference between a resolution and a signed article!

On January 9 there took place an EC on the telephone between Kinnell and
Jones and Smith. (The road was snowed up). I was in the same room as Kinnell.
I had proposed that I write a general article on the situation in Poland, and
Kinnell had included this in his plan for the paper. The issue met with fierce
opposition from Smith and Jones.

I remained out of the discussion; all I would have had to contribute was the
opinion that the comrades had no right to veto this, and probably some not quite
peace-generating comments in response to the arguments. They had no special
rights, but to have refused to let them veto the article would have precipitated
a much sharper crisis than the one we have now. For myself I decided it was better
to think the situation out than act 'spontaneously'. The incident confirmed me
in the conclusions I had reached earlier at the TILC conference.

I will bear repeating here that insofar as there is a political difference
over Poland, I represent the position voted for by the EC. In effect, the
majority was being denied the rights that I would advocate giving to a minority.

The arguments of Smith and Jones (for which I rely on Kinnell and on what I
heard) were essentially: I wrote too much; I had plenty of time to write articles
raising controversial questions, and this particular article was likely to be
controversial on the question of the defence of the USSR; they didn't have time;
they couldn't keep up, because they worked at Cowley and I am a full-timer.

Plainly much of what was said later at ECs had its origin here.

There is a lot of demagoguery here (and in much that I believe was said later
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extent would division of labour. The revolutionaries would opt out of trying to
'Keep up' with the 'struggle on the ideological front' - the struggle which distinguishes our theory of the party from all other notions of a party. The comrades take a self-defensive stand on the limits imposed on themselves by working at Cowley, and seem to want to confine what the party can do within those limits...

All of this has, of course, no bearing on whether I would write anything useful on Poland, or whether I should be dismissed as a party worker for incompetence or some other reason. If these are the issues, though, then the comrades should focus on them directly, and not argue in generalities which challenge the basic theory of the party we are trying to build.

More damning in its implications is the denagogic 'workerism' which they try to use here. Working in Cowley is not the best situation from which to prepare for and write serious articles. That's for sure. That the organisation should do everything it can to offset the pressure on time and energy so as to make it possible for the comrades to write and study, is essential to the organisation being a healthy one attuned to the working class, one in which workers can live, breath and develop. I would argue for Smith and Jones having their burden of routine party work lightened much more than it is at present. I also know from experience what the comrades face in trying to combine writing with doing heavy industrial work.

But Jones has written on Poland. How can the gaps and limitations, and the fact that over months he didn't seem to manage to focus his ideas on the issues raised, be explained in terms of his general situation, within which he has written a lot of articles over the years?

In fact this seems to be an attempt to appeal for support and sympathy on a spurious and dangerous basis - a denagogic appeal to a section of the organisation against the Bolshevik idea that the party is a cadre organisation which knits together petty bourgeois and proletarian members (and, to bring myself into it, proletarian members who function as professional revolutionaries).

The attempt to appeal demagogically - and with complete spuriousness - to something essentially irrelevant to the issues under debate, against their political opponents on Poland, is quite a long way from the letter and spirit of the political tradition we declared ourselves as having in common six months ago - that of the theorists of our views of the party, Lenin, Trotsky, Gramsci, Cannon.

Smith's assertion that I had insulted the Assembly Plant branch at the last E.N.C. was in the same vein. I hope that if a discussion develops, we will not descend to this level again. I serve notice, however, that if it does, then we will discuss these questions politically - in terms of what conception the comrades have of the revolutionary party we are trying to build.

The question of the revolutionary party is indeed the heart of the problem. The revolutionary party is in the first place a programme - which is not just a set of numbered points, but a concretisation of goals and basic concepts in relation to the world around us, i.e. it is also an analysis, if it is alive. The drive of some of the comrades to reduce down the ideological work, or even the work of keeping the real world under review (the issue in dispute over Ireland last year) amounts to a drive to sterilise the organisation politically and intellectually. Instead we need to have a Bolshevik approach of not being frightened to express differences and to fight for clarity on the basis of an effort to learn and to convince.

Many of the problems we face arise from an averaging-out approach - organisationally and politically - which as far as I can see afflicted the old WSL, which threatened the new WSL, and which thus threatens to undercut and destroy one of the essential strengths of the I.O.U.

Time and space force me to draw to a conclusion. It is as follows:
1. The paper should be so edited as to promote and defend the agreed positions of the League. It will maintain a sharp and clear line on the immediate issues of the class struggle.

2. Agreed policy covers positions adopted by conferences, leading committees, etc. It does not and cannot cover shades of analysis, assessment, etc; moreover, such officially adopted positions can be solidly and scientifically grounded only to the extent that they are based on substantial work done by competent and interested comrades to develop those 'shades' as clearly as possible in line with objective reality.

The Leninist method strives for a homogenous understanding - but not on the basis of averaging-out. Leninism therefore demands a range of shades of analysis in the press - the alternative being to edit the press on the basis of a lowest-common-denominator or a consensus, i.e. to sterilise the paper and the organisation politically and intellectually.

3. Given the different cultures and traditions in the League, and given that lowest-common-denominator politics is alien to Trotskyism and unprincipled, we do not have any alternative in the organisation but the approach above.

4. Where there is a majority position, minority views should generally be allowed space in the press for a discussion. The exceptions should be where such public discussion compromises the integrity of the organisation, would bring us into disrepute, or use the weight of bourgeois public opinion against the League, etc. On major defined differences the right of decision would, of course, lie with the leading bodies of the League.

In addition we will probably need a period of paying more attention to the formal commitment to parity than we have been doing.

CAROLAN 14.2.82