



Aspects of the international situation and our tasks  
 .... draft amended by Organising Committee  
 The Economic Situation .... Kinnell

## Notes:

a) A table on page 2 of the 'Economic Situation' document is difficult to read. It is as follows:

	1960-70	1970-80
W. Germany	5.4	2.1 (1970-9)
US	5.3	2.9
Japan	11.0	6.4
UK	3.3	0.1
Spain	n.a.	6.0
Mexico	9.0	5.9
Iran	12.0	n.a.
Brazil	n.a.	10.3
Algeria	7.8	11.4
Malaysia	n.a.	11.8
S. Korea	17.6	16.6
Turkey	10.9	6.1
Nigeria	9.1	12.0

b) By mistake two bulletins have both been numbered 22. One contains 'The Crisis of the FI and our tasks' and November 1982 NC minutes; the other contains Carolan on the LP and Parkinson/Fraser on women.

c) Several other articles have been submitted for the Internal Bulletin already, and will be got out as soon as possible. Send material to the centre, typed A4 on Roneo stencils if possible.

## ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OUR TASKS

(Draft presented by WSL Executive to TILC, Dec 1980)

### The Political Situation

#### CENTRAL AMERICA

US imperialism today finds itself hard-pressed by the political aftermath of its Vietnam defeat; by increased inter-imperialist rivalry in a situation where its domination has been eroded; and by internal economic crisis.

In Central America, an area of central strategic importance, it now faces a spreading revolt by the people against the old system of rule by military-landlord oligarchies in alliance with US corporations. The failure of wavering tactics to save anything for the US in Iran and in Nicaragua has decided the Reagan administration to adopt a hard line in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.

This battle has more than local significance. It is part of an attempt by the US to restore its world authority, and regain the associated economic advantages.

Yet the problems of staging a direct military intervention in El Salvador anything like the British Malvinas adventure is a daunting prospect for US strategists, who are faced not with barren islands but with a people in revolt, with the probability that any US invasion would trigger off an escalation of anti-imperialist struggle not only in Salvador but throughout Central America. In addition, the aftermath of the Vietnam war has seen a lingering mass domestic opposition to any further US military adventures which even Reagan and Carter's cold war campaigning have not reversed.

As a result, the US effort in Central America has been a combination of supplying cash, arms and 'advisors' to the dictators, together with covert CIA operations, jointly with former Somocista National Guard Forces, across the Honduran border into Nicaragua, with hopes of harassing and even toppling the Saninistas.

It is a strategy that has run into substantial problems, with the military, political and economic weakness of the Salvadoran junta exposed to strengthened attacks from the guerrilla forces. The US offensive against Nicaragua, too, has so far failed to dent the popular support achieved by the Sandinistas, while driving them to seek economic and military backing from Cuba and the USSR.

Concerned at these developments the Mexican bourgeoisie, jointly with the European leadership of the Second International, have canvassed an alternative strategy designed to stabilise the region through a process of negotiation and class collaboration rather than the risky course of confrontation. Key to this is the reformist leadership of the Salvadoran opposition front, the FDR, which has offered unconditional talks with the imperialists and with the junta, and whose political programme is one limited to reforms within capitalism. Such a strategy threatens not the immediate physical liquidation of the fighting masses, but their political strangulation with the consolidation of petty bourgeois governments tied hand and foot to the imperialist banks and markets - and thus forced to restrict the democratic rights and economic conditions of the workers and peasants.

The Cuban bureaucracy now acts on practically all issues as an agent (with whatever reservations) of the Kremlin, without whose massive economic and military support it would be unable to sustain its present line of policy. The Cuban leadership, like its Moscow patrons, seeks not socialist revolution but diplomatic and military advantage - but under conditions where it faces a hostile and aggressive imperialist enemy just 50 miles from its own shores. In relation to Central America, therefore, behind the well-publicised "radical" and "revolutionary" rhetoric, the Cuban leadership has in practice pursued a course pretty similar to that of the Mexican bourgeoisie (whose leaders it warmly applauds). Repeated US