

AGAINST NEUTRALITY ON THE FALKLANDS WAR
DEFEND ARGENTINA - NO CONFIDENCE IN GALTIERI

The present position of the movement on the Falklands war was endorsed by a 20-16 vote on the National Committee on Sunday May 17th. This vote overturned a 5-3 majority decision of the Executive Committee a week earlier. The present majority NC position, which determines our attitude to the Falklands war, is one of defeatism on both sides, linked to demands for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands and self-determination for the 1500 islanders. The signatories to this document consider these positions to be wrong and damaging to the WSL, the working class and the anti-imperialist masses.

There seems to be a lack of clarity as to what defeatism on both sides means. We have to be absolutely honest and say that it means neutrality in the military conflict between Britain and Argentina. Contrary to the impression which may be given, to call for defeatism in Britain does not imply a call for the victory of the Argentine forces over British forces. This has been clear on the EC and the NC. There has been agreement on the call for the defeat of the British forces but not by the Argentine forces.

Defeatism means the defeat of your own ruling class by the working class. It means "the main enemy is at home". It means "British workers and soldiers turn your guns on your own officers and ruling class", because our own ruling class is an imperialist ruling class. That is a basic Marxist position that we hold in all wars at any time which are being waged by our own ruling class. The question is, what position do we hold for the other side in the war, in this case Argentina? If we hold, as we do, a revolutionary defeatist position for the Argentine working class, then we are saying, "Both working classes defeat your own ruling class; the outcome of the war is irrelevant; a victory for **one side would not be more progressive than the other**". In other words, we are neutral in the military conflict between the two state powers, both in the final outcome and in particular battles or clashes. This is often a correct position to hold. We would always hold it in the case of a war between two imperialist powers. It would often be our position in the case of a war between non-imperialist powers - like Iran and Iraq. In the case of a war between a major imperialist power and a non-imperialist power, however, it can be fundamentally wrong. It even questions whether we would favour the defeat of the British forces by the Argentine forces if it happened. At the NC, Comrade Carolan could not decide which would be worst - a British or an Argentine victory!

Such a position of neutrality reflects in part the very different material conditions prevailing at present in Britain as against those facing the Argentine workers. In Britain of course there is no conscription, no danger of air strikes at our mainland, no enemy fleet cruising 12 miles off the coast threatening to attack any ship or aircraft which ventures out of port, and no overt austerity measures.

Conditions in Argentina are very different. The working class cannot escape from the fact that their country is under attack. The whole male population has been conscripted; and there is a foreign, imperialist navy offshore with guns and missiles trained on Argentine targets. The imperialist response to Galtieri's adventure in invading the Malvinas has in turn triggered a wave of anti-imperialist militancy. In the mass mobilisations on the streets can be seen the most advanced, class conscious elements in the Argentine workers' movement, exploiting the opening in the repression to put forward the slogan "Malvinas yes - Galtieri no!"

It is in this context that every major current of Trotskyism, with the exception of the WSL, the Sparts and a handful of (North European)

USFI people, has concluded that the war creates conditions to raise the consciousness of the Argentine working class and develop the struggle against imperialism. The closer we get to Latin America, the more unanimous are political tendencies that a victory for Argentina would create better conditions for the struggle to oust Galtieri and the junta. Yet from England, the TSL majority tells them all that they are wrong.

Indeed, since the majority position suggests - at least implicitly - that the cause of the Argentine workers might be better served by a military victory of British imperialism than by an Argentine victory, it is worth looking a little more closely at this scenario. Would a defeat for Galtieri precipitate a resurgence of workers' militancy in Argentina, a resumption of the mass action which pushed Galtieri into his initial invasion, a produce a heightened confidence among workers of their ability to topple the imperialist-backed junta which has so savagely repressed them?

This might be argued to be the case were it true that the predominant mood among the workers was hostility to the war. But all the signs are that the workers identify with the fight against British imperialism. They would regard a setback in that war as a setback for them. We have no reason to presume at present that under the blows of such a setback the working class - which had not been strong enough previously to topple the junta - will suddenly find renewed strength. Indeed a beaten and isolated Galtieri could even seek ways to utilise such a situation to rally "national unity" in a beleaguered Argentina, and implant the Malvinas diversion as a central obstacle to further moves of the working class.

Outside Argentina the masses of Latin America would witness a ~~bloody setback inflicted upon a whole nation by imperialist armed~~ force. We cannot precisely 'quantify' such a blow to the consciousness of the masses: but it would certainly shape the thinking and thus the actions of those in struggle against imperialist control.

To stand for the defence of Argentina in the war does not imply, of course, support for the blood-drenched military junta. It means standing with an oppressed nation against an oppressor. The government of the day in the oppressed nation is an important issue which we have to address ourselves to, but it is secondary to the struggle against imperialism. The very clear position argued by Trotsky on this is well worth repeating for comrades who still may not be familiar with it:

On Brazil:

"In the countries of Latin America the agents of 'democratic' imperialism are especially dangerous, since they are more capable of fooling the masses than the open agents of fascist bandits. I will take the most simple and obvious example. In Brazil there now reigns a semifascist regime that every revolutionary can only view with hatred. Let us assume, however, that on the morrow England enters into a military conflict with Brazil. I ask you on whose side of the conflict will the working class be? I will answer for myself personally - in this case I will be on the side of 'fascist' Brazil against 'democratic' Great Britain. Why? Because in the conflict between them it will not be a question of democracy or fascism. If England should be victorious, she will put another fascist in Rio de Janeiro and will place double chains on Brazil. If Brazil on the contrary should be victorious, it will give a mighty impulse to national and democratic consciousness of the country and will lead to the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship. The defeat of England will at the same time deliver a blow to

British imperialism and will give an impulse to the revolutionary movement of the British proletariat. Truly, one must have an empty head to reduce world antagonisms and military conflicts to the struggle between fascism and democracy. Under all masks one must know how to distinguish exploiters, slave-owners and robbers!"
(Writings 38-39, p.34)

On China: When China was faced with invasion from Imperialist Japan, Trotsky had to polemicise against a false position argued by sectarian forces (including some in the Chinese section). Their position was this: Since Chiang Kai-Shek is reactionary, a war fought in defence against the Japanese imperialists under his leadership was therefore also reactionary. In arguing their defeatism, the sectarians said: "The only salvation of the workers and peasants of China is to struggle independently against the two armies". Faced with a situation of a real military conflict between a non-imperialist country against an imperialist invasion, Trotsky defined the sectarian position in this way: "To speak of 'revolutionary defeatism' in general without distinguishing between exploiter and exploited countries, is to make a miserable caricature of Bolshevism . . . If Japan is an imperialist country, and if China is the victim of imperialism, we favour China. Japanese patriotism is the hideous mask of world-wide robbery. Chinese patriotism is legitimate and progressive."

Trotsky was not unaware of the reactionary nature of the Chinese regime: "Chiang Kai-Shek is the executioner of the Chinese workers and peasants. But today he is forced, despite himself, to struggle against Japan". "(it is) the duty of all workers organisations of China to participate actively and in the front lines . . . without abandoning for a single moment their own program and independent activity . . . To be able to replace him (Chiang) it is necessary to gain decisive influence among the proletariat and in the army, and to do this it is necessary, not to remain suspended in the air, but to place oneself in the midst of the struggle. We must win influence and prestige in the military struggle against the foreign invasion [Trotsky uses the word 'invasion' because he is referring to an invasion, on Brazil he talks about 'military conflict'] and in the political struggle against the weaknesses, the deficiencies, the internal betrayal. At a certain point, which we cannot fix in advance, this political opposition can and must be transformed into armed conflict since the civil war, like war generally, is nothing more than the continuation of the political struggle. It is necessary however to know when and how to transform political opposition into armed insurrection . . . To participate actively and consciously in the war does not mean to 'serve Chiang Kai-Shek' but to serve the independence of a colonial country in spite of Chiang Kai-Shek . . . In participating in the military struggle under the orders of Chiang Kai-Shek, since unfortunately it is he who has the command in the war for independence - to prepare politically the overthrow of Chiang Kai-Shek . . . that is the only revolutionary policy."

(On China, pp. 567-571)

On Mexico:

"Thus, in a conflict between the oil kings and their executive committee, which is the democratic government of Great Britain, the class conscious proletariat of the world sides wholly with Mexico."

(Writings 38-39, p.64)

On Tunisia:

"We shall not dwell on the fact that in the event of a national war waged by the Bey of Tunis against France, program would be on the side of the barbarian monarch."

(Writings 38-39, p.66)

That very clear quote, where Trotsky is talking about a regime worse than Galtieri, has not been adequately refuted by the comrades on the NC majority. They tackle it in two ways. First, they question whether Argentina is in fact a non-imperialist power, and define it as "sub-imperialist". Secondly, they say that Trotsky's position would only apply in the case of an invasion of the Argentine mainland aimed at the conquest and military suppression of Argentina. (Something which is absolutely inconceivable). But these two positions are contradictory. The first backs up an often-expressed view of the NC majority comrades that Argentina is a middle-ranking capitalist power little different to Britain. The second says that in the event of a war of conquest against Argentina it would be regarded as fundamentally different and Trotsky's view would apply.

The NC majority say that they would support Argentina in a war against imperialism only if national liberation was involved. And national liberation is defined to mean only the struggle to remove, or defend against direct imperialist rule through conquest. What the comrades have done is to define national liberation and war in such a way that they will never be called upon to defend Argentina.

But the facts are that Argentina is subject to national domination by imperialism. National rights are involved - the right of a non-imperialist nation to recover what it thinks is its property from imperialism, without having to face attack and discipline from the military force of imperialism. Argentina is a non-imperialist dependent state. And it is at war, in defence against imperialist attack.

The majority comrades argue at great length, and place great store, as to whether we have changed our position or not (although they would be better discussing whether we are right or wrong rather than if we have changed). There have certainly been mistakes since April 2nd by a majority of comrades on both the EC and the OC. The estimations of the war by the majority (not the majority as it now stands) have varied between treating it as a joke to a consistent underestimation of its significance. At the first OC meeting after April 2nd, comrade Carolan argued against discussing the adoption of a position on the task force on the basis that it was "a joke". From then until the first bombing of Port Stanley airstrip, a majority view held that the most likely outcome would be military intimidation to back up diplomatic moves limiting military action to "skirmishes". Pressure for this came from the OC comrades who now form the NC majority, and was undoubtedly influenced by a desire to mould events to fit their view that British imperialism hardly exists and is certainly no longer a significant force in the world.

A third strand of argument, recurrent in comrade Carolan's document, is to brand the anti-imperialist mobilisation of workers in Argentina - or even Latin America as a whole - as no more than "chauvinism". Those who call for defence of Argentina are likened to the social patriotic traitors of 1914. This position yet again obliterates any distinction between the status of imperialist Britain and dependent, non-imperialist Argentina. And it ignores the very real contradictions within the mobilisation of the masses that has followed the escalation of the war. The hundreds of thousands of workers on the streets are denounced in one lump as "chauvinists" - thus dismissing any prospect of developing the anti-imperialist dynamic of this movement in the direction of the overthrow of the nearest element of imperialist control - the junta itself. To make the ritualistic calls of the majority comrades for the arming of the workers, expropriation of imperialist holdings and overthrow of Galtieri a reality, it is necessary to find a point of connection with the most advanced workers. That connection is plain only from the standpoint of defending Argentina against imperialism - combined with the exposure and political struggle against

Galtieri's junta.

On April 8th the EC met a few hours before the opening of the TILC meeting to discuss, amongst other things, an attitude towards the Falklands situation. A draft by comrade Kinnell was agreed with five comrades in attendance. When we arrived at the TILC meeting, the draft was obviously inadequate, the comrades from the other groups wanting an in-depth discussion on the Falklands. A new draft was produced by comrade Cunliffe which elaborated the position more, removed self-determination of the islanders from point 1 to a lower position, and introduced a paragraph calling for the defence of Argentina in the event of an "all out war": "While recognising that the present conflict is restricted to the Falklands issue, in the event of a full-scale war between Britain and Argentina we would be unequivocally for the defence of Argentina."

(Comrade Carolan now invokes the first sentence to nullify the paragraph, but that was not the intention of comrade Cunliffe, who wrote it, and since any war and any scale of action which arises out of this will remain an issue "over the Falklands", it is obviously a ridiculous interpretation.)

This paragraph is important, because although we may disagree now over what constitutes an all-out war, the paragraph clearly shows that the resolution saw a war between Britain and Argentina as something different to an inter-imperialist war. It recognised that a stage could arise when we would have to defend Argentina and made provisions for it. Why was it agreed so easily then and disputed now? One can only conclude that the comrades have either changed their position on it, or that they agreed to the formulation safe behind their assessment that the war would never reach this stage, and the question of invoking the clause would never arise. But what has changed?

If the nature and stage of development of Argentine capitalism and the decline of British imperialism invalidates a comparison with Trotsky's views (quoted above) now, then the same was the case on April 9th at the TILC meeting. If the view that Argentina and Britain are similar middle-ranking capitalist states is right now, it was right then. The view of course does not hold. Militarily there is no comparison. Argentina is economically dependent on imperialism, mainly US imperialism. Like most of Latin America, it is a producer of primary commodities, in its case grain and beef, for export. Argentine private industry is heavily dependent on foreign, mostly US, investment, and the state industries and services are heavily dependent on vast loans from foreign banks resulting in the current huge debts.

Despite this, Argentina is second only to Brazil in economic development in Latin America. But this is still a long way behind the imperialist countries. Intercontinental Press uses a useful comparison with Canada to make this point (May 3rd 82, p.367):

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Population	27,300,000	23,940,000
% urban	72%	75.5%
Gross domestic product	\$61.5 billion	\$245.8 billion
Imports	\$6.7 billion	\$62.6 billion
Exports	\$7.8 billion	\$67.5 billion
Electricity produced (kw hrs)	29.05 billion	335.71 billion
Crude steel produced (metric tons)	3.2 million	16.1 million
Autos in use	2.03 million	9.02 million
Autos manufactured	135,000	1.14 million
Trucks manufactured	45,480	610,800

(continued)

	<u>Argentina</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Rail freight (not ton equals km)	10.37 billion	215.35 billion
Beef produced (metric tons)	3.19 million	1.06 million
Telephones	2.6 million	14.5 million
5-19-year-olds in school	59%	76%
Infant mortality (per 1000 born alive)	59.0	2.4
(With the car production figures, Argentina is equivalent to 2 tracks in Cowley and Canada is equivalent to BL before Edwardes).		

The Telegraph City Comment of May 18th gave some interesting figures on recent Western bank loans to Latin American countries (which should be seen in relationship to GNP):

"Since the Falklands crisis, international banks have been taking a hard look at the extent of their involvement in loans not only to Argentina, but to the whole of Latin America, with the result that many have begun to regret their past generosity. The latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements make it easier to understand why. The bank, which monitors offshore lending by international banks, reveals that Latin America continued to attract the 'lion's share' of new bank loans right up until the end of last year.

"In the fourth quarter of 1981, international banks lent an extra \$17,000 million to developing countries. Of that, nearly \$12,000 million went to Latin America. Mexico alone borrowed an additional \$5,400 million while Brazil took \$4,200 million worth of new loans. Argentina, though, less avid for new money, borrowed an extra \$1,300 million. The BIS figures also show that at the last count, banks had a total of \$182,000 million out on loan to Latin America. Against that, deposits from the area, which are seen as the first line of defence in the event of payment problems, amounted to just \$58,000 million."

So, if the objection based on Argentine economic development is not valid, has the war reached the stage of an all-out war? It is certainly true that such a stage was never adequately defined at the TILC meeting. In debate, views were expressed that this stage would come in the event of an attack on the Argentine mainland. This was plainly inadequate, and has to be reassessed in the light of the unfolding of real events. A full-scale war involving the destruction of most of the Argentine navy and air force and much of its army could conceivably take place without ever involving the Argentine mainland. It would be a false distinction to hold a neutral position on a bloody war raging between Argentine state power and British imperialism in the South Atlantic and the Falklands and switch to the defence of Argentina only in the event of air strikes on mainland bases which would be a part of the same war.

Already British forces are operating on the Argentine mainland, preparing military operations against bases and instalations. Where do we stand on these? Do we defend Argentina against them whilst remaining neutral in battles with the ships which landed them there?

In the first stages, when the task force was dispatched, it was not at all clear that Thatcher would be prepared to launch a war if diplomatic efforts failed. The South Georgia operation was conducted without bloodshed and the officers invited to dinner afterwards. It changed with the bombing of Port Stanley airstrip, the sinking of the Belgrano and the Sheffield, the shooting down of aircraft and the extension of the total exclusion zone to cover the whole of the South Atlantic up to 12 miles of the Argentine coast, preventing Argentir

ships from leaving port. At the same time the size of the task force was doubled and the number of troops at sea trebled. The decision had been taken to go to war.

Whatever assessment we had made of the previous period, and whether we had been right or wrong in our assessment of Thatcher's intentions and the probable course of events, all became irrelevant. It was now in our opinion an undeclared war and should be treated as such. On that basis we proposed at the EC on May 16th to change our attitude to the war in line with the contingency agreed in the TILC resolution, and switch to a defence of Argentina position.

This does not alter our assessment of Galtieri's motives in his invasion of the Falklands. It was to head off a confrontation with the powerful Argentine working class and therefore entirely reactionary. Galtieri's anti-imperialism is phoney because he rests on imperialism. He wanted to invoke the strong anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist sentiment in the Argentine working class for his own ends. But he clearly miscalculated the response of British imperialism, which saw in it a threat to its authority and an opportunity to reestablish some of the past glory of British imperialism, and establish a position where the forces of British imperialism has a record of military intervention far beyond Ireland. Galtieri's problem was that he could not stand against the British assault without bringing forward the Argentine working class and inflaming the strong and progressive anti-imperialist sentiments, something which could dig his grave at a later stage.

Nor does it alter the rights or wrongs of the Argentine claim of sovereignty rights over the Falklands. We cannot ignore the fact that the Falklands were taken by force from Argentina as part of Britain's policy of colonial expansion. We recognise that they were used by Britain as a naval base to guard the passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic ocean, but if the settlers were a distinct and viable community and were asking for self-determination, we would support them. Geographical or historical arguments would not apply. But they are not asking for self-determination. They are militantly pro-imperialist and determined to stay that way. On top of this, they are a population, as was said at the NC, the size of 3 streets in Islington, and declining all the time. A third of them are there simply because they are employed by Coalite Co. who run the place like a company encampment. Obviously their views and fears are a consideration and could be decisive under different conditions. But we cannot subordinate the world political situation to the Falkland settlers and give them an imperialist veto. To do so would ignore the class politics involved.

We cannot allow a reflexive bias towards self-determination as an answer to all questions to allow us to subordinate the international class issues involved in the Falklands war. It is the international struggle against imperialism which should come first for us now it has reached this stage.

As comrade Morrow makes clear in his document, the war has changed the parameters of the situation we are dealing with. In other words, the international dimension becomes paramount. Britain is doing what the USA has been unable to do in any real way since the Vietnam war, to impose its will on a non-imperialist power. It is indeed a war of imperialist authority. The main plank of Thatcher is 'that' Britain is now upholding international law and order as US imperialism claimed in Vietnam and Korea. What Thatcher means is law and order as defined and interpreted by imperialism. The implications of this are that the outcome of the war will have a profound effect on the world political situation afterwards. A victory for Britain would increase the confidence

of world imperialism in using military force, and would begin to establish the use of military force against non-imperialist nations as the norm. Whilst a defeat for Britain would deny the imperialists of such a boost and emphasise their inability to use force successfully.

Neither is it just a matter of British imperialism. US imperialism, which hesitated for weeks, has now come down on the side of Britain. Like Thatcher, Reagan would prefer a negotiated settlement on Britain's terms forced on Argentina by military threats and intimidation. But since this is not possible, with the junta caught between British imperialism and the anti-imperialist sentiments of the powerful Argentine working class, Reagan was forced to openly state his position. The USA is now clearly backing Thatcher with considerable military aid. Fuel supplies for ship and in-flight refuelling is now readily available to the task force. Sophisticated radar cover is now being supplied to the extent of a specially launched 'Big Bird' spy satellite orbiting constantly over the South Atlantic. There is no doubt that an unlimited amount of combat and logistical equipment will be made available to Britain from the USA as and when it becomes necessary. (Only a persistent anti-war feeling at home has prevented Reagan from carrying out similar adventures of his own.) To back this up they are also trying to use the EEC as a pro-imperialist political block.

The escalating military conflict to war proportions put an end to Haig's mediation and Reagan's prevarication. Though their overall interests are by no means identical, the USA's decision to back Britain was based on the assessment that this would best serve its world interests. The risk of severe disruption of the USA's relationship with the South American states, through undermining the Rio Treaty, OAS etc., were regarded by the US government as less damaging than weakening links with Western European NATO states and their common anti-USSR cold war policies.

For us to call for the withdrawal of the Argentine troops from the Falklands, which the NC majority comrades vehemently argue for, and about which comrade Kinnell has self-criticised his hesitation at the EC, under these conditions is incredible. To do that now the war has started would hand Thatcher a massive victory on a plate, particularly if the invasion of the islands had started and a land war was taking place. (Neither is it parochial to say that such a demand for withdrawal if carried out would result in another Tory government with a massive majority, since it would be an event of world significance).

For British Trotskyists to call for the withdrawal of Argentine troops is thus doubly unacceptable. But of course this does not mean that the issue is not a perfectly legitimate question for debate within the Argentine workers' movement, as part of a struggle which should centre around the slogans "Defend Argentina: No Confidence in Galtieri". The line of argument would then be obvious:

1) Argentina is under attack and must be defended against imperialism.

2) But who is best placed to defend Argentina? The Galtieri junta, hatchet men of imperialism, whose crazy diversionary adventure started a war over a side issue instead of over the expropriation of imperialist holdings? The Galtieri junta, who sent young conscripts into the invasion with orders not to shoot back; who still shrink from any break with imperialism; who keep thousands of militants in their prisons? Or the workers movement, organised in detachments to drive off the imperialist aggressors and seize their real bulwarks in Argentina - their factories, banks and land?

3) The workers have been placed under conscription - let the unions now organise the arming and training of their members in independent workers' detachments. Let the rank and file soldiers organise their own committees, and elect officers in whom they have confidence to

wage the struggle against imperialism! Down with the officer elite; down with the Galtieri junta!

4) Argentine workers have no interest in the armed occupation of the Falklands against the wishes of the population - most of whom are exploited workers. But in the present conditions it would be worse for the masses of Latin America as a whole if we were to concede a victory to armed imperialist aggression. A withdrawal of imperialist forces is the precondition for the Argentine workers' movement to take up the issue of the rights of the Falkland islanders as part of the fight on every level for democratic rights and the overthrow of the Galtieri junta.

We all agree of course about the main slogans for our work in the labour movement in Britain. Stop the war - bring back the fleet - but it would be absolutely astounding if we didn't, since we can get agreement right across the left on that. We also agree that these slogans, not "Victory to Argentina", would be the thrust of our propaganda work. But we have to have a political basis behind the slogans which we argue in detail. There we should argue for the defence of Argentina.

The NC majority comrades argue that a neutral position on the war gives us an adequate or even better basis for our anti-war work in Britain. Certainly a defeatist position is not necessarily a handicap. But there is also a danger that it can be, there is a danger that a neutral position will take the edge off our campaign. In fact we would argue it already has. Certainly prior to the NC on May 26th, our record was very bad against the IMG and the CP (and we say that with the knowledge that IMG-baiting is becoming an increasing problem on the NC), taking into account of course the CP's pacifist pro-UN position.

It was also argued that a victory of the Argentine forces would strengthen the junta and would therefore be negative. There are two points about this. Firstly, since the war is now a major world issue, and its outcome will affect the relationship of class forces on a world scale, the strengthening or weakening of the junta could not be a determining factor. But secondly, it would not necessarily strengthen the junta in the long or medium term. Whilst it is not true to say that Argentina is sub-imperialist, the junta does of course rest entirely on imperialism. Military juntas in non-imperialist countries are the stooges of imperialism. Like a foreman's relationship to an employer, or a lieutenant's relationship to the generals. Therefore if imperialism is weakened, as in the event of a British defeat by Argentina, the dependent military dictatorship must ultimately be weakened, and Galtieri would face that situation under conditions where the Argentine working class would be definitively strengthened by the military victory.

Smith
Jones
Cunliffe
Levy
Morrow

20 May 1982

The following is the resolution agreed by the EC on May 9th. But reversed by the NC on May 16th.

1. We retain our position on forcing the withdrawal of the British fleet and campaign for the disruption of the war effort.
2. The Falklands conflict has now gone beyond issues of sovereignty and self-determination.
3. The struggle has now become an anti-imperialist war with EEC/NATO, US and Japan all lined up against Argentina.
4. The bombing of Port Stanley, the sinking of the Belgrano and Sheffield, the declaration of the 12-mile limit represent a decisive escalation in the situation of undeclared war.
5. The central part of our position must be for the defeat of British imperialism and the victory of the Argentine forces.
6. We retain our assessment of the basis of the invasion by Galtieri.
7. We drop our call for the withdrawal of Argentine troops.

We are appealing to the comrades who support the general line of this document, particularly the conclusions which are summarised in the EC motion which was reversed by the NC, to join the tendency which we have declared on this issue. The purpose of the tendency will be solely and exclusively to argue and organise with a view to changing the current line of the movement on the Falklands/Argentina war.