English Defence League: wash-out or warning?

The 4 February English Defence League march in Leicester has been almost unanimously described as a failure by the EDL's opponents. The Unite Against Fascism website reported that “[t]he racist and fascist thugs of the English Defence League staged another flop today, failing to raise more than around 450 people for their national demonstration...” Meanwhile, the Hope not Hate blog confined itself to commenting on the low numbers of EDL supporters - “Numbers for the EDL are now closer to 250” - and their inebriated condition. Over at Searchlight, there appears to be no reporting of the EDL's activities on the day.

The local press and police paint a slightly different picture of events, with some estimates putting their numbers in excess of 700.

Why pay such attention to the numbers game? Whilst eye-witness reports suggest some exaggerations have been made in both directions and that whatever the actual numbers, the turnout fell far short of the EDL's hopes for 1500 attendees, the fact that several hundred racists marched unmolested through Leicester remains. Whether there were 200 or 700 on the streets, no amount of talking-down the EDL's numerical strength removes the fact that the racists marched through the city.

Comments like those from UAF and HnH serve to refute a more nuanced analysis of what the EDL march represented and masks the very real and dangerous weaknesses of both 'official' and independent anti-racist and anti-fascist activities. Such comments suggest that UAF's and HnH's tactics are working to destroy the EDL – a suggestion with no basis in fact.

If we are to have any hope of effectively opposing racist groups like the EDL and the myriad far-right and fascist organisations that litter the political landscape, some basic rational honesty will be required.

Leicester: some facts

The EDL's 2011 demonstration in Leicester ended with a group of their racist thugs breaking police lines and running rampage through sections of the city centre. Cars and bystanders were attacked as EDL supporters attempted to make their way to the Highfields area and its large Muslim community. They were repelled in part by local people who had organised to defend themselves against such a possibility.

In 2011, both the EDL and their 'official' opposition – Unite Against Fascism – were granted static protests by the police. For most of the day, EDL supporters were contained behind tall metal fences. Those who joined the UAF demonstration were similarly well contained. It was as they were being herded onto coaches out of the city that EDL supporters broke through police lines – something they achieved with relative ease – and ran riot. EDL observers and critics – as well as the EDL themselves, one assumes – scored this as some sort of 'victory' for the racists. They mobilised large numbers and in the face of apparently very restrictive policing, managed to carry out racist physical attacks. Anti-racists who observed this débâcle put the blame firmly on the police who failed to react and stood by as people were attacked.

The 2012 demonstration was somewhat different.

Since 2011 the EDL has suffered a split to its right in the form of the 'Infidels', a more explicitly racist and pro-fascist grouping. Another difference is the fact that the EDL leadership has formed a relationship with the British Freedom Party, a splinter group from the British National Party. The BFP is attempting to position itself as the sister party to European right-wing populist groups like the Dutch and Austrian Freedom Parties.

So several things have occurred in the run-up to 4 February 2012 that suggest some 'change' has taken place within the EDL. Complimentary to these changes are the following facts from the day:

1) On the morning before the EDL demonstration, members of their Leicester division – numbering between 20 to 30 – leafleted the city centre. Protected by a large number of police officers, local EDLers handed out a glossy two-sided leaflet proclaiming their “peaceful” intentions for the day. Now, “peaceful intentions” are not something one would normally associate with these racist thugs. Their own record of previous demonstrations makes the claim somewhat laughable. However, given their record this effort to distance themselves from violence is an important artefact in understanding what took place.

2) Immediately prior to the Leicester demonstration, high profile EDL activists – including the head of their LGBT division – were banned from attending by EDL leader Tommy Robinson/Steven Yaxley-Lennon. They were banned as a result of comments made on Facebook and elsewhere promising to raise havoc on the streets. The implication of this is that more violent and violence-prone EDL supporters were either told to stay away or excluded themselves by other means from events.

3) As EDL members made their way from an assembly point onto Leicester's city centre ring-road, they were met by a small but determined crowd of anti-racists. The EDL opponents didn't just stand by in vigil whilst the racists marched passed but chanted and directed insults at the march. At previous demonstrations – Nottingham, for instance – such chanting proved sufficient to provoke the EDL into a clash with the police as they attempted to attack their opponents. Not this time. Despite very light policing (including large gaps between officers stewarding the march) there was no attempt to retaliate. The assembled EDLers were on their very best behaviour.

4) The 4 February demonstration itself was not a run-of-the-mill, 'march and grow' stunt familiar from past EDL demonstrations. Prior to the New Year, the EDL leaders had promised not to protest again until March 2012 – the fourth anniversary of the demonstration in Luton where the forces that became the EDL sprung onto the political scene. As 2012 opened, the EDL leaders changed their minds by calling a demonstration in Leicester to 'protest' what they saw as a lenient court judgement in the case of a group of teenage Somali girls charged with assault. In their own minds perhaps but certainly to the public at large, the EDL wanted to present themselves as a 'respectable' political voice of opposition.

The exact thoughts and intentions of the EDL leaders are known only to them. What the facts preceding the Leicester demonstration and what was observed on the day suggests is that rather than being a “flop”, “wash-out” or “disaster”, the events signal a potential turning point in EDL tactics. If EDL leaders wanted nothing more than a 'respectable' parade round the city, then that's exactly what they got. What happened in Leicester does not rule out further, violent confrontations in the future but it does indicate that even when prospects for racist violence are slim, the EDL can still turn out several hundred supporters. This fact alone has important implications for potential future political activity.

Far-right populism

Far-right populism has a foot-hold across mainland Europe. The recently published 'Transatlantic Trends 2011' survey demonstrates some of the foundations for this phenomena. The survey reveals that across five major European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – the US is also included in the survey) more than 40% of respondents viewed immigration to be “more of a problem than an opportunity”.

In the UK 68% of respondents took this view with 71% expressing greater fears about 'illegal' than 'legal' immigration. 57% of UK respondents feel that there are “too many” immigrants, compared with figures between 25%-50% for the rest of Europe. When it comes to “sharing the burden” of immigration across the EU, only 18% of UK respondents (compared to 52% in France and 60% in Italy) agreed that the “burden” should be shared. Of UK respondents 58% felt that immigrants “take jobs”, 52% that they bring down wages and 63% saw them as a burden on social services.

In the UK, 44% felt that stronger border controls should be used to halt illegal immigration (the highest figure of any country) as compared to 18% in favour of increased international aid. 70% of UK respondents are in favour of the immediate deportation of “illegal immigrants”.

More specifically on the theme that occupies the attention of groups like the EDL, BFP and sister organisations in Europe: whilst 50% of US respondents took a positive view of the “integration” of Muslim immigrants, only 44% in the UK felt the same way. Figures for the rest of Europe are just as bleak, with only 41% of Italians; 29% of Spanish; 49% of French and 37% of Germans taking a positive view.

In the 'Integration and Belonging' section of their summary report, the authors of Transatlantic Trends note that “Europeans still considered Muslim immigrants to pose higher integration challenges than other immigrants, with only 40% of Europeans rating Muslim immigrants as integrating 'well' or 'very well.' This compares to 50% of Americans who believed Muslim immigrants are integrating 'well' or 'very well.' In some countries such as the United Kingdom and France, there was little to no distinction between the perceived integration success of 'immigrants' and 'Muslim immigrants.'”

These figures for attitudes towards immigration and Muslims are important outside of other obvious factors effecting the European political scene – namely, the general economic and more specific Eurozone crisis. As Matthew Goodwin argues in the April 2011 issue of Political Insight (the magazine of the Political Studies Association), the rise of the European populist far-right pre-dated the emergence of the world wide economic crisis. He writes that:

“Radical right parties have become an established political force in several European states. Contrary to early predictions that they would quickly disappear in time, or that their fortunes were intimately tied to economic cycles, these parties have recruited loyal electorates and proven stubbornly persistent ... they emerged well before the recent financial crisis and the events on 11 September 2001. Since at least the 1980s these parties have rallied support among some of the most affluent regions of Europe, and during periods of relative economic stability. Several have also outlived their charismatic leaders, who were often hailed in popular media as the main reason for their success.”

Goodwin also analyses the social base of far-right populist support. He notes that the most successful of the European far-/radical-right parties succeed in winning votes from three key socio-economic groups, these being: the “economically insecure” middle classes and the skilled and unskilled working class. He notes that one characteristic of the rapidly dwindling British National Party is that it failed to unite these groups, whilst the far-right populist Danish Peoples Party polled 12% in national elections by winning working class support away from the Danish Social Democrats.

The 'Transatlantic Trends' survey demonstrates that there is a significant layer of opinion within the UK that could be harnessed by an effective and organised far-right at the ballot box. If the EDL can bury or at least side-line their violent, confrontational image then the developments in Europe could be replicated here.

Key to this will be something previously noted in Solidarity: the social base of the English Defence League – that is, those who are mobilised on the streets and those who 'identify' with its message – is composed mainly of young, unskilled workers. If the EDL can combine successfully with an organisation like the British Freedom Party, they may have a chance of developing the sort of support base enjoyed by the European populist far-right.

The way in which the EDL is structured and the BFP's roots in the fascist British National Party implies an inbuilt instability at the heart of any political union. Whether or not those behind the EDL and BFP succeed in forming a new organisation, the social conditions exist. Any such formation – based on the EDL/BFP or not – would be a considerable set-back for the working class movement and the left.

Sharpening political scene

The major factor that could catalyse the reorientation or foundation of a new far-right populist initiative is the political climate determined by the general economic and Eurozone crisis. As Goodwin shows, the foundations of far-right populism across Europe pre-dated the events of 9/11 and the economic crash of 2008 but the interplay of broadly 'cultural' and sharply changing economic conditions is obviously vital.

Apart from the failures of fascist organisations like the BNP to successfully orientate themselves to win support across the middle and working classes – something that Marine Le Pen has started to achieve in France through a re-oriented Front National – the situation in Britain is complicated by the role of the Conservative Party in politics.

Most clearly in the late 1970s to early 1980s where Margaret Thatcher brought issues of race, immigration and nationalism firmly into the political mainstream, the Conservative Party has been able to adapt itself to and absorb support that would otherwise go to far-right and fascist organisations.

In his book “Contemporary British Fascism”, Nigel Copsey points out that “[u]nder the guise of the asylum-seeker issue, the ghost of Enoch Powell had returned to haunt mainstream political life. During the 1970s Powellism had opened up legitimate political space for the National Front, but when Margaret Thatcher had made a bid for the racist constituency in the late 1970s this space had been reoccupied by the Tories. Thereafter, the 'race' issue was removed from the arena … This was the case down to the spring of 2000 until the Conservative Party leader William Hague re-politicised the 'race' issue by turning asylum into a central plank of the Tories' May local election platform.”

One example of where the Conservatives may be testing the political water is over the issue of the Falkland Islands. Over a period of three-to-four weeks there has been an edging escalation of rhetoric from both the British and Argentine governments, with reciprocal accusations of “colonialist” attitudes. The fact that an American oil company has signed a billion dollar contract to explore oil fields in Falkland Island territorial waters no doubt escalated the mood, but the dispatching of both a British Royal and a large warship to the area fed the fires. It is generally accepted that the Falkland conflict of the early 1980s did the Thatcher government more good than harm – some would say it saved her from political ruin. Stirring the fires of nationalism now and testing the response would make some political sense for Cameron, especially as the storms gathering over the European economy edge even closer towards the UK.

So far – and apart from tub-thumping front pages in those avatars of far-right opinion, the tabloid press – the only 'demonstrable' response has come from the EDL, who burned an Argentine flag at their rally in Leicester.

So at the same time as making efforts to potentially accommodate and absorb far-right opinion, a Conservative government can act to feed and bolster organisations seeking to make their own independent political gains.

If the Tories under Cameron replicate some sort of 'triangulation' in the hope of mobilising nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim feeling for electoral gain, would this automatically quash prospects for independent or at least independent minded far-right political action? Possibly, but reality is more complicated than moves on a chess-board.

Take the American Tea Party as an example. The Tea Party has an independent political existence, calling demonstrations, rallies, conferences etc... under its own banner. The Tea Party is not a homogeneous, uniform organisation: it is riddled with factions, competing personalities and priorities. There are far-right fringe elements within the organisation and many figures who are simply ultra-conservative Republicans. When it comes to the electoral process, Tea Party activists focus on using the structures of the Republican party rather than independent political action. As Mike Davis points out “[t]he far right takeover of the Republican Party in the United States provides … [the European far right] … with an inspiring template” (New Left Review 72, Nov/Dev 2011).

It is therefore conceivable that something akin to the Tea Party could emerge as an adjunct to a traditional party political organisation like the Conservatives.

So what of the impact of the economic crisis? The state of the European left – from social democratic parties to the revolutionary left – is almost uniformly abysmal. In such conditions, it is the far-right and specifically far-right populist parties that look set to gain the most from any fragmentation or disintegration of the Eurozone. Groups like the EDL/BFP in Britain, Marine Le Pen's reformed NF in France and Geert Wilders' Freedom Party in Holland promote a nationalist identity politics and have convenient scape-goats to hand (ie. Muslims). They have structures, an existing base of support and a massive reserve of potential support that could be tipped in their direction by tumultuous political events.

The blades of nationalism are already being sharpened across Europe, from Athens through Rome through to Paris, as the fall-out comes to a head.

From far-right populism to fascism?

In a historical context, fascism is the final barbaric option open to a ruling national, capitalist class left floundering by sharp economic, political and social crises and threatened by a combative, militant working class. Faced with the prospect of losing their hold on society, the vestiges and gains of liberal bourgeois democracy are closed off. To protect private capital, all freedoms are curtailed – even those freedoms enjoyed by sections of the capitalist class themselves – and fundamentally, the labour movement is crushed.

It is this 'version' of fascism that was carried through by Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany and Franco in Spain. Had the Bolshevik revolution failed, then something akin to fascism would have emerged to decisively crush the Russian working class. It is this form of 'fascism' to which groups like the National Front, and later the leadership of the British National Party looked for inspiration. Their aim was to create an organisation capable of combining political action with 'street activism' – that is, thuggery – in order to create a fascist state. Nationalism, a specific concern with race and a vision of 'race war' were and are central planks of their propaganda, agitation and organisation.

The political outlook and intentions of fascist groups are 'counter-revolutionary' in the sense that they understand their final victory to be based on the crushing of any and all prospects for working class rule.

The same is not true for the new far-right populists of Europe. Their current aim is to wield political influence within the mainstream to 'deal with' specific cultural and national questions. They are reactionary to the core, often economically conservative and hostile to trade unionism, but not fascist in the way we have described … not yet, at least.

What the far-right populists and the movements they are building or attempting to build represent are the base from which a new fascist 'movement' could emerge. Developments in Greece and elsewhere in Europe will be a test for how rapidly such a transformation can take place.

Opposing the rise of the far-right

The most significant change required to quash the potential for reactionary advancement is a revival of the labour movement and transformation of the Labour Party into an organisation that fights for and as part of the working class movement. These changes would 'fix' a good many problems. However, no 'quick fix' is on the horizon.

As long as prospects for such transformations remain limited in the short-term socialists, and those anti-racists and anti-fascists prepared to fight with us, must take steps to organise. As part of our overall task to get the labour and working class movement to fight, we need to argue for the unions to adopt an independent program to combat racism and the threat from the far-right and fascism.

At present, most anti-racist and anti-fascist work has been 'franchised out' by the trade unions to organisations like Unite Against Fascism and Hope not Hate. The limitations of these groupings is a well rehearsed and analysed fact of political life, but suffice to say they are totally inadequate projects. The organisational approach of UAF and HnH is not bound to working class political interests. UAF operates as a front for the Socialist Workers Party and hangers-on, its main functions being two-fold – the promotion of and recruitment to the SWP and the pursuance of ineffective and preferably cross-class rallies, festivals and stunts. Meanwhile, HnH now acts almost exclusively to divert the trade unions and community campaigns into the sorts of activity that would have 'Blue Labour' gurus licking their lips. For instance, as the EDL were marching through Leicester Hope not Hate organised the clean-up of a local canal!

A program for the unions should include fighting policies to defend public services, extend housing provision, defend pay, workers rights, the scrapping of immigration laws etc... These policies are essential with or without the threat of organised racism. In addition, unions should commit to:

Massively expanding the number and active participation of black and Asian, male and female workers in the unions – organise the unorganised;

Organise for full equality in the labour movement – for an extensive anti-racist education program and zero tolerance of racism within our movement;

Unconditional support for self-defence against racist and fascist attack – for workers unity and organised defence.

The aim must be to mobilise the trade unions and trade union members on their own terms and in the interests of their own class, the working class.

This medium term aim can and should be complimented by action taken now. A broad, non-sectarian working class campaign against racism and fascism can begin to address the immediate issues raised by the work being done by the EDL and the remnants of the BNP. Most obviously, better coordination and organisation can ensure that not only a handful of people but a coherent group of activists can intervene against demonstrations and national initiatives by groups like the EDL. It means making links and building solidarity with those groups threatened by the EDL's racism not through self-appointed leaders but at the grass roots. It means making propaganda for working class anti-racism and anti-fascism and agitating for alternative tactics and methods.

Members of Workers' Liberty have been involved in such attempts before through the Stop Racism and Fascism network. It seems like the time to re-visit and investigate the possibilities for a democratic, working class anti-racist and anti-fascist campaign.