Bush blunders towards more bloodshed in Iraq
By Martin Thomas
George W Bush's "new policy" in Iraq is a recipe for more bloodshed on the lines of the assault on Fallujah in November 2004 - but also, so it seems more and more, a botched compromise which makes no sense from any angle at all.
Bush's basic line - a "surge" of 20,000 more US troops into Iraq, raising the numbers there to the highest level since 2003 - comes from right-wing wonks Jack Keane and Fred Kagan, the sort of people who believe that the USA could have won the Vietnam war with "one more push".
But Keane and Kagan have written: "Bringing security to Baghdad - the essential precondition for political compromise, national reconciliation and economic development - is possible only with a surge of at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months or so. Any other option is likely to fail..." - in fact, in their view, to make things worse. (Washington Post, 27 December 2006).
What Keane and Kagan see as needing at least 30,000 more combat troops - a nearly 50% increase on the 70,000 combat troops (140,000 total) currently in Iraq - is much more limited than Bush's stated objectives with his smaller "surge".
Keane and Kagan wanted 30,000 just for "clearing and holding the Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighbourhoods in the center of Baghdad". No attempt, for now, to reconquer the almost-all-Sunni province of Anbar, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi; no attempt to take on the Shia-Islamist "ultras" of Moqtada al-Sadr, who largely control the huge Sadr City district of Baghdad. Other right-wing writers who sympathise with Keane and Kagan, such as Reuel Marc Gerecht, have said publicly and emphatically that it is crazy for the USA to try to take on Sadr at the same time as the Sunni "resistance".
Keane and Kagan do not explain how their strategy would do anything other than heighten hatred of the USA among Sunnis, who would see the US troops acting as hired guns for a Shia-sectarian government, or how US troops could effectively "hold", i.e. police, Sunni neighbourhoods where almost everyone would hate them.
Yet Keane and Kagan seem sober and realistic as compared to Bush. Bush, with fewer troops (20,000 total, apparently, not 20,000 combat plus their back-ups) wants to subdue not only the Sunni areas of Baghdad, but also, apparently, Anbar province and the Sadr militia. Keane and Kagan do not claim that their "surge" could achieve results within less than 18 months; but the Bush administration has stressed that its surge is "temporary", and plainly feels a political imperative to show quick results.
According to the right-wing Wall Street Journal (2 January 2007), "senior military commanders believe the extra forces can be sustained in Iraq for only six to 12 months before logistical and manpower strains become untenable" - and that is without taking into account the political strains arising from the inevitable increase in US casualties.
Particularly chilling in the Bush administration's statements is a promise to shift US forces from "restrictive" to "permissive" rules of engagement. Translation: the administration thinks that US troops, who have already killed tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians, have been too restrained. Now they will be given orders enabling them to kill more freely. The official US government background briefing on Bush's new policy admits that "Iraqis [are] increasingly disillusioned with Coalition efforts". Don't they wonder why?
According to Bush's speech: "This time, we'll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighbourhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter those neighbourhoods..." I.e. Sadr City.
In a background briefing, a "senior administration official" said: "the militias have to be dealt with, because they are operating outside the law. He said very clearly that that includes the Shia militia... the Mahdi Army and Sadr have to be dealt with.. the commander will be free to go after those who act outside the law wherever they are in Baghdad... That would include Sadr City".
There must be many Iraqis in the Sunni areas who fear and dislike the Sunni-Islamist "resistance", and many in Sadr City who dislike Sadr's mini-Taliban. Bush's new "bring 'em all on" policy is likely to push them to rally behind their "own" communal militias.
Incongruously - and probably as a result of the final policy announcement resulting from long haggling between different points of view, none of them convincing - Bush's new policy includes, alongside its ultra-"hawkish" headlines, elements of the more "diplomatic" approach advocated by the Baker report.
Bush emphasises that progress on "benchmarks" will be required of Nouri al-Maliki's Iraqi government. This at the same time as he is effectively telling that government to abandon even the pretence of controlling its capital, and to step aside to let US troops do that for it; and he is announcing that those US troops plan to go to war against the faction in that government (the Sadrists) to which Maliki owes his election as prime minister! Bush is trying to combine two different possible US policies - to build up and sustain the Maliki government, as the best available; or to push it aside and remodel Iraq "from below" to create conditions for a "better" government - but reducing both to nonsense.
And if Maliki does not meet Bush's "benchmarks"? According to the US government's background briefing: "there is no indefinite commitment to US presence in Iraq... [it] works only if the Iraqis step forward and step up. And [Bush has] made it very clear that if the Iraqis do not do that, they will lose the support of the American people".
"Support of the American people" is an odd way of describing nervous, trigger-happy troops, with "permissive" rules of engagement, on Iraq's streets. But that is what Bush means. He is saying that if Maliki does not do what the USA wants, then Bush will withdraw US troops.
But using US withdrawal as a threat to make Maliki shape up is stupid, and not only because Bush obviously has no intention of carrying out the threat. The collapse of the Maliki government would trouble the government ministers much less than it would trouble the USA. The government ministers would mostly flee back to London, or some other city of exile, or retreat to an area of Iraq securely under their (Shia or Kurdish) control. The USA would be left with one of the world's most pivotal regions, the oil-rich Gulf, convulsed in all-out war and chaos.
And the workers and the peoples of Iraq? They lose out either way. Their only hope is the emergence of a secular and democratic pole within Iraqi politics, led by the labour movement, which can fight both the US/UK and the sectarian militias. Our duty is solidarity with the much-harassed Iraqi labour movement trying to do that.
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US Strategy
I think a picture of US policy is emerging. The US says it is going to take on the Sunni "Resistance" as well as the Sadrists in Baghdad. I think the first part of this is for show. The main fly in the ointment for US policy seems to me to be the Sadrists,a nd the surge is intended to take them on, weaken them at least, and possibly to set the scene for the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad, handing it over eventually to the Sunnis.
This will be the price the US will pay for securing some sort of peace with the Sunnis. This is being backed up by the decalrations of the Saudis - who almostc ertainly cleared it with the US first - that they will not let the Sunnis go down, and who in addition have offered considerable sums of money to rebuild what would effectively be an autonomous Sunni state.
All this seems to me to point to the break-up of Iraq into its three essential component parts - in fact the Kurds have already effectively split away, and the Southern Shia have declared their interest in doing so.
To pull that off Sadr has to be defeated, and Maliki probably has to be replaced by someone closer to Sistani - who will gain from an autonomous Shia state in the South where he has most support. That is also why responsibility and pressure is being put on Maliki by Bush. Ultimately, the US has two main concerns. Firstly, to secure a strategic position in the region. They have that in large part in the North and the Kurds will want to retain US support to avert an invasion by Turkey. Depending on what deals they can do in the South they may achieve it there - they would obviously prefer power to move towards one of their favoured secular bourgeois politicians, but that's unlikely. But in the South they still have Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The main reason for the need for a strategic position is both to do with geopolitics, and directly the supply of oil, for which some stability is required. The oil is in the North and South. Splitting up the country in this way could reduce the potential for civil war, and give the US its main objectives, whilst sterilising the Sunni triangle pacified by Saudi largesse, and undermining the grounds for the "Resistance" once the US has left it to take up station in the North and possibly South. There is a third objective. To get out as soon as possible whilst meeting the two other objectives. Splitting up the country looks the most likely means of achieving that too.
Arthur Bough
Shi'ites and Shi'ites
What the US wants in Iraq is increasingly incoherent and I think there are some things necessary to add to Arthur's analysis.
First of all, there are Shi'ites and Shi'ites in Iraq. To be more specific, there is the Badr Organisation and there is the Mahdi Army, the military wings of the two main components of the ruling United Iraqi Alliance. Both operate death squads and both have infiltrated Iraqi State institutions. The bad press goes to the Mahdi Army, while the Badr Organisation is hardly mentioned in the Western media. This should be a signal that the US favours one over the other.
Why is this so? It's always due to policy. Due to my limited information, I'm far from certain here, but I have the impression from reports that the Mahdi Army are decided centralists. They want a united Iraq with a strong central government. The Badr Organisation, on the other hand, is mentioned so seldom that I'm not sure what their policies are, besides good relations with Iran. Since Uncle Sam would not be in favour of Iraq having good relations with the current Iranian regime, I can only assume that they're supporting other policies. Perhaps the Badr Organisation is more amenable to partition. This would especially be the case if their strength was in the south, since Baghdad seems to be the Mahdi Army's main stronghold. If so, then this might indicate that partition is the US plan.
The problem that the US has is that the group that it seems to favour is the one most aligned to that prominent member of the Axis of Evil, Iran. This would "make sense" if the US had a viable plan to destroy the Iranian regime once Iraq was stabilised (it would also be fundamentally immoral, but I think it's uncontroversial on this site to note that morality is never a consideration in US policy).
The US does not, however, have the capacity to destroy the Iranian regime. Military action short of invasion and conquest would only strengthen the mullahs, while the US does not have the military force necessary to occupy Iran while it imposes a government. The US military is deteriorating badly in morale and the "surge" into Baghdad will only worsen the situation - possibly drastically. Recruitment is bad and getting worse. Only conscription would give the US enough soldiers - but introducing conscription now would worsen the morale problem inside the military. The US government have no good options.
Probably the least bad option for Uncle Sam, in my opinion, would be to withdraw immediately from Iraq and spend the next 5 or 10 years getting the morale of the military back together, while boosting its size considerably in order to ensure future occupations go better than this one. In the meantime, military action should take the form of bombing campaigns or possibly invasions of tiny places the size of Grenada. Maybe naval action in the Taiwan Strait (as long as they don't have to put "boots on the ground")? I don't say this in order to give Bush advice, but in order for the Left to make an assessment of what is possible and what is not possible to expect from the US.
So, what do we do? As so many people have said, but as AWL opposes, we must say "Troops Out Now". Even from the perspective of protecting the Iraqi labour movement, the occupation is a negative rather than a positive. The WCPI have realised that they can only build the labour movement if they are a credible part of the struggle against the occupation. The key thing is how the occupation will be ended. Will it be ended by military action by religious sectarians, or will it be by working class struggle? We must therefore campaign within the labour movement against the war and occupation, making the class argument against it. We must also refuse all alliances with religous sectarians who in Iraq are dominating the military resistance and in the West are supporting it - and denounce them where necessary. That, and not by rejecting the word "NOW", will be how we both distinguish ourselves from the SWP and, more importantly, build the class struggle which is the only chance the Iraqi working class has.
Age of Empires
I agree with most of what you say, but it seems a feature of Empires that they always overreach themselves. The US policy in Iraq has been catastrophic for the people of Iraq, but has it necessarily been catastrophic for US interests? On one level yes, which is why I'm not sure how much of the war was fought with the backing of US imperialism i.e. those dominating capitalist interests in the US, and how much of it was in fact simply an example of how much bourgeois democratic governments have some leeway to act independently of those interests, and in this case was motivated more by the political and ideological agenda of the neo-cons who took advantage of Bush's desire to have a go at Saddam.
And the fact is that for a long time US foreign policy was conducted through the channels of the CIA. The CIA's Modus Operandi is not through all out conventional war, and the establishment of stable regimes. It is through chaos, deception, the dividing of the enemy against itself etc. The interests of US imperialism is for stable regimes where those regimes are sympathetic to US policy, where those regimes provide stable conditions for US capital investment, but where that is not the case, chaos and division weaken a potential or regional power.
I am not at all sure that it is impossible for the US to bring about regime change in Iran through a military intervention. Certainly not through bombing alone. The consequence for Iran need not be a stable regime, but a repetition of Iraq, and the creation of chaos. That policy has certainly worked for Israel in the region with its neighbours over the last 60 years.
And out of chaos at some point normally arises some strong man figure it is the kind of situation where CIA intervention can thrive supporting such individuals and groups covertly. And the past has shown how such strongmen can easily through such covert support, and the promise thereafter once in power of US largesse be won over as a client. The downside is that the chaos would push up oil prices in the near future, but probably not as much as would be thought, because Iran's supply of oil in the total is not currently that high anyway, and very little of it goes to the US, what does does so through the pooling of oil on the international spot market.
I do not at all rule out the possibility of further military adventures into Iran and Syria, and possibly alongside Israel into Lebanon if the pretext of Hezbollah attacks can be manufactured. The US has already provided its client states in the region with new and increased supplies of Patriot missiles in recent weeks ready for any Iranian counter-offensive. In Iraq the US has detained Iranian officials accusing them of stiring up trouble in Iraq. Both the US and UK have been able to do that almost at any time in the last three years, but it is significant that they have chosen now to do so, and to make an issue over it with the possibility of the Iranians being brought to book for their actions.
The strategy outlined in the "New American Century" was always for such a perspective of regime change throughout the region, which could not have been accomplished without such military intervention. But it was never possible to take on all these countries at the same time without causing outrage, and sever logistical problems. A precondition was to establish a bridgehead from which to launch the further military attacks. Saudi Arabia could not be used for that purposes without threatening the Saudi Regime itself - from where the US does get a lot of oil and investment to cover its debts - so Iraq was needed for that purpose. Iraq is central to that overall strategy. Clearly, Iraq did not go the way the neo-cons foresaw - otherwise the attacks on Iran and Syria would probably already be underway. But US policy seems clear in at least this. Even in the proposals of Murtha the troops stay, but are removed to the fringes. They are supposed to be there to make tactical raids into Iraq, but on the fringes they can just as easily launch attacks into Iran or Syria.
The division of Iraq will give the US the opportunity to get out of the Sunni trinagle and to put its troops with consent into the Kurdish North, and to place the rest in KUwait, perhaps with some staying in the South by agreement with Sistani in return for them dealing with Sadr in Baghdad for him. In both places they are strategically placed for a pincer attack into Iran, once it has been siftened up by air strikes from the air craft carriers off Iran's coast. It has been commenetd that these carriers are insufficent for launching an air attack large enough to oust the regime. That is reason to beleive that a ground assault will be necessary, and after the US experience of air attacks against Iraq they probably realise the limitations of such attacks. Even in respect of the nuclear facilities it is thought that these are probably spread around in hardened facilities so that air strikes may not be sufficient.
The current diplomatic manourvres, the probability that UK forces will have been removed from the South of Iraq - probably replaced with US troops - give time for the US to come up with some kind of solution in Iraq along the lines of division of the country freeing up resources for an attack on Iran. That is probably months away, but it is an increasingly likely outcome. The US must have known in bringing down Saddam that the consequence would be to strengthen Iran as a regional power, and it seems unlikely they would acquiesce in that unless they already had in mind that Iran would never achieve that due to it being invaded.
The Occupation cannot be seen other than as part of the overall strategic goals of imperialism. That is why socialists have to argue for getting those troops out of Iraq now.
Arthur Bough
Imperial Over-reach
The over-reach of the US is worse than Arthur thinks. The days of CIA manipulations to put a "strongman" in power are gone - at least in most countries. It certainly is off the agenda in Iran, where the proportion of the population engaged in political life and aware of global affairs is far higher than it ever was in your average banana republic (or even in the Iran of Mossadegh in 1953). Manipulation of a political elite is just no longer enough - the elites have agendas of their own and a confidence in their ability to achieve them, so the supply of Quislings is a good deal shorter.
This means that, while the US might be able to bring down a government, it won't be able to determine the replacement. In Iran, the political consensus (as far as I can tell from this distance) is so anti-American that leadership would fall to another anti-US group. Pro-US regime change, therefore, would require occupation. Uncle Sam doesn't have the soldiers for that and won't until after recovering from the Iraq debacle.
Yes, the PNAC plan was for Iraq to be a base for regime change across the region - but that's been pretty comprehensively stuffed by the result of the Iraq War. By the time the US has an effective military again (let's assume it will take half the time that recovery from Vietnam did), Uncle Sam's imperialist rivals will be in a far stronger position than they were in 2003. There will not be a New American Century.
My main Point
My main point is that the US can achieve its goal just by creating chaos in Iran as it has in Iraq. If you look at Rice's recent visit to the region she was able to get backing from a large number of Arab states - notably all of them Sunni, and all of them pro US. These states that are stable, and the ones that the US needs for its oil supply, and funding supply are what it needs to keep on side. Which is also why I think the US will take on Sadr to enable a Sunni statelet to be created, and will take on Shia Iran.
On the US politics programme, The McClaughlin Group, Eleanor Clift of Newsweek made no bones about the fact that she thought that the US would be going into Iraq, and the Conservative panellists like Pat Buchanan did not disagree. They see it as necessary. Moreover, opinion polls in the US even now despite the huge swing against the Iraq war, are in favour of action against Iran that is seen as a bigger threat.
Arthur Bough
Chaos in Iran
The US could achieve its aims through creating chaos in Iran, except for two things:
(a) It really does need Iran's oil to come onto the market. Iran is one of the world's major oil producers and, if its oil it taken off the market, prices would go sky high. Last year, professionals in the oil market were forecasting at least $US100/barrel in that eventuality. Saudi Arabia doesn't have anything like the excess capacity it used to have and can't expand production to compensate. Neither does any other OPEC country (or Mexico, production from whose major oil field is in free fall). The effect of removing Iranian oil is still valid even if the US doesn't buy a single barrel of it at the moment, precisely because oil is a fungible commodity with the price determined by a single global pool.
(b) As Iranian President Ahmadinejad has said, Iran "has 100,000 US hostages in Iraq". If Uncle Sam starts organising US troops in Iraq for intervention in Iran, the Shi'ites would immediately start attacking US troops with as much enthusiasm as the Sunnis are at the moment. It might even cause the Iraqi Civil War to be suspended for the duration.
Two years ago, senior US government officials were telling Bush that the US had no good military options in Iran. I doubt they've discovered any in the meantime.
Yes and No
Actually, Iranian oil production has been falling quite a lot. The mullahs don't seem to be too good at increasing output in the absence of western technology and know-how. Oil is forecast to go to $100 plus whether or not Iran stops producing according to many commodities investors, because increasing world demand from China and India will in the next year or so remove all spare capacity. That is why the US is looking for alternative secure supplies, and is now beginning to look seriously at its susceptibility to the oil weapon. The removal of Iranian oil could then be marginal to that anyway.
I'm not sure the Shi'ites in Iraq would attack the US. If the US does a deal with Sistani that undermines Sadr, and provides Sistanis supporters with a Shia state in the South, they might refrain from attacking the US if those forces were taking on their other competitors from SCIRI. Moreover, my point was that before any invasion of Iran occurred, the US would have been looking to some sort of settlement based on a division of the country, and would then withdraw its troops to the Kurdish North, and to Kuwait in the South where they could protect the US's important oil and capital suppliers from Kuwait, and the Emirates. It has already provided these states with a large number of Patriot missiles. Given the danger these states might face from an Iranian backlash, they may well be prepared to sign bilateral deals with the US for oil supply at fixed prices, as could Saudi Arabia. These countries have already promised to not let the Sunnis in Iraq go under, and have promised huge sums of money to rebuild the Sunni triangle and Sunni areas of Baghdad. Given the relationship of these regimes with the US,and the recent visit to them by Condi Rice, this is not likely to be accidental.
Arthur Bough
Yes and No from Ablokeimet, Too
During 2005 (the latest figures I can lay my hands on at the moment), Iran exported 2.6 million barrels/day net - though I understand it's lower than that now. They were the world's fourth largest exporter in 2005. Taking that out of the global oil equation would be a major shock and send the price extremely high. If demand from China and India sends the price to $US100/barrel with Iran's oil still on the market, you'd be looking at $US150 at least without it. I'm sceptical about fixed-price Saudi contracts for oil to the US - and I'm damned certain that Hugo Chavez wouldn't go along with it, something which is vitally important as Venezuela is a far larger supplier of oil to the US than Saudi Arabia is.
Bush's attempts to reduce US dependence on oil imports are laughable - he wants to reduce petrol consumption by 20%, but 80% of that reduction is projected to be from "alternative fuels", which are actually a receding target and not viable. Doubling the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve will only address a short-term crisis and won't be able to handle the situation of Iran descending into chaos, which would continue for quite a while before anyone emerged as a "strongman" to impose order on exhausted factions.
Arthur's characterisation of the politics of the Shi'ites leaves me confused and I'm not sure what he's saying. The Iraqi Shi'ites are grouped in the United Iraqi Alliance. SCIRI is the largest group in terms of MPs, with the followers of Sadr running a close second. If Uncle Sam eliminates the Sadrists as a political force, that leaves SCIRI dominating the UIA and thus in charge of any potential Islamic Republic of Basra. While Ayatollah Sistani has tried to stay clear of party politics, it looks like he's closer to SCIRI than to anyone else. I can't imagine him being anything but hostile to a US invasion of Iran (he was actually born there), so if Bush is looking for cordial relations with an Islamic Republic of Basra, attacking Iran is not the way to go about it.
On the other hand, withdrawing to Kuwait & Iraqi Kurdistan would temper the ability of the Shi'ites to disrupt an assault on Iran, so Arthur has a point there. An interesting aspect of this would be the price that the Kurdish parties in Iraq would extract for a US assault on Iran from their territory. If an autonomous Iranian Kurdistan were to be linked to Iraqi Kurdistan, the reaction from Turkey would be over the top. In the vernacular, they would "go ballistic".
To sum up, I think the constraints on US military action against Iran are extreme. That doesn't mean Bush won't go ahead with it, but it does mean it will be completely counter-productive if he does.
Not Convinced
Iranian production has been falling significantly. OPEC has recently reduced output by around 1m barrels, and looks likely to cut it further due to the falling world price due to oversupply. This is despite the fact that China has since the end of 2006 been building up a SECOND strategic oil reserve. The US Reserve is also fall with around 1 months US supply available. Most of the OPEC cut has come from Saudi, and it could probably bridge the Iranian shortfall from increasing its own supply. Saudi and the other Sunni states that Rice visited the other week are extremenly worried about an Iranian sub imperialist power that is now becoming dominant in the region, and which shortly could have nuclesr weapons. I think the US could very well do a deal with these states - nearly all of whom are the major oil producers in the region - to allay those fears, and to bolster their regimes.
Chavez may not do a deal for a fixed price supply of oil, but he is actually still supplying some States like Massachusetts with cut price oil to get the Kudos for helping the poor of the US. New US production is due to come on stream in the Gulf of Mexico, and the US has billions of barrels equivalent in tar sands.
Its not clear to me that Sistani would prefer the idea of being a subject of Iran rather than having control of a Shia state of his own in Southern Iraq. He certainly would welcome the threat of Sadr being removed by the US. But as I said that is not crucial to US plans which appear in most variants to involve withdrawing US troops to the borders. US troops in the Kurdish North could almost certainly guarantee oil supply and pipelines in a way that they cannot now. And icnreased oil production again from that are would go a long way to offsetting any reduction of Iranian supply - which would not be a complete cessation of oil supply if Iran descended into some form of chaos, just as it has not done in Iraq.
As for the effects of the increase in oil price remember that only 6 years ago oil was seeling for $10 a barrel. That was a low point, but for much of the 90's it was not much higher. An 8 fold increase in the price of oil from $10 to just under $80 did not cause the sky to fall in. I doubt a rise from the current $50 to $100 would do so either.
Would the US sanction/support an Iraqi/Iranian Kurdish state. Probably not for the reasons you outline. But Turkey too is looking for western support for its membership of the EC etc. Turkey has invested in oil production in Iraqi Kurdistan. They would welcome stability for that to make profits. Could they be bought off, and resolve their own Kurdish problem through the establishment of a Kurdish state? Who knows. Not me.
I think you overstate the restrictions on US action against Iran. Even now as opposition to the war in Iraq mounts in the US there remains support for action against Iran, partly because people in the US remember what happened in the hostage crisis, and because unlike Iraq there is no doubt that Iran is developing nuclear technology. The news today - whether it is true or not - that North Korea is assisting Iran in that project will do litle to assuage those fears in the US.
In the past the US has had most success when it has worked through the back door, using CIA dirty tricks to make alliances with corrupt strongmen. It did that in Iran in the 50's, in Chile against Allende, in Nicragua, El Salvador, in Afghanistan against the Russians, and so on. Its record in fighting wars has not been very good. Other than Grenada the only ones it has been on the winning side in, are WWI and II, and they were won mostly due to the efforts of Britain and France in I, and the USSR in II. It has tried the "we want democracy" tack now in Iraq, and failed. Its likely to go back to what it knows best, chaos and CIA dirty tricks. An aerial bombardment, and a lightining ground assault to take out the nuclear facilities and command and control centres would do that probably at not too large a cost, before retreating to fortified position on the Iranian and Iraqi borders.
As the strategy stands at the moment it is in tatters. A succesful strike on Iran, especially one that neuters the regimes leadership would mean Bush could salvage something. They haven't been stepping up the heat on Iran for nothing. They haven't supplied large numbers of Patriot missiles to their clients for nothing, and the build up of the fleet is not for nothing either. They just need more time for the logistics to be in place, and then they just need the pretext, which Iranian involvement in Iraq will give them.
Arthur Bough
Neither am I
Arthur hasn't convinced me with his arguments, either. Given that events will determine which of us is more correct (and probably fairly soon), and neither of us is advocating allowing the US to attack Iran, I'm willing to let things lie here, except for one point.
The previous rise in the price of oil actually had some serious effects, and is still having them (Ford announced a record loss yesterday). These effects were more seriously felt in the US, where the rise in crude oil prices was directly expressed in petrol prices, than in Europe, where already-high exise taxes meant rising crude oil prices produced a much less than proportional rise in petrol prices.
People in the US now cannot afford to drive the sorts of cars they were buying the distances they are used to driving. This has cut car sales and, even more significantly, changed the pattern of car buying, leaving companies like Ford & GM out on a limb. Further, it has had an effect on the real estate market. While it is only recently that US home prices and construction approvals have started dropping, this is the aggregate picture. At least a year ahead of that, house prices started dropping on the outer edges of cities, as people counted the cost of commuting the distances required from those addresses and stopped buying houses there. Economic analysts have been saying that the rising cost of petrol (they call it "gas") acts as a tax on consumer spending and a substitute for interest rate rises. US newspapers last year were full of stories of the pain felt by working class people (they call them "middle class") because of high petrol prices.
In these circumstances, a rise in the price of crude oil to $US100/barrel would have major effects on the US economy and on US society. I happen to be one of those people who thinks it will hit that price, probably some time this year, without an attack on Iran. With one, the sky is the limit.
Reply To Bloke
The main point here I think is the likely attack on Iran. The US has now given the go ahead for its troops in Iraq to kill or capture any Iranians caught operating in Iraq. Some weeks ago there seemed some hope that a faction within the US were looking to doing a deal with Iran and Syria that would have overseen the break-up of Iraq. There seems to be some support within Europe for that approach, and the Baker Plan suggesting going down that route. Bush and Rice have specifically rules it out. Rice was deliberate in NOT involing them in her recent tour of Sunni states.
Again the main point is that such an attack on Iran is likely to be planned, directed and launched from Iraq where the US has its main logistical base. It is inconceivable to me that anyone can honestly and seriously claim to be opposed to an attack on Iran without calling for the withdrawal of troops from the palce that the attack is likely to originate from. Yet that is the position the AWL, with their fetish of the "No Troops Out Now" position, have put themselves in.
On the US and oil your economic analysis is way off beam. Ford and GM have been losing large amounts of money for a long time as I have written about previously. The main reason for this is their high US cost base. A large part of that is rather like the problem the UK car industry had of lack of investment, but it is also due to high US wages and high health insurance costs - I think its calculated that in a typical GM car made in the US something like $1500-$2000 of the price goes just to cover workers health insurance premiums. GM in particular has only kept afloat for the last decade due to the fact that its Financial Section GMAC, which provided mortgages as well as consumer credit was, like most such businesses in the US, very profitable as US workers tried to maintain living standards by going hugely into debt financed by their rising home prices. A look at other car manufacturers in the US, particularly Toyota and Honda, gives a completely different picture, as their sales have been increasing rapidly. Until only a few months ago home prices in the US have been in a bubble - at least in selected parts of the country. That bubble is not exactly bursting but being deflated not as a result of higher gas prices, but because over the last couple of years the Fed has been increasing interest rates by a quarter point every month rising from 1% to their current level. Were it not for the fact that huge inflows of Capital from China, Japan and the OPEC countries - the latter's funds being channelled through London which is why it looks like British lending to the US is high - which goes primarily into the US Bond Market, and has pushed the Long Bond yield down creating an inverted yield curve, then mortgages rates in the US would be much higher - because mortgages are based on Long Bond rates rather than on the Fed's Discount Rate. It is this icnrease in interest rates and the consequent slowdown and fall in home prices - which reduces the ability of US consumers to use their homes as an ATM to finance consumption - which is having the current effect on retail sales in the US not gas prices, which have in fact been falling considerably in recent months.
Oil is likely to hit $100 in the next couple of years because of Peak Oil i.e. the thesis propounded by some - though not all - commodity traders that the world has already reached its peak capacity for oil production, and that from here increasing demand will create an ever wider gulf compared to the inability to increase supply. But the fact is that even at $100 oil would still be cheap in real terms compared to its price in the 1970's. A long term comparison of oil against the price of gold shows that the price has mainly risen due to inflation, and the depreciation of currencies, particularly the dollar in which it is denominated.
The price is likely to rise towards $100 for the simpel Marxist economics reason that the long term price of production for oil brought to market in the next few years is likely to be around that figure. But economics and capitalism are not static. They are dynamic. As I have pointed out in a separate blog considerable investment is now taking place in alternative forms of energy - not considerable compared to the investment in conventional energy, but that investment is in constant capital i.e. production mainly rather than research and development. Rising oil prices will lead to the introduction of new technologies both to make oil use more efficient, and to replace it. Nearly half the cars in the US now run on petrol with a mix of ethanol produced from corn. The use of new biotechnology techniques will make ethanol and other bio-fuel use even cheaper and more efficient.
The world has just entered the first stage of a new Kondratieff Long Wave upswing. Historically we are at a conjuncture the equivalent of the 1880's/90's or the mid 1950's. Such points are always marked by a strong upward movement of raw materials prices such as we have seen in the last few years in oil, copper and all other raw materials. But they are also marked by the icnreasing use of base technologies to icnrease productivity developed in the previous innovation cycle, which we are seeing now in mobile telecoms and a whole series of other innovations, not yet really including all the genetic and biotech developments. The consequence is rapid growth, relatively low inflation due to the high productivity which offsets the increase in raw materials prices. This is not a conjuncture which sees major economic crises caused by shocks to raw material prices. At best there is the operation of the normal business cycle, and that too tends to be more muted. Fortunately, for Marxists it is also the time when new ideas are developed and taken up by the working class, and when icnreased demand for labour due to the long upswing increases labour militancy some of which is already being demonstrated in those parts of the world where the upturn began such as Asia.
Arthur Bough
Analyst On Attack on Iran
Puru Saxena is a financial analyst that appears frequently on the BBC, and on Bloomberg, CNBC etc. In this article (bottom of page on link) he argues that whenever the world has seen big increases in raw material prices, powerful nations have done what is necessary to get their hands on their share. The point is consistent with the argument put forward by Kondratiev.
He argues that in this context, and with the sending of further US Air Craft carrier groups to the Gulf, an attack on Iran looks likely.
Puru Saxena
Arthur Bough
To Abloke
I was just wondering Abloke whether you have changed your impression of the likelihood of an attack given more recent events.
Arthur Bough
Good that the AWL opposes sending in more troops.
But it amazes me that you STILL oppose the withdrawal of US/UK troops from Iraq. Rhetorical excess aside, this Weekly Worker article on the AWL's position seems wholly spot-on to me:
http://www.cpgb.org.uk/worker/655/Awl.htm
I Agree
Red, I just read the article, and I agree with your assessment.
Arthur Bough
CPGB
The WW article blatently lies about what is said in Solidarity! It claims, for instance, that I don't notice that the government and occupation are one side of the civil war, when the article it refers to makes precisely this point...
I find the idea that anyone who is at all sympathetic to us, and followed what we actually say, would find this pile of typical CPGB lying tosh remotely 'spot on' very disturbing. It makes me feel - which is a feeling I repeatedly get in this debate - that someone, and it might be me, is suffering from some kind of cognitive disfunction. How can we be talking past each other this much?
I Think The Point is
Clive, I think the point that WW are making, and I agree with them, is that you cannot on the one hand claim that the Occupation is preventing Civil War - and I still maintain that if you beleive that such action is progressive you cannot avoid saying so - and at the same time accept, and above you again do accept that that same Occupation and the puppet government it has created are themselves on one side of that Civil War!!!! Dialectics will only stretch so far.
And your point about not udnerstanding your position is relevant here. If those of us that are sympathetic to the AWL are at best confused about your position - I don't think we are I just think your position is wrong, and that you believe that the logic of your position is one thing when in fact it is something completely different - or at worst (for the AWL) that we disagree with it, then what do you think that says about the rest of the working class that are not so nuanced in these discussions?
Arthur Bough
Prevention...
1 . Clearly, there is already a civil war. It is my view that if the US simply abandoned Iraq, the civil war would get even worse. Does this mean the occupation is 'preventing' civil war? I don't see why.
2. Dialectical or not, this assessment makes perfect sense to me. It also seems to make sense to ordinary people I run it by, if not to nuanced Trots.
But
But when you run this by those ordinary people who accept the idea that the Civil War might get worse if the Occupation left - which I accept is not an unreasonable view, though one open to debate - do you also point out to them that "Oh and by the way do you realise that the Occupation are in fact taking part in the Civil War, and arming and training one side of it."
Arthur Bough
Yes.
Yes.
It's open to debate on one level. Something unexpected might happen, as they sometimes do. But if you accept it is 'not unreasonable', surely you accept the logic, in principle at least. In which case - well, in that case you understand it perfectly well, too.
The logic flows, it seems to me from two things:
a) that it's not quite so simple. The civil war now is one which the occupation has fostered by its policy of sponsoring sectarian-based schemes, dating back to the early days after the fall of Saddam. Partly this was conscious. Partly, though, it was accidental - I don't think the US *planned* to have a government in which the dominant forces were backed by Iran (or were independent of Iran but militantly anti-American, verbally, like Muqtada). They remain responsible for the Shia-sectarian/government/militia-inflitrated state apparatus side of the current civil war; but I don't think civil war was their policy: it was a by-product. In other words it is not simply the case that the occupation is, in effect, one side in the civil war already (so take it away and you weaken that side, I suppose). I wish life was as simple as that, but it's not.
(The existing arrangement includes, for example, the Kurds, who in so far as they are part of the national government are outside the immediate sectarian civil war in Bahgdad, eg).
b) if there was abrupt withdrawal 'now', there would be a power vacuum. The various forces would, most likely, go ballistic, fighting for control, territory, etc. This kind of civil war would be of a new, worse, kind to the one taking place now.
(For instance, I think it would make the Kurds feel their own immediate concerns were more to do with Kirkuk and so on, intensifying sectarian conflict there).
People make various cases for why this is not so. I've not read anything which I find particularly convincing on that score, certainly nothing which is so convincing I think 'yep, things will definitely be better'.
But
I do not think that the view that if the troops leave things might get worse is an unreasonable view. I do think its open to debate, and don’t necessarily accept your view that only if something unexpected happened would it not be the case. My point is that Marxists should not base their position on a forecast of what might happen. It should not prevent us from advocating a position of class struggle against imperialism inside and out of Iraq, and mobilising the working class around a slogan of immediate withdrawal for the reasons I have given several times before.
To determine the demands you raise, and to limit the way you oppose imperialism on the basis of the temporary, sectional interest of the Iraqi working class is ultimately to undermine the struggle against imperialism both inside and out of Iraq. The consequence of that now is being demonstrated in the problem you have over how to reconcile your position on troops in Iraq, and a potential invasion of Iran using that existing bridgehead. But it is wider than that. As I pointed out elsewhere if the Labour Movement in the US did mobilise around a demand for immediate withdrawal in the face of determined opposition to such a course by the US do you not think that in terms of the international class struggle such a massive mobilisation of the working class – even were it just in the US – outweighs the sectional interests of the tiny Iraqi Labour Movement. I know that sounds harsh, and that the AWL’s new Shachtmanite approach is all about petit-bourgeois morality, but the reality is that in class war, as in any other kind of war sentimentality has to take a second place to strategy, and the interests of winning the war over particular battles and skirmishes.
It seems to me that you are letting the moralising and sentimentality get the better of the need for proletarian strategy and principle.
Arthur Bough
Clarification
Clive, you comment above that if I think that, the suggestion that if the Occupation left things would get worse, is not unreasonable, that this means that I must understand your position perfectly well. I clearly need to clarify. You were talking about speaking to "ordinary" people about this issue. My point was that, if you made this point to someone in the street, on its own,then I can quite easily see how they would find the comment reasonable. There's violence, most people have a view of the bourgeois state being like Dixon of Dock Green writ large, so why wouldn't they believe that "our troops" were doing a good impartial job of keeping he peace.
But, you miss out the second part of what I said, which is the crucial point, which was that I then asked you, when you make this argument do you also point out that "our" troops are not at all like Dixon of Dock Green, there to keep the peace, acting impartially and so on, but that in actual fact they are there for a specifi reason related to the strategic interests of imperialism, and that in that context they are far from impartial, and that they have been and stioll are taking the side of one side in the simmering Civil War. My whole point is that the idea that from the perspective of the "normal" person the idea that the Occupation is keeping the peace and things would get worse oif they didn't is "reasonable", but debatable because such "normal" people could equally conclude like some bourgeois politicians that in fact the presence their is making things worse. But even were you to accepyt the former argument it becomes not reasonable when you then admit that the role of the occupation is not at all to keep the peace, that the occupation are not impartial, that the occupation are supporting one side of the Nascent Civil War.
And if my analyis at the beginning of this thread is correct, the Occupation will have no qualms if it feels that is what is strategically required in being more specific in its partiality by attacking Sadr's forces as a prerequisite to pacifying the Sunni triangle prior to the country being split up, both because it is necessary for the establishment of a Sunni statelet in that region given the dominance of Sadr's forces in Baghdad, and also to give dominance to Sistani's forces in the South against the Jacobin elements that could overtake them allied to Sadr.
Arthur Bough
We don't call for Troops Out Now
To say our position is equivalent to 'oppos(ing) the withdrawal of troops' is a typical CPGB distortion and needs a bit of justification from you, USRed. The article that WW use as the basis for their attack makes clear that it is opposing the call for immediate withdrawal. It only uses the word 'withdrawal' once, and then it is preceded by the word 'immediate'. Peculiarly WW who are usually very keen on providing links to sources don't have one in their article.
In Sean Matgamna's article that WW attack, where is it even hinted that if the US/UK governments were planning a withdrawal, we would say 'No, you must stay'? Time and again we have explicitly said the opposite. And it says so again in the article that WW use and is linked above - 'So then, we should advocate that the occupation forces stay, perhaps that they should be numerically strengthened? No!'.
What we do oppose, is socialists calling for 'Troops Out Now' and either:
1) welcoming what will then happen as an opportunity to engage in denunciation policies, (something else to blame on Bush and Blair); or
2) in calling for 'Troops Out Now', indulging in fantasies as alternatives. And it is a fantasy at present to say that the Iraqi workers movement has a remote opportunity of taking power or even being able to significantly exploit the situation of an immediate withdrawal.
Ours is not an argument for the 'troops to stay' - it is an argument for the Troops Out Now brigade to engage with reality, and stop pretending that they are in the lead of a powerful internationalist movement that will determine when or how the troops are withdrawn. It is an argument for them to use whatever power they have to aid the Iraqi workers movement.
But You Are Restricting the Interpretation
Pete, I agree that it is a fantasy to beleive that the Labour Movement inside or even outside Iraq could "Now" force US troops to leave. But is it a fantasy to beleive that the Labour Movement in Iraq could MOBILISE around such a demand? Clearly not, because they already are. Is it a fantasy that the Labour Movement internationally could if it mobilised its full might force US imperialism to withdraw? If it is then the prospect of socialism goes out the window too. But in order to mobilise the Labour Movement for such a demand is it not first necessary to raise it?
Of course if you start from a defeatist position of what the working class is capable of achieving you will never raise such demands. That is always the excuse of the Trade Union bureuacrat for not raising the demand for a strike. Fantasy they cry, the members will never support it. It was also always the cry of the Stalinists for holding back the working class from independent class action, preferring instead to work within the confines of bourgeois democracy.
But we then come to the other strand of the argument which is that the demand is not one that should be supported anyway because the result would be a civil war in which the Iraqi Labour Movement would lose out. That argument itself has changed from the original argument that the Occupation were actually protecting the Labour Movement, and before you say that was never raised look back at an argument on this line raised by Martin some months ago who argued that it was the existence of the Green Zone that allowed the Labour Movement to meet within it, and who raised the argument that if we were being attacked by fascists and the police were standing in the way we wouldn't call for the police to go away.
But a) if the desire is to support the Iraqi Labour Movement then shouldn't the actual position of the Iraqi Labour Movement be considered somewhat important in that, b) the opposition to imperialist aggression is one that involves the Labour Movement internationally not just in Iraq, the issue is not just about a specific instance of imperialist aggression but the extent to which the Labour Movement should stand by and allow imperialist aggression per se. So on what basis do Marxists subordinate the class struggle globally to the sectional interests of a working class in one country. As I have said before that was the policy of Stalinism in relation to Socialism in One Country, it is not the position Marxists should adopt.
In the context of a potential invasion of Iran by US forces that argument becomes ever more stark. If there were no issue about the US forces preventing a Civil War in Iraq would you or would you not oppose the presence of US troops in Iraq in a situation where they would be likely to launch any attack on Iran from bases in Iraq? If the US did indeed station troops there would you call for their immediate withdrawal because of their intimdatory nature against Iran? I would hope that your answer to these questions would be yes.
But if your answer to those questions - as it is - is no, then the only reason you can give for that is the one you use. They are preventing a Civil War in Iraq which would be detrimental to the Iraqi labour Movement. In other words you are quite prepared to subordinate the struggle against imperialist agression against Iran and the consequences that would have for the Iranian working class and Labour Movement to the narrow sectional interest of the Iraqi Labour Movement. And what then? If this conflict spread. The US feel the need to invade Syria, or to invade Lebanon to confront Hezbollah would you oppose those invasions whilst still refusing to call for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq because they were preventing a Civil War?
Arthur Bough
One of three replies
Long comments on this site can be a little forbidding and prevent others getting involved so I'm breaking this reply up. Arthur says:
"… But is it a fantasy to beleive that the Labour Movement in Iraq could MOBILISE around such a demand? Clearly not, because they already are."
I think you confuse the popularity of a slogan with a movement. Undoubtedly the US are highly unpopular, are blamed for having been in power whilst this situation developed. I imagine that almost universally the Iraqi people, rightly, want the US (and UK) to go. Many, even most, might well say they want them to go 'now'. Just because a slogan is popular doesn’t mean serious socialists should raise it. Remember July 1917?
Some courageous, but small, sections of the workers movement may use the slogan, although not particularly loudly at the moment. But where is the Labour movement mobilization you talk of, its mass workers meetings, its demonstrations, its militias? Look at what all sections of the Iraqi Trade Unions are doing, where are they trying to mobilize around any 'Troops Out Now' demand? There are things such as the IFC's Safety Force but these are still pretty small and do not pretend that if the US vacated Baghdad tomorrow they could take over. That militia was formed to oppose the sectarian gangs not kick the troops out NOW!
But You confuse different things
But you are still confusing two different things. The ABILITY to kick the troops out now, and the possibility of mobilising around the demand to kick the troops out now, as opposed to trying to argue that the troops are playing some positive role so its best not to mention it. Even Clive in our last discussion on this admitted that the way this demand was used in Iraq had to be different from the way it was used in the UK, US etc. He recognised that the WCPI do raise this demand, and I think - he will correct me if I'm wrong - he recognised that given the situation in Iraq, it was probably necessary to do so if you didn't want to lose the confidence of all those workers that do want to see the Occupation kicked out now.
As I pointed out in that discussion workers often raise demands such as "10% Now", whilst actually this really means build support for a claim for 10% which might take us several weeks of campaigning and action to achieve if we can build sufficient support for the demand. But no strike has won a 10% rise without the demand being first raised, and then campaigned for.
I am not suggesting that workers militia or any of those other things exist in a form that makes workers power or dual power an imminent event in Iraq, far from it. That's why I began by saying the idea that the Troops could be kicked out "Now" was indeed a fantasy. I am sayoing that you never build a movement capable of such things if you begin with a defeatist attitude, and fail to raise the necessary demands.
Arthur Bough
Large Comments
Pete, I'm not sure I agree about large comments. When I debate with US Libertarians on another site the posts often are very long. The nature of political debate is such that ideas cannot be delt with in short comments. Just look at anything that Sean writes. But those long comments on that site do not prevent the threads running often to 2,3 and even 400 posts, and the views of the discussions run into thousands.
I think the problem on this site is not long comments it is the fact that 90% of threads receive no comments whatsoever, and that of those that do there seems to be less than a dozen people that regularly contribute anything.
Arthur Bough
Demanding the impossible?
Furthermore Arthur says:
"Of course if you start from a defeatist position of what the working class is capable of achieving you will never raise such demands. That is always the excuse of the Trade Union bureuacrat for not raising the demand for a strike. Fantasy they cry, the members will never support it"
I always thought socialists supported strikes because they were both necessary and possible and not a fantasy. Instead you tell us we should call on workers to do what we know they are incapable of doing, just to outflank bureaucrats and Stalinists! That would be rightly seen to be the actions of an irresponsible activist in a trade union.
But what is worrying about such a light-minded attitude on Iraq, is that your parallel to 'a strike' i.e. the troops immediate or, at least, very early withdrawal not impossible.
Revealing
Pete, I think your argument here is very revealing. My argument is that workers cannot kick the troops out "Now". That is a far cry from me believing that they could not kick them out if they were mobilised to do so, and that in the process of so mobilising not only did they necome stronger, but that they were able to pull in other sections of Iraqi society behind them, weakening the religious militias in doing so.
That is the point of raising the demand - to begin the process of such a mobilisation. That is what militants and basic good TRade Unionists do when they raise the demand "10% Now" recognising that in doing so they give members something worth campaigning and organising for, that they might win over wavering members through the campaign, and might even recruit new members encouraged by the fighting spirit.
But your answer reveals that you really are defeatist for the working class, and obviously do not beleive that it is possible for them to mobilise in that way. That now expplains in clear light why you put your faith in the imperialist Occupation to hold the ring - an Occupation that is in fact supporting one side of the Civil War - and in elections and bouregois democracy rather than in mobilising the working class through workers democracy.
Arthur Bough
And finally
Arthur: "In the context of a potential invasion of Iran by US forces that argument becomes ever more stark. If there were no issue about the US forces preventing a Civil War in Iraq would you or would you not oppose the presence of US troops in Iraq in a situation where they would be likely to launch any attack on Iran from bases in Iraq?"
This is a strange argument. We should raise the call for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq because... they might attack Iran? What about missile strikes from the Gulf? US Troop manoeuvres and war games in Europe, the presence of US air bases in the UK in striking distance of Iran? Of course, we oppose all of these, call for them to end etc. But do we religiously demand that NOW has to be ended to mention of them? By the way you keep slipping into saying things like we do not "oppose the presence of US troops in Iraq". WE DO!
We prepare the movement to oppose them, mobilise workers better, in Iraq as outside, without having the NOW mantra that only miseducates and sows confusion
Even You Must Realise This Argument is Absurd
Pete let me start at the end and work back. You say I argue as though we do not oppose the presence of US troops in Iraq. "We DO!" you protest. Methinks thou dost protest too much. If I were to call the police and complain to them when they arrived that a double glazing salesman has overstayed his welcome, the first thing the copper is going to ask is did you actually insist that he went, did you tell him directly to go straight away? But of course that is not what you are doing, that is precisely the point you are not calling for the US troops to go, because you think it would be very bad if they did go.
As for the possibility of air strikes from US carriers, very likely, but SO WHAT? Wouldn't we, shouldn't we if those carriers are seen to be deliberately threatening Iran call for them to go, and go now. If US air bases in Britain look likely to be used in such an attack, shouldn't we at least be calling on the British Government to refuse permission for such operations "NOW", and in the light that such a call would not be heeded, wouldn't we be calling for those bases to be closed "NOW" i.e. before they could be used for such an attack.
But how does any of that change the fact that the most likely bridgehead for any land based attack on Iran will come not from the carriers, not from Europe, not from the Us, not from the UK, but will come from the huge armed encampent that imperialism has created in Iraq.
It appears that we can now call for the immediate removal of US bases from anywhere in the world, the withdrawal of US ships from the Gulf region, the only place we canot call for the removal of US troops to prevent an attack on Iran is from the very place where such an attack is likely to be planned, directed, and launched - Iraq!!!!!
Arthur Bough
Arthur Bough
From Pontius to Pilate
What I also find duplicitous in the argument here also is the way you try to send us from Ponius to Pilate in order to get off the hook on which you have impaled yourself.
On the one hand you use the argument. We cannot call for Troops Out Now beccause the Iraqi working class is not strong enough to achieve that. I have dealt with the point that the question is how do you reach the point where they are above. But you also say "But we are opposed to the occupation."
I have also dealt with that above with the simple analogy with the double glazing salesman, and the quesion the copper would ask you "If you didn't want him here did you clearly ask him to leave?"
But, the further substantive point arises that maybe the Iraqi working class is not powerful enough to force the troops out at the moment, but the US working class, and the British working class are if they chose to mobilise to do so. So the argument you raise about the Iraqi working class cannot be used in Britain and the US, but you do not call for the withdrawal of troops the presence of which you tell us you oppose. I think the copper would charge you with wasting police time if you told him that you never even bothered to ask the salesman to leave.
Which leaves me with one final question were it then the case that the British and US working class did mobilise in a huge strike wave demanding the withdrawal of troops, what would be your position? Wouldn't such a huge mobilisation of the working class against imperialism outweigh in terms of the world revolution far more heavily in the balance than the sectional interest of the Iraqi working class? Would you then fall into step with that mass of working class anger? If so aren't organisation that tail the working class in that fashion and determine thier policies on the hoof in accordance with such pressure usually called opportunist rather than principled Marxist organisations?
Arthur Bough
Addenda
"Ours is not an argument for the 'troops to stay' - it is an argument for the Troops Out Now brigade to engage with reality, and stop pretending that they are in the lead of a powerful internationalist movement that will determine when or how the troops are withdrawn. It is an argument for them to use whatever power they have to aid the Iraqi workers movement."
I hadn't really focussed on these last sentences before, but it really demonstrates a point I was making with Clive lower down. First of all I'm not sure when Marxist began determining their demands to "teach a lesson" to their political competitors as the last part of your first sentence implies. Secondly, it is clear from this comment that you really have lost faith in the ability of the working class to determine its destiny, that you have lost all hope that the working class could develop through struggle. It is clear from your comment above that all you see as being possible is to limit activity to routine Trade Union type activity and support. In short economism.
Arthur Bough
Comment which I've brought over from Venezuela debate
There is a debate on Venezuela going on here, in which Arthur Bough raised a point about Iraq. My response:
Arthur,
If I understand you correctly, you're saying that if a working-class seizure of power was on the agenda in Iraq, you'd support our position "100%". Which position? The refusal to call for "troops out now"? But if the Iraqi workers were in a position to take power, of course we could call for immediate US/UK withdrawal - both because the Islamists would not pose the same kind of danger and because the occupation would function primarily as a threat to the Iraqi workers, probably uniting with the Islamists to crush them.
Even if it wasn't a revolutionary situation but it was clear that the Iraqi entity and state would survive withdrawal, and the only fundamental conflict in Iraq was between the Iraqi government, backed by the occupation, and the workers, we would call for withdrawal.
You seem to have got things very much the wrong way round.
I'll let someone else take the thing about "progressive".
Sacha
My Fault For the Confusion
Sacha, now I udnerstand why you were confused. Its my fault. "The sentence beginning "If the situation in Iraq" should read "If the situation in Venezuela" It was a typo caused by old age. Sorry.
Arthur Bough
No, no and thrice more No.
My comment to Paul in the Venezuela debate had nothing to do with Iraq. My comment to Paul that if the situation in Venezuela was one where there was dual power and the question of socialist revolution was on the agenda, then I would agree with his position 100% in terms of criticising the limited reforms of Chavez, of the limited nature of the Communal Councils etc.
How you have confused this with Iraq, I don't know. My only comment in this respect concerning Iraq, was that the establishment of Communal Councils in Iraq seem to me a more progressive development than is the AWL's position of advising the Iraqi working class to absorb itself in bourgeois elections and Parliamentarism at a time when that working class is under serious physical attack by the same forces that dominate that Parliament. My point was that the carping about the fact that the Communal Councils are not organs of workers power stands in stark contrast to the support for organs of bourgeois democracy.
Arthur Bough
Workers democracy
I don't understand this little thread. I would have thought the AWL would be wholeheartedly in favour of building workers' council-type bodies (community committees, factory committees, etc), and workers' militias based on them, as a policy for workers' unity, against sectarian conflict, etc.
I really don't know where you've got the idea we thought the labour movement should 'absorb itself' in bourgeois democracy. From me, presumably; but that's never been my view. Participating in bourgeois democracy isn't the same as 'absorbing yourself' into it. And clearly, a policy against civil war, against sectarianism, for defence against death squads and what have you stands outside the organs of bourgeois democracy. I have never considered this controversial. (On the contrary, I suggested on another thread that the main tasks of the workers' movement most likely lie in this area - to be told by you, Arthur, that I was too defensive and pessimistic, or words to that effect).
I Don't Think So
You would have to show me where I said that. Getting old but hopefully not that senile yet. I think I might have said that the attitude of providing routine Trade Union support, as opposed to raising more offensive demands such as the building of workers militia, factory committees, and of the international labour movement being called on to provide more physical and military support for the Iraqi working class was too defensive. I might have said that starting from these initiatives, and by mobilising around the emand for the immediate withdrawal of troops was the precondition for he Labour Movement in Iraq being able to transform itself, and to potentially reach a stage where it was able to have a decisive influence on events, but that is quite different.
Arthur Bough
Main point
My main point here, though, was that we have not argued for the labour movement to 'absorb itself' into bourgeois democracy.
That Wasn't The Impression You Gave
I have to say that was not the impression you gave in the previous discussion. When I raised the analogy of Spain, and the Action Programme for France, which precisely does call for the setting up of workers militia, factory committees, Peasant Committees etc. your reply here Spain and Iraq was that Spain and France were not relevant analogies from which I took it that you believed that demanding such things in Iraq were therefore not relevant. I haven't seen much in terms of propaganda and campaigning for these things. I have seen lots of discussion about why the elections in Iraq were a good thing in and of themself.
Arthur Bough
Spain
My point about Spain was that there *was already a revolution* in which workers' militias etc already existed. And beyond that, that setting up workers' militias, and trying to form workers' councils etc are not necessarily counterposed to participating in parliamentary elections. If you have dual power, they are counterposed (though even then I think it's more problematic, but that's another discussion). You do not have dual power, or a workers' revolution, in Iraq.
That we would be in favour of organs of working class democracy I took for granted.
I think that is part of the problem
Clive, I think the last bit is part of the problem. You see what I can't get my head round is that if say we take Iraq, I have seen lots of stuff about the participating in elections, I have seen lots of stuff about workers internationally providing assistance to Iraqi Trade Unions, finance, speaking tours etc., but I haven't seen anything actually arguing decisively in favour of the setting up of workers militia etc. On one occasion I even proposed that if you really wanted to build opposition to both the Occupation and to the Islamists that perhaps it would be a good idea to develop and campaign for the type of programme to fight fascism that TRotsky put forward in the "Action Programme for France". BUt I haven't seen any kind of propaganda or development of such a proletarian policy. All I have seen is propaganda for routine TRade Union solidarity work, and support for the idea that bouregois democracy would be a step forward, agood thing initself, and that in so far as imperialism might make a space for that we shouldn't actually oppose it, even if we shouldn't support - and saying we don't want troops in Iraq is not the same thing as opposing their presence, which does mean calling for them to go.
But, the further problem I have is that this seems symptomatic of the AWL's approach in general. Some time ago I had a debate with USRed about defending nationalised property. I was talking about defending nationalised property in the USSR. Red said there was nothing particular about nationalised property per se that should be defnded. I begged to differ and referred him to the NHS, Tube etc. where Marxists would defend even its current form, though we would argue for workers control etc. Red was arguing no the whole basis of defence could only be if the principle of workers control was advanced. Skip forward a few months, and look at the AWL's position re. the NHS. I have said several times now that I have read all the AWL's leaflets and propaganda on defence of the NHS what I find amazing given your attitude to nationalised property in the USSR, and even your criticism of Chavez is the fact that when it comes to the bureaucrat, ineffieicient state capitalist NHS all of that goes out of the window. There is not one single comment in all of your propaganda relating to the NHS that points out that it is run by bureuacrats, that it is state capitalist and therefore oppresses its workers and looks after the interests of the other capitalist that leach off it and bureuacrats that run it, and certainly not a whiff of the idea that it should be brought under workers control let alone workers ownership. It gives the clear impression that your approach is we don't like Stalinism so nationalised property is bad - and you define Chavez basically as coming udner that category - but actually the bourgeoisie still represent soemthing progressive so we'll support state capitalist property in bourgeois democracis without making too much of a fuss about the lack of workers control etc.
Or are you taking it for granted that workers should know all about workers control etc. and raise these demands themselves that there is no need for you to spell out your programme.
Arthur Bough
With regard to Iraq....
.... I think the problem - certainly on my part - is not wanting to be 'toy town trots' about it. I mean that you can say, as a generality, the workers need a militia, the labour movement needs a policy against sectarianism, against the Islamists, the death squads, the government, and the Americans.... But I am very nervous of the kind of thing you often get from would-be Trots (Workers Power are a good example), which is yelling 'THE PROGRAMME' on the basis of actually quite limited real knowledge of what's going on on the ground, etc.
In the 1980s, for example, we were able to be really quite concrete - or at least a lot more concrete - about socialist policy in South Africa, because we had very good contact with labour movement activists and the far left. You could publish stuff coming out of the unions or the left groups, for instance (with a comment) rather than just spout off in the abstract. Iraq isn't like that.
So no - of course I don't take it for granted that workers should or will know all about anything. I meant that I took certain things for granted in a debate with you.
I accept that the AWL should make clearer its general programmatic view on this sort of stuff. But I don't accept that the AWL thinks 'the bourgeoisie represents something progressive so we'll support state capitalist property in bourgeois democracies without making too much of a fuss about the lack of workers control." This seems to me an entirely unfair deduction.
With regard to Iraq....
.... I think the problem - certainly on my part - is not wanting to be 'toy town trots' about it. I mean that you can say, as a generality, the workers need a militia, the labour movement needs a policy against sectarianism, against the Islamists, the death squads, the government, and the Americans.... But I am very nervous of the kind of thing you often get from would-be Trots (Workers Power are a good example), which is yelling 'THE PROGRAMME' on the basis of actually quite limited real knowledge of what's going on on the ground, etc.
In the 1980s, for example, we were able to be really quite concrete - or at least a lot more concrete - about socialist policy in South Africa, because we had very good contact with labour movement activists and the far left. You could publish stuff coming out of the unions or the left groups, for instance (with a comment) rather than just spout off in the abstract. Iraq isn't like that.
So no - of course I don't take it for granted that workers should or will know all about anything. I meant that I took certain things for granted in a debate with you.
I accept that the AWL should make clearer its general programmatic view on this sort of stuff. But I don't accept that the AWL thinks 'the bourgeoisie represents something progressive so we'll support state capitalist property in bourgeois democracies without making too much of a fuss about the lack of workers control." This seems to me an entirely unfair deduction.
Good Point
Clive, good point. I agree that it is a mistake to make up long detailed programmes about situations you do not have good knowledge about, and certainly wrong in such situations to shout YOU MUST do this, and then denounce people when they don't. That has often been the attitude of Leninism let alone sects like WP, but I also think it characterises some of the AWL's comment about say Venezuela too.
But I thought the AWL did have fairly good links with the WCPI and Iraqi Trade UNionists.
And I think my point generally stands. You agree that Marxists should advocate workers democracy - we should advocate that in Britain let alone Iraq, and my point in some of the discussions with you and Janine for example of drug counselling was that the fight seems to be confined to within bourgeois democratic channels the elements of workers democracy being very limited and seen merely as a means of applying pressure to those bourgeois democratic channels. Therefore almost whatever the concrete conditions shouldn't Marxists be propagandising for workers democracy being the way forward, and if information is limited being guarded in the aspects of that workers democracy they propose. I think that in a situation where workers are under physical attack it should be automatic to raise the demand for Workers Defence Squads,a nd for Workers Militia in a growing Civil War for instance. I think that in a situation which we did know cocnretely the attempts of the Occupation to privatise the oilfields that the principle of factory committees to draw in all workers rather than just the unionised ones, and to cut across different union structures is fairly obvious, and given the attacks on those plants by the Islamists the need for such committees themselves to be linked with the establishment of militia to defend them against such attack.
But I have seen no such demands raised. The only conclusion I think I can reasonably draw from that given your comments about the Occupation holding the ring is that you in reality look to the Occupation to do those things. You make abstract comments about workers democracy, but in practice do nothing about it relying instead on the normal operation of bourgeois structures. As I said I think that stands in stark contrast to the criticism of Chavez for establishing Communal Councils which are not SOVIETS.
But my point is even more applicable to Britain. In Britain you DO have good knowledge of the situation. So what is your excuse for not raising demands for workers and patients control in the NHS. IN the last weeek or so the bourgeois media have even carried stories about how the NHS is ripped off by highly paid consultants, in fact a leading capitalist went to a Manchester hospital and himself raised criticisms basically about how it was run for he convenience of such people