Workers' Liberty

On the second anniversary of the terrorist bombing of the Tube, here's a reminder of what Tubeworker said at the time.

Tubeworker is still trying to get our head round the idea that while the country as a whole has a security level of 'critical', ours is a mere 'serious' (one step less serious than 'critical'). What, is London Underground some kind of place of safety, a refuge from the unsafe streets?!

Jubilee Line management pulled a stunt that they thought would be a nice, attention-grabbing bit of propaganda, but has backfired and upset staff.

They send everyone a DVD, in a packet - not marked with the company's logo or a return address - which also contained a piece of signal cable. The problem was that in many cases, the cable tore through the envelope and stuck out, making it look very much like a letter bomb. Indeed, one member of staff evacuated his family to a place of safety and called the police to open the packet.

Remember OSN52? It's the Operational Standards Notice which was supposed to improve the way we evacuated the system in the event of another terror attack like the one on 7th July 2005?

During refurb work at Epping, Metronet has employed a security guard to protect its worksite. But the guard has been getting rather too close to the ticket barrier, on occasion looking like a substitute member of station staff.

Last night at Bank, call point operation triggered an evacuation ... and the P.A. failed. No Inspector Sands, no P.A. from the control room, nothing.

With superhuman effort, the staff evacuated the complex in twenty minutes. Fortunately, it was a false alarm. Had it been a fire, people would have died.

Late one Sunday evening at the start of this month, a driver pulled into West Ruislip and let his passengers off. He noticed that the train in the opposite platform was closed up and asked its driver why. The answer? There was a suspect suitcase on the train and they were waiting for the bomb squad to arrive and investigate.

Readers might remember our report about District Line Control telling station staff to remove 'lost property' from a train - except it wasn't lost property but an unattended bag. Well, we had hoped that following complaints by the station concerned, this unfortunate and unsafe incident would not be repeated. But unfortunately, on Tuesday it was.

LUL management have compiled an audit of distribution of Operational Standards Notices (OSNs). Although they claim it shows the system to be "robust", further reading reveals that in fact, OSNs aren't getting round to frontline staff nearly as efficiently and effectively as they should.

Terrorist Gets Tube Job screamed the headline on the Evening Standard's poster boards. For a fleeting moment, Tubeworker thought that they might mean Bob Kiley, what with him being a former CIA agent and the CIA notoriously assisting various terrorist outfits. But hey, that would be both years out-of-date and rather tenuous.

The east end of the District line has been bugged by problems of violence for some time. The latest dangerous invident was on Thursday afternoon, when someone shot at drivers between West Ham and Bromley-By-Bow with an air rifle. At least one D and one C stock were hit. The service, already running about three-quarters of an hour late, was suspended from Plaistow to Whitechapel.

Late one August night, BTP report to Paddington SS that there's an unattended bag heading north on the Bakerloo. (Hang on, why didn't the BTP deal with it? They are, erm, the Police, after all.)

Anyway, the SS tells Line Control, who plan to get it checked at Queen's Park. But Line Control has a bit of a problem getting hold of anyone at Queen's Park (sorry, did someone say "stations destaffing"?!). But rather than hold the train and wait, or get the police/bomb squad down there, what does the Control Room do? Tell the driver to press ahead to Willesden Junction and they'll get it checked there.

We're all supposed to be on heightened alert for terror attacks, right? So abandoned, suspect bags should be dealt with under the HOT procedure, right? Or is it one rule for operational staff but another for Line Control?

Found this story on the net and although it stems from one of the infamous "Red Tops" which litter the British press,if there is an element of truth in it then there is a cause for concern.

'Terror risk' over nuclear cargo

It's OK, everyone. Calm down. King's Cross is a 'low-risk' station. We know this because London Underground Ltd says so.

Odd isn't it? How the government mourns the victims and praises the staff over the 7th July bombings ... then when it thinks we're not looking, tries to cheat people out of a bit of compensation.

The GLA has published a report on the 7th July bombings, which praises staff but damns the equipment and support system we work with. Quite right.

Tubeworker tips our hat to the staff at Holloway Road station who, on Wednesday evening, saved the life of a 21-year-old man who had been viciously stabbed.

Management tipped their hat too. But unfortunately, they didn't manage to show up in person until 7 o'clock the following morning (the stabbing took place at 23:20). So the station staff had to deal with the incident - and with their own trauma - without any back-up from a manager.

The shine wears off your halo pretty damn quickly when LUL is your boss. So you are a driver who led people to safety after a near-miss bomb blast? So you still get flashbacks?

The New Year’s Honours saw a few gongs dished out for heroics on 7th July. Of course, the vast majority of Tube workers who were heroes on that day did not get a medal.

Tomorrow, loads of people will gather in Trafalgar Square in memory of those killed in the 7th July bombings. Quite right too.

LUL thinks that it has a procedure for keeping stations open if the PA fails, involving staff making announcements through loudhailers.

We have long thought this to be a bit dodgy. But in the current security climate, it is ... er ... surely less than adequate.

Unless the world's problems are sorted out very soon and very suddenly, we all know that it is matter of time before there is another terror attack on the Underground. So we need to know that we have the best system possible to protect ourselves and the passengers.

A few months back, dozens of Edgware Road train ops refused to drive their trains when the radios failed. Quite right too.

Management's response? A disciplinary letter! Looking out for the safety of thousands of passengers (and yourself) is obviously very very naughty.

Or does it?

Oddly, LUL seems to agree in principle that it is not safe to run trains when the radios don't work, but in practice, the company is finding ways to keep the service running anyway. Anyone would think that following the bomb attacks, they feel the need to say one thing but do another.

You might also be tempted to think that the best way to deal with this is to fix the radios. Strangely, LUL seems able to put all manner of new technology into revenue collection, but is rather less successful at harnessing it to run a safe railway.

Anyway, this is what RMT Trains Safety Council reps had to say about train radios on 12 August 2005:

In the current situation, it is vital that whenever there is a security alert, we all know what is going on. After all, not only are we on the frontline, we also keep passengers informed and prevent panic.

So why have drivers been held at signals for up to ten minutes with no information?! It's just not good enough - Line Controllers will have to do better.