

March 1984

INTERNAL BULLETIN 83

NATIONAL COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS

FOR MEETING MARCH 10 1983

10.30am to 9pm.

Provisionally at Camden Town Hall
(entrance in Judd St, off Euston
Rd, opposite St Pancras Station).
Please phone in to confirm.

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Please also note

ORGANISERS' MEETING

MARCH 11 1983

10.30am to 4.30pm

Venue as above. (Again, please
phone to confirm).

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Contents of this bulletin

Agenda for NC

Agenda for Organisers' Meeting

'Some immediate tasks' - resolution from
Kinnell

'Enough is enough: the Smith faction and
the WSL' - document from Carolan, includes
a resolution

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NC members should collect copies
of IB 82, and extra copies of
IB 78, from the weekend meetings.

IB 82 is a document from Scott,
'Imperialism and the new internat-
ional division of labour'.

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AGENDA FOR NATIONAL COMMITTEE MARCH 10

1. OUR TASKS

Resolution from Kinnell, attached.

Further resolution from Kinnell: 'That we organise a trade union school within the next 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ months, details to be fixed by the OSC, agenda to give a central place to discussion of the Broad Lefts'.

2. PARTY REGIME

Discussion on IB 50: 'Building the WSL', Carolan/Kinnell.

Paper debts: resolution from EC. That unless the four branches named in the EC decision of 22.1.84 have made substantial progress towards meeting the terms of that EC decision (bearing in mind the extensions granted to Basingstoke and to Oxford Factory), disciplinary action be taken against those members more than 12 weeks in arrears on paper money, initially in the form of temporary lapsing until such time as they put themselves in good standing financially.

Cunliffe: resolution from EC. 'That the NC removes Cunliffe from the EC because of his irresponsibility towards the work of the League and refusal to abide by the decision concerning him at the January NC'.

Control commission: resolution from Kinnell. This NC severely censures Smith and Cunliffe for the way they have abused the CC.

a. The refusal of Smith to cooperate with elementary defendants' rights by giving those charged notice of his charges;

b. The refusal of both comrades to abide by section 12:iii of the constitution and take issues through the leading committees first;

c. Their attempt to use the CC in effect as a parallel EC;

d. Their use of the CC as merely a means for the 'continuation of (factional) politics by other means'.

Under this item the NC will also have to consider the charges brought against the NC by Smith before the CC.

'3. The authority of the NC to vote not to have the annual conference at the constitutional time despite the objections of a minority.'

'5. The decision of the NC* to lapse members for paper debts, conference registration and pool fares. (I believe lapsing to be something which specifically applies to membership dues. The only other circumstances where the constitution provides for lapsing is 'Where members have become inactive without adequate cause, and there is no dispute on this fact, they may be lapsed from membership'. It is serious because none of the protective procedures provided for in the constitution are involved in a lapsing. I am not of course arguing that there should not be action on paper debts etc - but it should be under disciplinary action which involves all the constitutional safeguards).'

(* The complaint actually reads 'EC', but the decision complained about was taken by the NC of July 1983).

Conference: motion from the faction that we have a conference in April.

School: motion . 'That we organise a League school on the disputed international issues, specifically imperialism, Afghanistan, EEC, within the next 3 months, details to be fixed by the OSC'.

Joplin, Kinnell, Parkinson

3. AFGHANISTAN

Motion that we call for the withdrawal of the USSR's troops from Afghanistan.

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The above are the resolutions received by the closing date set by the last NC, i.e. seven days before the NC meeting.

The last NC did not set any time limit for amendments, but obviously it would be useful to have them as early as possible.

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AGENDA FOR ORGANISERS' MEETING MARCH 11

1. Our tasks: report from NC
2. Coming events: BLOC conference
 - J. conference
 - Liverpool council
3. Wiganisation:
 - A. YTS
 - B. CND
 - C. Health cuts
4. Finance
5. Paper sales
6. The magazine
7. Education

SOME IMMEDIATE TASKS

Resolution for NC 10.3.84.

Kinnell.

1. INDUSTRIAL

A. The level of strikes is still low. The slight economic upturn since 1981 remains slight: manufacturing investment is still falling.

B. Thus sullen, weary resentment remains the dominant mood in the working class. But the tremendous turnout on February 28 - after a weak call from the TUC, so late that it gave almost no time to organise - shows that this sullen, weary resentment can very quickly change into angry action.

C. After the June 1983 election, the top TUC leaders decided that the Tories were now entrenched for a whole period, and that their (the leaders') role must be not to fight the Tories but to act as bargainers between the Tories and the working class. The Blackpool TUC decisions and the TUC's betrayal of the NGA followed.

But bargainers need something to bargain with and something to bargain about: and the Tories are not always ready to grant these to the TUC leaders. Thus explosions like February 28.

TUC leaders are already moving to minimise the impact of their breach with the Tories over GCHQ. But Britain's (and the capitalist world's) social crisis, the tenseness of class relations, and the inherently contradictory position of the trade union leaders themselves, make more such explosions likely.

D. Another factor for instability is the state of the Tories. The decay of the 'Falklands Factor', the repeated scandals, and their internal divisions all make the government look far less formidable.

E. Up to June 1983 employers had been very cautious about using the Tory anti-union laws. Now they are much bolder. These laws are now, and so far as we can predict will continue to be, a central issue in the class struggle.

Thousands of militants are aware of this. Yet there is no coordinated labour movement campaign against the laws. No-one has taken an initiative to launch one.

We should argue for the BLOC conference (see below) to launch such a campaign, on the basis of:

- * TUC should break off all collaboration and talks with the Tories,
- * Trade unions to commit themselves to defiance of the law,
- * Solidarity strikes to defend any union penalised,
- * Democratic delegate campaign committees at both national and local level.

A campaign set up by BLOC is liable to be very much a Militant front. Nevertheless it will be too weighty in the labour movement for us to hope to launch an alternative. We will have to take the initiative for local committees where we can have more influence, and use what pressure we can to get more open and democratic functioning nationally.

If BLOC does not launch a campaign, we should gather what support we can in the labour movement to help initiate one ourselves.

F. Health cuts are another major area for large-scale activity by us, through the local health campaigns which exist in most areas.

We should argue for occupations and supporting strike action, and for a socialist policy on the NHS.

Health Fightback 84 is potentially an important initiative in linking together activists in this field, but it is limited by the fact that it is led by a small group of individuals, mainly ex-League members, who are evidently suspicious of central League involvement. We should maintain pressure for a newsletter to be set up and try to get an input into it.

Privatisation, especially in the NHS, is also likely to be a major issue this year: we must argue for a refusal to get involved in the specifications and tendering process, for strike action to resist privatisation, and for nationalisation without compensation of the supply industries.

G. Defence of Liverpool council is central to the local government cuts fight right now. We should argue for unions to support Liverpool with industrial action and, in the event of Liverpool being cut off by the banks, for other Labour councils to solidarise by suspending payment of interest charges.

Liverpool aside, however, leadership is more likely to come from the council unions than from the Labour councillors.

NALGO has a policy of non-cooperation with the abolition of metropolitan authorities. We must fight for that policy to be enforced (which will mean backing it up with strike action in case of victimisations), and for it to be adopted by other local authority unions.

NALGO's policy of no cover for unfilled vacancies must also be enforced.

Against job cuts and redundancies, especially those likely to result from rate-capping, we should argue for unions to take industrial action (whether the job cuts/redundancies are their own members, or members of other local authority unions). We should also fight to commit unions to national industrial action in support of local industrial action taken in particular authorities: otherwise, workers in particularly hard-hit authorities, e.g. those selected for rate-capping, will be isolated.

The building of joint shop stewards' committees - and, where possible, stewards' committees extending across several authorities, e.g. across London - is also important. So are links between those stewards' committees and tenants' and community groups.

2. POLITICAL SLOGANS

A. 'Break collaboration' remains a very apt slogan, and should be central.

B. With the passage of time, 'Recall the TUC' becomes less usable. We should phase it out.

C. The 'workers government' can hardly be used as a slogan in the present period. The basic perspective of transforming the labour movement which it expresses remains valid, but the immediate task is to reorient the Left towards a new drive for such transformation: the emphasis in this sphere is more on propaganda than on agitation.

D. While maintaining political criticism of the Kinnoch/Hattersley centre-right leadership, we must however put more stress on placing demands on them.

3. TRADE UNIONS

A. The POEU Broad Left has just led itself into a fiasco, and the left wing leadership of the NUM is in the process of doing the same. But the new Broad Lefts, for all their weaknesses, are an important, maybe even a growing, factor in the labour movement.

B. We should seek to build the Broad Lefts and to argue within them for:

*Open and democratic political debate (within which we advocate our policies) - in contrast to the consensus method practised by the POEU Broad Left;

* An orientation towards direct struggles and to the rank and file generally (as we have fought for in the UCW over Basingstoke) - in contrast to trade union electoralism.

C. The BLOC conference on March 24 will be important. We should intervene with the planned pamphlet discussing the experience of the POEU and CPUSA Broad Lefts, and with the proposal for a campaign on anti-union laws.

The conference is also likely to signal the emergence of 'Militant' as the dominant left force in the unions - a development which starkly exposes the nonsense of those who counterpose trade union work to Labour Party work. As 'Militant' increases in size, it will become less monolithic: there are signs of this already. We should devote some attention to propaganda specifically designed to win over 'Militant' sympathisers.

4. WOMEN

A. We should support the June conference planned by WF on women and local government cuts. This conference can both make an important contribution to a struggle in which we have many other channels of involvement, and give WF a chance to regroup forces.

B. The central resources available for this work are slight and are likely to be fully taken up by organising for the conference and producing the WF paper.

In the branches comrades should establish orders for the paper (and payment for them) and seek WF members and affiliations.

5. YOUTH

A. Youth work has been our major area of recruitment over recent months, and is likely to continue to be so.

B. J. conference must be an all-out mobilisation of our youth this year as previously.

C. For J. campaigning activity our main priorities should be YCND (see below) and YTS. The two main lines of YTS work are: organising local YTS action groups with trade unionists, and unionising YTSers; and building a Campaign Against Compulsion among unemployed youth and tech or school students.

D. Starting with the March 24-5 youth school we need to devote more consistent effort to education of our youth, with regular schools, etc.

6. LABOUR PARTY

A. The Labour Left is still in retreat. But this must not be overestimated or presented as a uniform process. The Left is not dead, and while sections like the LCC have moved to the centre-right, others have moved closer to our politics.

B. Benn's triumphant return to Parliament may galvanise the Campaign group and open the way for a new broad organisation of the Left. But there are no very clear signs of that at present: any such developments look like coming slowly rather than soon.

What could change these calculations, and provide a spur to a more rapid reassembling of the Left, is a move by the centre-right to gut mandatory reselection.

Until then, broad Left fronts like LAW and CLPD are 'ticking over', and our main job is to reorient and re-educate the more serious Left.

C. This must not be interpreted as an inward-looking orientation. Turning the O. outwards, and especially building workplace branches, is vital: they can provide new recruits to replace the jaded leftists who are now moving to the centre-right.

D. A major factor in the Left's retreat has been the activity of the 'local government Left'. A whole segment of leftists, who could have become an educating, organising, inspiring force for broader sections of the labour movement, have allowed themselves to be captured by the bourgeois structures of local government.

Their political inadequacies, rather than being remedied through the enlightening effects of experience and the educational efforts of the most conscious revolutionaries, have been consolidated, and have become a spreading infection. The left, having got into council positions, has adapted itself to the limits of the established structures (because it had no clear idea of how to fight them), and then become a force trying to educate the rest of the labour movement to accept those limits.

Some of our own comrades in local government have not been immune to this process. We must tighten up our integration of such comrades into the organisation, and approach any new nominations for local government positions with great caution.

The job of socialist councillors is to use the council as a platform to advance working class claims, not to select the most deserving of those claims to be fitted within the limits of balancing the budget of the 'local state'.

E. Our broad groups are generally speaking no longer broad groups, but an ideologically defined Trotskyist current. This is no bad thing in itself, though it must be recognised that we have done much less with this tactic than we could have done.

At the same time the B. network has established itself as a voice of the Left.

This is not entirely positive. B was launched by people who split from the broad groups over the question of rate rises. They have consistently maintained their opportunist attitude to the local government Left since. That the central B people garnish their opportunism by 'revolutionary' phrase-mongering like 'Labour Take The Power' only makes it worse.

B has been popular with the O. Left because it has pandered to them. Rather than educating its readers as a Marxist publication should, it has flattered them. Correspondingly it has shown little ability to organise rather than reflect developments: the number of actual 'B activists' is tiny.

Bs often have big circulations: they are rarely able to organise regular activist meetings of any size.

B's political weakness is not the weakness of naivety or immaturity, but the politics of a tiny but entrenched centrist sect.

But the influence of B is a fact. To boycott B would isolate us needlessly (and hand over the whole thing to SA). To go for a full national-scale confrontation with the central B people would at best leave us with a shell and a bad odour around us. We should therefore focus on building local B. groups, on our politics as far as possible; gradually crystallising a left wing in the B network through these local groups; and getting more political input into the national B.

In local B groups we must press for:

- * An all-round, rather than narrowly O., activist orientation;
- * Regular meetings;
- * Our politics on issues like cuts/rate rises, the AES, the EEC, LP workplace branches, etc.

If we use local B groups to organise a broader Left, then we must correspondingly tighten up our local 'broad groups'. Alongside the B group meetings we must have regular advertised 'broad group' meetings. Obviously these should be designed so as to fulfill a different specific function from B group meetings, e.g. with more educational content, more organising in areas other than O work, etc. But the basic essential is to maintain our own profile.

The aim of our activity in B groups must be to organise people, not to produce local competitors to our paper, to divert our resources into producing such competitors, or to use local Bs as a soft-option alternative to our paper. Our financial and human-resources commitments to producing local bulletins must be checked and discussed with the OSC, which after consulting with branches should have powers to decide in such matters.

Better active B groups with skimpy duplicated bulletins than thick printed bulletins and little real organising activity beyond producing and circulating those bulletins.

7. CND/ PEACE MOVEMENT

A. The CND leadership have a 'long haul' strategy which effectively means accepting Cruise as an accomplished fact and watering down unilateralism. This strategy can only demobilise CND. Yet CND as yet shows no sign of fading away. And the constant threats of war in the international situation provide stimulus enough to keep a large number of people active in CND.

B. We have begun to develop a collective intervention in CND over the last nine months or so: it is still weak and needs more resources.

C. The main lines of our intervention are: no equivocation on unilateralism; for CND to campaign for withdrawal from NATO; a labour movement/LP orientation (especially TU boycotts); democracy in CND and YCND. Our propaganda should also seek to draw people towards us from CND by pointing out the connections between war and capitalism.

D. We should continue support for the Greenham Common peace camp and the women's peace movement, and reject ignorant blanket criticism of them as 'opposed to all politics', 'relying on pacifist opposition of the individual to war', etc. At the same time we should try to help these women build for labour movement action (especially trade union boycotts), and try to encourage them to join the fight inside CND.

E. While also supporting the May 26 Coventry demo, our main push in the coming months should be for the June 9 anti-Reagan demo.

8. BUILDING THE LEAGUE

A. We need a turn away from too much 'going-to-meetings' activity, and towards both 'Wiganisation' (mass campaigning activity) and more intensive education and propaganda work.

B. The main areas for 'Wiganisation' (mass campaigning activity) should be health cuts, YTS, YCND, and building O. workplace branches. (Not necessarily in that order: local priorities will have to be decided in consultation between branches and the OSC).

C. As part of this political turn, we need a drive on paper sales. This is also necessary financially.

D. We should organise a recruitment drive especially among youth. We need to more resources for the centre (especially on the paper) to free the Youth Organiser for such work.

E. For all this we need a more coherent organisation, acting as a unit while debating internal differences democratically, and demanding that minorities argue their differences in a structured, responsible way so as not to disrupt the external work of the organisation and make the internal atmosphere repulsive.

NOTE: This is not a complete encyclopaedia of all our work, and is not intended to be. Thanks to several comrades for contributions in various sections.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH:
THE SMITH FACTION AND THE W.S.L.

Carolan

4.3.84

Since last year's three-part conference, which ended with the August session, the organisation's internal life has been dominated by the refusal of the faction to accept the practical consequences of the decisions of that conference - namely,

- a) That they are a clear minority in the organisation,
- b) That they had been convincingly defeated on every one of the political questions, in so far as they had been posed; and
- c) That, therefore, short of a sharp turn-around by a big chunk of the organisation, or, alternatively, a sizeable influx into the organisation of co-thinkers of theirs who would give them the majority, they were likely to remain in the minority for the immediate period ahead.

Their choice lay between two options - either to split, or to act as a disciplined minority, collaborating as the constitution demands minorities should to implement the decisions of the conference and to build the organisation under the guidance of the leadership elected at the conference.

In the second option they would of course retain the right to argue their political differences internally.

They refused to make a clear choice, and launched instead on an escalating course of disruption without any obviously coherent perspective. They did not attempt to develop any of the political debates further, but went instead for a series of "scandals", seeking to "expose the leadership" in much the same style as the SLL/WRP used to do in the trade unions.

In fact the 'them and us' polarisation of the organisation was posed initially (and essentially) entirely from their side and not at all from the majority. The majority's view was that the range of differences (with Smith, as opposed to some of his followers) did not justify the heat or the polarisation. It attempted to integrate the minority into the work of building the League by:

- a) proposing a new way of electing the NC (STV) so as to give them maximum guarantees of representation;

- b) including all the leaders of the Smith group in its slate for the NC presented to the April conference. (By contrast the Smith group presented a narrowly factional slate, from which, for example, they punitively excluded Ed Levy for disagreeing with them on one issue, the Labour Party - and organised tight 'whipping' of votes for that slate).

- c) over-representing the faction on the EC by retaining all the former EC members from the Smith group in the newly-elected EC,

- d) Operating 'positive discrimination' for them in League work. For example, Cunliffe continued as joint editor of the paper; Smith was urged to do the work of industrial organiser; etc. etc.

- e) Continuing the privileged position of the Smith group leaders, and allowing them to write what they pleased in the paper. Nothing that they have ever written has been rejected for political reasons. The only example of limitations on Smith is when he was asked to reduce an article down to two from four full pages of the paper. He was not asked to change the political content.

Despite all this, the minority was irreconcilable. Smith and Jones talked, acted, and responded as monarchs by right treacherously ousted from their position of unchallengeable designate leadership - 'the worker leadership', as they refer to themselves on the committees.

They responded in a spirit of vendetta, trying to get their own back. In fact, their faction was declared only after the second part of the conference, which they saw as decisive and which elected the NC.

Instead of accepting the verdict of the conference and working loyally as members of the organisation, the faction leaders have:

a) Continued to poison the organisation with an envenomed campaign of slander and demonology against the majority of the organisation and against its leading representatives. Accusations and abuse are usually, if unfortunately, features of any sharp political conflict: but from the Smith faction the explicitly political element has been minimal, completely overshadowed by the accusations and "scandals".

b) Increasingly adopted the methods and technique of an internal agitating faction, unconcerned with the work of the organisation or with the effects of their behaviour on that work.

c) Progressively withdrawn from the work of the organisation, in what amounts to a partial secession, while continuing to exercise and enjoy full rights, indeed privileges, within it.

Dues and paper money. Some faction members are conscientious, some non-faction members are irresponsible. But the basic path of development is illustrated by the Oxford factory branch in which eds Smith and Jones are active.

In August 1982 they had a relatively modest paper debt of £89.70. By March 1983 it was up to £259.40. Between March and July 1983 it escalated to £509.80.

Then those arrears were cleared off into a separate account, with the opportunity to clear it at a discount, and a current account started afresh.

By mid-December 1983 the ^{old} arrears were practically untouched, and the current account debt had swollen to £236.20 in addition.

Pressure from the centre then produced a reduction of the current debt to £103.70 by January 1 1984 - and a huge hue and cry against alleged bureaucratic oppression, which is still continuing. The debt now stands at £208.70 (in addition to the £500 old arrears), though the branch has made some progress on dues in the last month.

Commitment to central work. Smith has been free for full-time work for over 15 months, but has done practically nothing as industrial organiser. His explanation is that he is writing a book about Cowley. This use of his time has never been discussed, let alone agreed.

Gunliffe walked off his job on the paper in January. Smith has subsequently endorsed this action.

Federalism. The writ of the organisation's leading committees scarcely runs in Oxford.

Increasingly, the faction leaders relate to the organisation as 'interventionists' to agitate and ambush - seemingly without any regard to the detrimental consequences for the League. They enjoy a full share of 'power' in the organisation, and indeed a privileged position, but take no share in the responsibility (especially financial/organisational) for the running of the organisation. Indeed, increasingly, they do their best to oppose, thwart and spite the efforts of the League leadership to administer the basic functions of the organisation.

The Smith group has turned the leading committees into arenas

rendered partly non-functional by endless petty and irresolvable disputes of a narrowly organisational and non-political character.

The only rational perspective for a political minority in their position would be propaganda focusing on basic political issues. The feverish agitation makes sense only if they were about to win the majority (which they aren't) - or as a build-up to a split.

This activity has sapped the vitality of the organisation in two ways:

- a) Directly in terms of revenue; paper sales; discipline in work; ability of the elected leadership to organise our work according to the decisions of the conference, NC and EC; and our ability to organise rational political discussions on political questions.
- b) Indirectly by the resultant effect on the morale of the organisation.

A hiving-off by the Smith group would probably now lead to an increase in the organisation's activity rather than a loss of real resources.

But the most destructive result of the behaviour of the Smith group has been on their own forces.

They have shattered the grouping that they brought into the new organisation in July 1981 and scattered most of its forces to the four winds. At first, soon after the fusion, there was a shake-out of odd sectarians here and there: these were the first consequences of Smith's and Jones's failure to win the old WSL to the politics they had agreed for the new organisation. Then there was the RWL split. For fear of a shattering split straight down the middle of the organisation we were compelled to stand by as a transparently vicious and completely alien cult openly built up a faction in the WSL - out of potentially valuable youth who had been poisoned against the WSL by Smith and Jones and who then broke with Smith and Jones because S/J refused to draw the logic of their own slanderous denunciations of the WSL majority.

The third wave of ex-Smith-group forces has dropped away one by one since the last conference, because, like the TILC-oriented youth before them, they took seriously what Smith and Jones say about the organisation and its majority.

That, incidentally, is the explanation for the surprising fact that the organisation can suffer the serious haemorrhaging it has had for a full year now and still be able to do pretty much what it was doing a year ago or 18 or 24 months ago. Most of the haemorrhaging has been from people who were never really integrated into the organisation and its work anyway. The clearest example is youth work.

The whole history of the Smith group shows the unviability of trying to build a political organisation around a self-designated 'worker leadership' rather than clear politics and clear political accounting. If we look at the nine years since Smith and Jones broke with the WRP, a graph presents itself which shows at first a rapid ascent and then a catastrophic decline.

In 1975 Smith was one of the best-known militants in Britain, receiving publicity from the bourgeois press on the scale of Tariq Ali or Jack Dash. He was also boosted to widespread fame and prestige in Trotskyist circles by the USFI press, which was interested both in courting him and in using him against Healy. Lots of people flocked to the WSL, among them petty bourgeois intellectuals from other organisations. At its peak it came close to 200 members. Then it declined, haemorrhaged, was twice invaded by Spartacists, lost its neo-Healyite verve and coherence.

The decline was intersected and seemingly arrested by the fusion in July 1981. Potentially it might have been in fact arrested. But with Smith's attempt to regroup the old WSL on the Falklands war issue the decline quickly resumed, until today there are about three dozen in the faction.

Much of the Smith group's generalised discontent and irreconcilability seems to derive from a desire to have back again their golden days of the mid-1970s. But the desire cannot be satisfied.

In the meantime, the organisation now faces the alternative spelled out in the declaration of myself, Joplin, Parkinson, Hill and Kinnell to the EC of 5.2.84.

~~"The present situation in the organisation is untenable. As far as we are concerned the choice facing the minority is either to resume full organisational autonomy or to accept that they are a minority, bring to an end their partial secession, and behave as a disciplined part of the WSL under the control of the leading bodies. If they choose the latter course, we will of course continue to uphold the rights of the minority to present their views in internal debate and to participate in the normal activity of the organisation".~~

The situation is untenable. The way the Smith group is now going, a split is inevitable.

Smith and Jones no longer adhere to the WSL in any positive sense: the faction is a more or less wholly negative force within the organisation. It is not clear why Smith and Jones have so far failed to draw the same conclusions as those many who have graduated from their group out of the WSL: the only possible reasons are the fact that they have no better alternative to the WSL, and/or a desire to do maximum damage to the organisation before they go.

RESOLUTION

This NC declares that the situation must be resolved in the next few weeks one way or the other. The faction must decide to go out of the WSL or come into it. It cannot continue the way it is.

The NC declares that a split is neither desirable nor necessary, and that it can be avoided if the faction shows itself willing to build the organisation and to accept - for now - minority status.

The following are the basic minimum preconditions for integrating the faction into the organisation.

a) That all members of the faction fulfill their basic obligations as regards paper sales, dues, etc.

b) The faction accepts majority rule.

c) An end to federalism.

d) That the faction accepts a full share both in decision-making and in responsibility within the organisation, or accepts exclusively-majority decision-making. The faction leaders either work constructively in the leading committees, or get off them and accept a subordinate role. The committees must be allowed to function properly.

e) That the faction leaders cease irresponsible and disruptive agitation.

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Postscript on cds Smith and Jones: Cd Cunliffe has raised the demand that other members of the EC and NC should automatically defer to Smith on trade

union matters. The position of the 'worker leadership' (their own title) has long been one of the central sore points in the leading committees. Therefore it is necessary to clarify their position in the organisation, if they choose to remain in it.

The members of the leading committees are elected by conference or by the NC on the basis of comradely equality. Issues are resolved by comradely discussion between equals. Individuals may (and sometimes should) defer to each other on specific questions, but there can be no question of a general deference. There can be neither institutionalised deference nor its slavish underside, institutionalised subservience or institutionalised second class citizenship.

Smith and Jones are valuable and experienced comrades, with much to offer in the leadership of the organisation. But the rest of the leading committees must retain the right to disagree with them and where necessary outvote them. We must establish the possibility of us doing so without having to face disruption from these comrades or those who defer to them, by way of refusal to accept the results of decisions.