Sacha writes, "if you oppose Iran having nuclear weapons, that IS a disagreement with the position of Permanent Revolution - isn't it?"
Not as far as I am aware.
From recent PR article
"HOPI and the "nuclear free Middle East"
HOPI’s founding statement states it campaigns “for a nuclear-free Middle East as a step towards world-wide nuclear disarmament.”
The AWL know this: bizarrely enough they even go on to quote it … after spending several thousand words comparing the Iranian theocracy to Hiterlite Germany. There is, however, only one nuclear power in the Middle East and that is Israel. Not Iran … Israel. This means there is only one country in the region with the capacity to use a nuclear weapon to annihilate the working class of another country and that is, obviously, Israel. Not Iran… Israel.
The AWL leadership needs to recognise this simple fact.
There is a great deal of consensus on the subject of whether Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons. It isn’t. The American imperialists say it isn’t. Israeli academics say it isn’t. The British left, with the exception of the AWL, says it isn’t. Therefore, Iran does not pose a serious threat to Israel. Israel, on the other hand, poses a huge threat to Iran. It truly is that straightforward. Now the AWL has a choice: it can continue to talk in increasingly far-fetched hypotheticals to the very end, or it can start to engage in reality. Which is it to be?"
We haven't as far as I know debated or voted on this issue but though individual articles don't necessarily reflect the position of the whole organisation unless anyone disagrees after say a few weeks it can be taken as the view of PR as far as I know.
Also from PR6
"Workers’ organisations of various kinds, from hiking associations (which never go hiking), to clandestine workers’ committees and shoras proliferated. Strikes and sit-ins saw a dramatic upsurge in frequency. By necessity all figures are estimations but there were approximately “140 strikes in October 2005, followed by 120 in November” compared with around 90 in over two years from March 1998 to May 2000. “The frequency of strikes since early 2004 appears to be unparalleled in post-Mossadeq non-revolutionary Iran.”
Malm and Esmailian go on to suggest that there is little or no scope for reform of the regime from within. Rafsanjani tried this in the 1990s and failed. The millionaire mullahs’ control over almost every aspect of economic activity, including illegal ones, proved to be just too strong. They also cite evidence that the workers themselves have little interest in reform of the regime under which they have suffered so badly for so long. In a society where the engine of capital accumulation is the state, protest quickly focuses on it and nothing short of regime change is seen as a solution.
What could also save the regime, in a strange irony, is its demonisation in the west and in particular the US. Bush needs an evil enemy and Ahmadinejad needs a diversion. The more bellicose Ahmadinejad becomes, the more Bush will attack him, thereby returning the gift. While the threat of outright war with the US seems unlikely due to difficulties in Iraq, Ahmadinejad can afford to play this game.
In the cycle of Iranian politics that Malm and Esmailian describe, an emergent workers’ movement grows to establish itself as a force throughout the country, only to be cruelly and brutally repressed. As they say, “after spring comes winter”. They offer little by way of prognosis for this latest emerging workers’ movement, but we have to hope that the Iranian workers can this time achieve the necessary level of self-consciousness and organisation to enjoy a long hot summer. "