

## POLAND AND STALINISM

In this article I wish to cover the question of the "Right of self-determination" with regard to the Eastern European countries and their relationship to the USSR. But in order to do this, I will have to make reference to two other questions of some dispute in the movement. The most important of these is the use by some comrades of the term "potentially progressive" when describing the nationalised property relations in the SU and E Europe. This is something I strongly disagree with and which I think affects the present position on Poland. The other point, which has only just arisen is the failure of some comrades to recognise the dangers from imperialism to the nationalised property relations. With some comrades this goes further to the actual assertion that there is no such danger.

### The right of self-determination

This was put forward on the NC as one of the WSL's "Solidarity" demands and accepted with a small majority. It has since been expanded in the TILC resolution in two ways. Firstly, with the slogan "For an Independent Socialist Poland"; and secondly, with a paragraph in the text explaining that we fight for Polish self-determination as part of our programme for a political revolution. These two additions were included in the TILC resolution with the support of the whole WSL delegation.

I think that as a solidarity slogan, "For Polish self-determination" is wrong. I think that the slogan put forward by Trotskyists should be "For an Independent Socialist Poland". This slogan would allow us to immediately relate to the progressive content of the hostility to the Kremlin bureaucracy. But it would also allow us to develop that hostility in a transitional way towards the political revolution. At the same time, through such a slogan, we would easily be able to distinguish ourselves from the social democrats and reactionaries. In all our propaganda, we would explain that socialism means the working class in power, and not social democracy. It would be impossible to directly adapt the slogan which Trotsky used in relation to the Ukraine - "For an Independent Soviet Ukraine" - as this would be confusing. But we should try to capture as much of that meaning as possible.

Let us be clear from the beginning that I am in favour of the Polish people having the right to self-determination. I am no way in favour of tanks from the SU deciding what takes place in Poland, unless it is as a defensive action against a direct imperialist military intervention. But that is a general orientation. To simply turn that orientation into a slogan can create important problems. For, as a slogan, it is abstract and open to many different interpretations. It can connect up with extremely reactionary nationalist elements which want to bring Poland under the control of imperialism under the guise of "independence".

Insofar as the relations of Poland to the Soviet Union are concerned, the call by many of the nationalist elements for "independence" is characterised by a strong anti-communism. To be more precise, it is characterised not by opposition to the anti-working class bureaucracy, but by opposition to the nationalised property relations. This point mainly applies to emigre elements. Within Poland, although there is much confused political thought, the general position of the working class is not for a return to capitalism. The demands of workers in struggle and solidarity statements made that quite clear. The demands of the workers are for political transformations and economic changes which could only occur on the basis of nationalised property relations.

I am not suggesting that other comrades say that we are for the right of self-determination and leave it at that. But if we do do that, then we are suggesting that Poland can be independent, can pull away from the Stalinist camp, and somehow develop without being ensnared in the imperialist camp. But we must remember that this is the same Poland which has a 27-billion dollar debt to the

West. In addition, a vast sum is owed to the USSR whose industry and economy are approaching a state of collapse. In reality, even if the USSR did not intervene, Poland could never take some "democratic" path under capitalism. It has not got the economic basis for that. Far from being under the control of the Polish people, let alone the Polish working class, a capitalist Poland would be under the control of the imperialist banks. Far from independence, the banks would own Poland. They would pursue a path not of democracy, but of profiteering and plunder, of retribution. And they would do this with their tanks behind them.

The reality is that the only way that Poland can develop, outside of Stalinist or imperialist control, is along the road of political revolution based on proletarian internationalism - i.e., combined with the struggle for such a revolution throughout E Europe and in the USSR, and for a social revolution in the capitalist countries. There is no other basis on which the Polish people can determine their own future. This is the struggle for independent class politics that the Marxist movement has always fought for. It is necessary, in our propaganda and agitation, to make clear the only real basis for independence from imperialism and Stalinism.

There are many Polish workers with nationalist ideas. They or other nationalist elements may say to us that they have the right to determine their own future. They may put forward the slogan of self-determination. We do not say that we disagree with them or that we are opposed to their struggle. But we do say that a genuine self-determination can only be achieved in a revolutionary way on a socialist political and economic basis. So we need a slogan which can take up the right to self-determination and point the way forward in developing the progressive hostility to the Kremlin bureaucracy. We need a slogan which can take up existing nationalist sentiment and consciousness but develop it politically in a transitional way towards the political revolution. The slogan "For an Independent Socialist Poland" serves these tasks. And it is therefore the slogan which we ourselves should put forward.

### Soviet Union and National Oppression Historically

For the Bolsheviks after the revolution, the question of national oppression of the countries around them was not invented in an abstract way. It was posed in a very real way in a situation where the Bolshevik government was trying to exist with a correct approach to national rights at a time of war and revolution.

Take for example the "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Question" written by Lenin in 1920 for the second Congress of the Comintern (Theses, Resolutions and Manifestoes of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, pp 76 - 81). Lenin talks of the need for a closer union with the "working people of the various nations and the Soviet Union". Therefore, he argues in Thesis 7 for a federation as a "transitional form to the complete unity of the working people of different nations", and he cites as examples the relations between the RSFSR and the Soviet Republics of Hungary, Finland, Latvia, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine. He also cites the autonomous republics of the Balkans and Tartars. Why does he argue for federation? Because this is a much looser form/unification, and is aimed at taking into account the "national" feelings of the peoples of those countries, many of whom had actually been previously oppressed by Russia.

But why does he argue for any relationship? Well, this is argued in Thesis 8 and is quite straightforward. It is based on the impossibility of developing the productive forces in countries surrounded by a hostile imperialist world, other than through this relationship. Such a relationship would be both political and economic.

This attitude of Lenin's comes out quite clearly in his article 'On the Nationalities Question' (in Lenin's fight against Stalinism). Here he is taking up the role of Orjonikidze and Dzerzhinsky and behind them Stalin in the

"Georgian affair". He even proposes that it might be necessary to "take a step backwards at our next Congress of Soviets, i.e. retain the USSR only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual peoples commissariats" (p 137). He says this in order to defend the revolution's prestige with the emerging anti-imperialist movements and says that we must not be seen to have any vestige of "those imperialist attitudes."

#### Invasion of Poland 1920

This is often cited by anti-Marxists as an example of "neo-imperialist elements" in the Bolshevik tradition. In fact, it was defensive counter-attack, launched only after the bourgeois Polish army had attacked the RSFSR. It had two aims: firstly to stop any further attack; secondly to help the Polish workers seize power. The Bolsheviks saw the massive oppression of the workers and peasants of Poland at the hands of a bourgeoisie which was being assisted in every possible way by the imperialists (especially through arms). They thought that this was an uneven battle which the Polish workers could not win without outside help. To the Bolsheviks the Polish campaign was necessary to defend the revolution against imperialism. It was also an internationalist act of proletarian solidarity. It is something for which no Marxist has to apologise. On the contrary, we should be proud of it, and sorry only for its failure in its second goal. I do not want to deal here with the reasons for that failure. But one thing must be made clear: it was not in any way a chauvinist campaign. For example Order 217 in May 1920 attacked any mistreatment of prisoners, despite the fact the Polish White Guard forces were torturing and killing Red Army soldiers. Order 230 closed down the Military Science journal of the Red Army because of a racist remark in an article. Even when the Red Army was winning they still talked about the "inviolability of Polish territory".

The reality of the Polish campaign was this: the Polish government enslaved the people of Lithuania and the Ukraine. The Bolshevik government offered them peace terms. These were rejected and the Polish army then invaded Russian territory. The Red Army then fought back, drove the Polish bourgeois army back to the edge of Warsaw, was defeated and was driven back. The Riga Peace was then made. This left the Polish bourgeoisie in a worse position than when they first invaded. They still controlled Lithuania, but parts of the Ukraine had been freed. So far from this being a great defeat for the Red Army and an example of its "imperialist attitudes" it was a blow to the real imperialists who were using their stooge Pilsudski. Nonetheless, the imperialists still ended up enslaving the Lithuanian people.

In the case of Poland, the Bolsheviks were willing to use a defensive invasion in an effort to promote the Polish revolution. Yet the whole way through, they did not in any way relinquish the general Marxist commitment to the right for self-determination. But that general position was concretised. The same thing happened in the case of the other states within the RSFSR. Here, the Bolsheviks were willing to advance federalism. The slogans were completely different. But each slogan took account of nationalist feelings and was based on a general orientation in support of national self-determination. If the slogans were different, the method underlying them was the same. The way the Bolsheviks proceeded was to take account of nationalist feelings and try to develop them in whatever, in the circumstances, was the progressive direction.

I have tried to show, then, that "self-determination" was never a simple slogan or question. Of course, conditions changed from one case to the next. Now the Soviet Union has degenerated, and so the questions today are different. But I think that the method, of taking full account of nationalist feelings, but trying to develop them in a progressive way, must be the same.

### Ukraine: Trotsky's real position

Cde. S. sometimes suggests that his position arises simply and directly out of Trotsky's writings. I think that only a cursory reading of Trotsky shows this to be false, and study demolishes it.

In In Defence of Marxism Trotsky calls for an "independent Soviet Ukraine" and for that matter says that he would suggest the same as regards Byelorussia. His position just before and during the war was the same. In an article written on April 22, 1939 he says "A clear and definite slogan is necessary that corresponds to the new situation. In my opinion there can be at the present time only one such slogan; a united, free and independent workers' and peasants' soviet Ukraine" (Writings, 1938 -39, p 304). Cde. S. now tries to say that Trotsky's real position was for an "independent Ukraine". He says that the demand includes "soviet" because of the particular conditions, especially the war. In fact, Trotsky is not just dealing with the Ukrainian question because of the proximity or existence of the war. He specifically attacks those "socialists" and "communists" who only take up this question because it was brought to the forefront of world attention because of the approach of war.

Several questions were involved in the Ukrainian question. At that time the Ukraine was split; part controlled by the capitalists of Poland and Hungary, and part in the Soviet Union. It is clear from Trotsky's slogan (stressing unity) that it was not only referring to the part of the Ukraine in the SU. The article makes this even clearer. So he is attacking the treatment which the capitalists give to the oppressed peoples: the way the capitalists trample on the national rights of the Ukrainians, as well as their oppression at the hands of the Stalinist bureaucracy. But I think it is clear that he is presenting a slogan based on the property relations inside the Soviet Ukraine. If Trotsky developed his slogan in this way because of the threat of war then it was being based on the danger of the invasion of the Soviet Union. But if it was based just on that danger Trotsky would not have stressed "independent".

Trotsky makes this clear when he says the following in relation to Finnish resistance to a Soviet attack: "Finland's resistance to the USSR was, with all its heroism, no more an act of independent national defence than Norway's subsequent resistance to Germany. The Helsinki govt itself understood this when it chose to capitulate to the USSR, rather than transform Finland into a military base for England and France. Our wholehearted recognition of the right of every nation to self determination does not alter the fact that in the case of the present war, this right does not have much more weight than this tumbledown. We must determine the basic line of our policy in accordance with basic and not tenth-rate factors." (Manifesto of the FI, 1939 - 40, p 198)

In relation to Finland, where war was the basic factor, 'independence' could not weigh more than this tumbledown. But in relation to the Ukraine, Trotsky includes 'independence' because his position is not based just on the fact of the war.

Trotsky made clear his attitude to "nationalists" in the 1939 article. He wrote: "Not the slightest compromise with imperialism, either fascist or democratic\* Not the slightest concession to the Ukrainian nationalists, either clerical, reactionary, or liberal-pacifist! No people's fronts! The complete independence of the proletarian party as the vanguard of the toilers!" (p 30)

True, he declares that this is a personal position. He expresses the hope that as the international discussion opens up, the Ukrainian resolution would be an especially important part of it. But this was certainly Trotsky's position at the time.

Cde. S. quotes from a later article on the question of independence - 'Independence of the Ukraine and Sectarian Muddleheads'. This article begins with an attack against sectarians who have opposed the slogan of an independent Soviet Ukraine and have expressed outright hostility to the rights of the Ukrainian

people. Because he is attacking sectarians who argue that it was wrong to support the independence of the Ukraine, Trotsky keeps referring to the slogan "For an independent Ukraine". This is to show his opposition to those who take no account of the nationalist feelings of the Ukrainian masses.

In the latter part of the article, Trotsky changes the target of his attack. Then he takes up those who limit the demand to an independent democratic Ukraine. Against them, he argues that the correct slogan is "An independent Soviet Ukraine". "The petty bourgeois nationalists consider correct the slogan of an independent Ukraine. But they object to the correlation of this slogan with the proletarian revolution. They want an independent democratic Ukraine, and not a Soviet Ukraine." (p 53) Either we believe that Trotsky places himself with the petty bourgeois nationalists and does not want a Soviet Ukraine - remembering that this would mean handing over part of the Ukraine to the capitalists. Or we recognise that Trotsky recognises the reality of nationalist feelings, sees in these a progressive content insofar as they are based on mass hostility to the Kremlin bureaucracy, and at the same time advances a slogan which is designed to develop that hostility in a progressive direction.

Trotsky never saw the bureaucracy collapsing and disappearing. He never left the question of its destruction open. He always saw it being brought down, in a particular way. Therefore, he persistently tried to give political direction to anti-bureaucratic sentiments and feelings. This is clear for example in the case of the Kirov assassination in 1934. Trotsky argues that he can understand the action of the assassin Nikolaev, but that the action can only benefit counter-revolution. "So long as the Soviet bureaucracy has not been removed by the proletariat - a task which will eventually be accomplished - it fulfils a necessary function in defence of the workers' state." (Writings 1934 - 35, p 123) This is not just a chance slip. Trotsky quotes the article in his evidence to the Dewey Commission, 1939. It is true that in the case of Nikolaev, Trotsky is in no way arguing for his imprisonment. In fact, he explains his action and in so doing solidarises with him. But he puts forward his own, proletarian method of taking forward the fight against the bureaucracy.

In fact, all Trotsky's writings of this period are designed to give the national struggle against bureaucratic oppression a positive direction. The slogan "For an independent Soviet Ukraine" is put forward as a transitional demand to do precisely that.

So Com. S. cannot suggest that his position arises simply and directly out of Trotsky's position. His position is actually not an orthodox position. It is not enough to claim that support for national self-determination is an orthodox Trotskyist position. It is necessary to give the general orientation a specific and concrete content. Com. S. misrepresents Trotsky's real position. Then he puts forward that misrepresentation as evidence that he is following orthodox Trotskyist lines. But he ignores the orthodox Trotskyist method - to take general orientations and principles, and give them a specific content which gives political direction. That is why Trotsky, who was the greatest fighter for the rights of the oppressed and exploited peoples of the world, is able to say that he is completely committed to the rights of the oppressed peoples to national self-determination. But in both examples we have looked at - Poland in 1920 and the case of the Ukraine - that general commitment was given a different specific content.

#### Defence of Nationalised Property Relations

And so Com. S. cannot claim Trotskyist orthodoxy, except in the abstract. This does not mean that the slogan he puts forward is necessarily wrong. It does mean that it cannot be backed up as a position directly developed from Trotsky's writings. The only other basis on which Com. S. can argue his position is to point to changed conditions. It is true that the danger of an invasion today is far less immediate than it was when Hitler faced the USSR. No doubt

Com. S. bases his case on this difference in conditions. Likewise, it is true that a reactionary Soviet invasion of Poland is a distinct possibility. But beneath these differences, there are important similarities. And these similarities should be as much part of our analysis, and the basis for our slogans, as the apparent differences. It is here that I think there are much more than differences of assessment in the positions which Com. S. and I put forward. I believe that these are reflected in Com. S.'s argument that the nationalised property relations of the deformed workers states are "potentially progressive". So it is necessary to deal with this term and its implications.

I think that the slogan "For an independent socialist Poland" fulfils a crucial task which the slogan put forward by Com. S. ignores. Apart from recognising and addressing itself to the national oppression of the Poles, it also directs towards the task of defending the nationalised property relations. It's possible to make an assessment which says that the nationalised property relations are not under any real threat. I do not agree with that assessment.

The imperialists are building up a war movement. They are openly talking about overthrowing the Yalta agreements - for them this means only one thing: overthrowing the nationalised property relations in the workers states. The Stalinist bureaucracies are weak and unstable, and this extends to the Kremlin bureaucracy. Poland and other E European countries are massively indebted to the imperialist banks. This does not mean that I think an invasion is likely or an immediate threat. I do not. But the threat to the nationalised property relations, their undermining, is a process which can take many forms and have many aspects, short of an invasion. We do not need to look for slogans which take as a priority defence against counter-revolution. But we must put forward an analysis, and base our slogans on it, which is aware of the threat and warns and directs against it.

Trotsky all the time tries to show the contradictory nature of the bureaucracy. The dominant factor is its counter-revolutionary nature and role, but together with this is the fact that it is based on the gains of the October revolution in the form of the nationalised property relations. So it is not the same as a capitalist government, however great the atrocities it perpetrates. In the same way we see the dominant role of the trade union leaders as defenders of the capitalist state (even going as far as they did in Nazi Germany to co-operation with the fascists). But they are still based on the trade unions, workers' organisations, so we would defend them against the capitalist state.

Trotsky, in In Defence of Marxism, says: "There is not one amongst us who doubts that the Soviet workers should defend the state property." He argues for the defence of the USSR (p17) and says that this can not be achieved through the bourgeois governments or that of the USSR, "but exclusively through the education of the masses, through agitation, through explaining to the workers what they should defend and what they should overthrow". In other words, Trotsky is arguing that the nationalised property relations should be defended, and that such a defence is a real physical task facing the working class. He also makes it quite clear that it is our task, as revolutionists, to point out to workers the dangers to the nationalised property relations and to agitate for their defence. The slogan put forward by Com. S. does none of these things. The slogan "For an independent socialist Poland" does. Trotsky goes on (p19) to explain statification of the means of production in Poland. First of all he says that transformation in this or that area is not the most important thing. Even with whole, completely retain its reactionary character and remain the chief obstacle on the road to world revolution." He then goes on to say that this does not "alter the particular fact that the statification of property in the occupied territories is in itself a progressive measure". (my emphasis)

Trotsky winds up the article with a passage which explains a great deal. "We must not lose sight for a single moment of the fact that the question of overthrowing the Soviet bureaucracy is for us subordinate to the question of



preserving state property in the means of production in the USSR; that the question of preserving state property in the means of production in the USSR is subordinate for us to the question of the world proletarian revolution."

There can be no confusion here. The defence of the state property is a physical thing at every point, not just a "potential task". The loss of the Soviet Union was a real blow to imperialism and a gain for the working class. That is a reality which has already occurred. If we see the state property forms as a central gain for the working class against imperialism, then central to the programme of the revolutionary party must be the defence of those gains. That is why I would argue that Trotsky presented his position as an independent Soviet Ukraine, and not just an independent Ukraine.

In this sense, the defence of nationalised property relations could be compared to the trade unions. These could be said to be only "potentially" useful to the working class because, in the long run, if the working class doesn't take power, the trade unions will be smashed. Their usefulness could also be said to be potential because today they are used by the state and the reformist leadership against workers. But even with all of this, they have been built by workers through struggle. In reality, they are a real material factor in the defence of the working class, a real weapon of resistance. That is why the state constantly seeks to destroy their power, and that is why workers still look to them for defence, even with all the betrayals. Our position must be to point to every single threat to the unions, whether these are still only developing, or whether they take the form of a full onslaught. And it must be exactly the same with any other gains of the working class - of these the greatest are the nationalised property relations in the workers' states. The fact is that all gains of the working class are under permanent threat of attack from the capitalists. The working class has the power to defend these gains, but only if it is led and directed to that defence, only if it is alerted to all dangers. The fact is that, without the defence of partial gains, it will be impossible to move forward to new gains.

That does not mean that I take the position of Mandel. He argues that because of nationalised property relations, the economy of the Soviet Union is therefore stronger than that of the capitalist countries. He claims that the working class thus gains through the development of the means of production. Trotsky only ever held such a position in the early stages of the revolution and its degeneration. If Mandel was right, the bureaucracy would be a new kind of class, playing a progressive historical role. But this is not the case.

When looked at from the point of view of a rise in the living standards of the working class, then the nationalised property relations can be termed only potentially progressive. They bring only the potential for real massive material benefits because of the obstacle which acts as a brake on their development and use for human need - the Stalinist bureaucracy. Once that brake is removed through the political revolution which brings down the bureaucracy, then the potential already contained within the nationalised property relations will be freed. But when it comes to talking about the defence of those relations, then to talk about them as only potentially progressive can be completely politically disorientating. Because that directs away from the task of identifying threats to them and alerting the working class to those threats.

And therefore, when it comes to the question of national rights to self-determination, the question of defending property relations can be made completely secondary or ignored. And this is not, I stress, because of a different assessment of events and the immediacy of the threat to those relations. It comes because of a different understanding of the nationalised property relations, what they mean, where the threat to them comes from, and why Trotskyists defend them, or in Trotsky's words, make the question of overthrowing the bureaucracy subordinate to the question of defending the nationalised property

relations (which in turn is subordinate to the task of developing the world proletarian revolution).

I believe that cde S can reach a position which leaves out the question of defence, not because of an assessment of events, but because of an incorrect political position on defence of the Soviet Union and the deformed workers' states.

#### The correct slogan.

It is possible to argue that implicit in self-determination for Poland is the need to defend the nationalised property relations. This is because it is only on the basis of such relations that there can be any possibility of any level of self-determination for the Polish people. But we should look for slogans which make what we mean as clear as possible. And in this case, we must look for a slogan which corresponds to events and the needs of the situation, gives political direction to nationalist and anti bureaucratic sentiments, and alerts the workers to the process weakening and threatening the gains embodied in the nationalised property relations. I would therefore argue that the correct slogan is "For an independent socialist Poland". And in propagandising and agitating around this slogan, we should spell out that we are talking on the basis of Workers' Councils and defence of the nationalised property relations.

This demand contains the right to self-determination within a positive direction. And it differentiates us from reactionary nationalists, particularly the violently anti communist emogres. And it avoids the two major misconceptions which dominate cde S's positions. I have already discussed the first of these - that the nationalised property relations are only potentially progressive. And I have outlined the second - that the nationalised property relations are not in danger from imperialism. From this last point, cde S seems to draw the conclusion that all developments in E Europe must be progressive; or at the worst, the situation will remain the same.

I think this is wrong. Imperialism has suffered a series of defeats and is weakened. But it is still the dominant system world-wide. It is based on the ruling class of a class system. It is therefore more stable and consistent than the bureaucracy. In crisis, imperialism is always driven against the workers' states. This does not just take a military form. I would stress that I am not arguing that invasion by the imperialists is around the corner. But danger does not just come through invasion. It should be clear that the capitalists are not indebted to the Soviet Union; the whole of the Eastern bloc is mortgaged to capitalism. The debts are just one of the methods through which imperialism permeates the deformed and degenerated workers' states. They are just one part of the whole process of weakening the gains of the October revolution. The economic crisis in Poland is causing extra strain on the weak Soviet economy and is allowing the imperialists a stronger and stronger foothold in a deformed workers' state.

In fact, we are not dealing with two super-powers. We are dealing with economically aggressive imperialism and the indebted deformed workers' states. They are not equals in a static equation. To think that is like equating the trade union bureaucracy with the capitalist bosses.

The property relations and the Stalinist bureaucracy are inherently unstable. We must realise the dangers posed when the instability of the bureaucracy grows each day, but the workers' movement is politically unprepared to move forward and resolve the crisis through its own seizure of power. In such a situation of instability, especially when the workers' movement has been driven back by the bureaucracy, even if temporarily, the door is always open for the imperialists to cement their foothold into the situation. It is our task to recognise, warn against and fight against such dangers.



The societies of E Europe can move in one of two directions. The restoration of capitalism would be a massive retrograde step. Under capitalism there can only be more war and suffering. The only progressive future lies in the hands of the working class and the political revolution. That is why we could say that the Solidarity movement had an inherently progressive content - because it was a movement centred on the working class, an inherently revolutionary class. It is true that there was no revolutionary party. The weakness resulting from this has already been exposed. But the content of the movement was still progressive. The Solidarity movement was anti-bureaucracy, i.e. immediately fighting the Polish bureaucracy. But it was also anti the Soviet bureaucracy, upon which the Polish bureaucracy was finally based. The movement thus contained a progressive nationalist element in its struggle against bureaucratic oppression. A revolutionary party would have to combine both - progressive nationalism and anti-bureaucratic feelings, and give political direction to both. In doing so, it would have to separate itself from any reactionary nationalist elements. Hence the slogan "For an independent socialist Poland".

### A Polish bureaucracy?

Finally, I want to deal with one other question. This is whether there exists a Polish bureaucracy, or whether it is just simply an extension of the Soviet bureaucracy. This would affect whether the struggle is entirely a national struggle against the oppression by the Soviet Union, or whether it is also an internal political revolution.

It also affects our arguments against reactionary elements in Polish nationalism. They present Poland as one nation, whereas I would argue that in reality it is divided between the masses led by the working class and a Polish bureaucracy. In response to a purely nationalist argument I would argue that it was a Polish bureaucracy which has acted against the Polish working class. It is too simplistic to argue that the bureaucracy in Poland is simply an extension of the Soviet bureaucracy. That is an argument similar to saying that the CPs in the West are the same as they have always been and are simply extensions of Moscow. In fact developments have been much more complex. There has been a limited division between the Kremlin and the different national bureaucracies and CPs. At the same time as Moscow's hold on the Stalinist parties of the West has been weakened, the national bureaucracies and the Kremlin have sometimes been in conflict over their own specific bureaucratic interests.

This is first the case with Yugoslavia. This serves as the classic example of a bureaucracy which has pursued its own national interests and not just toed the Moscow line.

Often the conflicts between the bureaucracies emerge over the methods they are going to use to hold down their own working class - i.e., a more liberal or more oppressive method at any given time. The basis for clashes between the Kremlin bureaucracy and the national bureaucracies and Stalinist parties is inherent in Stalinism. It was of course from the degeneration of the Bolshevik revolution and the emergence of Stalinism that the nationalism of "socialism in one country" was encouraged within the national CPs. Similarly it was the degeneration of the revolution and the Stalinist policy of "socialism in one country" which promoted Popular Frontism and class collaboration in each country i.e. putting a relationship with your "own" bourgeoisie before proletarian independence and internationalism.

The theory of "socialism in one country" and the nationalism which it encouraged created pressures for the relative independence of each bureaucracy from the Kremlin. This tendency towards national independence came out clearest in Poland in 1956. At that time the head of the Polish forces was Marshal Rokossovsky who was actually a Soviet citizen. He was the direct agent of the Soviet bureaucracy in Poland. The Soviet Union prepared a takeover on Oct. 18, the day before

