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Statement to January 1984 NC on resignation from work on SX - Cunliffe.

FOR AN EDITORIAL BOARD - the issues behind my resiEnation as joint editor of the paper: Cunliffe.

IN DEFFNCE OF OUR PARTY PRESS - CUNLIFEE

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\text { October 27, } 1983
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2TH OSTRICH AIN THE STEAMROLTHR: Two wrong views of party building - a reply to Carolan and Kinnel.'s resclution in IB50 (July 1983) - Cunliffe.

## Statcment made to January 6th NC moeting by Cunliffe

On Sunday January lst 1984, after writing two lettors to the EC in December and after nine ycars as an eclitor of Trotskyist newspapers, I resigned a.s joint editor and production worker on so. Thisposition will only be reconsidered if the National Committec or a subscquent conference votes to overturn the standing policy of the Executive Committee and establish a proper, functioning and represcntative editorial board, which will plan the Eeneral contont of each issue of the paper, discuss its editorial line and its presentation, and ensure adequate and balanced convurage of the main issues of the day.

My resignation came after the Executive Committee voted, on Jan. 29th, with only myself acainst and two absontees, to reject such an Editorial Board, and instead to decl re that the EC itself will act as an Editorial Board, allocating a proportion of its meetings to a discussion on the paper. My resolution, before the NC today, received only my vote. This EC ?ecision consolidates what has for a long time been an unacceptablo position in the production and control of tho paper - and creates conditions in which I am no longer prepared to devote the grenter portion of my working life to it.

I would not have resigned, and would continue to work on the paper now, despite my political differences with the majority that controls the movement, if there were a democratic or sciontific basis on which the paper were collectively discussec. week by week rethor than - as in the last year or more - simiply the outcome of a personal discussion on a Monday morning between myself and the other editor.

My previous experience of work on a weekly paper - Socialist Press - was entirely different from what has become the regime on SO. SP was prepared every week by an Fiditorial Board meeting of seldom less than two hours in duration, attenced by some EC members plus other leading comrades from oxford, London and the Midlands.

The meetings would hear a report on the work done up to that point - the articles proprer and lined up - and would discuss a detailed allocation of space to these and to other articles suggested. They would have a discussion on the main national and international political issues and trade union issues of the day, decide from that discussion on front page coveraje, the main headline, and general guidelines of presentation. They would plan ahead for less urgent centre-page theoretical, historical, cultural and other feature articles, and go on to look back on the completed issue and raise any ciiticisms and if necessary rectify omissions. Through this procedure, I as editor, largely working from an office isolated from the shop floor movement, was able to draw on the experience of our comrades in the unions, the Labour Party the' wider movement, the assessments and information offerer by a range of comrades - not all of which reflected the majority view. The FB was not a gesture of flabby liberalism: it procluced a better, more consistent, stronger, better balanced paper than could otherwise have been done. And its discussions were generally of a high calibre. Often we would have an EB meeting at six on a Saturday, and use that as the political introduction to an EC meeting to follow it. Nowadays politics seldom seem to surface in moetings of the executive.

I don't want to give an exaggerate view of the SP Fritarial Board: some weeks its attendance was down; some wooks we had less time; some woeks everyone was knackored and the discussion was not up to scratch, an? we wound up having to put the papur together with less guidance. But the meetings went on every week. Thoy were part of the st ructure of the movement. They holped make the paper the movement's paper. And wo sustaned this on the basis of the old WSL aione (though the current size, moralc, and financial situation of tho new WSL makes those. seem like golcen days of woalth and splendour).

When the fusion took place, we from the WSL tried at first to continue
that system in the new organisation. But we had a major problem: there was no comparable inportance attached to the FB by the old ICL comrades. They had. worked from a much swaller boly composed mainly if not sololy of full-timers. And they never acreed with us on the importance of reculariy opernting a representative EB.

So we wound up with a series of meetings which became increasinely tokenistic and depleted. This in turn m de oxford comrades - who have borne the brunt of travelling to leaderśhip meotings since fusion - more reluctant to travol to thom. Gradually the meetings fell into disuse. Then the polarisation of the organisation effoctively consolicated the non-operation of the * FB. Willy nilly or by design, we have evolved into the position whero:

There is no involvement of trade union comrades in the discussion on the paper's coverage or its line. Sa we had just before Christmas, the bizarre situation where botn the comrades responsible for the trado union work declared themselves stronely critical of the paper's coverage on the TUC and the NGA dispute; but the only forum in which they could raise their criticism was the tiny and notionally organisational organisation Subcommittee. One of the editors -carcuan-sits on that committee: and it was his line - of wild overoptimism on the TUC - and not that of our comrades active in the movement, which went in the paper. Indecd there was no attempt by canolan to discuss these differences with me as a co-erlitor - and I only found out after the event that such a debate had occurred. We have a parallel occurrence in the lates, paper, with coverage of the Shipyard strike including no warning of the obviously impending sell-out.

The result is that one of the strengths which we ought to reflect in our paper - out trade union work and the fights we are wagins against the bureaucracy - finds no expression, or only a limited expression in our weekly publication. And our comrarles in the unions find the paper of less and less: value to their work - lageing in the cas of the NGA coverage gehind the developments in the struggle and the awareness of many militants.

* There is no involvement of comrades who actually sell the paper and work with it in the labour moverent. It is put together in the office by two corades most isolated from the bropder wonkers' movemont. Only by guesswork or accicent con the paper connectup with day-to-dey discussions, problems and struggles of the working class: and the proposils made by severnl comrades at the branch orgnisers' mectine for much more oducational material in the paper hove been largely ienored. It has become a sectarian sheet whose actual isolation from the living movement is in no way onswered by publishing long, boring, confusing and reactionny tracts from 'left' luminaries like Anne Pettifor or Vlarimir Derer.
* There is no involvemont - indeed there is an alienation - of comrades outside the lines of the main factional fivisions in the movemert, who to a large degree despair of the paper and of their chances of seting it changed. Indeed thefactionalism emerges in the pages of the paper, where supporters of the EC majority sit on the erlges of their seats waiting for an article by a minority suporter to appear, so that they can rattle of lengthy and vituperative replies, while doing nothing to reply to Derer, Pettifor and other reformist claptrap carried to तisguise the paper as "broad".
* There is no collective discussion of the priorities and balance of the papor in advance of oach issue appenring. And there is no routine woy to areue for changes or to raise criticisms. So the only answer to what a comrade feels to be a wrong position in the paper is to use the laughable 'lotters.' page (and help make the WSL more of a laughing stock on the left), or to raise resolutions of censurc on lending bodies. This is a disruptive, livisive and destructive system that dous nothine to build a cadre and a colloctive leadership. It procucos weak, lopsider papers reflecting all the weaknesses of the two editors and fow of the strengths of the rost of the movement. And it entrenches tho divisions, alienation and rescntment that are smashing. this mjement to pieces.

So what is the answer posed by the FC majority? The majority faction propose that the EC should become the Fiditorial Board. They rejected Kinnehn's amendment that the "EB" discussion should be first item on the EC agenda, and left vague a sugeestion that non-FC members, might be invited along.

I voted against the plan because:
I) It is impractical. Asenous discussion to prepare the paper that would be more than each comrade listirg a part would require well in excess of the l-hour maximim suggested by the comrades. It should be regular and at a time that will enable worker comrades to attend. The EC's plan would subordiante this meeting to other EC business, render it irregular, and reduce discussion to token levels which would soon ddter non-EC members from coming.
2) It is a charade. There is no issue of substance on which other members of the EC majority are likely to disagree openly with CARChan to the extent of supporting another line. So talking to the FC majority is as useful as talking tocARolant and just as useless. It means basically no change.
3. It is narrow. By focussing on the EC it marginalises the input anyone else might have; by restricting its length of time it amounts in reality to offering one or two lucky members a brief audience at the court of King Garolan to make their proposals - and go away again. On that basis only a Iackey or a masochist would keep comine back.
4) The EC itself has not functioned - political leadership has in practice simply been exercised by the majority faction, with occasional discussions on the organisational subcomittee. There is no need in any case to take the whole EC into an EB: a few EC comrades could be delegated to it, as we did in the old WSL - with the obvious provision that the majority on the TC elould have a majority on the EB. Instead of looking for flexible answers to get the paper functioning, the EC majority argues the failings of the EC as a reason against having a functioning Editorial Board. This is simply a pretext.
5) The EC itself is sharply polarised, with only myself outside the two main factions. Even the working agreement we used to have on industrial questions appears to have collapsed, with cerolan making a point of taking a different line from Smith on anything and everything. There is little chance under these conditions of produciag any constructive debate on the paper. There is no way anyone else can get much of a look in or press for changes. The proposal is a charade: it was designed siiply to fob off the NC while consolidatine the majority's single-handed control over the paper. It should be rejceted, and an EB set up.

Finally, a few points have been made against me in a set of obviously rehearsed speeches at the Executive meeting where I raised my resolution.
1): I am accused of raising an unacce table "ultimatum" to the movement. The fact is that $I$ have beon donicd and $n$ n refused acceptable political conditions in which to wori. In toras of material conditions, I, like eviry other fulltimer, have put up with workine in a slum, with the rats, crumby equipment and in an anarchic and ramshackle organisntional set-up. I have worked 3 days a week away from my home for $2 \frac{1}{2}$ years, and given up comfortable working condirtions in Oxford to do so. But without a poiiticnl basis on which my contribution can be more than an individual effort, without a political basis that can help produce a paper I can be proud to work on, there is no way I con keep this up indefinitely.

The end of one year and the start of the new one stemed as good a time as any to fight for ? change. And I will go on raising these questions whatever the NC decides today.
2) I am accused of refusinc to accept that I am a minority. Comine frora the leaders of the majority faction, that llegation must teke the cake for hypocrisy. Who cen ina ine Covolom or Kianell workins loyally as a minority on anything? What happoned to oun Falklands decision?

In fact I have been a minority since before the fusion - to which I was opposed. Unfortunately - and duspite my best and loyal efforte to build the fused or ${ }^{\text {bandisation - overy one of my worst fears of the fusion has been realised }}$ in practice. Hence the state of the organisation today. I have done what I could to mitigate or resolve the problems. But there are linits to everything - and I have been in a minority pursuing such a constructive line.
3) It is said that I have "ro right" to resign from work on the production of the paper. Carouanas even suggested that I should resign as "joint editor" where my status has obviously been unequal - and simply work on the paste-up, implementing his decisions. HIL has suggested I might be disciplined for resigning. These responses are symptomatic of the arrogant and bureaucratic attitude of the majority faction leaders. If they cannot persuade someone, they seek instead to bully them or drive them out. I have the right to refuse to act as the lackey of a leadership whose methods I find completely unacceptable. I have the right to withdraw in order to fight these methods. And if anyone Wants to criticise or vote for disciplinary action against me, I hope they would be at the same time raising their hands to volunteer to sign away the rest of their working lives to carrying out carolans instructions - or those of any future majority leacership in the WSL.

Interestinely the EC has raised no objection whatever to my withdrawal from Internati nal work after the last NC sdopted a line I found indefensible, and which I could not in all conscience defond in the USA. The majority faction are only concerned about the paper because of my practical not my political contribution.
4) It is said that I have not raised criticisms of editions of the paper at the right time, but only after the event. In some cases this is true - and reflects the fact that the criticisms that have been made or supiorted by me afterwards should have been heard at an EB beforehand, so that $?$ better paper could be produced. I'm not perfect. Nor is CaRoLANThe present system exposes all our weaknesses. On other occasions I have raised objections and disagreements - or been forced to swallow them due to the impracticability of making changes late on in production.
5) Interestingly, nobody in the majority faction has crjticised me for endangering the remnants of the fusion: probably because they don't care, and would even prefer the old. WSL to depart quickly.

Yet the fight to preserve the fusion was the main reason I have put up with conditions on the paper for the past 18 months. I am the only member of the present EC to heve made any substantial effort to hold the present fusion tosether and develop constructive rele.tions between the two sides. The oniy other one was Levy, and it is no coincienence that he and I have both become profoundly pessimistic about the future of the movement.

My efforts have been to no avail. I have not been able to influence the majority faction in any wy whetever, as they have set about widening the divisions, anc provoking the minority faction into $s$ me moves which I think wore and are unwise.

A one-man unity effort in the WSL is a fool's errand. If the NC rejects an Editorial Board which can really do the job, I will cintinue to argue among the membership for the democracy and accountability which we used to have in the WSL before the fusion. This may well prove the majority faction to be an actunl minority on the regime they favour.

- the issues behind my resignation as joint editor of the paper: Cunliffe.


#### Abstract

"Comrade Cunliffe put a resolution on the form of the Editorial Board for the paper. This was defeated. An alternative resolution from the $\mathbb{E C}$ was carried. A resolution was also carried instructing Cunliffe to return to his work on the paper, which he had walked out of as from the New Year"


With these few - Characteristically misleading - words, many branch organisers would presumably have been informed for the first time by the latest Branch circular of the Majority Faction's view of the discussion which led up to my resignation as joint editor of the newspaper. Conspicuously and equally characteristically, my resolution which was defeated, my letters to the EC explaining my position (which I had requested to be circulated in the IB) and my statement read out at the NC, the circulation of which I had requested, are not provided for comrades information. I gather this was to onsure that my statement was delayed pending a sutitably lengthy, slanderous and vitriolic reply from cde Carolan to go with it. So while my point of view is suppressed, those who support the Majority position are busily canvassing their views and poisoning the atmosphere against me.

For this reason I have had to take steps myself to put the record straight. And, in so doing I have brought together a number of documents relevant to the current dire situation inside the WSL. Since I am currently under threat of disciplinary action in the form of removal from the Executive Committeo by the majority at the next NC meeting on March 10, this body of information should be of use to comrades in understanding the background.

Firstly, it is a wilful distortion to describẹ the dobate on the EC and NC as one over "the form of the EB for the paper". The debate was and is in essonce over whether or not there should be any oditorial board which will discuss, prepare, monitor and control the content of the paper and its gencral line, or whether, as at present, this whole area of work - the biggost singlo operation of the League - should be left in the hands of one or two comrades to do as they like. That is the present status quo. It has evolved as the position in the period since fusion. That is what I am objecting to... And, as my stand shows quite clearly, I am objecting to it whether or not I am (in theory or in practice) one of the one or two individuals granted such arbitrary power over the movement's press. For well over a yoar and a half there has boen no editorial board. The conscquences, of this had grown increasingly serious in the content and balance of the paper; but they became more serious still after Carolan took over $f$ om Kinnell as joint editor last summer.

I had ropeatedly objected to this sot-up, both on political grounds sinco it is a bad way of producing a balanced newspaper or a full analysis of the major events - and on the grounds of asserting the principles of democracy and accountability ( to which cde Carolan's attachment has never in my experienco been at all visible). From last summer onwards I ropeatedy raised objections to the anarchic organisational set-up arising from Carolan's high-handod and exclusive method of apramoh, which loft most if not all discussion until the Monday moming prior to Wednesday evening publication, thus limiting the options available and causing unnecessary havoc and confusion for all those involved in work on the paper.

The fruits of this method during the final months of 1983 emerged in a succossion of weak, lop-sided and unsatidfactory issues of SX which failed either to drow on the strengths of the organisation as a wholc or to match the requirements of the ssituation. Our failure until after the "Black Wednesday" betrayal to offor any analysis of the TUC leaders in the NGA dispute was for me the final straw after a period of growing dissatisfaction both at the way the work was being done and its practical outcome. I wrote a letter to the Executive - received on December 10 - setting out my political objoctions to the system, and making practical proposals to combat the present weaknesses, central to which was a functioning $\mathbb{B B}$.

I argued that such an EB should include comrades from the various political currents, in the League, specifically drawing in trade union comrades and activists - Who currently have no voice in the running of the paper.

Without such changes, I declared, I could see no political basis on which I could continue to carry out my functions and responsibilities as joint oditor of a paper run along lines with which I so strongly disagree. If the $\mathbb{E C}$ and sobsequently the $\mathbb{N C}$ insistod upon maintaining the existing undemocratic, cxclusive and chaotic methods, then I would have no ohoice buit to withdiaw as editor and full-time worker to allow room for a nominee from the Majocit. Faction who believes such a system to be defensible and correct. I seid that to allow time for discussion I would work through to the New Year.

In tho ovent thore was no effort to discuss this with me until after the Xmas holiday. At an EC mecting on January 29 however the EC Majority made it plain that they had no intontion of establishing a democratic EB. After giving the matter further consideration I decided, ragretfully, that after nine years of editing the movement's newspaper, I had no choice but to rosign, and that I could reverse this decision only in the unlikely event of the NC voting down the EC Majority at its January 7 meeting.

Was my demand unreasonable? Is it an outrageous individual ultimatum? In essence what I have callod for as a basis for continuing as editor is a restoration of the Editorial Board as it was discussed and agreed at the time of fusion in 1981, as a distinct and functioning body in the movement bringing together the various wings of the kovement in a constmuctive framoworis. But as far as the Majority Faction is concerned the spirit of fusion is long gone and forgatton: so my proposal had to be portrayed as something bizarre, alicn, new, unnecessary and somehow destructive. So we had the strange spectacle of the EC voting with only myself in favour for rejection of an Editorial Board - but then attompting to create the fiction of smo kind of controlling body. With only myself voting ageinst, it was docies to allocate up to onc hour of revived EC meotings to an "EB session: The argument was erected that this was simply a difforent "form" of Wuch a cynical linc was plainly intended to bamboozle otherwise doubttua mombers of the NC, and those who know little or nothing about the prodaction and preparation of a weekly paper or the realities of the Executive Committee.

On the old Socialist Pross, with only 12 pages per weck and a largely unitod loadorship, it used to take us a full-length, specific Editorial Board mecting of 2 hours or more cach week to prepare it properly, particularly $\dot{\text { I }}$ comrades other than Executive members were to have a real input and involvement in decision making. To suggest that in today's WSL and with a biggor paper, anything worthwhile can be done on an "EB" of rostricted momborship in under an hour is either cynical or naive - and naivete is not one of the weaknesses of the Majority Faction.

Experionco has borne out by initial objections to this charade. The Majority cdes have scarcely oven bothered to go through the motions of a bogus "honeymoon period" of their new "EB". In reality total control over the paper is now even more. firmly in Carolan's hands than before. Look at the events:

The Figst "EB" grew out of the 玵 meeting on December 29 which voted against sotting up a proper EB. EC members remained seated for another 45 minutes whilo a vague, undifferentiated list of topics and articles was totted up be running around the room, supplemented by an even longer and vaguer list read out by Carolan. No page plan was drawn up: the list in tatal would have filled several issues. Few of the articles saw the light of day. In the event, our coverage of the shipyard pay fight failed to warn of the obviously impending sellout, and lacked the bite of even the Guardian:s foporting.
"EB" NC. 2 , Which I and the Oxford cdes could not attond, dẹcided on a lead story which was resoundingly rejected next day, by the NC.
" ${ }^{\text {FBn }}$ No 3, January 15, was as tokenistic as the first. I made clear to anyone who had doubted it that I was willing to write for the paper, and volunteercd to write articles on Central America, the MJJ strusgle and SOGAT. This was agreed; the articles were sent in on time and (with some unnecessary changes) published. Two eztra articles on Central America vere lef.t over for the next issue.
"झ巴" No 4, however began to show the realities of the Majority Fection's attitude to collective discussion of the paper. Ne nere told that the Dditor would not be present, because he was "working on the peper" \& A desultory discussion then followed, in complete ignorance of the Pditor's plans for the paper; but it was agreed that I should write more international news, particularly on Scuthern Africa, and a plece on SOGAT. Having spent a whole day researching and writing the material on S.Africa and a piece on Poland, they were sent in to arrive at the same time as the previous week's material. This time, however, none of the articles were used: nor was the left-over material on Central America, which had been in the office for a week. I then learned at second hand that my article on SOGAT was "not wanted", and that another member had been asked to write the story.

The SX for that week was filled to the brim with timeless reviews, reprinted leaflets, and aricies lifted from other publications. One article on Namibia lifted from a campaign bulletin declared in distinction to my article that, because of the pressures of world public opinion, the tide was turning against South Africa in Namibia. Perhaps more glaringly, an article by Smith, on the notable victories scored by our comrades in the Covley Assembly Plant deputy convenor elections, was buried at the bottom of page 15, undermeath a lengthy and belated chronology of the NGA's Stockport dispute which had been lifted wholsale from ... the Financial Times

However at "EB" No 5, on January 28, the Fditor again failed to make an appearance to enable Smith and myself to ask what was going on. Indeed the Editor refused to give even Kinnell any infermation on plans for the paper when eventually he was telephoned at the Centre. Kinnell claimed that my articles had "arrived too laten - but offered no explanation on the fate of the Central America articles. He assured me they would be published. Smith handed in an extended article analysing the industrial situation, which had been discussed in general terms the previous week, and was intended to be published in instalments.(Two days later, however, the article was rejected for being out of line with the poIitical views of the Editor.) A rather muted discussion drew up a sketchy list of articles. But there was no discussion on anything remotely resembling the Editorial article which proclaimed a substantial change in the content and presentation of the pger. (Indeed not one of the Bditorial articles published since the New Year has been prepared in the "BP" discussions). Understandably, neither Kinnell nor Joplin - the Vajority Faction representatives present - seemed at all keen to move on to the listed agenda item of discussion on other comrades to be invited to these farcical meetings.
$n_{\text {HRB }}$ No 6, on February 5 marked the end of any pretence of cooperation on the paper by the Majority. Kecutive =esolutions were carried barring the publication of any article by me until after the next NC on Harch 10; condemnine Jmith for refusing to write hack news "filler" articles while the Bditor censors his political articles from the paper; and declaring the intention to romove me from the Bxecutive Comittee unless I return to the practical labour of pasting up the paper along the lines decreed by the Majority Faction. After such introductory decisions, the outcome of the subsequent " GB " session, which Smith and I could not attend, is irrelevant.

Experience confirms to the hilt my prediction that the "FBn put forward by the Majority Faction was a crude device to con members of the NC. But it shows something else as well. Thile it is true to say that the $E B$ is no
panacea to resolve the deep problems in the League, it is eaually true that the atitude of the rajority to the proposal of an is a litmus test of their attitude to democracy and constmotive working rolations between the various currents in the orgaisation. Instead of being prepared to recognise that their "AC as $\mathrm{BD}^{\prime \prime}$ formula has produced only a succession of farcical encounters, the Vajority has simply stepped up its heavy-hended bureauemtic efforts to press-gang the minority or gag theme.

It is no coincidence that the same meeting which debarred me from writing for the paper and threatened to oust me from the $X$ also sam blunt warnings from Carolan that those who oppose the politics of the Najority had a choice between knuckling dow or being in one way or another "picked up and throw out". The same meeting saw evidence that the Constitution is now being arrogantly torm up by a tiny hend.ful of the core "Ma.jority" leadership, who plainly regard the NSL as their own personal property. Letters have been issued, decreeing summary fines on comrades who heve failed to fill in the necessary dues assessment forms. That they should be made to fill in the forms is not in dispute; nor is the need to take action to remedy the heavy arrears built up by some mombers. But when Smith and I asked which leading body of the League had decided to embark on such wholesale disciplinary measures, we were (untruthfully) told that it was the "Orsanisation Sub Committee". Zven if this had been true, the OSC has no political authority to take such a decision: it is a purely organiational body. Nor even has the EC the pover to impose summary disciplinary penalties on comrades without giving them their Constitutional right to a hearing. Yet the IS disregarded such niceties and voted to tear up this aspect of the Constitution by retrospectively endorsing the allegged "sub committee decision". This is all the more disturbing since on the issue of finance and the clearing of back debts there had until then been a common position between the Majority and minority on the $\mathbb{B C}$. Now Kinnell, in a burst of megalomania, has decided to embark on a unilateral course of action.

Is this course of action seriously calculated to resolve the finacial prob lems? Or is it not a provocative, deliberate kick in the teeth against comrades from the minority who had taken a constructive and cooperative position?

In my view the Bditorial Board question - expressing the attitude of the Najority leadership towards domocracy and constructive relations with the group - sums up the current stage of crisis in the League. Included in this IB, therefore are other documents which offer background on the current situation.

The first is my statement to the NC on January $7 \cdot$
Secondly there is a bowdlerised version of a document which I wrote last Cctober on the question of the paper and the ISL magazine, at the point where the Hajority Faction first made clear their intention to scrap Sorkers Socialist Review and Iaunch instead a Broad Group magazine. Though this document vas published in Ia 75 it received only $\ddagger$ imited circulation because the llajority comrades objected to the fact that it referred in passing to the cuestion of "convergence" of the League with the Braod Groups. The :TC Yojority in its wisdom decid-d to reatrict discussion on this question to IC nembers, and it hrs zubsoquently been shelved indefinitely. But in the montime my document was blocked fron further discus ion or circulation. Though some of the points in it no: appear rather deted, I feel it is a useful leadun to the present discussions.

The third document reproduced here is a cut-dow version of a reply which I drafted last July to the Majority Faction's document on "uilding the WSL" contained in IB 50. After a number of cleshes over this document at Brecutive level, the Vajority cdes agreed to focus discussion at the

August conference simply on the conclusions to their document, which were for the most part comron ground. On that basis I decjded not to publish my response to IE50, and instead to attempt to build on the areas of agreement.

However, developments since the August conference heve sho:m the need to take up tho differences on party-oulding and intamal denocracy wich are-encapsulated in the lajority's arguments in IB50. Though the document as a whole was never put to the August conference (nor indeed was the scrapoinc of the magezine) I believe that its method and content underlie the method and direction of the liajority in their day-tomay muning of the movement - which is now in even more catastrophic shape than it was last year. Unless these questions are sorted out, there can be only more deterioration of the ISL.

Once again the July document - largely unchanged - may read as slightly dated. Put I am sure that comrades with open eyes and open minds will grasp its relevance.

Cunliffe, February 8, 1984.

## The defeated resolution

"That this $\mathrm{P} / \mathrm{NC}$ instructs the Bditors to take immediate steps to establish an Editorial Board, including $\mathbb{C C}$ members as well as other comrades from various points of view in the League who can contribute to the paper, to begin functioning as of the next issue of SX. This AB should meet every week that $S X$ is being published, and at such a time (normally weekends) that trade union comrades can attend (some possibly as alternate members if they cannot guarantee weekly attendance). The 3 should plan the general content of the paper, discuss the editorial line and its presentation on the main issues of the day, and in this way strengthen the paper. The JB will provide a focus that will assist in structuring the hitherto anarchic run-up to production, and will also plan in advance for non-urgent feature articles and centre-spreads."

Cunliffe, Dec 22 1983.
Doteaied EC moting Dec 29, 1983
Deforted NG meeting Jan 7, 1984 .

On my return from the USA I was horrified to learn that the Majority on the Executive had declared their support for a motion to the NC tabled several months previously by the Glasgow Branch. The gist of the motion is to "broaden" the Editorial Board of our weekly paper by bringing in non-League members; and to scrap the Workers Socialist Review as our journal, and instead launch a bi-monthly magazine in tine name of the broad groups, with an EB "controlled" by the League, yet incorporating "prominent left wing intellectuals who are sympathetic" (no names are mentioned).

I attended the NG on October 15 expecting to face a battle to defend the last vestiges of the WSL's public face (though WSR can scarcely be viewed as a well-known or regularly-appearing face). The night before, Najority cues on the $E C$ had agreed to extend the debate on this question to 2 hours. To my (and everyone's) surprise, however, cde Carolan announced after the lunchbreak his proposal that the motion - Which he strongly supported be held over by the NC.

It was not feasible - in the absence of a Glasgow cde to argue for it, and in view of cde Carolan's shift of tactics - to force the resolution onto the agenda. But there is no doubt that its postponement simply postpones and amplifies rather than averting the real dangers of liquidation implicit in these proposals. Indeed Workers Socialist Review is already to all intents and purposes dead - since there is no way the Majority, will allocate resources to the production of a magazine they clearly hope to do away with. Thus already one specific conference decision from April - for the production of two issues of the magarine to a timetable - has bitten the dust in spirit ass well as in the letter.

Since the Glasgow proposals are the only ones actually on the table for uss to discuss at present let us look at their implications.

The resolution (backed by the EC Majority) proposes: "That steps be taken forthwith to broaden the editorial board of the paper to include non-Learue members, and that the paper be reduced in size to provide resources for the point below" (emph adäed).

Now broadening the $S B$ is a long overdue task. In reality there is and has been no functioning $E B$ for at least nine months now, and the entire content of the paper has been basically decided week by week by two or three people. This does not and cannot adequately reflect the political strengths and talents in the League: and it contributes to the organisational chaos of the weekly production process.

But broadening the $E B$ "forthwith" (ie last week, if the motion had been adopted by the IVC) to include non-League members vould mean that this ramshackle arrangement would be further confused by the addition of outsiders with equal voice and vote (I presume falt least the Glasgow movers do not mean the newcomers to be a mere fig-leaf for the status quo).

So, having made no headway in establishing adequate Leapue participation in the paper, we would begin at once further diluting our input and control. And yorse: with less space in a reduced size of paper - as proposed by Glasgow the need for clarity and balance between our line and that of other forces would become not less bot that much greater.

Already - as cde Carolan has admitted in heated moments discussing the contonts of partioular issues of $S x$ - ve carry week by week a number of "shittyu articles by non-members for discussion purposes (thou the hamering they deserve) Already this causes readers some good deal of confusion. (I was asked alI over the USA if we had changed our line on Nicaragua following Corbyn's articles). That confusion could easily become the dominent feature of a paper constructed according to the Glasgow model: yet Majority caes appear ready to support the proposals.

For my part, though I have always remained sceptical as to the "broad paper" format as a;ainst a clearly formulated party press, I have been prepared to work along the lines of the fusion agreement:for a broad paper fulfiling many of the functions of a party press. The Glasgow proposals - supported by the IN majority - carry the real danger of negating that combination for good. Any more dilution of our (TSL) line in SX would in my view render it little more useful than a "Briefing"-styIe sounding board, open to all comers with little differentiation, ill-equipped to give Ieadership ar cIear analysis in the demanding struggles ahead.

Secondly, the Glasgow/Najority proposal is for launching a new, non-Leasue magazine. It does not actually mention WSR, but must surely negate its existnce through material resources if not explicit political expeutiency.
"priority," it says (this means priority over t he weekly paper) "should be given to the establishment of a magazine appearing ait least(!) bi-monthly, with a format similar to that of Marxism Today, Intermational, Chartsist, etc. and that prominent left wing intellectuals who are sympathetic be coopted onto the editrorial board. The League must ensure that it retains control over the magazine, which wilI be published in the name of the broad groups." (emphasis added)
Thus the decision of the Majority in supporting this, is to wind up the only publication which (every 9 months or so) carries the name of the Workers Socialist League - and to substitute a "braod" magazine patronised by unnamed "intellectuals", within which the VSL would have some input by virtue of controlling the BB .

So what's in a name? If the Ieagee retains "editrial control" does the "label" iISL mean very much? Could we - as the Majority want us to believe carry our full politics in a "broad" magazine, while reaping all kinds of advantages ( soaring sales, admiring circles of intellectuals, respectability) by discarding the "label"?

No we couldn't: Certainly on some issues we could arguo the same formal posjition as we would in asR (as we do in the paper). Dut the magazine is not intended simply as a vehicle for this that or the other article: it is a vehicle for the Leninist organisation to explain its relationship to the issues of the class struggle, to questions of theory, culture and histcry. The party "lavel" should not just be something stuck on the front cover, but should inform the whole content and thrust of the magazine. In building the WSL, and fighting to recruit from the "braod" milieu to our ranks, we argue the need for a disciplined, leninist vanguard party organisation - distinct from broader, looser caucuses and pressure groups in the existing reformist labour movement. We need to present our own programme, policies, tactics and strategy: we need to show a distinct method of organising and fighting for leadership if we are to win the best elements of the workers' movement to our banner. In dropoing the "label", we drop also the banner - leaving the next step the dropping of the party itself: and all for no tangible gain.
cuite apart from the questionable viabillty of finding any prominent sympathetic intellectuals（and obscure ones are of no particular use in the Glasgow enterprise）we have to recognise the implications for the WSL of scrapping its only publication．

NSR is the only form in which we could argue our full political analysis of social democracy；it is the only forum where we can call openly for the reconstruction of the Trotskyist Fourth International；the only form where we can argue simply why people should join the iSL and build a revolutionery party．＇The Majority＇s move to scaap this forum is the more major because it follows on a 2 －year process of gradually dissolving and discarding public activities af the WSL。Already our＂entry＂is so totai that only three leading comrades－myself，Smith and Levy，none of whom can gain admittance to the KO － can publicly acknowledge ourselves members of the League！

Since the successful Fusion Rally of notober 1981 （anyone remember that， highly successful，event？）there have beer few，if axy WSL meetincs in the local areas and none narionally：my proposal for an anniversary rally last autumn was brushed aside as＂crazy＂by Hill and other liajority cdos．The only national WSL event since then has been the I982 Summer School（in which the USL title was insisted upon vehemently by odes of the present lajority as a transparent ruse to block TIIC sections from any voice in the agenda or conduct of the school）．League classes exist on a small，occasional scale in only a few areas．The iSL issues no leaflets，no statements（vith the eaception of the NC resolution on the Cowley 13）and has to all intents and purposes ceased to exist for the workers：movement．Indeed in a number of areas - ．as the Branch Organisers！meeting showeã even teaze branch meeting have become a thing of the past，while few of those which persist appear to feature an introductory political report．

Those of us who have looked on at this decline with some dismay，wupported the amended resolution or $B$ uilding the WSL at the August congerence as a means of tightening up the organisation，and hoped that，in a fight for the reguiar publication of the magazine，a stimulus could be given to uSL recruit－ ment and public presencs．Instead．the Mejority wants to screp the magazined．

But to return to the Gfasgow proposale whish are before the $⿴ 囗 ⿱ 一 一 廾$ ；what would the consequence be of scrapping the magazine？
（1）Firstly，it would mean scrapping the last vestiges of the fusion agree ment of 1981 －in which many of us were only reluctantly persuaded to give up our weekl y party press in exchange for an agreement that there would be a regular party magazine to supplement the＂broad＂paper．

It is worth asking the question oi whether such a repudiation at this stage is not in fact a calculated provocation by the Najority，in the hopes that substantial numbers of old－wslers will be infuriatedi enough to leave the
argani sation（and thus further strengthen the grip of the Carolan－Kinnoll Majority）．Certainly nothins in the conduct of these cdus at leadership level should give members any grounds to believe that they mish either to preserve or still less to strengthen the remnants of the fusion．And it seems that this attitude at the top is finding a predictable refloction in a high level of polarisation－even systematic denigration of oldilisers－throughout the orgonisation．

In gauging whether or not the move is a calculated provecotion is is important to note thet the Kajority＇s decision to push for this far－renching change in the prablic profile of our organisation
takes place quite delib erately geven wooks after the final stage of an extended cunferenco period．
(2) Secondly, the proposal would make the WSL
a laughing stock in the international arena, where every organisation, no matter how minuscule, succeeds - if nothing else in producins some kind of barty press spoking in its own nome. Apparentiy Carolan/aifucil now cito the Socialist League as an exception to this patterm. Since then hes the SL been regarded by these cdes as an enitome of Trotskyist party-buildinc? In any event the USFI (rajority and minority) have ind opendent journals used by the SL, and Intemational is clearly an SL journal.

With neither a magazine nor a paper in our own neme we would be particularly bady-placed to exploit the opportunities for party building in the USA and the coming crisis in the USFI. The retreat on the magazine vould be a gift for our opponents, a blow to our friends - and do nothing to strengthen our members.
3) The final aspect of the scrapping of the magazine is precisely the cuestion of how our mombers view and ficht for the VISL.

Low sales of the magazine have been cited by Carolan and Kinnell as "evidencen that it is not saleable as a party publication: if the "label" were dropped, it is clained, cdes would keenly sell it.

Yet there is no evidence that this logic applies to the paper - whose sales have tailed off terribly. Nor would.selling a "braod" magazine necessarily help at all in building the WSL (as I have pointed out above).

My view is that low sales of the magazine, like the poor level of organism ation, are evidence of a low political morale amongst our membership and a Iack. of Ieadership commitment to following through the work. There has been no sigm at all of any"drive by cdes of the majority to produce and push the magazine: and this is reflected in the branches, where members naturally hold back from what they see as an unnecessary struggle to sell an irregular "extra" publication. Not surprisingly, given the general absence of public profile, low sales also run alongside low recruitment to the $\operatorname{siL}$, low levels of branch activity and weak, sporadic and largely marginal involvement of our cdes in local level disputesio.

It might of course be possible to cover up one aspect of this process of liquidation of the USL by abandoning production of a magazine whose saless provide a practical test of memberst commitment and activity: but the retreat to a "Broad Group" magasine will not build a Leninist party.

I hope that comrades will be on their guard against the top-Ievel liquidat ionism now being advocated and that in B ranch and area meetings
NC mem bers will be told quite categorically that they should vote to throw out the 1 aspow motion,

The Ostrich and the Steamroller:
Two false views of Party Building.
A reply to Carolyn and Finney's Resolution in IB50. Cunliffa. July 1983,

## "Put on a hapoy face"

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\text { Majoning in Southing the st in } 1350 \text {. }
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From its very first sentence thelResolution/embarks on selfmeception. He are assured - without a hint of evidence - that "most organisations on the left are stagnant or have lost proportionately far more members in the last period than we have:

Does anyone seriously believe that? True, other groups have been losing some members ( While others, like Militant, appear to be growing). But losing proportionately more than us? The raw figures since our fusion 2 years ago indicate that our organisation has declined by $30 \%$. But the actual morale of the organisation, the dubious status of many of those still counted as members, and the incessant loss of demoralised odes must take the losses by now as high as $40 \%$. Many of those who have left are hard to replaces experienced odes, many youth, active women odes with a record of struggle, and workers. The League today has been reduced in size to the hisin point of the profusion iSL. The losses have wiped us out in whole areas - Bradford, Winsford, Brighton .. which contained prospects for development.

Carolyn and Kinnell may argue that they wrote their Resolution before the conference and the loss of the Internationalist Faction - Which in turn has triggered other losses. But it is no secret that Carolyn and Kinnell not only welcomed the $I F^{\prime \prime} s$ eventual split, but had anticipated it for months before the conference. They were neither surprised nor sorry to see them go.

## A Curious Omission

We could however be charitable about this ostrich-like refusal to recognise the reality of the organisation if it were confined to the opening sentence. Perhaps they know of cataclysmic losses in the SAIl or SL of which we are unaware.

But the initial dubious assertions are followed in Section 11 by an absolutely astounding omission: Carolen/Kinnell (C/K) have drafted a whole document on "building the VSL" which DOBS NOT 30 MUCH AS NMTTIOT the SX or other Broad Groups, or the fact that the vast, vast majority of the day-tomay work of the WSL is done not as the TSL but through such fronts.

This omission can be no accident. Section II(2) of the Resolution refers to the failure to "init together" fields of work in the IUs, the 0 and among the rpecially oppressd - but does not mention SX. Section

- II(3) refers to the work amongst women, but does not mention WX $\mid$ Section II(4) does refer to the youth "broad group" - but only to dismiss it as "the empty shell of a League front". Section II(5) refers to 0. work but doss not mertion the CX grouns. And section II( $)$ refers to ous appalling failure to recruit to the ISL out of the crisis in the Dritish SMP - Without referring to the lack of a WSL public face or activity through which they might have been attracted to us. Nowhere in this document is there any reckoning by $\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{K}$ of the actual situation of our organjsation, any balance sheet of our current broad group periphery or the problems of working theough such groups. One might almost believe they do not exist, and the $\operatorname{ZSL}$ operates through its oin name and a party press!

We can easily imagine what the reaction would have been had Smith Jones or myself drafted a document incorportasing such omissions. Ne would havo been castigated mercilessly as "sectarians" seeking to "abandon" or "wreck" the broad groups. How then should we read such an omission from $\mathrm{c} / \mathrm{K}$ ?
The missing balance sheet
C/K seem profoundIy reluctant to present a balance sheet on the SX "turn" which the fused organisation inherited in 1981, and which has coloured every aspect of our work since then. How lise are we to understand a Resolution on building the organisation that leaves out any reference to its primary and all-mbracing tactic? Our failure to recruit and to develop cannot simply be detached from an examination of the actual work most comrades actually do.
The disappearing USL.
The reality is that with the $S X$ turn the movement embarked on what was confessed to be a partial liquidation into its periphery. The theory was that this would culminate in an eventual 'convergence' in which the periphery would be hardened and assimilated into an enlarged organisation. At the time of fusion many of us from the old WSL were highly scoptical on this notion, but dscided under pressure to give it a try, provided that the WSL retained an independent party publication, a public face, and utilised the opaper as an undeclared "party" paper open for debate with wider sections of the labour movement.

The reality is that though the paper has in my view generally achjevod a reasonable political profile on most key issues of the class strungis, the profile of the VSI as an orranisation has been totally submerced.

This problem might not seem so onormous if it had not coincided with the proliferation of disarreements and factional polarisation within the TSL itself, which have embroiled the organisation in an almost unbroken succession of wrangles, hassles, manoeuvres, and the more or less surreptitious application of personal pressure on individuals. Combine this with an unresolved and seemingly unstoppeble financial crisis related to the failure of the League to grow, and we see an alarning "scissors crisis" in which all of the practical and constructive, overt daily tork of WSL activists is conducted not under the name of the WSL but throuch SX and other broad groups, while the iflimer seems to be littile more than a focus of every conceivable açravation, offering neither leadership nor orsanised political structure in the daily work.

Is it surprising that some members have asked themselves the purpose of remaining in such in organisation?

The partial, tempofrary, controlled licuidation is tuming into $a$ wholesale, nemanent, uncontrolled liauidation, which
far from building the WSL is treading dow its walls and raising a question mark over its very existence.

## "We see no ships"

of confronting this very rall problon, thich is conrected to political positions which they developed and broucht into the organisation before the fusion, $c / K$ search around dishorestly for scapecoats on thom to blame the present chaos. This is why Section II of their resolution is one long diversion. Placing their telescopes to their blind eyes, they claim:
(1) That is is only since liay 1982 that "intemal conflicts have absorbed much of our energies". Why choose hay 1982? So that they can -a,t least implicitly blame the internal conflicts on thos who argued for a chan ge of position on the lialvinas lar. The comrades know fill vell that the conflicts had been rife on the leading Conmittees since the Autumn of 1981 - only months after the fusion. There were disputes over the bohemion behaviour of RL in relation to the leading vodies of the ISL and the political line she projected for our work anongst women. Where were disputes over the content and control of SK. By the Spring of 1932, cdes on the MC were being treated to $\mathbb{M C}$ cover-ups of the extent to which conflicts were paralysing the $D C$ and $O C$. There never was any "golden age" of the fusion: the apples were never neatly stacked on the cart for the minority (subsequently the majority) on the Nalvinas question to lmock over. The differences that erupted in May 1982 were simply part of the legacy of the inadequate basis of the fusion - for thich both sides of the organisation must share the blame。
(2) Certainly the organisation has "failed to knit together" different fields of work: but the component of the organisation that has failed most abysmally is the leadership, on which both $c$ and $K$ sit.
(3) In blaming "factionalism" between "groups of League women" for the wrecking of "one of the most promising and fruitful areas of our work", Carolan and Kinnell evade the responsibility of leading groups of Leasue MKI - themselves at the forefront - who consciously stitched up a fusion in which none of the sharp political differences: on work emongst women had been resolved. And the same League men, by their actions and inaciion helped foster the factional strife that erupted on the women's commission. $K$ and $C$ carry particular responsibility for their stubborn refusal right up to her resignation to take any serious steps to control the individualistic and highly factional activities of RL as women's "organiser". Their dogged defence of her every move on the leading bodies got the work off to an appalling start, from which it has never recovered.
(4) The thumbnail account of youth work by Cok leaves out any reckoning of the pressures on our comrades from $J$ routinism, or of the lack of any serious allocation of leadership or material resources to youth work.
5) The problems of recruiting 0 . contacts and "quasi-supporters" cannot b e unrelated to the lack of any overt political existence of the USL. Many would see it as sufficient to join or work with the SX Broad Group. Yet this problem is not even mentioned.
(6) Thile the points about industrial struggles and factory bulletins appear fair enough, $K / C$ say nothing about the alaming lack of involvement (often complete lack of interest) of many of our bronches in local level trade union stmueles, which can be far more direct and useful means of finding and developing contacts than industrial bulletins. The appalling remoteness of London branches from battles on their doorstep - Grosvenor House; Tilbury docks; Hackney DHSS; Metal Box, etc...- indicates the detachment of much of our organisation from the day-to-day struggles of workers against employers even where they do occur; to an alarming extent this appears to have been supplanted by 0. and TJ routinism.
(7) While it is fair to say that the organisation has been negzicent in involvement in CID, it is also necessa-y to point out that only at the Summer School was a serious discussion actual Iy promoted on the question by the Becutive: and that debate came pretty weil a year too late to move in any serious way into Cll which is now almost certainly past its peak strength for some time to come.
(8) .... arganisational chaos of the movement dates back to before the factional conflicts, to the time of fusion, when the new ins simply inherited an amarphous apparatus consisting of the old ICL structure with 2 or 3 WSLers velded on and no clear assignment of responsibilities. As the unwieldy nature of the set-up became clear, neither side felt able to proceed to do anything about it since the organisational problems o ocame inseparable fom the political issues. We must share the blame, not seek to heap it onto the other side if we are to find a way forvard.
(9) With only 3 issues of the WSL magazine - and no other TSL publications having appeared in 2 years since fusion, $C / K$ give us no clue as to how they imagine the WSL as an organisation was remotely equipped to exploit opportunities in the SIP crisis - or any other left wing organisation. In fact, sugcestions are now being floated by Carolan that we might detach the magazine : from the "FiSL" label, which would.of course compound the problem and ensure that we never pick up more than the most dogged wouldme recruit who manages somehow to intuit the existence of a WSL burjed deop behind multiple barricades of "front" groups and "broad" publications.

## An avoidance of reality

In my view these omissions and distortions are in themselves onough to discredit and dismiss the remainder of the $\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{K}$ resolution, which is plainly not addressing the reality of the WSL and its work but a highly solective and factionally warped picture of that reality. But we have looked so, far at only two out of ten sections! What is the substance of the remainder?

Section III of the Resolution blames organisational problems and differences rather than political disagreements for the chaos. Of course there have been organisational failings and disagreements. Dut they come from both sides of the organisation. The "Leninism" is by no means the property of the c/K fection alone: some of the earliest organisational disargeements focussed on the maverick attitudes of both RL and cde Carolan himself on leading bodies of the orgenisation. The "Bolshevism" upheld in the $\mathrm{c} / \mathrm{K}$ resolution is plainly a selcctive, onesid d application of discipline, to the disadvantage of the present minority in the NSL.
Politics and factionalism
C/K let the cat out of the bag when they claim that there has been mpre "heat" raised of differences over "norms rules and standards" than over political questions. This is a pointer to their main priorities and concerns.

Bxperience since the April conference has confirmed that under the guise of a political fight over perspectives, what c/K were in fact fighting for was organisational domination of the WSL: the docunents were less perspectives for ork in the class than manifestos in an undeclared presidential-style election campaign.

My proof? Look at events since the conference.
The najority voted at conference for IB45, which was depicted by $c / K$ as a rejection of sectarianism', and defonding on orientation towards the 0 . as a central part of a labour movement orientation against supposed threats from supporters of IB48. Yet since the conference $\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{K}$ have given next to no attention to the development of 0 . work along any lines at all. The election has come and gone without ony serious discussion being
promoted by these comrades in the SSL on its implications for our 0. work or any revised analysis or perspective. IPC5 has yet to be translated to any concrete tactics or stratesy for the next period in the 0 . The most active orientation towards the current strugele there was in fact put forvard on the $\because: C$ by Jones, a supnorter of IB48, who pronosed a resolution prioritising an active fight for support to Neffers frathich was carried despite angry opposition $f$ om Kimmell.

Take another example. The concrote proposals andanalysis on work amongst women contained in IB34 were voted dow at the conference. Some of its authors - women with long and valuable experience, roots and skills in building campaigns and struggles - have since been successfully wom down and demoralised by their opponents and driven out of the organisa.tion. As a result, the majority
now have
unchallenged control of the WSL's work amongst women. Yet they have made not a single concrete proposal or jnitiative to advance that :ork since the beginning of the year. The comrade landed with practical responsibility for the work under such conditions plainly recognised that she had been left in the lurch, and that to maintain IX under conditions of an indifferent WSL majority leadership and demaoralised and disorientated vomen comrades was impossible. The whole fight proves to have been simply a factional show of strength rather than any serious fight for practical politics to b e taken into the labour movement by the majority.

In similer fashion, the majority lent its support to documents proposing farmeaching measures to boost the movement's youth work, without ever intending to devote the political and material resources that would make possible their implementation.

And having triumphantly driven the sectarian "Intermationalist" Faction out of the NSL and seen TILC split in the way they wished, C and K are now advocating the consolidation of waht amounts to a rump "mini*TILC". in a farcical exercise of toytow' intemationalism' far more sectarian than anyone other than the RWL would ever have suggested on the old TILC.

## Prize Rxhibits

In each case it seems patently obvious that the political fight was simply the suise adonted by the C/K majority for procuring their dominance in the organisation rather than any serious strvagle for a practical line of march for the WSL at home or ab road. This mates Carolan and Kinnell prize exhibits fit for the museum of sectarians in the true meaning of the term - placing the (narrouly conceived) interests of their small groupine within the WSL in counterposition to the development of the group as a whole and the worting class movement. Dressed up in the schizophrenic rhetoric of "broad groups" and "Jolshevism" we are confronted by a Ieadership which combined the politics of liquidationism with sectarianism; of the ostrich and the steamroller. A curious miz indeed: but certainly not unprecedented. Perhaps the politics of Gerry Mealy are not so far behind us after all?
Iondins dom jedeas to "the rest"
It is a related, narrow, sectarion viow of the party and its leadership which comes over in the Resolution's Section IV. While formally correct in stressing the ideological role of the party as the carrier of the prograne and method of Narxism into the labour movement, $C / K$ leave out any notion as to how those ideas themselves are developed, enriched and checked in practice. The result is a vision of the party in which the "ideas men" at the top simply hand down policies and theories to a subordinate crew of hod-carress and lackeys in the rank and file: the membership is cut off from any but the most subordinate role. $\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{K}$ show to conception of
the positive and crucial role of the process of denocratic discussion, critical analysis of practical experience, or a collective leadership in which more than one political strand is enabled to play a prod uctive role.

There is no contesting the need for an active nembership, committed to the $c$ loss stmbele, integrated in the labour novement, fighting under the direction of the party as a conscious force seeking to advance and raise the political level of workers beyond sponteneous and reformist forms of organisation and struggle. Only through such work can we prepare the basis for new and more audacious campaigns, and win the most class conscious sections of the working class to our programe and recruit them to active membership of our party.

But since the $\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{K}$ document pays no attention at all to the nuts and bolts of the work our comrades actually do in the branches and the problems of recruitment, it is hard to take these formal statements as more than the orthodox icing on a factional cake.

In reality Section IV boils down to a vision of a top-dow, hierarchic party structure in which the "ideas" are passed on from the upper echelons of "small committees" ( possibly occasionally the EC) to the "rest of the party". C/K actually rationalise the separation of Ieadership from membership in the following (again formally correcti) passage:
"Within the party a similar unevenness in education, experience, commitm ment, to that which characterises the relationship between the party as a Whole and the class emerges between leading layers and the rest of the organisation....The National Committee and its subsidiaries within the party cut themselves off from the party when necessary to deliberate and discuss...."

The outcome of these deliberations, gift wrapped from the top dogs, is then generously handed out to the plebs on the lower level, whose views and experiences are plainly seen as irrelevent to the whole process. Centralist this certainly is: democratic it aint. Nor is it even a sensible way to seek to administer a movement mired in a crisis of morale and perspective, in which members already feel alienated and ignored.

In fact such an approach can cut the movement off from the vital materialist base on which our theory and programe can be developed through the most searching analysis of our experience in the work - in which evexy member has a part to play.
A sectacian viev from tho of tho stcantolloz
The logical conciusion of the approach contained in the $c / \mathrm{K}$ Resolution is agein sectarian. It would eventually reduce the organisation to a homogenous but slender "hard core" grouping of probably less than 80 ex-ICL loyalists, who are apparently accustomed to being dictated to by "srall committees", and ready to stick with Cand $K$ through thick end thin.

The vaunted ideals of the "non-sectarien" fusion of 1981 have thus been transformed into a sectarian nightmare 2 years later. Tqually as ruthlessly as the RGL majority leadership which $K$ and $C$ so virulently attacked for their behaviour, the present majority leadorship are prepared to use their majority to make life impossible within the organisation for those who hold a position independent of their otm.,

Having ap parently renounced any hope of "integrating"the leaders of the old WSL - for whom they have never had more than a cynical contempt - into the leadership, $C$ and $K$ are now doing their best to whittle away their $b$ ase of support in the movement and force them out of it.

How else can we explain the ostrich like approach of experienced comrades like Carolan and KinnelI to the current appalling State of crsisi in the ISL? We are forced to conclude that what they lnow doosn't alarm or disturb them. They would be quite hapoy to see a smaller, less influential orcanisation, provided it is purged of serious opponenta of their views.

WIY $\operatorname{HLSE}$, after two years in which the topic has barely been mentioned, and in defiance of a fusion agreement to postione a vote until after $a$ serious discussion had made possible more than simply a voteout, should Carolan begin now to resurrect the question of Afghenistan, and set out to force it on to the August :IC and conference argendas? hy else, if not to heat up the factional divisions and put the boot into the minority, in the hopes that more will become disnimited and leave?

Orcanisational recipes for political problems.
Sections V, VI and VII of the Resolution basically cover in more detail points already touched upon. Suffice it to say that the failure of the League to recruit is put down in each instence primarily to organisational rather than political reasons - With the unnistakeable implication at each stage that the fault lies somehow with the minority and the membership in general rather than the majority.

Section VIII attempts to offer organisationel solutions to the question of contact work. We are urged to "convince contacts... of the irreplave ability of the RSL". But since most of our daily work (if not all of it, given the evident failure of most League branches to give guidence on IU and other work) appears to take place alongside rather then through the WSL, it might be more convincing if Cerolan and Kinnell were to explain exactly why the WSL is irreplaceable, and how they propose branch work should change to make the League central. Since they do not attempt this, they rest content with lambasting the membership in general for failing to convince people that our invisible party, the "eminence grise" b ehind our plethora of Broad Groups; is really the hub of all political development。

More bizarre still, we are told by the two most factional individuals in the League (if not the world Trotskyist movement) that an "educated cadre" is needed to secure "comradely relations in discussion" bib

Section IX once again offers us a formally correct argument on the need to integrate intellectuals with worker comrades. But this cannot be separated from the general slant of the document, and must therofore be recognised as arguing in practice for the perpetuation of the existing parity hierarchy, and against anyhting that might limit the "scientific activity" of "intellectuals" in the leadership. There are no prizes for guessing who carolan and Kinnell would regard as "intellectuals" in the TSL.

The Missing lagazine
Tho final set of organisational proposals in Section $X$ make no reference to the role of ysi publications - centrally the magazine - or our press and broad groups,in recruitment。 The results are confusing.

Though "classes" are mentioned, their presentation (ISL or SX? private or public?) is left vague; and the likelihoood of them happening, short of a major drive to transform the work of the branches, seems minimal.

No attention is paid to the role and political development of local brenches in the labour movement.
once asain the aproach is a "top dom", bureaucratic, hierarchic approach thich larcely ignores the concrete problens of the embers thile seeking to make the organisation more cosily habitable for the top layers of tho majority londesrhip.
$\frac{\text { A Discraceful Clessic }}{\text { As a Resolution on party building, the Carolon/Kinnell document is a }}$ discrace. As an exercise in distortion and double-dealing it i.s a classic.

The basic prerequisite of establishing a heal thy innen-party regime in the NSL and confronting the accumulated wobl oms of what both sides should now admit was an unprinvipled, ill-conceived, botched and bungled fusion
in 1081 is an abandonment of the sterile and destructive factionalism which the Resolution in I350 was drafted to serve. The fusion remains a fact of life: both sides must lear to live with it if we are not to decimate the organisation rendering the greatest comfort and amusement to our rivals on the left and to the class enemy and reformist leaders whom we should be fighting.

The only way we can hope to moke a positive development that could compensate for the damage we have done to both profusion groups by the fusion is to devote our attention and energies to creating relations of trust and cooperation between the various elements of the present $\pi S L$, and mapping out political and organisational initiatives - such as the Sept 17 conference - which con tum our movement outwards, widen its periphery and create more favourable conditions for political discussion and Clarification. Carolan and Kinnell's : factional and divisive text show: Jus that they have no intention of following such a course: and unless they are repudiated by the membership, they will set the tone for the entire next period in the crisis of the NSL.

A year ago, in a (vain) attempt to raise a more positive note in the midst of the sharpening debate over the Malvinas, I wrote in IBII a document on party-building, focussed on the development of Branch and Area leadership and initiatives, and the need for branches to direct the work of comrades if individual members are to be integrated and developed in the organisation.

There was no organised discussion of this text, though parsons wrote a reply, and some comrades - in my view correctly - pointed out that it did not deal with the role of the broad groups sufficiently. While accepting that it could be substantially improved - and recognising that its tone appears wild y and absurdly optimistic in the contact of today's WSL, I would argue that the general line of approach of that document offers the only way by which the organisation can make itself habitable to new members and play its crucial role in giving leadership in the daily political work our comrades carry out in the labour movement.

It is no accident in my view that Carolyn and Kinnel's document makes n o reference to this text, but instead heads at a tangent from it, refusing to confront the daily realities of the work.

Against the sectarian recipes served up by Carolyn and Kinnell in IB50, I would counterpose the general line of my document on party building in IBID.

Cunliffe, July 1983.

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