Falkaands/Malvinas special conference:

AMENDED RESOLUTION

Carolan/ Collins/ Fraser/ Gardiner/ Hill/ Kendall/ Kinnell/ Parkinson/ Wolf.

(These are the amendments made to the first draft of the resolution - see IB 16.

- 1. A typing error is corrected in point 3, para 3, last sentence. (In the first draft the word 'not' was omitted!
- 2. The last three paragraphs of point 7 are cut out. (Not because we disagree with them, but because they are more suited to supporting argument for a resolution than the resolution itself).
- 3. Point 9 (rejecting the idea that there was an economic anti-imperialist content to the war) is expanded.
- 4. A passage in brackets is added to para 2 of point 10.
- 5. The last sentence of point 10 is deleted (to make it possible for comrades who have a pro-Argentine position, but reject the generalisation that "whatever the implications for the proletariat, we have to base our position on the implications for the international struggle against imperialism", to express their view).
- 6. Point 11 is amplified by inserting the exact quotation from IB 7. In addition in some copies of the first draft, a line is missing from the bottom of page 2 as a result of bad duplicating. That line reads:
 "Marxists reject the primitive rebels' approach that places a plus...")

PROPOSALS FOR TAKING RESOLUTIONS IN PARTS

Carolan/Collins/Fraser/Gardiner/Hill/Kendall/Kinnell/Parkinson/Wolf

REPORT FROM THE SCOTTISH AREA DEBATE

Casey and McVicar

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CORRECTION TO I.B. 13

Kinnell

IBs 15 and 17 are being produced outside of London and will be distributed separately.

1. A Marxist attitude to a war must start from an assessment of which classes are waging the war and for what objectives. On the basis of that assessment we determine our line not as supervisors of the historic process but as militant advocates of class struggle.

Where a war, even under bourgeois leadership, is about an issue like self-determination for an oppressed nation — an issue which is a necessary part of the liberation struggle of the working class — the working class should support the war while maintaining complete independence and the fight to over-throw the bourgeoisie.

Where wars under bourgeois leadership are about no such progressive cause, class-struggle politics demand a <u>defeatist</u> stance - i.e. denunciation of the war, continuation of the class struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie while clearly accepting that this will make defeat more likely in the war.

Where a war between bourgeoisies has no progressive content on either side, we must fight for the defeat of both sides — i.e. against the war and for the defeat of both bourgeoisies by working class action.

In all cases we fight for working class fraternisation. We do not disrupt the international unity of the working class, setting one national section to slaughter another, casually or out of deference to the right of the bourgeoisie to rule as it likes. Where a war has a progressive content, we fight for working class unity on the basis of support for the progressive demands of the progressive side.

As the 1920 Theses of the Comintern on the National and Colonial Question, a basic document of our movement, put it: "... the entire policy of the Communist International on the national and colonial question must be based primarily on bringing together the proletariat and working classes of all nations and countries for the common revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the landowners and the bourgeoisie. For only such united action will ensure victory over capitalism, without which it is impossible to abolish national oppression and inequality of rights".

2. Britain's war over the Falklands/Malvinas was designed only to preserve a relic of empire and shore up the prestige of British imperialism. A defeatist stand towards Britain's war was therefore the no.1 campaigning priority for Marxists in Britain.

Instead of assisting the Tories in their crisis by 'patriotic' support for the government, the British labour movement should have used the crisis to hasten Thatcher's overthrow in the interests of the working class, and given all material and political support to the Argentine workers in the struggle for democratic and trade union rights and for the establishment of a genuinely antimperialist workers' government in Argentina.

We repudiate any legitimacy of British territorial claims in the Falklands or any legitimacy in related British claims to resources in Antarctica.

3. But the pretext on which the Argentine junta embarked upon the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas was equally contrived. In taking its action, the junta acted not against imperialism, but in a populist ploy designed to divert and unite the Argentine masses behind the Generals' own repressive rule.

In doing so the Argentine dictators trampled upon the rights of the Falk-land inhabitants, who in themselves oppress and threaten no-one and should have the right to decide their own future. Such action did nothing to build anti-imperialist consciousness in the Argentine working class, but rather sought to generate chauvinism and 'national unity'. We did not support this action, and called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops.

In its seizure of the Falklands/Malvinas, designed to boost its position at home and in the region, the Argentine regime miscalculated about the British

reaction, and the US response to the British reaction.

This miscalculation could not however make the seizure, or the war to maintain the seizure, progressive.

Galtieri's invasion did not liberate anyone from colonialism or imperialism. It did not lessen the burden of imperialist exploitation, or improve the conditions for the fight against it, for a single Argentine worker. It embroiled the Argentine people in a war in which they could hope to win nothing of significance, a disastrous war in a false and reactionary cause.

- 4. On both sides therefore the war was reactionary. The job of Marxists in both Britain and Argentina was to oppose the war, to counterpose international working-class unity, and to continue the class struggle for the overthrow of both the Tories and the military regime.
- 5. Support for the right of the Falkland Islanders a distinct historical, ethnic, linguistic, economic and geographic community 400 miles from Argentina to determine their own future is axiomatic for Leninists in the given conditions, where that community exploited no other community, threatened no other community, and was not used as, or likely to be used as, a base for imperialist control of another community.

The Falklanders' right to self-determination cannot be invalidated by a desire by them to adhere to the now-imperialist state that spawned the Falklands community. That desire to adhere to Britain would invalidate their right to self-determination only if adherence had direct imperialist/colonialist consequences for Argentina or some other country, whose right to resist those consequences would (because of their size etc.) outweigh the rights of the islanders. Only then would the "pro-imperialist" views of the islanders lead to them playing an imperialist role. Nothing like that was actually involved. The agency for imperialist domination in Argentina is the Argentine state, not the islands or any base on the islands.

To use a definition of the islanders as "pro-imperialist" against their right to self-determination is to introduce inappropriate political categories and criteria, different from those which properly apply. The Falkland Islanders are British. That is what determines their attitudes, not any pro-imperialist views they may have. The WSL is not in favour of the subjugation of a population because it has such views, or because of their origins. The ethnic tidying-up of the globe is no part of the international socialist revolution.


Support for the Falklanders' rights plainly does not necessarily mean any support for military action to enforce those rights. In actual situation, with Britain an imperialist power, we rejected and opposed the British military action. We look to the international working class, and especially the Argentine labour movement, to secure the Falklanders' rights.

Such a consistent democratic policy is the only basis for international working-class unity, and specifically for the unity of the British and Argentine working class (which had to be our central concern) in this dispute.

6. The WSL conducted itself as an internationalist and revolutionary proletarian organisation during the British/Argentine war. We raised a variant of the famous slogan of Liebknecht and Luxemburg: 'The enemy is at home', and called on the working class to actively hinder the British ruling class's prosecution of the war by industrial action. We conducted internationalist working class propaganda against the social-chauvinist Labour leaders, while attempting to maintain a dialogue with the pacifistic Labour Left (that is, with those in the working class who listen to the Left leaders) on the question.

It is no necessary part of proletarian internationalist opposition to the war of an imperialist government to side with their opponents. Our response to the fact that it was for the British ruling class a war for authority and prestige was our defeatism; positive support for Argentina could, for communists, only be grounded in positive working-class reasons for such support.

Marxists reject the primitive rebels' approach that puts a plus everywhere



that the bourgeoisie puts a minus. We must judge events from an independent working class viewpoint.

We side with our ruling-class enemies in particular conflicts if the struggle serves our politics - e.g. in a national liberation struggle, even under the leader-ship of a Chiang Kai Shek.

But in no way could the policy of the Argentine proletariat be deduced as a mere negative imprint of the policy of the British bourgeoisie.

The tendency justifies the pro-Argentine position with the view that "a victory for Argentina would quite likely mean the downfall of Thatcher... And the British have a far more important international role then Argentina as a primary carrier and protector of imperialism. This means that the nature of the British regime is a question of immediate international importance..." (IB 7, p.16); conversely "Argentine withdrawal... would results in another Tory government with a massive majority... it would be an event of world significance..." (tendency document p.8).

The idea here that Argentine workers' policy should be decided by what is worst for the British bourgeoisie — that the British revolution has priority, and the Argentine revolution should be subordinated to it — is British nationalist and utterly to be rejected as a basis for determining proletarian politics in Argentina.

7. Argentina is far more developed than most non-imperialist countries; it is a fully bourgeois state; and it possesses political independence. It also occupies a subordinate rank within the imperialist world economy. This subordination, however, in no way gives any progressive character to the Argentine bourgeoisie.

The Argentine bourgeoisie is not a progressive force, but the major agency for imperialist domination of the Argentine working class and an assistant for imperialist domination throughout Latin America. It has moreover its own predatory ambitions. For the Argentine working class it is 'the main enemy at home'. Quite apart from its foreign connections, it is the class that directly exploits them.

We reject as un-Marxist assessments of Argentina's situation such as this:

"Argentina is economically, militarily and politically dominated by imperialism — not by its own national bourgeoisie — but in particular by the US imperialists. The whole basis of its economy is subject to the international market over which Argentina has no influence, let alone control and dominance" (IB 7, p.2).

We reject the counterposition of the Argentine bourgeoisie to imperialism, and the measuring of Argentina's situation by comparison with a situation where the country would escape the international market (which in a capitalist world it can never do).

Every country is more or less dominated by the world economy. No country has control over it — now not even the US colossus which was supreme after World War 2. This situation cannot be changed by war between the weaker bourgeoisies and the stronger. Not such wars, but the international workers' revolution, can change it.

The communist answer to colonial, semi-colonial, and military domination is national liberation struggle; to the domination of the weaker by the strong in the world market (as to the domination of the weak by the strong, and the pauperisation of particular regions, within capitalist nations) our answer is the proletarian revolution.

We reject the notion of an anti-imperialist united front for Argentina (a version of the bloc of classes central to Menshevism and then Stalinism, motivated on the grounds that the Argentine bourgeoisie is an oppressed class in relation to imperialism.) We reject the notion that the Argentine bourgeoisie can play any progressive role either within Argentina, where it is our mortal class enemy, or against imperialism, into which it is completely integrated.

8. In the war over the (maybe strategically important) Falkland Islands there was no conflict over military bases or possible future military bases of a character to give socialists the option or the duty to favour one of the contestants.

Argentina and Britain are in the same imperialist camp. Britain was literally

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within months of scrapping the naval apparatus that made the re-invasion of the Falk-lands possible. (But because of the internal crisis in Argentina the junta could not wait).

On the other hand, the Argentine junta had been negotiating with the USA, South Africa, and Britain to set up a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation to police the region (as Argentina helped to police El Salvador for imperialism by sending troops). The expert commentators are largely agreed that this would have led to US bases on the Falklands.

That is, had Argentina got hold of the Falklands without falling out with US imperialism, it would have speeded up the work of replacing the decrepit and militarily insignificant British imperialist presence with a military presence of the dominant imperialist power.

The Falklands are maybe strategically important; but neither side in the war would have taken them away from imperialism. Argentina is part of the imperialist system; its war with Britain did not place it outside that system.

9. There is no sense in which the conflict had an economic anti-imperialist dimension. British property in Argentina, not to speak of the property of other imperialist powers, was left alone during the war. The Argentine state did not even propose to take the Falkland Islands Company from Coalite.

Better Argentine claims on Antarctica from the Falklands would most likely have led to US exploitation of the Antarctic, with Argentina as a conduit. That is the concrete meaning of the subordinate position of Argentina vis—a—vis the US and imperialism.

Conversely, one of the major reasons why Britain had been trying to give the Falklands to Argentina is that a stable political settlement is a precondition for the viability of the big investments necessary for the capitalist exploitation of the area's resources.

The exploitation would have to be joint exploitation, on one set of terms or another. The war was not about whether the resources should belong to imperialism or not.

The Argentine bourgeoisie is not counterposed to imperialism. And imperialism cannot be identified solely with Britain (conversely, anti-imperialism cannot necessarily be identified with an anti-British stance). The British-Argentine war was a war within the network of imperialism and its clients.

The Argentine regime went to war, not for anti-imperialist reasons, but to strengthen its political position at home. They did not wait to win the Falklands by negotiation because of their domestic crisis. And thus they aborted the process of reaching agreement with Britain.

10. The Argentine working class should never subordinate its own class struggle to estimates of the "international balance of forces" between different bourgeoisies. The view that "whatever the implications of that for the Argentinian or British proletariat, we have to base our position on the implications for the international struggle against imperialism <u>first</u>" (IB 7, p.7), is anti-Marxist.

The assessment according to which British victory was a major blow for imperialism is incomplete. The British bourgeoisie certainly was strengthened by victory politically and in its prestige. But these gains may well prove shallow and temporary (indeed, the continued class struggle has already proved them shallow and temporary), and the British bourgeoisie has gained nothing material — like new military strength, new spheres of influence, or new possessions.

The Argentine regime, on the other hand, has certainly been weakened by defeat. This result is a blow against imperialist and capitalist control in Latin America.

Workers in each country can act as internationalists only by fighting their own bourgeoisies, not by acting as makeweights for international bloc politics. For Argentine socialists to support their rulers' predatory war on the basis of the

estimate that the British bourgeoisie's predatory war was worse, would violate that principle.

11. We emphatically reject the notion that the socialist working class can orientate in world politics, and particularly in relation to conflicts among politically independent capitalist states like Eritain and Argentina, by constructing a view of the world in terms of two camps, modelled on the division of the world between the degenerated and deformed workers' states and the capitalist states: "We have to determine our position according to the basic class camps, not on conjunctural events... the class camp into which Argentina fits in a war against imperialism..."

Between the USSR and similar states, and the capitalist states, there is a basic historical class distinction, despite the savage anti working class rule of the totalitarian bureaucratic elites. No such gap exists between capitalist states.

The bourgeois foreign policy of the rulers of Argentina, even when it is expressed in acts of war, can in no sense change their class camp. Even should the bourgeoisie of such a state be in alliance with a healthy workers' state, the task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie would be the central task of the proletariat in the capitalist state — a task never to be subordinated to international diplomatic, military, or balance—of-forces considerations.

This was a central teaching of the Communist International, and it was not formally repudiated even by the Stalinists until 1935. Thereafter the notion that bourgeois forces which allied with the USSR thereby crossed the historic class divide and joined the camp of progress was the ideological basis of Stalinism to legitimise policies of class betrayal and popular frontism.

We reject as un-Marxist, and brand as 'international popular frontism', the view that the Argentine bourgeoisie and their state became part of the 'class camp' of the international working class because of their conflict with Britain or during their war with Britain for possession of the Falkland Islands.

12. Support for Argentina's chauvinist war could not be justified on the basis that it could be the first stage in a development towards militant antimperialist struggle. Nor could the war be defined as anti-imperialist by reading an assessment backwards from the scenario of a hoped-for anti-imperialist development.

The scenarios lack the first link: a real national liberation content to the war. A Marxist policy must be based on the realities of the actual war, not on hypothetical speculations or wishful thinking about strategic outcomes.

Argentine workers had no interest in the armed occupation of the Falklands against the wishes of the population; they should have pursued the class struggle regardless of the effects of such struggle on their rulers' ability to maintain the occupation; and it was none of their concern to protect the Argentine bourgeois state against the humiliation it would suffer from being unable to maintain the occupation. These points should have been the basis of a Marxist policy in Argentina.

The tactical ways of expressing this principled position could of course be very flexible (following the method according to which Trotskyists developed the 'proletarian military policy' as a tactical expression of the defeatist policy in World War 2).

It would be the job of Marxists in Argentina to seek to develop the genuine antiimperialist elements in the confused nationalist reaction of Argentine workers, with demands such as arming of the workers, expropriation of imperialist property, and seizure of the factories. While making their our views on the war clear, they should have sought to develop common class actions with workers who confusedly saw Argentina's war as 'anti-imperialist' but wanted to go further in anti-imperialism.

13. A change in our fundamental attitude to the war could only be justified by a

longer a war restricted to the Falklands/Malvinas issue. If Britain's objectives had shifted so that the war became fundamentally one about an attempt by Britain to make Argentina a colony or a semi-colony, then Marxists should have sided with Argentina's national independence. But that did not happen. It was always very unlikely that it would happen.

28.8.82

PROPOSALS ON VOTING BY PARTS

We propose the following voting-by-parts:

Our resolution: points 1, 2, 3, 4 and 13 should be voted on together. They summarise our basic conclusions.

Points 5 to 12 should be voted on each separately whether points 1/2/3/4/13 have been carried or not. They cover other points raised in the debate. On the one hand, comrades may wish to vote for our basic conclusions without voting for these other points. On the other hand, they may wish to vote for the minority conclusions but reject ideas like Argentina being in our "class camp".

The ideas dealt with are:

- 5: Self-determination
- 6: Basing a position for Argentina solely on what is worst for British imperialism.
- 7: Defining the Argentine bourgeoisie as progressive
- 8: The war being anti-imperialist because of military implications
- 9: The war being anti-imperialist because of economic implications
- 10: Basing a position on the "international balance of forces"
- 11: Capitalist Argentina being in our "class camp"
- 12: Support for Argentina as a first step in anti-imperialism

Minority resolution: Points 2, 5 and 7 should be voted on separately.

Point 2 states that the Argentine claim to the Falklands is legitimate. The original position of the tendency (when it was founded) was that the claim was false. So there should be a separate vote.

Point 5 would commit us to:

- a) The theory of a whole "system of colonial enclaves" which is "an imperialist system of control". It is true that colonial enclaves were an imperialist system of control in China in the first part of this century, for example. To suppose that the same holds today is anachronistic. Certainly this sweeping conclusion needs a separate vote.
- b) The idea that the Falklanders were/are an instrument of imperialist control over Argentina. So far as we know no argument has been put forward to support this idea, which to us seems completely out of ture with the facts.
- c) Ideas about Gibraltar and the Panama Canal which either miss the point or are factually false (and how can the conference vote to commit the WSL to factually false statements?)

Gibraltar was not established by imperialism. It was seized by Britain during the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1704, long before the epoch of imperialism. It is very far from "racially and culturally 'pure'"; the population is of mixed Spanish, Italian, Jewish, Maltese, Moroccan, Indian, Pakistani, and British ancestry. Obviously it has been part of Britain's system of world power (not a very important part today); and from all accounts the history of British imperialism in Gibraltar is a sordid nne.

The implied idea that we should positively support the Spanish claim to Gibraltar does not however follow from a condemnation of British imperialism. And it would introduce a completely new principle; for the minority have rested their Falklands/

Malvinas position heavily on the fact that Argentina is non-imperialist, but Spain is imperialist.

Not just the Panama Canal Zone, but the state of Panama itself, was established by US imperialism, as a US-sponsored split-off from Colombia in 1903. (Would the tendency perhaps propose the reconquest of Panama by Colombia?) The Canal Zone is not "racially and culturally 'pure'". A lot of US citizens do live there, but their wishes, as far as we know, were not cited by the US as its justification for retaining control (which it still does, partially, under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, until the year 2000).

Clearly we support Panama gaining full control of the Canal - its major economic resource - as soon as it can; we denounce the unequal treaties under which it has been forced to cede this resource to the US. The comparison with the Falkland is non-existent.

Point 7 would commit us to a chain of reasoning which says that if the imperialist big powers are weakened, then so also are all reactionary regimes. The reasoning seems to us abstract, formal, false, and liable to lead to ridiculous conclusions. Has the Khomeini regime been weakened by its victory over Iraq, a victory which has certainly reduced the grip of the imperialist big powers in the whole region?

Comrades may well want to vote for the pro-Argentine position without committing themselves to this sort of logic.

On August 27, a Scottish WSL area aggregate was held to discuss the Falklands conflict. Comrade Smith opened on behalf of the minority. An opening speaker from the majority was regarded as superfluous, since all WSL members in Scotland supported the majority position.

Although some of the points raised in the discussion at the aggregate have doubtless been raised elsewhere, this brief report has been written in the hope that it will provide a positive contribution to the continuing debate in the organisation.

Smith opened his lead-off by taking up the "isolation" of the WSL in the "world Trotskyist movement". Such alleged isolation did not in itself mean that we had the wrong position, said Smith, but it should certainly give us some cause for concern. Why it should is difficult to see. After all, what is this "world Trotskyist movement" that Smith refers to? A mish-mash of Castroites, Gaddafi-ites, Lambert-cultists, plus an assorted hotch-potch of dead-end sects like Workers' Power who have never had an original thought in their lives. Surely it would be a cause for greater concern if we were to end up with the same position as the professional accommodationists of the United Secretariat, International Committee... and world Stalinist movement.

Despite Smith's claim that no great importance should be attached to our isolation, the minority obviously does attach considerable importance to it, or else it is difficult to explain why Smith should begin his lead-off by taking up this issue (more accurately, as far as we are concerned: non-issue).

But, Smith went on to explain, the majority is not in absolute isolation: we share the same position as the ultra-lefts of the Spartacist tendency, the national-chauvinists of the Militant, and the counter-revolutionaries of the Thatcher cabinet. Dangerous company indeed - but a slanderous fabrication and distortion to claim that our position is the same as theirs.

(We leave out here the question of the Spartacist tendency since, due to their non-existence in Scotland, we know next to nothing of their position on the Falk-lands.)

Militant's position is based on Ted Grant's senile delusion that it is World War 2 all over again. The Tories' position is based on defence of British imperialism. What has that got to do with the majority position? Did we say: in this war there is simply nothing to be done, as Militant did? Did we say: full support for British imperialism? If the positions and arguments of the WSL majority, the Militant, and British imperialism really are exactly the same, then how could we possibly have distinguished ourselves from them when the conflict was a live issue?

That Smith accused the Scottish comrades of "demagogy" at the day school while himself indulging in such outlandish accusations was contradictory to say the least.

Another of the WSL majority's strange bedfellows was the SWP, and particular emphasis seemed to be placed by Smith upon this. Smith asserted that the national liberation of Argentina was not complete, and that those people, like SWP mandarin Kidron, who asserted the priority of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie in "underdeveloped" countries were mistaken. Kidron, said Smith, had developed the issues in the early '70s, and the WSL majority had been influenced by them.

The fundamental inadequacy of Smith's line of reasoning on this point is that it led him to claim quite explicitly that it is wrong to raise the slogan "The enemy is in the home camp" in countries such as Argentina. For Smith and his fellow-travellers, the enemy is US imperialism.

Haven't we heard this all before, the Scottish comrades asked themselves? If history repeats itself the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce, what grotesque form does it take on the third time around? Firstly there had been, and is, the International/United Secretariat attitude to Stalinism, Ben Bella in Algeria, Castro in Cuba, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Then came the demise of the arch anti Pabloite Healy with his uncritical support for Gaddafi in Libya and the

Ba'athist butchers in Iraq. And now the anti-Pabloite opposition to Healy capitulates to the counter-revolutionary junta, ascribing an anti-imperialist content to its actions. At least the USFI had the decency to accommodate to people involved in a real struggle against imperialism, like Ben Bella, Castro, and the Sandinistas. The same can hardly be said of the counter-revolutionary Argentine regime.

"The failure of the Trotskyist movement time and time again", one comrade concluded, "to make a correct appraisal of the role of the national bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries was the product of the material and ideological pressure of Stalinism internationally upon revolutionary socialists". His claim was underpinned by quotes from documents of the Communist Party of Argentina, which, abounding with fine phrases about objective anti-imperialism, colonial enclaves, and the national struggle of the Argentinians, embodied exactly the same methodology as that used by the minority tendency.

It is not by chance that so many members of the minority oppose the withdrawal of the Stalinist army from Afghanistan. In both cases the methodology is exactly the same: we don't actually approve of the invasion of the Falklands or of Afghanistan, but now that the Argentinians/Russians are there, they had better stay there, or else it will be a victory for imperialism. The real result is to regard Stalinist oppression in Afghanistan as a lesser evil than imperialist oppression, and the Argentine junta as a better master than Coalite. It is in fact worse than that: it is to collude in the repression carried out by the Argentine and Stalinist regimes. Serious opposition to their repression would mean demanding the withdrawal of their armies, but in relation to neither Afghanistan nor the Falklands do these members of the minority raise this demand.

Nor again is it by chance that Smith saw the world in terms of camps, in a similar manner to the fake-Trotskyist Stalinophiles of the '50s. Smith said that camps was perhaps an unfortunate word to use, given its connotations, and that sides would have been a better word. On this point the vocabulary is neither here nor there. The methodology is important. For the Stalinophiles of the '50s there was the camp of imperialism and the camp of the workers' states. For the minority, there is the camp of imperialism and the camp of the nations oppressed by imperialism. In both cases the result has been desertion of an independent class position.

Smith's position on the Argentine invasion of the Falklands struck the Scottish membership of the League as being particularly muddle-headed. The invasion was both reactionary and also objectively anti-imperialist (and therefore progressive). According to Smith the invasion was originally reactionary because it was an attempt to divert Argentine workers (and apparently the minority as well) from the overthrow of the regime. With the dispatch of the fleet the invasion became anti-imperialist, and the issuebecame a conflict between a country oppressed by imperialism and a major imperialist power.

Morrow, from whom Smith clearly has a different position, is at least consistent on this point. For him the invasion was progressive right from the word go. (Morrow's lack of logic lies elsewhere. Given his position on the Falklands, he ought to support the Stalinist invasion itself of Afghanistan. And if Morrow replies that the Falklands really do belong to Argentina, which they don't anyway, but Afghanistan doesn't belong to Russia, why doesn't he demand the Stalinist armies withdraw to allow Afghanistan the right to self-determination?)

How can the dispatch of the British fleet change the character of the Argentine invasion? If the invasion had an anti-imperialist content, it must have had it from the outset, and the dispatch of the fleet was merely the manifestation of the action taken by the aggrieved imperialist power, rather than an action which changed the character of the invasion. And if, as it was, the invasion was reactionary from the outset, then the response of the British imperialists in neither here nor there. If Galtieri comes into conflict with his imperialist superiors in an effort to stay in power, why should the Argentine masses, and even less so the WSL, be dragged along in his slipstream?

The Scottish comrades could be forgiven for concluding that the minority has 57 varieties of explanation and characterisation of the invasion, each one ready for heating up for the appropriate occasion.

Smith, however, obviously regarded such attention being paid to the question of the invasion as nit-picking which paled into insignificance before his analysis of the "balance of forces" on a world scale. The Scottish comrades were privileged enough to be presented with a majestic display of global speculations about the repercussions of the British victory, ranging from the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon to the Tory offensive against the unions. Despite the grandeur of the occasion, however, the comrades were unimpressed.

Firstly, Smith's speculations were precisely that: speculative. A serious analysis of the world balance of forces is something very different from stringing together a few events and claiming, without a shred of evidence, a causal connection between them. Secondly, the same speculative method could just as legitimately have led to an opposite scenario of mounting class struggles: the NHS dispute, the actions by Solidarnosc, the release of Geraghty, etc. etc. And thirdly, it is all irrelevant anyway. Nobody was calling for a British imperialist victory, so even if a British victory did have the outcome claimed by Smith, it is no argument against the WSL majority's position on the Falklands. The difference between the majority and the minority is not that the former called for a British victory and the latter for an Argentine victory. The difference is that the majority, unlike the minority, look to international working class action instead of to a semi-fascist military regime to defeat British imperialism.

Until the dissertation of comrade Smith, the Scottish comrades had always believed this scenario-type politics to be the preserve of the IMG. Smith expressed surprise that Glasgow IMG had rejected an offer from the Glasgow S* group of a debate on the Falklands. "I thought that they would try to take advantage of our divisions", commented Smith. Quite apart from the fact that there aren't any divisions in Scotland — could it be that the IMG are just more aware of the weaknesses of their arguments than their co_thinkers in the minority?

CORRECTION TO I.B. 13 - Kinnell

On page 11 I am minuted as saying: "The whole of Latin America settled by Europeans in 19th and 20th centuries".

I don't think I said that - in any case it is a mistake. The European settlement of Latin America dates back to the 16th century. In Argentina the bulk of the settlement was between 1870 and 1930, but that is exceptional.

On page 10 I am minuted as saying: "Economic independence would not change this" (i.e. the fact that the Argentine bourgeoisie is the 'main enemy at home' of the Argentine workers). What I was trying to say, if I remember rightly, is that this fact of the Argentine bourgeoisie being the 'main enemy at home' is not changed by a greater or lesser degree of economic dependence.

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