As the Easter (6-10 April) conference of the National Union of Teachers approaches, Patrick Murphy draws the lessons from two years of campaigning against the Government's pension changes.
Whatever differences there were between delegates at last year’s National Union of Teachers [NUT] conference, on one thing all were agreed. The Coalition’s pension proposals were the greatest threat to our members’ conditions of service in living memory and the most serious challenge the Union had faced for many decades. Defeating them was vital, would require industrial action on a huge scale and was a struggle we simply had to win. The priority motion passed at that Conference included the statement that ‘This Union believes that a one day strike in the summer term will only be the start of the battle on pensions, and that further, more widespread and coordinated strike action across the public sector will be needed’. The one-day strike referred to was June 30th.
A year later the balance sheet does not look good. The government has not shifted from any of the essential prongs of their pension proposals and, indeed, teachers will see significant sums taken out of our pay later this month, the first of three contribution increases between now and 2014. The change in inflation-proofing of our pensions so that it is linked to CPI rather than RPI was in place last April and continues despite the much-vaunted legal challenge and the strike action of last year. The normal pension age for teachers will not only rise to 68, it will happen much quicker than originally proposed (by 2026) as a result of an announcement by Osborne on the eve of the last national strike.
The priority motion was right to assert that ‘further, more widespread and co-ordinated strike action’ would be needed. No-one should be surprised that the government has had such an easy time in forcing through their plans, however, as the aforementioned action was never to materialise. June 30th and November 30th were glorious days which, as we said in Solidarity at the time, ‘demonstrated the potential social power of the working class to a generation of workers who had not experienced it before. It was a glimpse of the mass labour movement as a vital social force’. They were, however, essentially protest strikes; moments of anger in defence of our rights but not nearly adequate to meet the task.
As things now stand, Conference delegates are assessing whether we can quickly build up to national action again after a retreat by the National Executive to localised strike action in London only. It has to be hoped that we can since the pensions campaign is otherwise doomed. Whatever the outcome of that debate, though, we need to consider how we got here and how we ensure no repeat of some unavoidable mistakes. A return to national action on the same basis as this time last year would represent little advance. It remains the case that neither the NUT nor any other public sector union has put forward a strategy for a real winnable dispute as opposed to a series of protests.
How did we get here?
A. External factors
A number of factors which have exerted a damaging effect on this campaign have been largely outside the control of the NUT. The TUC and the leaders of the largest unions made it clear from the start that they had no appetite for a serious campaign of industrial action. Under the pressure of June 30th (as a show of strength a genuine success) they shifted their tactics but not their assessment or objectives. In essence they joined the strike movement all the better to demobilise it at the least sign of concessions. The first offer from government in November (protection for older workers and no contribution increases for the lowest paid) was more than enough for them and they signalled clearly to Ministers before November 30th that that day would be the last such action and they would settle with no hesitation afterwards. Their actions are a disgrace, they played absolutely no positive role in the campaign and they stand rightfully condemned. But the criticism should not be made only privately. Unions whose action has been ‘mugged’ in this way should ignore internal TUC diplomacy and organise together to fight this craven trade unionism in the open. Without this approach talk of the betrayals of Prentis and Barber is just excuse-making.
Just as important, the job of co-ordinating strike action should not be left only to one-to-one talks between union general secretaries. Regular joint meetings between the national executives of public sector unions would have broadened the democratic control of the dispute and undercut the ability of a small number of individuals to use union difference to undermine the campaign.
The NASUWT too have played an appalling role. The fundamental fact of teacher trade unionism is still that the two largest unions representing teachers could sustain a very effective defence of our terms and conditions if they worked together and co-ordinated action. No blame whatsoever for the lack of such co-ordination lies with the NUT leadership. On the contrary the (completely understandable) determination of the NUT to exhaust every possibility of bringing the NASUWT on board, together with the resolute refusal of that union to enter into any meaningful discussions about joint action has acted as the major drag on the pensions’ campaign. And the NASUWT did worse things than refuse to work with us, they worked through the TUC and ‘behind the scenes’ to wreck the June 30th action by forcing the ATL to withdraw from it.
It was right to work hard to get teacher (and indeed broad trade union) support for a co-ordinated public sector action campaign to defend pensions. It was also necessary, however, to assess the prospects of achieving this and, above all, to ensure that the campaign was being shaped by those who were prepared to fight and not, as it in fact was, by those who had little interest in it. The likely position of the NASUWT, for example, was very easy to predict. Under the unchallenged control of its General Secretary, with no visible rank and file or activist pressure of any kind, the prospect of them engaging meaningfully with us was always very slim. We couldn’t rule out some wild lurch into action to outflank the NUT (to a large extent their bizarre non-strike action is just that) but what never seemed likely on any of the evidence was serious co-ordination. In our relations with the NASUWT we have allowed hope to triumph over sober assessment.
B. Internal mistakes and misleadership.
Piled on top of the external factors, though, have been a number of decisive mistakes from our own leadership. It helps no-one for us to refuse to face up to these seriously. On the contrary the success of future campaigns on workload, regional pay and indeed pensions if we can revive that struggle, depend absolutely on confronting our own weaknesses. This list is not exhaustive but it does include the decisive episodes.
1. No Strategy
The tone for this campaign was set at last year’s Conference when we debated the priority motion. The basic message of the motion was unanimously agreed- we needed action on pensions starting with June 30th and much more co-ordinated action beyond that. If it was to be fleshed out more that would be done in amendments, of which there were three, all from the left. One proposed some basic campaigning ideas that would certainly have been taken up in any case, one proposed the development of a detailed plan of escalating action to follow June 30th and one called for no action at all from the Union, merely stating that ‘action would be strengthened if the TUC called such coordinated action, beginning with a one day public sector general strike in the autumn’. It didn’t call on the TUC to do this, or even instruct the NUT to make such a call. It was an utterly meaningless amendment, as could be seen when the whole conference voted for it. The CBC placed the only amendment to discuss a strategy beyond June 30th last and the debate was then closed down before we reached it. The decisive forces in this manoeuvre were on the left (on CBC and the conference floor). It wasn’t just that there was no strategy, it was also important to avoid any debate which would reveal that this was the case. This approach continued throughout the pensions’ campaign whether on the Executive or in the wider union. At no point did any of the activist groups in the Union (STA, CDFU, Broadly Speaking) publish any material outlining a strategy any different from that pursued by the Executive. Strike day meetings have been rallies at which members heard from the great and the good, reps briefings have been mainly information sessions and what has been avoided is an honest and open discussion with members about how this dispute could be won.
2. Protest strikes.
June 30th was not a platform for ‘further, more widespread and coordinated strike action’. Instead it was a protest strike that was not followed up by any further strike action for five months. And then it was succeeded by another one-day protest strike. A much bigger one for sure but in character no different with no set plans for what to do next, no discussion organised or allowed at the strike rallies and a repeat of the ‘wait and see what your leaders hand down’ approach of the entire campaign. Indeed the strike day rallies were considerably worse in most cases than June 30th in that they were dominated by the least inspiring and most timid of union full-timers. Nine months after Conference and over a year after the pension proposals were first announced we had no more idea of where this was going than we had at the start.
3. The reserved position.
On December 19th the Government gathered all of the public sector unions in a room and tried to browbeat them into accepting a final agreement which kept all the key proposals intact. The NUT response was terrible and it made tangible in a new and more damaging way the problem with our focus on the NASUWT. Faced with a completely unacceptable deal, the abject and pre-arranged surrender of the ‘big’ unions and a heavyweight news management plan designed to send public sector workers into their Christmas holidays with the message that the pensions’ dispute is over the Union’s job could not have been clearer. We had to reject the deal unmistakably and emerge from the talks pledging to organise with all other rejectionist unions to co-ordinate further action as soon as possible. What we, in fact, did was announce that we had a ‘reserved position’. What that meant we still do not know. The material to divisions talked, ludicrously, of some additional information which the government had not yet provided which prevented us from reaching a final view. It was utter nonsense. There was no new information that would alter the basic facts; we would still pay more, work longer (even longer than before November 30th) and get a worse pension. School reps and members left work at the end of term neither knowing nor understanding whether their union had rejected a deal or was close to settling. The reason given for this stance (but only to the Executive) was that this was the position the NASUWT had taken and it might help us draw them into future action if we avoided taking a different position. Not for the first time we showed more concern to court the NASUWT (who were making it quite plain they didn’t fancy us) than to properly inform and give confidence to our own members.
4. Failure to respond to the Heads of Agreement.
Anyone watching the depressing events of December 19th unfold on the media could see that what was needed was a rapid demonstration that, in fact, this dispute was not finished and that a significant number of unions were prepared to continue to organise action against this rotten deal. Given the government’s deliberate timing this could not happen until January but that restriction apart the responsibility was obvious. In fact, despite emergency meetings being convened, the Executive voted down proposals to take urgent further action in January or February. The key reason given was again the need to wait for other unions to step forward with concrete plans. When one of the education unions, UCU, did just that and named March 1st, we rejected that date as too early and announced that we wanted to consult our whole membership.
5. Uncertain signals.
The signal all of this delay and vacillation sends out to members is surely unmistakable. We did not know what we were going to do next, we were waiting the decisions of others and we hadn’t even announced a clear rejection of the deal.
6. Death by survey.
In February the Executive decided to survey all members on two questions (rejection of the deal and further action to start with a national strike on March 28th). We had already carried out very large sample surveys of members since the December ‘Heads of Agreement’. There was no need to carry out a further poll as the original ballot was valid and we had the mandate to call further action. The decision to carry out a full membership survey and refuse to call any action or discuss an effective strategy to win until it was complete simply reinforced the signal conveyed by all of the above- uncertainty, delay and vacillation.
7. Ignoring the members.
Despite all of this the survey produced a really positive result. 73.4% of our members voted to support further action ‘starting with a national strike on March 28th’. That they did this despite all of the mood music since December and in full knowledge that the ATL and NAHT had pulled out and the NASUWT were showing no signs at all of taking strike action demonstrated significant confidence and determination in the circumstances. Their clearly expressed views became, however, only the backdrop to the most bizarre decision of the entire campaign. By a majority of 24-15 the Executive responded to the survey on March 14th by voting against a proposal to proceed with national action on March 28th. The problem, it seems, was the turnout though there were negative comments made about the yes vote too (less than the overwhelming 92% in the original ballot). And this was not a defeat on ‘the left’ inflicted by ‘the right’. The recommendation not to proceed was made by the General Secretary and explained in her absence by the Deputy General Secretary. It was carried on the votes of all the CDFU members on the Executive and the one abstention was STA member, Dave Harvey. This was followed in a domino effect by UCU, PCS, EIS and NIPSA also deciding not to take national action. Having waited for other unions to line up with us before calling action the Executive were now instrumental in ensuring that none of them did.
Where now?
The future of the pensions’ campaign will be the subject of the most important debate at Conference when the priority motion is debated on Saturday afternoon. If activists and members in London get the reward they deserve for the hard work in selling and then delivering a regional strike there on March 28th then we should be voting on proposals for an escalation of that action to national action again as soon as possible after Easter. It is still the case that a combination of national strikes with rolling local or regional action will be needed to force the government to make more concessions.
From Conference the only realistic and serious next step forward must be a decision to:
- set a national strike day now, for as early as possible in the summer term, and campaign to get the PCS, UCU, Unite, EIS, and NIPSA out on the same day. This is possible. PCS, Unite, and NIPSA are already talking of a strike in "late April", and PCS leaders will be under pressure from their members to display some action before their union conference in May.
- formulate plans now for a quick-tempo rolling programme of regional and selective strikes, sustained by strike levies, to follow the national strike
- put out those plans to wide democratic discussion in the union, including in democratic strike meetings on the late-April strike day; and organise strike committees in every area jointly with other unions continuing the campaign.
- formulate precise and credible demands on the Government: reopen negotiations, exempt teachers below average pay from contribution increases, reduce the pension penalty for retiring below pension age. Rescinding the Government's entire package will be very difficult, now that the union leaderships have wasted so much time. Merely to call on members for protest strikes "about" pensions, without indicating what precisely what the union demands, is to eat away at the union's stock of loyalty and credibility. Making limited demands now in no way blocks the union from advancing more radical demands as and when a new mobilisation gathers momentum.
