In determining a political analysis it is important to look at what people do not say as well as what they do say. It is easy to paint a picture if you are selective about the story you tell. Take Venezuela for instance. A cursory glance at the political system is very confusing. On the one hand there are elections, freedom of speech, an extensive free press and media. All the things that one would attribute to a bourgeois democracy. On the other there is a President who is a former military man, the leader of a failed coup, and whose connections to the military are out in the open, moreover a military that is itself integrated into the everyday life of the country. In short some of the features we would expect from a Bonapartist or even military dictatorship. Throw in some references to this or that action that appears authoritarian, and you can swing the picture clearly in that direction.
But then consider other facts. For example, the fact that Venezuela is one of the richest countries in Latin America. That it is a far more urbanised country than most in Latin America, and that it has had unlike most of Latin America a stable socio-economic system, and bourgeois democracy since the 1950’s. Consider also that in fact the current relationship of the President to the military, and the role of the military in society is in fact nothing new and specific to this particular President, but has in fact been a feature of political life in Venezuela for nearly all the time it has been a bourgeois democracy, including all the time when it was run by a two-party system known as “partyarchy”. Then the relationship of this particular President to the military and the military’s role takes on different characteristics. That is why a Marxist approach does not begin at the level of these political characteristics, which can be deceptive. That is the method of the journalist, or the petit-bourgeois sociologist. It was the method common to people like the Katheder Socialists who completely misunderstood the nature of the state seeing it as somehow class neutral, a concept later adopted in practice by people who claimed to be Marxists like James Burnham and Max Shachtman. Rather a Marxist begins from the social relations in the particular society, and understands political relations and the state in those terms.
In his analysis of Venezuela Paul Hampton often refers to articles from the Venezuela Analyis website. The extent to which this superficial approach can lead to superficial, and wrong conclusions can be demonstrated by looking at some of the articles there that as far as I am aware Paul has not drawn attention to.
Dictatorship again!
“Venezuela’s opposition and critics of the Chavez government around the world finally feel vindicated (again). The Venezuelan dictatorship that they have been predicting for the past eight years has, according to them, finally come to pass – for the sixth or so time. Already when Chavez was first elected in 1998 critics predicted Chavez would bring about a dictatorship in Venezuela. They kept having to revise their estimates for when this dictatorship would set in, though, because following each prediction of impending dictatorship Chavez would do something that completely negated the announcement.”
Greg Wilpert
Venezuela’s Enabling Law Could Also Enable the Opposition
“For example, following his election in 1998, the first thing he did was to call for a referendum on whether to have a new constitution and held a vote for a constitutional assembly. When the constitutional assembly took on more powers than the legislature, opponents were again screaming “dictatorship,” except that the assembly proposed a constitution that was more democratic than the previous one. Similarly, the 49 law-decrees of 2001 were another marker for the onset of the Chavez dictatorship, except that these laws democratized land ownership and access to credit in Venezuela, among other things. Then again, the April 2002 coup was justified with the story that Chavez was ordering supporters to shoot at opponents, except following the coup very few of the coup organizers were arrested. This pattern repeated itself again with the 2002-2003 oil industry shutdown and with the struggle around the 2004 recall referendum. Each time the opposition and international critics were forced to revise the start date of the Venezuelan dictatorship backwards, much like a religious cult that predicts the end of the world and keeps having to revise its doomsday date.
I wouldn’t dream of comparing anyone to the Reverend Moon, of course.
“Chavez’s opponents are at it again. This time, they say, Chavez is definitely stepping over the line. After all, what could be more dictatorial than “ruling by decree,” “closing” an independent TV station, forming a “single party,” and becoming “president for life”? If this were what is happening in Venezuela, it would be ominous indeed. However, these descriptions, taken from the opposition and the international media, are completely removed from what is actually happening in Venezuela.”
“In Venezuela, however, the enabling law is completely different from the above type of “rule by decree” in that it is limited in several ways. First, the President is bound by the constitution. He can only issue so-called “law-decrees” in the areas named by the National Assembly, in the time limit the Assembly imposes, and that are consistent with the constitution. In other words, he cannot arbitrarily order someone’s arrest or do away with basic civil rights, for example. Some of the laws even need to be submitted to the Supreme Court, which vets the law for its constitutionality.
Second, contrary to popular belief, even though Chavez supporters control all branches of the state, law-decrees can be reversed by the most important power of all: the citizens. That is, law-decrees can be rescinded by popular vote. According to Venezuela’s 1999 constitution all laws can be submitted to a referendum if at least 10% of registered voters request such a referendum. Law decrees have an even lower signature requirement, of only 5% of registered voters (800,000 out of 16 million registered voters).
Third, the National Assembly may also modify or rescind law-decrees, at any time, should it feel the need to do so. This is quite unlike the enabling law in the U.S., known as the “Fast Track” law, where the president may sign international treaties that are automatically binding and not open to revision or rescinding by the population”
“If we look at the previous instance in which Chavez had the power of an enabling law, in 2001, this is not what happened. The 49 law-decrees that Chavez signed into effect in November 2001 had a democratizing effect, such as the land reform that democratized land distribution, the banking reform that improved access to credit for micro-entrepreneurs, the fishing reform that empowered small fishers to increase their catch because larger fishers have to fish further from the shore, or the hydrocarbons law that increased state revenues from oil production. Based on this previous experience, there is no reason to believe that this time around Chavez will not pass the types of laws that the enabling laws says he will.
What is more, polls by the Chilean NGO Latinobarometro have shown over and over again that despite all of the opposition’s dire warnings about Venezuela’s supposed slide towards dictatorship, Venezuelans themselves overwhelmingly believe that their government is democratic and is getting more so with every year. Eight years into the “Bolivarian Revolution,” and Venezuelans are in second place, after Uruguay, compared to all other countries in Latin America in saying that they are satisfied with their democracy. This percentage has been on the increase throughout Chavez’s presidency, rising from 32% in 1998 to 57% in 2006. Meanwhile, the Latin American average was 38% in 2006.[4] This and many other similar poll results flatly contradict the notion that Chavez is steadily heading Venezuela towards dictatorship
“Venezuela is not heading towards dictatorship and the opposition Cassandras will have to revise their doomsday date for Venezuela yet again. However, it could very well head towards another period of uncertainty and destabilization if Chavez and his supporters are not careful.”
Or this one from Bart Jones
“On the surface, it seems to Chavez's critics that he is finally doing what they have long predicted — creating a totalitarian state in the image of his mentor, Fidel Castro. But the situation in Venezuela is a little more complex than what many in the media and the establishment make it out to be. Take, for example, Chavez's decision not to renew the license of RCTV television network when it expires in May.”
“Chavez's decision not to renew RCTV's license is not exactly akin to George W. Bush shutting down CBS or NBC because they ran a few stories critical of him. If RCTV were operating in the United States, it's doubtful its actions would last more than a few minutes with the FCC.
Likewise, Chavez is not creating a single-party state as widely reported but is melding together an amorphous array of parties that support him. He is not outlawing opposition parties. He has no need to, as he showed when he glided to a record landslide victory in the Dec. 5 presidential vote by a 63 percent to 37 percent margin in a free and fair election.”
“The world should remain vigilant to ensure a free press, a free political system and a mixed economy where property rights are respected remain in place in Venezuela. If Chavez infringes on any of these rights, it should be vigorously protested and condemned. But so far it hasn't happened.”
Bart Jones, Houston Chronicle
Or take this report by Salim Lamrani who asks the same question I have done here, which not why is the licence of RCTV possibly going to be withdrawn but why are the media still in the hands of putschists?