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Iraqi oil workers discuss strike

Iraq

According to the Iraq Freedom Congress, a grouping initiated by the Worker-communist Party of Iraq, oil workers in southern Iraq are planning a strike which "aims to bring security and build a free and democratic society in Iraq".

The IFC reports: "The oil workers will strike for the following demands:

  • Abolition of all contracts including privatisation imposed on the workers of Iraq, particularly oil workers;

  • An end to the killing of workers committed by the armed militias in Iraqi cities.
  • Redistribution of the ration food without taking away any item listed in the ration coupon.
  • Redistribution of the profits among the workers in the oil sector".

    According to the IFC, "this strike will hit the occupation and its puppet government hard. It... will unite Iraqis against the sectarian gangs who aim to plant discrimination among the workers and the rest of the society".

Exactly which oil workers' organisations are involved, what sort of strike action (a one-day protest, or something longer) is planned, and when, is not clear.

A statement on the IFC website from Falih Abood Imara, secretary of the southern oil union, calls the current Iraqi coalition government "the most repulsive sectarian government in our history", while another statement on the website of the British support group for the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (www.basraoilunion.org), signed by Federation president Hassan Jumaa, lists a different set of demands and calls Maliki's administration "a legitimate elected government".

Meanwhile, however, that government, using Decree 8750 of August 2005, has seized all the Federation's bank accounts.

Any level of action by the southern oil workers on anti-sectarian lines will be a tremendous flash of hope in the gloom and chaos of Iraq.

In May and June there was a flurry of manufactured "good news" announcements from the US/UK occupation in Iraq. A coalition government was formed (at last, following five months' negotiations since the January elections) under Nouri al-Maliki.

Maliki announced a plan to try for "reconciliation" with some of the Sunni-sectarian "resistance" groups. (The USA has been seeking behind-the-scenes talks with "resistance" groups for many months).

The UK announced that it was handing over responsibility for Maysan and al-Muthanna provinces to Iraqi forces, and the USA announced the same for Najaf. The USA talked about the possibility of withdrawing some of its troops. And US forces killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of "Al Qaida in Iraq".

None of this progress-talk had any grip. Sectarian conflict has increased steadily, interwined now with violent clashes between rival Shia-Islamist gangs in Basra. Water, electricity, and fuel supplies, and jobs, are all more scarce and unpredictable than ever.

The Islamic Accord Front (a coalition centred round the Iraq Islamic Party, the Iraqi offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood), which is the main Sunni-Arab element in the Maliki government, has withdrawn from the parliament and is threatening to withdraw its four ministers from the government.

The US withdrawal from Najaf had already been announced in 2005, and the USA had made exactly the same announcements about its hopes of reducing troop numbers in Iraq last year too. The "withdrawals" of US and UK forces from areas within Iraq are anyway not what they seem: they mean not that the US and UK forces leave those areas, but that they go onto the streets, in theory, only as backup for Iraqi government forces.

The Maliki government has announced extended curfews in Baghdad, a month-long state of emergency in Basra during June, and a "security clampdown" in Baghdad. None of these have damped down the sectarian killing; if they have achieved anything, it is harassment of democratic civil-society opposition, with the seizure of the oil union federation's bank accounts and a decree banning all political activity on university campuses (6 July).

US forces are clashing more with the Sadr movement - which has ministers in the government - and meanwhile the Sadrists have announced a bizarre plan to mobilise one million Shia to march on the mainly-Sunni city of Samarra and rebuild the al-Askari Shia mosque there, which was wrecked by bombing in February.

The simmering Shia-Sunni civil war is gradually coming to the boil. On Sunday 9 July, at least 42 people were killed in a bomb attack in the mainly-Sunni Jihad district of Baghdad. Sunni leaders blamed it on the Shia-Islamist Mahdi Army led by Moqtada al-Sadr. At least 66 were killed the previous Sunday, 2 July, by bombs in a market in mainly-Shia Sadr City.

Nir Rosen, author of a new book on the Iraqi militias, told al-Jazeera on 6 July that the call by Osama bin Laden on 2 July for Iraqi Sunni-Islamists to kill the Shia represented nothing decisive and new:

"Iraqi Shia are being killed every day anyway.

"Every day by the end of 2003, they were being slaughtered on the streets by the resistance and of course by Zarqawi... Shia are resented because they are perceived as the beneficiaries of the occupation... and in many ways, they are in charge now [where for centuries before 2003 Sunni Arabs had dominated]...

"The [US] occupation is a daily crime, it is little Abu Ghraibs, little Hadithas, being forced to do what the Americans tell you to do. Having American machine guns pointed at you everywhere, having American security convoys shoot at you when you're off the streets, having American tanks block off your roads, American concrete barriers block off your city, American helicopters fly over your house, American soldiers break into your house and raids.

"So many little acts and so many innocent Iraqis killed or arrested or humiliated or terrified. Probably hundreds of thousands have been traumatised by this, especially children.

"I was 'embedded' [with US troops] for [only] two weeks of my... time in Iraq but for me that was the most traumatic experience that I had in Iraq.

"Normally, if I'm on the streets and I see someone pushing an old lady or bullying a child, I'd want to interfere. But here I was with soldiers and they were doing the same thing with Iraqis. I would just stand there and watch and not get involved...

"But now that I think the civil war is... open and intense... it's possible that an American withdrawal would actually make things worse because there will be nobody patrolling the borders and would allow even more foreign fighters to come into the Sunni areas. It would allow greater intervention from Iraq's neighbours which will only increase the civil war.

"I think the Americans should leave... but an American withdrawal wouldn't make things better at this point because of the civil war.

"I think all mixed areas of Iraq are going to be unmixed, are going to be 'cleansed' like Bosnia before this ends... Sunni and Shia hatred at this point in Iraq are so intense that they are beyond the point of reconciliation..."

Splitting Iraq up into autonomous regions - as advocated by some Shia politicians, and some US strategists - is no easy answer, according to Rosen.

"It's much more complicated because the Sunnis don't want to have some form autonomous province. They want all of Iraq, just like the Shia want all of Iraq.

"Everybody wants Baghdad. Sunnis of course want the oil... Even if you divide [Iraq] into autonomous provinces what would you do with Baghdad and Kirkuk? ... There's no solution at this point, I think".

There is indeed no solution, unless the hard-pressed Iraqi labour movement can assert itself as a powerful force, counterposed both to the occupation and to the sectarian militias. Working-class, anti-sectarian action by the southern oil workers would be a tremendous boost to that possibility.


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Maybe

I think your separation of the example of the Protestants and of the Sunni is strained. The Northern Ireland Protestants whatever they profess are Irish, aren't they. They live on the island of Ireland. If you're argument were correct that they do in fact constitute a nation (because they do not consider themselves Irish) and that is then paramount in our definition of them, then the correct position surely to take would be one of self-determination. In that case if the Protestants consider themselves British and not Irish, and you wish to accede to that then you should support them being part of Britain not part of Ireland, or rather like in the case of the Falkland Islanders you should defend their right to their own state against attempts to incorporate them into a larger neighbouring imperialism or sub imperialism (Britain or Ireland).

But of course you don't do that because you recognise that they do not constitute a separate nationality, but merely a minority community. The correct position then is to defend their rights as such a minority within the context of a larger federal state. But your argument could easily be turned round too. In the case of the Kurds there seems to me no doubt that were they to dmand self-determination we should support that demand because they clearly are a nation. Short of such a demand we should certainly support their right to have their rights protected within the context of a federal Iraq. BUt on your argument if the Sunni turn round and say historically we are a separate people, we are only part of Iraq because the three parts of Iraq were cobbled together by British imperialism then on your definition that would make them precisely the same as the Protestants wouldn't it? And wouldn't they have a justifiable argument in that as Iraq was cobbled together on that basis not far off the time that Northern Ireland was cobbled together.

No I didn't say I would have supported the Algerian military cancelling elections. I have no interest in advising the class enemy on what they should do I will leave that to the people in the Euston manifesto group. Nor do I have any interest in supporting the actions of the class enemy, or of hoping that the class enemy might do something, as, for example, the AWL did in hoping that US and UK imperialism would defeat Milosevic, or as it does in hoping that US and UK imperialism might somehow do something progressive in Iraq like bringing democracy. What I am interested in doing is putting forward independent working class politics i.e. politics which advances the position of the working class and does not tie it to the fortunes of those class enemies. That is what your support for the elections in Iraq does, it "hopes" that everything will turn out for the best. It "hopes" that some kind of rough and ready bourgeois democracy will emerge. It "hopes" that the Islamist parties will not do what thier fellow Islamists in Iran have done, despite the fact that those Islamists exercise as much of their power on the streets through their version of the Brown shirts, and despite the fact that those parties have already used the sham of democracy to ban trade unions, and despite the fact that these parties already have introduced restrictions on women in government and even the role of women working for the occupation, and despite the fact that the working class in Iraq could have no effective control over any of that, and by accepting the legitimacy of those elections undercuts its ability to reject the results of them and the constitutional legitimacy and state power that flowed them. In short under the circumstances it is far from independent working class politics it is politics which begins with an acceptance of the weakness of the Labour Movement in Iraq, and on that basis reconciles itself to tying the future of the working class to the hope that the class enemy will institute some form of bourgeois democracy. Just as in Serbia it began with an acceptance of the weakness of the working class in Serbia and internationally, and in place of an independent working class policy ended with tying the fortunes of the working class to the "hope" that imperialism would do something that was objectively progressive even if it did it for the wrong reasons.

As for Kornilov my example was in fact wrong. The correct example should, of course, have been that the Bolsheviks should have accepted the result of the Constituent Assembly elections. The point is effectively the same. Had they done so they knew what would happen. The compromise parties and Kadets would have invited Kornilov to stage a coup and overturn democracy, both the bourgeois democracy and the Soviet democracy, as Kerensky had done in August. The example with Iraq seems to me the same it is giving democratic cover to people who at the earliest opportunity will overhtrow democracy in order to institute a clerical fascist regime.

As far as Egypt and islamists and elections etc. I think I have answered that question. I said that the question is one of tactics not principle. It would depend on the circumstances in each particular case. If the forces of reaction were tiny, and the working class is strong then of course workers should be in favour of elections. We are not going to oppose elections in Britain just because the BNP might win a few Council seats or even were they to win a few Parliamentary seats. They would not be able to use that as a cover for establishing a fascist state. Nevertheless, even in Britain when the fascists do stand we make exactly that point don't we. We say thse people are standing in elections but they are the enemies of democracy. If they ever were in a position to do so they would use the state to overthrow it and to crush opposition. And I think that were the situation to arise where on the back of support from the bourgeoisie, petit-bourgeoisie and lumpen proletariat there was a possibility of the BNP winning a General Election socialists certainly would have to consider seriously their position. They might have to argue that such an election was a diversion from the task the working class needed to be undertaking i.e. the strengthening of its own defences for the coming onslaught, they certainly would have to be arguing that workers should not simply accept the result of the election as giving a democratic mandate to the fascists, whether they used the election to do that the better or not is, I reiterate a matter of tactics not principle.

On Turkey, no I didn't say that. I also pointed out that Portugal and Spain were not the same as Nazi Germany. There are nuances, partly the result of the cultural differences of each country, partly a result of the personalities of the fascist leaders, partly a result of the particular conditions existing within the country, partly a result of the needs and interests of the bourgeoisie whose interests the particular set of fascists are serving, partly a result of the strength and potential for opposition to the regime or its ability to achieve its objectives by less ruthless methods. Turkey now is different from Turkey in the 80's. Part of that is a desire to join the EU, and therefore a need by the Turkish bourgeoisie to undermine the power and influence of the Islamists (especially as theoretically Turkey remains a secular state). But even against that strong desire of the Turkish bourgeoisie the power of the Islamists can still be detected, and that is why Turkey continues to have problems meeting the conditions for EU membership (as well as of course racist objections from France and Austria in particular). The same thing was true to some extent with the referendum in Ireland where the influence of the Catholic Church secured a No Vote initially because of the Curch's belief that if the Irish Constitution was subordinated to the EU it would have opened the door to abortion in Ireland.

I didn't answer your question about South Africa. I think there could have been an argument for proposing a federal solution in South Africa, yes. Were it the case that the fairly substantial white working class were going to be subject to racism and oppression, I think that socialists would have had a duty to defend that white working class, wouldn't they. Or does the fact that the white working class were part of a former exploitative group mean they lose all rights to protection as you seem to be arguing in relation to the Sunni. Exactly, how that as best achieved would have been a matter of analysis at the time. Clearly, socialists would argue for the greatest possible unity between the black and white working class. But that was what Militant used to argue as the solution for Northern Ireland, and we correctly criticised them for a naive position.

Arthur Bough


Categories and stuff

I am going to make this my last post, because I need to be getting on with stuff, and this is making me think about the wrong things! (It's been stimulating, if quite frustrating).

I think on almost every point, Arthur, you are confusing categories, confusing an argument about one thing with an argument about another. Argument by analogy, which seems quite basic to how you argue, only works so far. I think in much of this argument, analogies are taking you way off.

Elections

Of course it's a tactical question whether to *stand* in elections. And of course we should not be bound by democratic procedure if that is suicidal. I think Lenin's point against Kautsky is this, isn't it? To take an example you've used, it would have been suicidal for the German workers' movement to think that because Hitler won the election that was that. You could multiply such examples - where there are democratic realities, like survival in the face of fascism, which take precedence over the institutional formalities. This is true of almost any democratic form, in principle (for instance, self-determination, if for instance it's a matter of life and death for a workers' state - and so on and so on.) But there was never any question of denouncing elections as such because Nazis would win them. I don't think that train of thought ever occurred to anyone.

But as a general rule, the holding of elections - and short of socialist democracy, a bourgeois democratic system - should be something we support. Emphatically. And we are aiming - aren't we! - to win majorities. And in dictatorial or authoritarian regimes which deny or fix elections, the call to have proper elections - whether or not 'we' have people we can stand - is a good, powerful, progressive, energising one. Socialists are never going to win much influence if they are seen as the people who oppose elections. And I think, in general, they wouldn't deserve to win it in that case, either.

The reasons the 'resistance' opposed elections certainly are relevant - in making an assessment of the resistance, obviously, and more generally of the mood among Sunnis. That your starting point is that Sunnis have good reason to fear majority rule and this is perfectly reasonable is blinding you to the actual social truth of the situation.

In Algeria in 1991/92, whether or not you supported what the dictatorship had done would be the basic argument. You could say 'I refuse to give our enemies advice', but wouldn't that be just dodging the issue? In Egypt, where there is a labour movement and small socialist groups, they simply can't ignore, I would have thought, the question of whether they think there should be proper elections, whether all parties should have a right to stand in them, and so on.

Sunnis and Prots

I don't think the difference between Sunnis is strained at all. It is absolutely central to this argument. In the actual conditions in Ireland - principally the intermingling of the populations - self-determination entailing the repartition of Ireland would be reactionary. But the basis for supporting Protestant autonomy is, or should be, that they are a national minority, not that they are a different religion. (The conflict is obviously national, rather than religious. The same is true of Israel/Palestine. It's not a Muslim/Jew conflict, even if some people see it like that: it's over territory. The Irish conflict is over the border, not theology).

Of course Sunnis should have 'protection' in the sense of the right to religious freedom. But to enshrine Sunnihood in any definition of citizenship would have terrible consequences.

Outside Baghdad – where such an arrangement would cauterise the city into religious-sectarian enclaves (and God knows what it would do to those areas which are mixed) – you might argue, there is a territorial element to the Sunni-Shia divide, ie the Sunnis are mainly in the middle part of the country a constitute a distinct quasi-national group. But

1. Any kind of local government – and of course I’m in favour of local government – will give the Sunnis de facto control in those provinces where they’re a majority. It’s hard to think of anything they might to do with that control *as Sunnis* which would not be objectionable, though. (You might say the same for national minorities; but – the Protestants being rather exceptional in this regard – usually there is a language issue, for example.)
2. ‘The Sunnis’ (and it’s an unfortunate shorthand that we speak of them as if they have one collective opinion on everything) don’t tend to want merely local autonomy, because the areas where they’re a majority don’t have any oil. On the other hand those among the Shia who want to give the Sunni areas autonomy – by default, anyway, by claiming federal rights for the Shia south – want to do so precisely because it would leave the Sunnis without any oil wealth. What ‘the Sunnis’ want is control over the national state, which can only be achieved by depriving the Shia of their inevitable majority.

You can argue that given growing sectarian tensions, the best thing is to allow each group maximum democratic rights for the group as it currently perceives itself, and this will lance the boil, so to speak, of those tensions (ie, that we should approach religious-communalist conflict exactly as we do national conflict).

But there’s something simply different – isn’t there? – about religious and national identity. This is one of those questions which can leave you spinning around in a logical circle – for everything you can put a finger on which expresses this difference, you can think of something ‘on the other side’ which seems to say it’s the same. But even leaving aside the anti-democratic impulses to Sunni particularism, and even if you assume their fear of Shia ‘revenge’ once the Shia ‘have power’ is justified, there is something simply more backward, more reactionary, about religious communal identity than national identity. A democratic political culture can’t accommodate it, in a way that it can, in fact, notions of national identity, and national minorities.

Imagine if, instead of Scottish and Welsh parliaments, we had Christian and Muslim parliaments... (or Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian...). Devolution to Scotland and Wales (whatever debates we might have about it more specifically) is perfectly consistent with a democratic culture. ‘Devolution’ to religiously-defined groups would not be.

In any case, I think the Sunni-Shia division in Iraq is more complicated than it seems at first sight. There are historical roots to it – the Ottoman empire was Sunni, and then the Sunnis were favoured by the British colonial state. But the division hasn’t always carried the weight it has now. Conversions have been common. Revolts against Britain united Sunni and Shia. I don’t think there was any particularly Sunni/Shia dynamic to the 1958 revolution (there were ethnic dimensions, but that’s different). Even though the Ba’th built its base among Sunnis, it did not do so exclusively; the Shia did not support Iran in the Gulf war; there was a dynamic which was simply to do with the role of the Shia clergy – the earlier Sadrs, for example – in opposing Saddam. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, writing in 1987, concluded “... the fundamental division... was not ‘religious’ or ‘sectarian, but socio-economic, between the haves, and the have nots...” (Iraq Since 1958, p190). Even if this was partly wishful thinking, I think it means that the depth of sectarian feeling and conflict now is a new phenomenon. Presumably 1991 was a major turning point – as the south rose in revolt, but the Sunni central area did not, and then the revolt was brutally crushed as Saddam’s state was allowed by the US to reassert itself.

In other words, the Sunni-Shia conflict is not simply a permanent fixture of Iraqi life. Sunni privilege is largely a matter of governmental favouritism: it’s not a structural feature of the political entity (like the border in Ireland). It would be wrong to do anything, or propose anything, which helped to crystallise and make permanent these forms of identity. We should be in favour of a secular state.

There are situations where thinking you are dealing with national groups and arguments for autonomy and self-determination are the democratic solutions would lead you to catastrophe. Think of the partition of India - which was justified on the grounds that the Muslims were a nation. They were not. The consequence was fantastically bloody. South Africa, too: recognising the legitimacy of apartheid's artificial divisions was not progressive; the whole progressive movement saw the democratic programme as one person, one vote in a unitary state. You could protect white workers from racism without giving them territorial rights (assuming in any case that that was possible, which it wasn't: the abolition of apartheid meant the destruction of white territorial enclaves. That's what pass laws were about).

Turkey and Iraq

Extending your analogy between fascist regimes, comparing Turkey to Portugal, is only helpful if it is a meaningful analogy in the first place. It isn't. Turkey today is not meaningfully comparable to Portugal under Caetano - where there were no elections, the military ruled, etc. Turkey *when it was a dictatorship* is more comparable; Turkey now, despite its Islamist government, is basically a bourgeois democracy (very limited, but less limited than it used to be).

Islamism is comparable to fascism in certain respects but not all. Iraq is not Turkey, either; it is not a bourgeois democracy. But it isn't fascism, or an analogue-with-fascism, either. Not yet.

Cheers Arthur. Look forward to our next scrap.


Furthermore

"The power of the Islamists" is not the reason why Turkey is struggling to get into the EU. If anything, the Erdogan government has brought the country closer to that goal, and a victory at the next election for the hard-right, secular MHP (who in any case are anti-EU) would take the country further away from it.

www.shirazsocialist.blogspot.com


South Africa

Just remembered this old thing I wrote nearly 20 years ago on the differences between Israel and South Africa, which seems relevant.


Some Quotes from Lenin

I have long since rejected the need to justify any of my ideas by reference to what Lenin said. In fact I disagree with Lenin on many things. But that is not to throw the baby out with the bath water. Lenin still got it right on many things too. In a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary situation – and I would argue that is the closest description of the situation in Iraq not revolutionary, but counter-revolutionary or a developing right-wing revolution as opposed to a normal bourgeois democratic situation – Lenin has a lot to say that is worthwhile.
The following quotes are from “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky” unless otherwise stated.

Lenin attacks Kautsky for talking about democracy in general, as though there were some non-class democracy.

“It is natural for a liberal to speak of “democracy” in general; but a Marxist will never forget to ask: “for what class?” Everyone knows, for instance (and Kautsky the “historian” knows it too), that rebellions, or even strong ferment, among the slaves in ancient times at once revealed the fact that the ancient state was essentially a dictatorship of the slave owners. Did this dictatorship abolish democracy among, and for, the slaveowners? Everyhody knows that it did not.

Kautsky the “Marxist” made this monstrously absurd and untrue statement because he “forgot“ the class struggle ....” (p13)

Lenin certainly makes the point that proletarian democracy is a superior historically more advanced form of democracy than bourgeois democracy, but his main point is not that proletarian democracy is just a higher form of democracy is not bourgeois democracy taken to a higher level it is that one is the form of democracy used to hide the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, whilst the other is the ideal form of government for proletarian class rule. In other words you cannot say this is better than that because the two are completely different each serves the interests of a different class. Forgetting that difference leads to democratic formalism and the fetishisation of Parliamentarism.

“Bourgeois democracy, although a great historical advance in comparison with medievalism, always remains, and under capitalism is bound to remain, restricted, truncated, false and hypocritical, a paradise for the rich and a snare and deception for the exploited, for the poor. It is this truth, which forms a most essential part of Marx’s teaching, that Kautsky the ’Marxist” has failed to understand. On this the fundamental issue Kautsky offers “delights” for the bourgeoisie instead of a scientific criticism of those conditions which make every bourgeois democracy a democracy for the rich.” (p19)

And against that formalism and fetishising of Parliamentarism and elections Lenin quite rightly puts forward the principle of the primacy of the proletarian class struggle, of defending the interests of the working class.

“The formal democratic point of view is precisely the point of view of the bourgeois democrat who refuses to admit that the interests of the proletariat and of the proletarian class struggle are supreme.” (p44)
“Kautsky the historian fails to see this. Kautsky the historian has never heard that universal suffrage sometimes produces petty-bourgeois, sometimes reactionary and counter-revolutionary parliaments. Kautsky the Marxist historian has never heard that the form of elections, the form of democracy, is one thing, and the class content of the given institution is another.” (p44)

“Kautsky has heard about the Kornilov mutiny, but he majestically scorns historical facts and the course and forms of the struggle which determine the forms of the dictatorship. Indeed, who should care about facts where “pure” democracy is involved? That is why Kautsky’s “criticism” of the disfranchisement of the bourgeoisie is distinguished by such ... sweet naïveté, which would be touching in a child but is repulsive in a person who has not yet been officially certified as feeble—minded.

“...If the capitalists found themselves in an insignificant minority under universal suffrage they would more readily become reconciled to their fate” (p. 33).... Charming, isn’t it? Clever Kautsky has seen many cases in history, and, generally, knows perfectly well from his own observations of life of landowners and capitalists reckoning with the will of the majority of the oppressed. Clever Kautsky firmly advocates an “opposition”, i.e., parliamentary struggle. That is literally what he says: “opposition” (p. 34 and elsewhere).

“My dear learned historian and politician! It would not harm you to know that “opposition” is a concept that belongs to the peaceful and only to the parliamentary struggle, i.e., a concept that corresponds to a non—revolutionary situation, a concept that corresponds to an absence of revolution. During revolution we have to deal with a ruthless enemy in civil war; and no reactionary jeremiads of a petty bourgeois who fears such a war, as Kautsky does, will alter the fact. To examine the problems of ruthless civil war from the point of view of “opposition” at a time when the bourgeoisie are prepared to commit any crime—the example of the Versailles men and their deals with Bismarck must mean something to every person who does not treat history like Gogol’s Petrushka[24]—when the bourgeoisie are summoning foreign states to their aid and intriguing with them against the revolution, is simply comical. The revolutionary proletariat is to put on a nightcap, like “Muddle—headed Counsellor” Kautsky, and regard the bourgeoisie, who are organising Dutov, Krasnov and Czech counter—revolutionary insurrections and are paying millions to saboteurs, as a legal “opposition”. Oh, what profundity!” (p48-9)

And I would argue that this last section is crucial for understanding the position in Iraq. As I said at the beginning we are not in a revolutionary situation such as that Lenin was describing in 1917, where the proletariat were striving for power, that is true. But we are certainly not in “peaceful” times either are we. In fact we are in a situation very much like that Lenin was describing, one of “Civil War”, where the “bourgeoisie (and clerical fascists) are prepared to commit any crime”. And it is precisely for that reason that it is inappropriate to call on the working class to take on the role of Loyal parliamentary opposition.

Lenin spells out his opposition to such fetishism of elections and Parliaments in such circumstances.

““We”, the revolutionary Marxists, have never made a fetish of “pure” (bourgeois) democracy. As is known, in 1903 Plekhanov was a revolutionary Marxist (later his unfortunate turn brought him to the position of a Russian Scheidemann). And in that year Plekhanov declared at our Party Congress, which was then adopting its programme, that in the revolution the proletariat would, if necessary, disfranchise the capitalists and disperse any parliament that, was found to be counter—revolutionary. That this is the only view that corresponds to Marxism will be clear to anybody even from the statements of Marx and Engels which I have quoted above; it patently follows from all the fundamental principles of Marxism.”(p55)

True the working class are not in a position to disband such a counter-revolutionary Parliament in Iraq, but the principle remains the same. At a time when the forces of counter-revolution and fascism are congregating for an assault on the working class the last thing the working class should be doing is trying to act as a Parliamentary Opposition. The class struggle comes first, and the need is to undermine the position of such a Parliament. If the forces of the working class are strong enough that includes using elections to do so, but in conditions like Iraq the working class clearly is not strong enough to do so, and standing candidates would probably simply have got them killed.

Finally, even in the text cited by Clive as an example of Lenin arguing against abstention from elections we find the following.

“Of course, anyone would be in error who voiced the outmoded viewpoint or in general considered it impermissible, in all and any circumstances, to reject participation in bourgeois parliaments. I cannot attempt here to formulate the conditions under which a boycott is useful, since the object of this pamphlet is far more modest, namely, to study Russian experience in connection with certain topical questions of international communist tactics. Russian experience has provided us with one successful and correct instance (1905), and another that was incorrect (1906), of the use of a boycott by the Bolsheviks. Analysing the first case, we, see that we succeeded in preventing a reactionary government from convening a reactionary parliament in a situation in which extra-parliamentary revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) was developing at great speed, when not a single section of the proletariat and the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proletariat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike struggle and through the agrarian movement.” (Left Wing Communism (p57)

At a time of growing Civil War, and in light of the announcement of the strike by oil workers which began this thread, I think the above is more than relevant.

Arthur Bough


Huh?

Who in this discussion is saying the Iraqi parliament is classless; that the working class should be a 'loyal parliamentary opposition'; that class struggle in the form of strikes etc should be subordinated to democratic forms; that the ruling class will go quietly; or indeed any other bloody thing that Lenin is referring to?

The example Lenin gives of a successful boycott, Arthur, was during the 1905 revolution! You quote him:

"we succeeded in preventing a reactionary government from convening a reactionary parliament in a situation in which extra-parliamentary revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) was developing at great speed, when not a single section of the proletariat and the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proletariat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike struggle..."

Nobody - absolutely nobody - is suggesting that the working class should quietly permit itself to be crushed, should make a fetish of parliamentary forms, shouldn't depend on its own strength outside parliament (and anyway, unlike the SPD, doesn't have any power inside parliament to 'fetishise').

What I have argued is that the elections did not bring to power a Khomeini-ite, still less a fascist, government. They were a popular event, because the Iraqi people had been denied the opportunity to express any democratic will at all by a very brutal dictatorship for a long time. They were therefore not simply a sham. For these reasons, it would have been (was) wrong for socialists to denounce the elections or, worse, support the boycott called by the reactionary Sunni insurgency (or tried to organise their own boycott. If they were too weak to stand candidates they were too weak to do that). The task for socialists, as elsewhere, is to hegemonise the popular desire for democracy, not pooh-pooh it. (In practice, without candidates, that comes down to a general broad attitude, it's true. But better an attitude which says 'elections are good, but we need to build our movement so we can fight in them in the future, and fight whoever wins them, etc' than 'aaaah, nooooo, not elections, the majority might win!')

The government is reactionary, dominated by Islamists - though there are counterveiling tendencies - and real power 'on the street' tends to be in the hands of militias. The general trajectory is towards less democracy, not more. Workers should give it no support.

But they were not going to prevent this government from forming by criticising the class content of democracy. The working class needs democracy, even bourgeois democracy, to grow and develop. There is, right now, a struggle taking place over democratic questions, and the labour movement should be at the forefront of it. There is a danger of a worse situation than that which now exists. We do not help the class struggle by declaring the worst outcome already to have occurred.

With that I really do have to get on with other stuff. :-)


Religion, Nationality, Fascism, The State and Elections

“Who in this discussion is saying the Iraqi parliament is classless; that the working class should be a 'loyal parliamentary opposition'; that class struggle in the form of strikes etc should be subordinated to democratic forms; that the ruling class will go quietly; or indeed any other bloody thing that Lenin is referring to?“

Clive. Kautsky was not saying that Russia was classless either. But Lenin was pointing out that to simply use the term “democracy” as though it is something that can exist outside classes is to miseducate the working class. It is to fail to educate the workimng class in the fact that this democracy merely masks a class dictatorship. The reason for putting in this quotation was in response to Janine’s comment that she could imagine no situations in which having no elections was better than having elections. It seems to me that that position is indeed pretty close to Kautsky’s of ignoring exactly what those elections are for and to. That also is the reason for putting in Lenin’s quote about Kautsky not recognising that such elections can produce “counter-revolutionary Parliaments”. It is also the reason related to this latter for making the point that Lenin eleaborates that for Marxists the interests of the class struggle are primary, and so Marxists cannot fetishise elections because three will be conditions udner which Marxists have to either boycott elections, or because they will have to call on workers in advance to ignore the result of those elections, and instead will need to help workers organise for a battle on the streets for a Civil War, sometimes a Civil War in which as in 1905 the workers are in the ascendant and so a bourgeois Parliament is irrelevant other than as a platform for propaganda, or a Civil War in which the forces of reaction are in the ascendant and the workers need to organise their forces not for a Parliamentary struggle – and Lenin says that the basis for taking part in elections is never to gain seats (on which I disagree with him) – and indeed in which such Parliamentarism is a diversion from the real tasks that are required.

“The example Lenin gives of a successful boycott, Arthur, was during the 1905 revolution!”

I agree, but as I made clear in placing that quote, and as I have stated above the conditions of a revolutionary or counter-revolutioanry situation are effectively the same in this regard. In both cases what is involved is a life and death struggle in which Parliamentarism/electioneering is a diversion. Indeed Lenin makes the point that such Parliamentarism is relevant only to times of peace. Can anyone claim that what exists in Iraq is a time of peace! What we have is a situation in which workers and socialists are daily being kidnapped, tortured and murdered by the Islamic militias attached to the very parties that you insist are not proto-fascist or clerical fascist parties. Parties that are already banning trade unions, murdering trade unionists, forcing women to wear the veil, issuing fatwas for the murder of gays, and in the words of the previous issue of Solidarity creating “Mini-Taliban states” around the country. And that according to that issue of Solidarity is not just the Sunni militias, or the foreign fighters, not even the the sadrist militias, but the militias attached to the main Islamist organisations.

“Nobody - absolutely nobody - is suggesting that the working class should quietly permit itself to be crushed, should make a fetish of parliamentary forms, shouldn't depend on its own strength outside parliament (and anyway, unlike the SPD, doesn't have any power inside parliament to 'fetishise').”

No I agree. I don’t think that the AWL not calling for workers to boycott the elections, and instead to propagandise as to why the resultant Parliament would be a thoroughly reactionary institution whose aim would be to crush them, is a big deal. As I have said the question of whether you boycott or not is a question of tactics not of principle. I do think the AWL’s position is a bit schizophrenic. On the one hand the AWL does amazing work for such a tiny organisation in doing what is the most important thing to do – giving practical support to the Iraqi Labour Movement. It is why if I didn’t feel so past it, and weren’t suffering with Depression I would probably join, though I have a problem with the continuing attachment to Leninism even if its in a relaxed form. But on the other hand it does not seem to draw out the political programme for that working class or indeed for the Labour Movement internationally that goes hand in hand with building that Labour Movement on the basis of truly independent working class politics. As I have said before I think that stems from the fact of the defeat of the Labour Movement during the 1980’s, and the creation of a feeling of pessimism in the ability of the working class to fight its own battles. So instead we have a reliance effectively on imperialism to hopefully do something progressive and defeat the Islamists, and hopefully to create something approaching a normal bourgeois democracy, and because of that hope a refusal to engage in outright opposition to the occupation. I think the same is true of your insistence that the rampaging Islamists that are killing and torturing Iraqi workers and socialists, and slowly introducing Sharia law throughout the country are not proto-fascists that will sweep away any semblance of democracy and crucify the workers at the earliest opportunity after the occupation leave or remove themselves to the borders. You are forced into that position because you have effectively said that the only hope for the workers is them gaining a breathing space through the actions of the Occupation and the Islamist Parties in the Parliament are tied to that Occupation, so any suggestion that those Parties were in fact fascist would undermine the idea that the Occupation were objectively protecting the working class.

“What I have argued is that the elections did not bring to power a Khomeini-ite, still less a fascist, government. They were a popular event, because the Iraqi people had been denied the opportunity to express any democratic will at all by a very brutal dictatorship for a long time. They were therefore not simply a sham.”

But this is the crux of the argument isn’t it. You keep insisting that, but all of the evidence points in the opposite direction. I will simply repeat. We have the militias attached to these parties acting pretty much as the brown shirts did during the 1930’s. We have the creation by these Shia militias of “Taliban mini-states” (and would you describe the Taliban as clerical fascists or not?) throughout the country. We have the leaders of various Shia factions issuing fatwas for the murder of gays, and women being forced to wear the veil, forced out of jobs etc. The result being that many people are trying to get out of the country. We have a fusing of the militias with the state apparatus of oppression. We have this Parliament banning Trade Unions. I agree its not fascism or clerical fascism yet but the full manifesatation of fascism in Germany didn’t arise immediately, and the Shia Islamists cannot show their hand too much yet because that would mean an open confrontation with the Occupation. They don’t want that ebcause the occupation is busy suppressing the Sunis and foreign fighters thereby fighting some of the coming Civil War for them. In the meantime they attack the occupation in a more surreptitious manner in Shia dominated areas.

I’ll tell you what I’ll bet you a tenner that within six months of the Occupation making a significant withdrawal or withdrawing to the borders that Sistani calls on his supporters to restore order in the country, that the Parliament is either swept away or is forced to grant the declaration of martial law throughout the country, and that will mark an all out attack on Sunni areas, followed shortly after by the declaration that Iraq is to become an Islamic state under Sharia law.

“But better an attitude which says 'elections are good, but we need to build our movement so we can fight in them in the future, and fight whoever wins them, etc' than 'aaaah, nooooo, not elections, the majority might win!')”

But that is a caricature of the position I have put forward. I have not said that socialists in Iraq should not argue that elections are a good thing and that they need to build up their forces in order to be able to win them. What I have said was that these particular elections were not a good thing for the working class. They were not a good thing because from all of the accounts that I have seen the large majority of people voting really had no idea what democracy was about, did not understand what they were doing in voting etc., and that was part of the reason, plus all of the cultural and tribal traditions, which meant that they were always going to rely on being told who to vote for. Now even as far as the limitations of bourgeois democracy is concerned it requires something more than just putting a cross on a piece of paper. Yes, Lenin says in Left-Wing Communism that even under conditions where reactionary parties might dominate – though I don’t think he meant proto-fascist parties – there can be a case for socialists to stand in order to educate the workers away from these kinds of prejudices etc., but to do that the socialists in Iraq would have needed to be a lot stronger than they appear to be. Nor have I said that the objection is that the majority might win. That really would be an ultr-left position. What I said was that fascists WOULD win and that under those circumstances the election would simply provide a legitimate cover for their real agenda.

“The government is reactionary, dominated by Islamists - though there are counterveiling tendencies - and real power 'on the street' tends to be in the hands of militias. The general trajectory is towards less democracy, not more. Workers should give it no support.”

But nothing about this parliament – other than it was elected by a lot of people who didn’t understand what they were voting for, and were told who to vote for by their religious and tribal leaders – is democratic as the piece in the previous Solidarity pointed out. And when you say that the trend is away from democracy because of the actions of the militias on the streets, I repeat to whom are those militias attached.? To the very parties you want at the same time to pretend are the vehicles for democracy. Doesn’t the fact that these parties act with a ballot in one hand and a roadside bomb in the other give you a clue as to their real intentions.

“But they were not going to prevent this government from forming by criticising the class content of democracy. The working class needs democracy, even bourgeois democracy, to grow and develop. There is, right now, a struggle taking place over democratic questions, and the labour movement should be at the forefront of it. There is a danger of a worse situation than that which now exists. We do not help the class struggle by declaring the worst outcome already to have occurred.”

I have not said that it has occurred. That is precisely the point. Had socialists warned of the trajectory of Khomeini in 79 the working class in Iran could have been preparing its defences. Instead the same platitudes were given then. We certainly do not assist the working class in Iraq by telling them that the occupation protects them from the militias when clearly it does not, and has never had any reason to do so, nor by clothing the proto-fascists in the Parliament in democratic garb. Instead of printing election leaflets socialists in Iraq should be printing leaflets exposing the nature of the fascists in the Parliament, and instead of building up election fighting funds, they should be buying guns to defend themselves against those fascists when they decide to throw off the cloak of the Parliament.

“I am going to make this my last post, because I need to be getting on with stuff, and this is making me think about the wrong things! (It's been stimulating, if quite frustrating).”

I’m glad about the stimulating, but frustrating? Come on, it should never be frustrating just because someone challenges your established beliefs.

“I think on almost every point, Arthur, you are confusing categories, confusing an argument about one thing with an argument about another. Argument by analogy, which seems quite basic to how you argue, only works so far. I think in much of this argument, analogies are taking you way off.”

I agree that analogies only work so far, but the basic tenet of Marxism is to learn from what has gone before to draw out the similarities and avoid the mistakes made in the past. I think that in relation to the Protestants and the Sunnis the analogy is incredibly close. You want to argue it isn’t because to agree that it was would completely undermine your argument, but in dooing so your argument in relation to the Protestants has become increasingly strained and removed from reality.

“I don't think the difference between Sunnis is strained at all. It is absolutely central to this argument. In the actual conditions in Ireland - principally the intermingling of the populations - self-determination entailing the repartition of Ireland would be reactionary. But the basis for supporting Protestant autonomy is, or should be, that they are a national minority, not that they are a different religion. (The conflict is obviously national, rather than religious.”

Come on Clive, you can’t honestly believe that. Is it a coincidence then that the leaders of the Protestants are overwhelmingly religious leaders? Is it a coincidence that there are Protestant and Catholic religious schools that exacerbate religious communal rivalry? Is it a coincidenece that all of the priviliges or lack of them that led to the Civil Rights movement were a function of what religion you belonged to? In a previous post you said that the issue was one of territory because the Protestants main concern was “the Border”. But that simply begs the question what is it about the Border that is the issue for them. The issue is of course their fear of being dominated within the confines of what Sean describes in his review of Loach’s film as a “priest-ridden backwater”. Whenever the concerns of Protestants about being dominated within this priest-ridden backwater have been discussed by the AWL or certainly of its predecessors that I am aware of I can think of none of them that are not in fact based on religion. The only possible other one would be being forced to speak Gaelic rather than English, but come on the majority of Catholics in the orth would probably object to that too. Can you name me any other single concern that the Protestants would have about being in a United Ireland where there rights might be infringed other than those based on religion?

Yes the Protestants 300 years ago might have come from Scotland, but for God’s sake (no pun intended) that was 300 years ago. The division in Northern Ireland is quite clearly a religious divide not one of two distinct nationalities. The people of Northern Ireland share a common nationality and heritage. They are Irish. The divide is based upon one section of the community having had privileges over the other which originally stemmed from their position as settlers, but which for well over a hundred years has been based on nothing more than religion. All of the fault lines are based around religion, and the marching season is clear evidence of that. The Protestants celebrate what? The triumph of a Protestant King over a Catholic challenger. And why did the British Parliament put that Protestant King on the throne, precisely because he was a Protestant and battle lines in Britain itself were still drawn around the religious divide of the Civil War. Why did the Catholics in Ireland oppose that Protestant King? Was it because they had some class interest in doing so? No. Did they have some national/territorial interrest in doing so? No. They opposed the King and supported the challenger for no other reason that they were Catholics.

The Protestants are not a national minority. They are a minority religious community. That is why they do not have the right to self-determination, but do have the right to have their minority interests protected.

I don’t think that what you say about Israel/Palestine is true either. Elsewhere you have said that you think that there is a problem with Israel’s Immigration Policy being based on religion. It is a fact that under the Israeli constitution Jews have the right to move to Israel irrespective of their nationality i.e. you could be a US citizen, a Jew from the USSR, or from Ethiopia, your nationality is not significant, but your religoin is. But that’s another discussion.

“Outside Baghdad – where such an arrangement would cauterise the city into religious-sectarian enclaves”

Do you mean like the religious sectarian enclaves in say Belfast or Derry?

“you might argue, there is a territorial element to the Sunni-Shia divide, ie the Sunnis are mainly in the middle part of the country a constitute a distinct quasi-national group. But

1. Any kind of local government – and of course I’m in favour of local government – will give the Sunnis de facto control in those provinces where they’re a majority. It’s hard to think of anything they might to do with that control *as Sunnis* which would not be objectionable, though. (You might say the same for national minorities; but – the Protestants being rather exceptional in this regard – usually there is a language issue, for example.)

2. ‘The Sunnis’ (and it’s an unfortunate shorthand that we speak of them as if they have one collective opinion on everything) don’t tend to want merely local autonomy, because the areas where they’re a majority don’t have any oil. On the other hand those among the Shia who want to give the Sunni areas autonomy – by default, anyway, by claiming federal rights for the Shia south – want to do so precisely because it would leave the Sunnis without any oil wealth. What ‘the Sunnis’ want is control over the national state, which can only be achieved by depriving the Shia of their inevitable majority.

But I can’t see where any of this is different from Northern Ireland or a United Ireland. You could just as easily say that Local Government in a United Ireland would give protestants control where they are the majority, and we know that in those areas where that was true they did do things in terms of employment and housing etc. that was objectionable to Catholics i.e. they basically denied it to them. That is the whole point about protecting minorrity rights. But the Protestants don’t want merely autonomy either do they? The whole point about their concern about the border is that a) without it they fear being dominated by Catholicism, and b) the in built majority the border provides has been the basis of their historic privileges as the majority community. The Protestants want to dominate just as much as the Sunnis. They want control over the Northern Ireland “state” because that is the basis of their power and privilege. It is why they have and continue to object to power sharing with the minority.

“But there’s something simply different – isn’t there? – about religious and national identity. This is one of those questions which can leave you spinning around in a logical circle – for everything you can put a finger on which expresses this difference, you can think of something ‘on the other side’ which seems to say it’s the same. But even leaving aside the anti-democratic impulses to Sunni particularism, and even if you assume their fear of Shia ‘revenge’ once the Shia ‘have power’ is justified, there is something simply more backward, more reactionary, about religious communal identity than national identity. A democratic political culture can’t accommodate it, in a way that it can, in fact, notions of national identity, and national minorities.”

I think that depends on whether the religion is the dominating aspect of each community’s culture which sets them apart from the other community, and whether the different communities occupy some fairly well defined territory as do by and large the Protestants in Northern Ireland (though that is becoming less so as the catholic population increases more rapidly), and as do the Sunnis in Iraq, or (as I’ll come to later) Muslims in Pakistan and Hindus in India.

“Imagine if, instead of Scottish and Welsh parliaments, we had Christian and Muslim parliaments... (or Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian...). Devolution to Scotland and Wales (whatever debates we might have about it more specifically) is perfectly consistent with a democratic culture. ‘Devolution’ to religiously-defined groups would not be.”

I disagree. The people of Scotland and Wales mostly speak English. In terms of common heritage for the last 300 years the people of Scotalnd and Wales are indistinguishable from the peoples of England. But supposing the people in Scotland were overwhelmingly Catholic, and the people in Wales overwhelmingly Druidic. Now as you say setting aside the point that as socialists we would argue against any division of the peoples of Britain as being reactionary wouldn’t there be a case as for the protestants in Northern Ireland to say that if the people of Scotalnd found that there religion made it intolerable to live in a Britain where laws and culture were based on a majority Protestant religion that they should have the right to separate if that was what they chose. Wouldn’t the very fact of their different religion within the confines of a given geographic area held with conviction be precisely the cultural difference that separated them off as a separate people. Wouldn’t the same apply to Wales? After all religion plays a very significant role in every culture, and at the end of the day it is that identification of a separate culture which is the basis of a people’s sense of belonging to one group rather than another.

“In any case, I think the Sunni-Shia division in Iraq is more complicated than it seems at first sight. There are historical roots to it – the Ottoman empire was Sunni, and then the Sunnis were favoured by the British colonial state. But the division hasn’t always carried the weight it has now. Conversions have been common. Revolts against Britain united Sunni and Shia. I don’t think there was any particularly Sunni/Shia dynamic to the 1958 revolution (there were ethnic dimensions, but that’s different). Even though the Ba’th built its base among Sunnis, it did not do so exclusively; the Shia did not support Iran in the Gulf war; there was a dynamic which was simply to do with the role of the Shia clergy – the earlier Sadrs, for example – in opposing Saddam. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, writing in 1987, concluded “... the fundamental division... was not ‘religious’ or ‘sectarian, but socio-economic, between the haves, and the have nots...” (Iraq Since 1958, p190). Even if this was partly wishful thinking, I think it means that the depth of sectarian feeling and conflict now is a new phenomenon.

Presumably 1991 was a major turning point – as the south rose in revolt, but the Sunni central area did not, and then the revolt was brutally crushed as Saddam’s state was allowed by the US to reassert itself.”

Very similar in fact to the history of Ireland. The fact that the first Republicans were Protestants, the history of the United Irishmen etc.

“In other words, the Sunni-Shia conflict is not simply a permanent fixture of Iraqi life. Sunni privilege is largely a matter of governmental favouritism: it’s not a structural feature of the political entity (like the border in Ireland). It would be wrong to do anything, or propose anything, which helped to crystallise and make permanent these forms of identity. We should be in favour of a secular state.”

But Protestant privilege was likewise the result of governmental favouritism in large part. Yes, Protestant owned firms like Harland and Wollf favoured Protestants, but they did employ Catholics, and it was not as though Catholics were banned from owning firms themselves.

“There are situations where thinking you are dealing with national groups and arguments for autonomy and self-determination are the democratic solutions would lead you to catastrophe. Think of the partition of India - which was justified on the grounds that the Muslims were a nation. They were not. The consequence was fantastically bloody.”

I don’t profess to be an expert on the history of the establishment of India and Pakistan so I am loathe to challenge the point you make without undertaking some further study. However, the prima facie evidence would seem to contradict your point. Yes, my knowledge does run to the extent of knowing that there were terrible pgroms of both communities at India’s independence, and widespread ethnic cleansing. However, despite the continual stand-off between India and Pakistan across the border isn’t the fact that the actual separation into two separate countries one in which both have managed to live in relative peace? Doesn’t that compare rather well to the continual bloodshed and pogroms that occur in Kashmir where both religious communities remain confined within the same political entity? Or even against the repeated cases of pogroms against Muslims particularly in India?

“South Africa, too: recognising the legitimacy of apartheid's artificial divisions was not progressive; the whole progressive movement saw the democratic programme as one person, one vote in a unitary state. You could protect white workers from racism without giving them territorial rights (assuming in any case that that was possible, which it wasn't: the abolition of apartheid meant the destruction of white territorial enclaves. That's what pass laws were about).”
Clive this is incredibly formalistic. It reminds me of the debates I have had with Libertarians in the US. They too think that people’s rights can be protected by a piece of paper i.e. some Constitutional arrangement. The most democratic Constitution in the world – on paper – was that of the Soviet Union. The fact is that had the black majority in South Africa decided to take revenge on the Whites, to impose on them the kind of restrictions and oppression they themselves had suffered, no Constitution in the world could have prevented them from doing so. Under those conditions it may well have been necessary to have argued for whites to have had a defensible territory, just as at one point Trotskyists argued that their might be a case for Blacks in the US to have their own territory. In the event neither was necessary, and I agree because it has not been necessary it would have been reactionary to have argued for an unneccessary separation, but that is not the same as arguing that under different circumstances it would not have been justified. There could have been no principled reason to oppose it.

“Extending your analogy between fascist regimes, comparing Turkey to Portugal, is only helpful if it is a meaningful analogy in the first place. It isn't. Turkey today is not meaningfully comparable to Portugal under Caetano - where there were no elections, the military ruled, etc. Turkey *when it was a dictatorship* is more comparable; Turkey now, despite its Islamist government, is basically a bourgeois democracy (very limited, but less limited than it used to be).”

But I wasn’t comparing Turkey to Portugal. I was merrely making the point that just as you argue that there are nuances between the islamists in Iraq compared to those in Iran, or to Turkey, there are also differences between the fascism in Spain with that in Portugal, or that in Germany or that in Italy. They were all different, but all fascist. In actual fact your example of Turkey goes against your argument. Turkey is not an example of an Islamic state, such as Iran or even Pakistan. Turkey for a hundred years has been a secular state. The forces of secularism remain dominant within the state apparatus. That is the difference with Iran or Pakistan or Iraq. In those countries the secular state was destroyed, and in its place an Islamic state has been erected or in the case of Iraq is being erected as the Islamic militias take over the armed forces and police. You of all people should realise that there is a difference between conrol of the state and merely government office.

“Islamism is comparable to fascism in certain respects but not all. Iraq is not Turkey, either; it is not a bourgeois democracy. But it isn't fascism, or an analogue-with-fascism, either. Not yet.”

Tactics and strategy should always be based on what is going to happen not what has already happened and you are too late to do anything about. As Napoleon once said a wise General always underestimates his own strength and overestimates the strength of his opponent. Recognising that the Islamists really were fascists after all when they have erected an Islamic state and shot or incarcerated all the workers leaders and even further atomised society will be little comfort to the Iraqi working class. That was the lesson the Left should have learned from Iran, but it seems doomed to repeat it.

“Of course it's a tactical question whether to *stand* in elections. And of course we should not be bound by democratic procedure if that is suicidal. I think Lenin's point against Kautsky is this, isn't it? To take an example you've used, it would have been suicidal for the German workers' movement to think that because Hitler won the election that was that. You could multiply such examples - where there are democratic realities, like survival in the face of fascism, which take precedence over the institutional formalities. This is true of almost any democratic form, in principle (for instance, self-determination, if for instance it's a matter of life and death for a workers' state - and so on and so on.) But there was never any question of denouncing elections as such because Nazis would win them. I don't think that train of thought ever occurred to anyone.”

No, because the workers movement in Germany was strong. There was good chance the workers parties (in which I would include the Stalinists though you obviously wouldn’t because of your State Capitalist or Bureaucratic Collectivist analysis of Stalinism) would gain a majority between them. Moreover, the election gave them a good opportunity to denounce both the Nazis and bourgeois democracy. Both had their own well organised and well armed Defence Squads with which to confront the Nazis during electioneering. But the point of their participation if they followed Lenin’s advice in Left-Wing Communism was precisely that. Not to enter the election for the purpose of winning seats but as a means of propaganda to win the workers away from bourgeois Parliamentarism. Read lenin that is what he says. He says, we do not enter elections for the purpose of winning seats, but purely as a means of winning the workers away from reactionary parties, and undermining bougeois democracy. In actual fact I think he is wrong on that last point, because he underestimates the potential for using Parliaments to heighten contradictions and to bring about a confrontation with the state. Had for example Allende have been building up the forces of the workers defence outside Parliament having control of the Government would not have been at all an inconsiderable advantage.

But that is not at all the situation in Iraq. It is not a case of the potential for workers parties or even bourgeois democratic parties having a chance of winning, with only the Islamists having the possibility of winning. The Islamists were guaranteed to have an overwhelming majority. Nor is it the case that having won a majority they then have to also secure control of the State apparatus which in Germany remained tied to the interests of the capitalist class until the Nazis eventually established full control, it is a situation in which the Islamists have inherited a situation where the state apparatus had already been completely smashed by the forces of the Occupation, where there increasing establishment of “Taliban mini-states” through the use of their militias is being replicated through control of the state apparratus which those same militias are taking over. In other words this is not a situation of normal “peaceful” politics which even in the 1930’s still largely applied in Germany where workers can carry out a dual strategy of building up their extra-parliamentary strength whilst continuing to conduct parliamentary propaaganda, it is precisely the conditions of Civil War that Lenin described in 1905 where the workers are under the cosh, where Parliamentarism is a distraction, and where the main task is to build the workers defence.

“But as a general rule, the holding of elections - and short of socialist democracy, a bourgeois democratic system - should be something we support. Emphatically. And we are aiming - aren't we! - to win majorities. And in dictatorial or authoritarian regimes which deny or fix elections, the call to have proper elections - whether or not 'we' have people we can stand - is a good, powerful, progressive, energising one. Socialists are never going to win much influence if they are seen as the people who oppose elections. And I think, in general, they wouldn't deserve to win it in that case, either.”

But that is a caricature of the argument I have put. I have not opposed taking part in elections on principle far from it. I have merrely argued there are times such now in Iraq where parliamentary activity is a diversion. I agree that short of socialist democracy socialists should support bourgeois democracy – whereas lenin doesn’t he argues that the aim is NOT to win seats let alone majorities but to conduct propaganda AGAINST bourgeois democracy, to undermine it from within – but I don’t consider that what exists in Iraq bourgeois democracy. If what was being proposed was the establishment of a democratic secular constitution, and the ability of workers parties to organise, propagandise, and stand their candidates without fear of them being simply mowed down by the Islamists whilst the Occupation watched on then yes I’d be in favour of workers parties standing in order to make the kind of propaganda I have outlined above. It isn’t.

“The reasons the 'resistance' opposed elections certainly are relevant - in making an assessment of the resistance, obviously, and more generally of the mood among Sunnis. That your starting point is that Sunnis have good reason to fear majority rule and this is perfectly reasonable is blinding you to the actual social truth of the situation.”

No. The Sunnis clearly do have reason to fear the position they will be in under a Shia dominated Parliament let alone a Shia state, just as the Protestants do have some reason to fear being in a Catholic Irish state – though I would suggest under the circumstances far less than do the Sunnis. I doubt the Southern Catholics would unleash violent pogroms against the Protestants. The fact of that leads me to the conclusion that a very weak working class could win some temporary repreive precisely by addressing those concerns, and hose of the Kurds for autonomy by including in its programme the proetection of those minority rights through the establishment and Constitutional enshrinement of a secular state, and in so doing would only be following the example of Lenin in 1917 in shoring up the weakness of the working class by making an alliance with Russia’s nationali minorities.

“In Algeria in 1991/92, whether or not you supported what the dictatorship had done would be the basic argument. You could say 'I refuse to give our enemies advice', but wouldn't that be just dodging the issue? In Egypt, where there is a labour movement and small socialist groups, they simply can't ignore, I would have thought, the question of whether they think there should be proper elections, whether all parties should have a right to stand in them, and so on.”

Okay specifically. In Algeria. My argument would be as follows. Compared to the Dictatorship a bourgeois democracy would be prefereable. Under a bourgeois democracy we the workers can better expose the class nature of the state, the extent to which it merely masks the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. If we the workers become strong enough we may become a powerful force in such a Parliament, but the moment we do, the moment we use that democracy to challenge the power of Capital at that moment the Capitalists will seek to sweep away that Parliament. That is why for us at the moment the real issue is not elections or not elections but the self-organisation of the workingc lass and pursuit of our own class interests, the pursuit of which we will continue whether there is a Parliament or not. In so far as the Dictatorship attacks the forces of the Islamists, who would establish a clerical-fascist regime in which not only bourgeois democratic rights would be removed, but under which our ability to organise and fight would be even more curtailed than under the Dictatorship, we are glad, but we palce no faith in the Dictatorship to do that effectively, and they will do so in their interest not in ours. We say a plague on both your houses, and look forward to the day when the workers are strong enough to sweep away both the Tweedle Dee of the Dictatorship and the Tweedle Dum of Islamism. If we are only strong enough at first to establish a bourgeois democracy, then so be it provided that such a democracy does not just provide a launch-pad for an alternative type of reaction, does not provide the cover for the installation of an anti-democratic fascist regime, a regime that merely uses the cover of “Democracy”, a democracy that is not our democracy but the democracy of the bosses used to dupe and deceive us. But our goal is not this bosses democracy, not the acceptance of the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie and our continued oppression merely softened by the velvet glove of “democracy”. Our goal is the ending of that bourgeois Dictatorship with or without its democracy, and its replacement with a proletarian Dictatorship, and the establishment of the only true democracy – a workers democracy.

In Egypt from the limited assessment of forces that I can make I would say that yes the workers movement should support the call for the establishment of a democratic secular Constitution, and for the convening of a Constituent Assembly on that basis. But in large part having done so the position of the workers party should be the same as that I have outlined above in relation to Algeria though nuanced. In other words the elections are an opportunity for socialists to conduct propaganda against both islamism and bouregois democracy. They are the potential within a heightened political environment to draw the workers and peasants away from the Islamists. They can do so in a way that they cannot in say Iraq because of the ability of workers to defend themselves and to conduct such Parliamentary activity without the restrictions they would have doing so in Iraq.


I know, I know I said I'd shut up

Thanks, Arthur, for this detailed response. I don't have time - I really, really have to do other stuff! - to do it justice. But a few quick points. BTW, it isn't 'frustrating' because I can't handle having my 'established views challenged', but because I think you miss lots of the point. (also I'm sorry I can't get the hang of HTML tags).

Elections

"Lenin was pointing out that to simply use the term “democracy” as though it is something that can exist outside classes is to miseducate the working class. It is to fail to educate the working class in the fact that this democracy merely masks a class dictatorship."

Don't you think this point has a different ring to it in countries living under dictatorships, where there haven't been elections in many years, or ever? I think socialists and the labour movement need to be the absolute champions of democratic freedoms, including elections, being absolutely clear that we're not only in favour of elections if we can win them - in order to hegemonise the masses' desire for democracy, but also because democracy is a 'good' in itself. There are circumstances in which elections - and 'democracy' doesn't only mean elections, don't forget, but an apparatus of institutions and laws - are less important than something else. But we should be *very* cautious, especially given the anti-democratic associations of the word 'socialism' in the countries under discussion - in invoking this principle.

I think, in the case of Iraq, you build your argument on a partial truth: Islamists have the majority (but there are non-Islamist parties at the heart of government and the emerging state, too) and terrible things are being done by those Islamists. But that is not the whole picture. For instance, for sure, many people in the unions, and at least one of the union federations, overtly supported the elections and the 'political process'. From their point of view, the people who called for a boycott and opposed the elections are the same people most murderously opposed to *them*, the Sunni so-called resistance.

I don't think it's the case that the millions of people who voted - in several elections, now - only did what their religious (or tribal) leaders told them to do. If they did, things are very bad indeed, and there is very little hope of a democratic culture taking hold - think what that would tell you, not just about the strength of Islamists (in so far as that is the same thing as the strength of religious leaders, and it isn't) but the general political culture of Iraqi society.

So yes, I absolutely think that the support for the elections - in a place which has been crying out for democracy for a long time - gives a powerful dynamic to them, a context which it is seriously wrong to ignore. I think also, incidentally, there is a lot more going on under the surface of news reports: there are the militias and the growing civil war, but there are also many struggles to build local democratic organisations, and so on.

Ireland

We disagree very strongly about Ireland. It seems to me that the fundamental division is between national groups - and not just because of 300 year old history. The conflict is about *the border* - to which nation they should belong. (Preferential employment in the North is only the issue it is/was surely, in the context of a border giving the protestants an artificial majority. The border is the underlying question. You could argue for equal opportunities, but if you weren't addressing the underlying issue you were missing the point).

In almost all - possibly it is all - national conflicts there is a religious dimension; often a particular sect dominates in each nation. But I don't think it follows either that all religious conflicts are ipso facto national conflicts, or that the same principles apply to religious conflicts as national ones.

To the concerns of a religious minority about persecution, discrimination, etc, it seems to me our approach is to advocate religious freedom, oppose sectarian laws, and so on. Where we are proposing territorial autonomy it is because those individual rights to worship, etc (or not have , say, catholic laws imposed on you) don't actually get to the heart of the matter, because the heart of the matter is a national conflict.

For instance, to propose reigious freedom as an answer to the Israel/Palestine conflict is to ignore the fact that it is not a religious conflict - although for sure the two groups coexist with a religious division - but a national one.

If the protestants are only a religious minority, I think it would be a serious and reactionary mistake to propose territorial autonomy. (We don't, for instance, apply the argument to protestants living in the republic).

I suppose the relevant texts - if we're going to refer to Lenin in this discussion - is Lenin's writing on the Bund, or debates with the Austro-Marxists (which is actually more or less the same thing).

(Another for instance: there's a huge Christian minority in Egypt. They should have the right to worship, etc; we are opposed to 'Islamic law' for one thing because it's sectarian to this minority. There have been periods of considerable, violent, sectarian tension. But I don't think anyone *has* suggested some territorial solution for it, and I don't think we should, even if you could work out what the territory should be. The Christians were favoured, a bit anyway, by British colonialism, like the Sunnis).

South Africa, India, etc

Sure, if things had developed to that point, you might propose self-rule for white South Africans. But they hadn't and didn't. My point is that in the actual situation in South Africa - as it was, not as it might have been - to propose territorial autonomy for whites was incompatible with a democratic programme. The whites were a distinct group, but not a national one (the term 'colour caste' has its problems, but it's not bad).

India and Pakistan have developed as separate states, yes. But at the time of partition - this was my point - I don't think it was a democratic approach to advocate or support the partition of India, because partition (and the forces fighting for it) was producing the most awful sectarian bloodletting. In practice, probably, the sectarian violence was so overwhelming that there wasn't much anti-sectarians could do. But to go along with the fiction of Muslim nationhood (however things have turned out - and it's pretty questionable that Pakistan, even now, is a nation) was to contribute to the sectarianism, not oppose it.

It is not always progressive to accept sectarian divisions and argue for 'autonomy' or whatever. Sometimes it is, it depends. Take large amounts of Africa: I'm not sure at all that it would be right in Nigeria, say, to just go along with tribal divisions and call for a federation on the basis of them... Or if that is the right answer, its rightness depends on more than just the fact those divisions exist. There are concrete circumstances.

Concretely, I don't think it's progressive in Iraq. You seem to be saying, Arthur, that it is perfectly reasonable for Sunnis to not want majority rule because this will mean a Shia state. I don't think those Sunnis who object to elections do so just because they don't want to see a government of Shia Islamists, though. They'd object to it anyway. Do you think there's anything wrong at all with their hostility to majority rule?


Left-Wing Communism in Iraq

Clive I'd just written this and was about to post it when I saw your reply, so I've tagged it on here before I've actually read your reply above. I'll do that in a mo.

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Left Wing Communism and Iraq

Clive above said that the points made by Lenin in left Wing Communism were all valid in respect of my argument against participating in the elections for the Parliament in Iraq. Is that true? What does Lenin actually say?

Lenin’s pamphlet was written against various Left Communists in Western Europe and the US. The specific comments are in the Section entitled “Should We participate in Bourgeois Parliaments” though I will show that Lenin makes other comments of relevance in other sections of the pamphlet. The Lefts had concluded that participation in bourgeois parliaments in the Western Democracies and the US were wrong in principle because Parliamentarism was obsolete, it had been surpassed historically by Soviet democracy. The first point I would make here is that Lenin’s comments are straight away not relevant to what I have said because I have not argued that participation in bourgeois Parliaments in wrong in principle as the lefts did. I merely said that because of the particular circumstances here it was tactically better not to. Lenin himself speaks about situations where such boycotts are legitimate, and throughout the pamphlet emphasises that Communists need to learn to be tactically very flexible.

What then of the substantive issue here about Parliamentarism being obsolete.

Lenin says,

“Parliamentarism has become ‘historically obsolete’. That is rue as regards propaganda.” (p49)

He agrees that the job of Marxists is to win workers over to soviet democracy. So what then was Lenin’s argument if he agreed it was historically obsolete? It was quite simply that although it was historically obsolete it was not politically obsolete in the countries of Western Europe and the US where bourgeois Parliamentarism was well established, and where its principles were engrained in the consciousness of the working class, if not in its advanced sections at least in the great mass. Consequently, the job of Marxists was to win workers away from that belief in Parliamentarism and convince them of he superiority of Soviet democracy.

The first point to ask here then is – was bourgeois Parliamentarism engrained in the consciousness of Iraqi workers? The answer is clearly no. There had been no democracy of any kind in Iraq during living memory for its workers, so they could hardly have been committed to it could they? Consequently, there was no embedded Parliamentarism to overcome for Communists in Iraq. It seems rather perverse then to argue that it is necessary to miseducate workers in Iraq that bourgeois Parliamentarism is a good thing in itself – which is what Janine suggests when she says that she can think of no situation in which having no elections is better than having elections, irrespective of the class nature of the body to which the elections are for, irrespective of whether the result might establish legitimate cover for fascism or counter-revolution - when such a belief is not already dominant within the working class, only then to have to convince them that bourgeois democracy is actually a bad thing!!!

Now of course Clive might argue, “Ah yes but the workers were suffering illusions in bourgeois democracy that was why they voted in such large numbers etc.” Maybe. But I have argued before that all the evidence is from reports that the majority of people had absolutely no idea what voting or democracy was about. Secondly, I don’t know what the figures are, but I wonder how many of the votes were votes of workers in the first place, and how many were the votes of peasants and petit-bourgeois of various kinds.

But let me accept that argument, and accept that instead of arguing straight away for the establishment of workers democracy within the workers districts and within the factories and thereby by-passing the need to disavow the workers of illusions in bourgeois democracy the workers had overnight become convinced of bourgeois democratic values. What then does Lenin have to say? What does he say is the purpose of Communists taking part in such elections? It is precisely that Communists do so in order to disavow the workers of those illusions!!!!

“If the Hendersons and the Snowdens accept a bloc on these terms, we shall be the gainers, because the number of parliamentary seats is of no importance to us; we are not out for seats. We shall yield on this point (whilst the Hendersons and especially their new friends—or new masters —the Liberals who have joined the Independent Labour Party are most eager to get seats). We shall be the gainers, because we shall carry our agitation among the masses at a time when Lloyd George himself has "incensed" them, and we shall not only be helping the Labour Party to establish its government sooner, but shall also be helping the masses sooner to understand the communist propaganda that we shall carry on against the Hendersons, without any reticence or omission.” (p88)
In other words the Communists take part not as Parliamentarians, not as people seeking to win seats – let alone a majority – but merely to expose what a fraud Parliamentary democracy is!!!! And he spells it out.
“If the Hendersons and the Snowdens reject a bloc with the Communists, the latter will immediately gain by winning the sympathy of the masses and discrediting the Hendersons and Snowdens, if, as a result, we do lose a few parliamentary seats, it is a matter of no significance to us……

We would take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets agitating for communism,…..

And I shall be able to explain in a popular manner, not only why the Soviets are better than a parliament and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the dictatorship of Churchill (disguised with the signboard of bourgeois "democracy"), but also that, with my vote, I want to support Henderson in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man—that the impending establishment of a government of the Hendersons will prove that I am right, will bring the masses over to my side, and will hasten the political death of the Hendersons and the Snowdens just as was the case with their kindred spirits in Russia and Germany.” (p90/1)

So Lenin’s policy was certainly not one of promoting bourgeois democracy as a good thing in itself of suggesting that elections in and of themselves are a good thing, and better than no elections. He was arguing that in those cases where the working class were imbued with illusions in bourgeois Parliamentarism, and in conditions of relative social peace, the Communists should take the opportunity to participate in elections as a tactic in order to convince the mass of the working class of the inadequacy, of the fraud of bourgeois democracy, and in order to win them over to Soviet democracy. And to make it yet more clear that he is talking about using elections for such propagandist rather than Parliamentary purposes he makes it even more clear.

“In Great Britain the Communists should constantly, unremittingly and unswervingly utilise parliamentary elections and all the vicissitudes of the Irish, colonial and world-imperialist policy of the British Government, and all other fields, spheres and aspects of public life, and work in all of them in a new way, in a communist way, in the spirit of the Third, not the Second, International. I have neither the time nor the space here to describe the "Russian" "Bolshevik" methods of participation in parliamentary elections and in the parliamentary struggle; I can, however, assure foreign Communists that they were quite unlike the usual West-European parliamentary campaigns…..

In Western Europe and in America, the Communist must learn to create a new, uncustomary, non-opportunist, and non-careerist parliamentarianism; the Communist parties must issue their slogans; true proletarians, with the help of the unorganised and downtrodden poor, should distribute leaflets, canvass workers’ houses and cottages of the rural proletarians and peasants in the remote villages (fortunately there are many times fewer remote villages in Europe than in Russia, and in Britain the number is very small); they should go into the public houses, penetrate into unions, societies and chance gatherings of the common people, and speak to the people, not in learned (or very parliamentary) language, they should not at all strive to "get seats" in parliament, but should everywhere try to get people to think, and draw the masses into the struggle, to take the bourgeoisie at its word and utilise the machinery it has set up, the elections it has appointed, and the appeals it has made to the people; they should try to explain to the people what Bolshevism is, in a way that was never possible (under bourgeois rule) outside of election times (exclusive, of course, of times of big strikes, when in Russia a similar apparatus for widespread popular agitation worked even more intensively).” (p 103-5)

In short Lenin’s pamphlet is aimed against Lefts that rejected electoral activity on principle in countries where the working class continued to harbour bourgeois democratic illusions. It argues that bourgeois democracy is indeed historically obsolete and the Communists job is to fight for Soviet democracy in its stead. In those places where bourgeois Parliamentarism is ingrained it is, however, necessary to participate in elections specifically for the purpose of conducting propaganda against bourgeois democracy and to separate the workers from those illusions. It is moreover, talking about conditions of social peace. None of that is relevant as an argument against advocating workers democracy as opposed to bourgeois democracy in Iraq, on the contrary it is the very opposite. For in Iraq you have a country where those bourgeois democratic illusions were not ingrained in the working class, and where therefore it was possible straight away to argue the case for workers democracy as being superior. It most certainly is not a condition of social peace. And finally the sole purpose of electioneering for Lenin was being able to propagandise to argue for Communism and against bourgeois democracy. He sets out above how that was to be done, and in the conditions of Iraq at present all of that work can be done all the time in the factories and in the workers districts whether there is an election or not. Indeed, doing that work outside of standing candidates in an election is safer for the workers parties, and also has the advantage of not sowing illusions in Parliamentarism where they are not already entrenched.

Arthur Bough


On Democracy and Sectarianism

Clive, before I get into this I was intending to ask you if you had written any other films etc., and whether you just write or do you have any other input, such as directing etc. I’m just interested because I started writing a few years ago – though I haven’t really written anything since I started with Depression – and my youngest son has just started work with a local film company after finishing University. He’s hoping to become a Director of Photography.

Right now this stuff.

“Don't you think this point has a different ring to it in countries living under dictatorships, where there haven't been elections in many years, or ever? I think socialists and the labour movement need to be the absolute champions of democratic freedoms, including elections, being absolutely clear that we're not only in favour of elections if we can win them - in order to hegemonise the masses' desire for democracy, but also because democracy is a 'good' in itself.”

I think this is dealt with in the quotes from Left-Wing Communism to an extent. Lenin it seems to me is saying quiet clearly that Parliamentary i.e. bourgeois democracy has had its day. The job of Marxists is to point that out and win workers to workers democracy i.e. to the Soviet form. In established bourgeois democracies that means taking part in elections in order to propagandise against bourgeois democracy, to denude workers of their illusions in it. In situations where it is not established and where such illusions do not exist then Marxists can skip over that and argue straight away for democracy yes, but for workers democracy. If you look at what Lenin’s position is on the National Question for instance I think you can see that logic clearly. Lenin opposes the Stalinist stages theory that says that workers have to pass through the bourgeois stage, and as a result acquire those illusions in bourgeois democracy that Lenin is so keen to rid them of. He argues for instance that the Communists participation in the national struggle will be on precisely that basis i.e. organising the workers on the basis of workers democracy not just for an overthrow of colonial domination, but also for the establishment of socialism or at least for a situation in which workers power rests upon their own organisations in opposition to any bourgeois democracy that might be established, that the only basis of the communists supporting other forces in such a struggle is on the basis of an acceptance that they will organise in such a way, and that they will organise the workers in militia etc. for such a struggle for the interests of the workers.
Now let me reiterate I long since ceased needing to defend my idas with reference to Lenin. I gave the quotes above merrely to demonstrate that your statement that his position in LWC undermines my argument is false. I agree, and disagree with Lenin on this. Firstly, I agree with lenin that the task of marxists is to counterpose workers democracy to bourgeois democracy at all times. There seems to have grown up the ida that Soviets or Workers Councils are only a relevant form of organisation during periods of revolutionary activity. I think this is nonsense, and I don’t think its supportable by references to Lenin, certainly. A Trades Council is a form of Workers Council. A Tenants and residents Association is a form of Workers Council and so on. They may not be revolutionary organs during normal times, but Trades Councils certainly have been quickly transformed into such at different times. I agree that we should build up these organisations even within capitalism as an alternative workers democracy counterposed to bourgeois democracy. The more such organisations develop and have grip the more they win workers away from bourgeois democracy. So I would argue on a TRA that tenants and residents demand control over their estate, they demand to manage it, run it, police it etc. They demand financial and other support from the Local Council to do so.

I disagree with Lenin in respect of his dismissal of Parliamentarism as a useful tool in the hands of workers in those situations where a bourgeois democracy exists. As I said previously had Allende been building up the workers democracy and workers organisation, including workers militia outside Parliament the securing of a Parliamentary majority would not at all have been of no consequence as Lenin suggests. It would have been useful for propoganda, and it would (as indeed it did) force the bourgeoisie to be the ones that initiate violence, giving the workers the advantage of the moral high ground, and legitimacy. Lenin has to adopt this position because of his conception of the revolutionary party. He conflates Government and state in some instances and is carried away with his polemic against Kautsky.

“I think, in the case of Iraq, you build your argument on a partial truth: Islamists have the majority (but there are non-Islamist parties at the heart of government and the emerging state, too) and terrible things are being done by those Islamists. But that is not the whole picture. For instance, for sure, many people in the unions, and at least one of the union federations, overtly supported the elections and the 'political process'. From their point of view, the people who called for a boycott and opposed the elections are the same people most murderously opposed to *them*, the Sunni so-called resistance.”

But that seems very much like allowing the “resistance” to set the agenda for the Labour Movement. “We can’t argue for a boycott because the Resistance is calling for it, and they are our enemy”. Let me restate the point I made before, I am not arguing an abstention from political activity in favour of some kind of syndicalist struggle. Nor am I arguing that the Labour Movement should not take up the call for “democracy”. I am saying that under the present conditions in Iraq all the activity Lenin sets out as that which Communists should undertake during elections leafletting in the workers areas etc. can and should be going on all the time precisely because of the nature of the political situation. And in that situation the activity of the Fredom Congress in establishing Workers Defence Squads, which if they are to function properly have to be linked to and controlled by democratically elected workers Councils in the factories and in the workers districts is the building of the kind of workers democracy that lenin talks of above. And if that activity is taking place if workers are in practice been won in the here and now to actual workers democracy as the means to defend their communities and further their interets, why on earth would you want to sow in their heads illusions in bourgeois democracy? The bourgeois democracy is in effect a sideshow. The militias are establishing “Taliban Mini-States” in those areas whre they can exert control – unfortunately all too many. The workers should follow that example, establish their own democracy, their own organisations to defend their interests in the workers districts, where the Labour Movement has some strength. If it can at least in some areas show that it can be successful in defending its community, that will increase the strength of the Labour Movement, it will be the signal for workers in other areas to follow suit. As Lenin points out in situations like these changes can happen vaery quickly. Today the Labour Movement is very weak, tomorrow with the correct strategy and tactics it could be very strong.

“I don't think it's the case that the millions of people who voted - in several elections, now - only did what their religious (or tribal) leaders told them to do. If they did, things are very bad indeed, and there is very little hope of a democratic culture taking hold - think what that would tell you, not just about the strength of Islamists (in so far as that is the same thing as the strength of religious leaders, and it isn't) but the general political culture of Iraqi society.”

Well that seems to have been the picture I have gained from numerous news reports etc. I would be surprised in rural areas were it not the case in such a traditional society. In fact look at what Lenin says in LWC about workers in Gfermany even been influenced how to vote by priests. The same always used to be true to some extent of the catholic Church in Italy, and even just consider how many workers in Britain take their ideas from the SUN, or the Mail, or the Express. It is one of the reasons we oppose bourgeois democracy. But of course those influences do not operate in so far as workers democracy, or at least to the extent that religious elements might put forward their case in a workers meeting in a factory or in a workers district those views can be challeneged directly by socialists there and then, not just on the basi of argument but on the basis of reference to the workers own direct experience. That is what makes workers democracy superior.

“So yes, I absolutely think that the support for the elections - in a place which has been crying out for democracy for a long time - gives a powerful dynamic to them, a context which it is seriously wrong to ignore. I think also, incidentally, there is a lot more going on under the surface of news reports: there are the militias and the growing civil war, but there are also many struggles to build local democratic organisations, and so on.”

And it’s the latter I would argue which should be the focus for the Labour Movement.

“We disagree very strongly about Ireland. It seems to me that the fundamental division is between national groups - and not just because of 300 year old history. The conflict is about *the border* - to which nation they should belong. (Preferential employment in the North is only the issue it is/was surely, in the context of a border giving the protestants an artificial majority. The border is the underlying question. You could argue for equal opportunities, but if you weren't addressing the underlying issue you were missing the point).”

Clive I can’t think of a kind way to put this, but your argument here just doesn’t make sense. I have asked you exactly what aspects of nationhood separate from religion a United Ireland would infringe for the Protestants. You haven’t answered that question. Your statement above seems to say that the question of nationality arises because the Protestants consider themselves British. There are a number of points here. Maybe the AWL has changed its position on this, but in the past it used to be argued that the Protestants insistence on their Britishness was in fact a cover for their desire to retain the Northern Ireland state which guarantees their dominant position and privileges that go with it. It was argued that although they claim to be “Loyalist” in fact on many occasions they have shown themselves to be anything but Loyal British citizens etc. Secondly, just considering yourself British doesn’t make it so does it. Something more than that is required for a people to actually be a nation. Later you challenge whether Pakistan is actually a nation, I would suggest it has far more claim to that than do the Northern Irish Protestants. But most importantly, and this is where your argument makes no sense, were it true then the proposal for federalism for recognising the minority rights of the Protestants can never resolve that for them can it. If the protestants really do as you suggest that they are British citizens then no amount of minority rights can allow them to be British and yet be required by the state in which they live to be Irish, any more than the extension of such rights by say Spain to people in Gibraltar could alow them to be British i.e. to exercise all the rights and functions of being British and yet be a Spanish citizen, or could enable the Falkland Islanders to do the same and at the same time be citizens of Argentina. If they really are British then they have a right to self-determination, and if that right to self-determination means attachment to the British mainland and state then that would be their right. We might not like it, we might think its reactionary just as we think independence for Scotalnd as an expression of self-determination would be reactionary, but it would still be their democratic right.

Just think of the problems. Suppose Britain and Ireland went to war. Would these British-Irish citizens be free to exercise their national rights and support their nation i.e. Britain in such a war?
“To the concerns of a religious minority about persecution, discrimination, etc, it seems to me our approach is to advocate religious freedom, oppose sectarian laws, and so on. Where we are proposing territorial autonomy it is because those individual rights to worship, etc (or not have , say, catholic laws imposed on you) don't actually get to the heart of the matter, because the heart of the matter is a national conflict.”

Okay just accept for a moment that the divide in Ireland is a religious divide. How would giving Protestants just religious freedom in such a situation address their concerns in respect of Catholicism. If a heavily Catholic dominated state decided to ban abortion for isntance on religious grounds, how would religious freedom help the Protestants. Yes they would be free to pray how they like etc., but they would still be breaking the law if they had an abortion. It seems to me that to have to say to such people in a situation like that, “We have every sympathy but the real answer is to overcome the religious prejudices for everyone is the real answer” is in fact no solution at all. It is in fact to deal with situations like that that the US has its Federal System which gives states considerable leeway.

“If the protestants are only a religious minority, I think it would be a serious and reactionary mistake to propose territorial autonomy. (We don't, for instance, apply the argument to protestants living in the republic).”

I think there is a significant difference. The Protestants in the South are not concentrated in a fairly well defined area as at least for now the protestants in the North are.

“(Another for instance: there's a huge Christian minority in Egypt. They should have the right to worship, etc; we are opposed to 'Islamic law' for one thing because it's sectarian to this minority. There have been periods of considerable, violent, sectarian tension. But I don't think anyone *has* suggested some territorial solution for it, and I don't think we should, even if you could work out what the territory should be. The Christians were favoured, a bit anyway, by British colonialism, like the Sunnis).”

But again I think that what is lacking is the concentration in a fairly well defined area. I am not at all suggesting that we should always propose such a division any more than I was suggesting that whites in South Africa should have been given the right to have their own territory. I am suggesting that in certain circumstances it does offer an alternative to sectarian conflict, or as in the case of say Blacks in the US racial conflict, or as could have been the case whites in South Africa.

“India and Pakistan have developed as separate states, yes. But at the time of partition - this was my point - I don't think it was a democratic approach to advocate or support the partition of India, because partition (and the forces fighting for it) was producing the most awful sectarian bloodletting. In practice, probably, the sectarian violence was so overwhelming that there wasn't much anti-sectarians could do. But to go along with the fiction of Muslim nationhood (however things have turned out - and it's pretty questionable that Pakistan, even now, is a nation) was to contribute to the sectarianism, not oppose it.”

As I say I do not profess to have much knowledge of India. However, I do seem to recall that the sectarian violence was the result of Muslims precisley considering themselves a separate group whose religious and cultural aspirations could only be satisfied by having their own state, and the relucance of India to grant it. I may be wrong about that. But if that is the case, then surely it was not the demand for a separate state which caused the sectarian violence but the refusal to grant that separate state. In other words the sectarian divide already existed before the separation and would and did spill over into violent confrontation. The actual separation (eventually) brought that violence to an end – sort of. By contrast in Kashmir the sectarian violence continues.

“It is not always progressive to accept sectarian divisions and argue for 'autonomy' or whatever. Sometimes it is, it depends. Take large amounts of Africa: I'm not sure at all that it would be right in Nigeria, say, to just go along with tribal divisions and call for a federation on the basis of them... Or if that is the right answer, its rightness depends on more than just the fact those divisions exist. There are concrete circumstances.”

Can we leave Africa ouit of it for now as we’ve already covered Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

“Concretely, I don't think it's progressive in Iraq. You seem to be saying, Arthur, that it is perfectly reasonable for Sunnis to not want majority rule because this will mean a Shia state.”

No what I am saying is the way to get the Sunnis to accept majority rule at the level of the nation state is to guarantee them certain rights within the context of a federal solution, in the same way as states in the US are guaranteed certain rights within the US Constitution. The federal Government determines things like Defence policy, Federal taxes etc relevant to the nation state, the individual states retain control over things not the Constitutional function of the Federal Government.
“I don't think those Sunnis who object to elections do so just because they don't want to see a government of Shia Islamists, though. They'd object to it anyway. Do you think there's anything wrong at all with their hostility to majority rule?”

Yes I do, and I don’t want to give them a veto over it anymore than I want to give the protestants a veto over a United Ireland. The question is how do you achieve that without a very destructive Civil War to force the minority to accede – either in Ireland or Iraq? I think you only have to pose the question to see the answer.

Arthur Bough


Lenin's Writings on the Bund etc.

As its been some time sicne I read Lenin's writings on the Bund etc. I thought I'd better refressh myself before committing myself based on memory. Having re-read those texts I confirmed my memory, and can find nothing that supports your position.

In relation to the Bund, what was Lenin discussing? He was discussing the acceptability of having divisions inside the revolutionary party based on "cultural-nationalism". He was quite rightly opposed to it, and I have adopted the same position in what I have said i.e. that within the workers movement the greatest possible unity should be argued for and maintained in its organisational structure. In fact I have argued also for such unity with other workers such as those in Iran.

Lenin's objection to the term "cultural-nationalism" was also that it suggests a non-class culture or nationalism which unites workers and bourgeois, whereas the task of socialists is to argue for an international culture which is not a summation of these national ultures but something completely different based on the culture of the working class, ints interests, and on the principles of socialism. Again I agree. But none of this has anything to do with the issue under discussion.

Lenin says that Marxists argue for the right of nations to self-determination, whilst continuing to argue for the greatest unity. I agree. In the case of the Kurds I have made that point precisely.

Lenin does not just speak of nations. In most instances he speaks of nations and peoples, which is clerly a wider category. His position is set out for example in the Draft Program for the Fourth Congress of Social democrats of the Latvian Area. He says,

"We demand unconditional equality for all nations in the state and the unconditional protection of the rights of every national minority. We demand broad self-government and autonomy for regions, which must be demarcated, among other terms of reference (note this phrase AB) in respect of nationality too."

"All these demands are obligatory for every consistent democrat, to say nothing of a socialist."

In 1913 Lenin delivered a series of Lectures on the National Question. In his Theses on the National Question, which formed the basis of these lectures he writes.

"Social-Democrats demand the abolition of the old administrative divisions of Russia established by the feudal landowners and civil servants of the autocratic feudal state and their erplacement by divisions based on the requirements of present day economic life and in accordance, as far as possible, with the national composition of the population."

Most specifically, and note the phrase used "social peculiarities" not necessarily "nationality" he goes on.

"All areas of the state that are distinguished by social peculiarities or by national composition of the population, must enjoy wie self-government and autonomy, with institutions organised on the basis of universal, equal and secret voting."

A look through Lenin's writings "On Proletarian Internationalism", throws up this same position time and again. Marxists are for the greatest unity of the working class, but in order to achieve it we have to be the most ardent advocates of defending the rights of oppressed minorities. We defend and maintain the strictest unity of the workingc lass within the workers organisation the workers party, the trade unions, co-operatives etc., and reject the division into "cultural-nationalist" sections within these organisations - which means Lenin would have opposed Black Sections for instance - but we advocate a high degree of "self-government and autonomy" for regions or areas where social peculiarities exist - say a specific area or region with a religious/cultural minority.

We reject the idea of a national language, just as we would reject the idea of a national religion, indeed the rights of religious minorities can only be protected are only compatible with the establishment of a secular state. But likewise we argue for the etsablishment of a national educational curriculum rather than the continuance of cultural division based on religious or other forms of cultural-nationalism in schools.

Realistically, the interests of minorities can only be defended on the basis of such self-government as proposed by Lenin and myself. And only on that basis can the longer term mistrust of such minorities be overcome, and the greater unity of the working class be created which is the prerequisite for the creation of socialism, which is itself the prerequisite for the abolition of all oppression of national and cultural minorities.

Arthur Bough


Austro-Marxists

Lenin's argument with the Austro-Marxists (whose position the Bund borrowed) was about whether or not national minorities should have 'cultural national autonomy' within a multi-national state, or on the contrary should have *territorial* rights, including the right to separation. You're right Lenin was also opposed to dividing up the workers' movement - which the Austro-Marxists, as I understand it, not only proposed but did, on a 'cultural' basis; but that was only part of the argument. He was also concerned, rightly in my view, with the structures of the state itself.

Sometimes, advocating the right to territorial separation or self-rule is the best way to develop unity, especially where you have very long-standing violent hostility between communities and it is meaningless simply to exhort them to be nice to each other.

But surely, for one thing - as for instance with Iraqi Sunni and Shia - where those hostilities are not long standing, and have only recently become violent and hostile, a different approach might be sensible. There is not a history of sectarian violence in Iraq; we should be very cautious about doing or proposing anything which stokes it up and institutionalises it. (One of the criticisms of the occupation is that it has done precisely this - pandered to sectarian identities, boosted Shia sectarians, etc).

I think it's you that hasn't thought all this through. Just briefly to go back over an earlier argument. You say, with regard to Ireland -

"If a heavily Catholic dominated state decided to ban abortion for instance on religious grounds, how would religious freedom help the Protestants. Yes they would be free to pray how they like etc., but they would still be breaking the law if they had an abortion. It seems to me that to have to say to such people in a situation like that, “We have every sympathy but the real answer is to overcome the religious prejudices for everyone is the real answer” is in fact no solution at all."

Your conclusion is that only federalism/autonomy would give the Protestants guarantees against Catholic laws.

But then, regarding the Copts in Egypt, whose situation I raised for comparison, you reject federaralism/autonomy, because

"what is lacking is the concentration in a fairly well defined area"

which you see in Ireland.

But you can't have it both ways. If Protestant autonomy is essential because of the risk of Catholic laws, 'concentration' is neither here nor there. Logically, you're saying the Copts should put up with Islamic laws because they're not concentrated enough...

We are opposed to religious laws, and in favour of secular states. We should fight Catholic laws in Ireland, and Islamic ones in Egypt, and demand religious freedom for religious minorities. Where there are *national* minorities -- so the right to religious freedom doesn't satisfy them, as it would not in Ireland (or as it would not in a single state in Israel/Palestine, for instance) - it makes perfect democratic sense to demand the right to separation/autonomy (as appropriate).

If you can't distinguish a religious from a national group, you get into all sorts of trouble. We should not casually call for any old religious group to have the right to territorial autonomy (or - if they are concentrated enough, logically, a separate state....???)

And sorry, one other point. You can see why Lenin thought, in 1919 or so, that 'parliamentary democracy had had its day'. But nearly a century later - with an immense spread of parliamentary systems, but even of such systems across much of the 'third world' (Latin America, etc), and where the demand for 'democracy' is the central mobilising factor in mass movement after mass movement (from Hungary, Poland - the whole of the Stalinist bloc! including China - the Philippines, South Africa, etc etc etc etc?)

Think Lenin's thoughts on moribundness here are even less helpful than on imperialism.

Clive

Good luck to your son, btw, getting work as a DP. I think the normal route in for that is to work as an assistant... It's not really my area, but if he needs any specific advice, I'll do my best to help.


Clive, Thanks For That

Clive,

First of all thanks for the offer of advice for my son, Simon. He is working as a cameraman with a local film company that has been going for 20 years, and is actually run by one of the senior lecturers at the University. He's already been given a permanent contract, and has now been subcontracted out. He seems to have impressed so far. He ha done some background work on the career path etc., and I have suggested he perhaps do some freelance work of his own. He has made some cracking documentaries both directing and behind the camera. The company has just made a documentary for Stoke Coucil and the NHS about the Retirement Villages run by the Council.

Anyway back to the issues above briefly.

I think Lenin's quotes about establsihing a high degree of self-government for areas, regions with social peculiarities are quite clear. Neither he nor I is suggesting encouraging divisions where none exist, but trying to assuage fears where they do as the basis of reducing mistrust and encouraging unity. No ground is given in that to supporting religious or other cultural traits for eample in rejecting the idea of religious schools. In relation to your point about groups like the Copts there clearly is a problem where different minorities are thinly spread within a population. Advocating self-government for an area clearly cannot work on that basis. Politics is about providing solutions to deal with problems that are within the realm of possibility. Some problems are not within the realm of possibility or the slution we would prefer is not possible, so we have to go down a different route. Where a group is concentrated in an area then self=government can work, where they are not it can't simple as that.

As for democracy, I thought I had made that point clear. I am not opposed to raising democratic demands at all. What I am in favour of doing is raising democratic demands that give primacy to workers democracy not bourgeois democracy. I am in favour of peasants committees, I am in favour of factory committees, I am in favour of neighbourhood committees within workers districts etc. Now of course if in the particular instance there is a strong groundswell of opinion amongst workers for Parliamentary democracy, if in other words workers have found themselves taken in by bourgeois democracy then calling for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly can be justified, provided that the way it is argued for is right. For one thing the basis of calling for it must be on the basis of the most thoroughgoing democracy to a degree that the bourgeoisie in most developing states would not be able to concede - which is Trotsky's point about such democratic demands flowing over immediately into Transitional demands. It would require that all organisations were guaranteed freedom of activity and propaganda etc., which certainly did not exist in Iraq under the condiitons of sectarian violence.

Moreover, as both Trotsky in the Transitional programme makes clear, and as Lenin makes clear the purpose of supporting such a Constituent Assembly would not be because of having any faith in it, not to suggest that it was good in itself, but precisely in order to obtain a platform to argue against bourgeois demcoracy to outline its limitations and fraudulent nature, and instead to propagandise for workers democracy, and socialism.

I think as I have said elesewhere that the position is different where bourgeois demcoracy is established. Socialists should continue to propagandise for the idea of Soviets, should actively build workers democracy in as many different forms as possible in order to establsih an alternative power base and the infrastructure rquired ultimately for the establishment of Soviets, and to give workers the confidence that they can run their own lives with bourgeois democracy. But I think that the fdeveloping class consciousness of the working class must necessarily result in the workers party gaining more seats, and the more it does the more it poses a challenge to capitalism. I think Lenin underestimated the potential for this and the extent it could cause a contradiction between government and state that inevtiably forces the bourgeoisie to resort to violence, but gives the working class the moral high ground, and legitimacy.

Arthur Bough


Further Clarification

Clive,

I have just read your post again, and think some further clarification is required. You talk about "separation", but in fact I have not talked about separation, except in the case of India/Pakistan where it was an established fact and merely in response to you bringoing it up. In iraq the only group for whom I have mentioned the right to separate is in fact the Kurds who we would both accept are indeed a national minority. Even there I have said that they have a "right", but not one I would at the moment advocate they use to separate - though that may change depending on the course of events.

There are of course many other truly "national" minorities in Iraq, but they tend to be spread amongst the population, and it seems to me that advocating separation for them would be truly reactionary, though we would have a duty to defend them against violent attacks to prevent there demand for separation. I have not argued for separation for the Sunni TRiangle - though it might occur anyway as part of a Civil War, especially if Jordan were to become embroiled. In fact with the current situation in Lebanon, there seems to me a growing risk of a Sunni-Shia war, witness the overt support of Saudi Arabia for the putting down of Hezbollah.

What I have argued for in Iraq is not separation, but the high degree of self-government spoken of by Lenin. That it seems to me is the way, as he outlined to undermine talk of cultural-nationalism, because it is the means of maintaining the nation-state, whilst calming sectarian rivalries and allowing socialists to concentrate on building the greatest possible working class unity.

Additionally, in relation to your point about the Copts, let me put it back to you. If as seems inevitable over the next ten years or so the Catholic Community become the majority or close to the majority community simply on the basis of demographics, and as a result the Catholc and Protestant communities become far more intermingled, how would you see your solution for the Protestants working out then. If their were no clearly defined areas in which Protestants as a national minority existed how could they exercise any federal autonomy, you require some defined geographical area for any kind of administrative area to operate. Yet under such conditions the Protestants sense of Britishness would not only have not declined, but might have actually increased. I have watched some of the series "War of the World" by Niall Ferguson, which I have thought was a pretty abominable series by and large, but he is right that nearly all of the racial/ethnic conflicts that have taken place in the last 100 years have in fact been in places where different ethnic/communal groups have been more rather than less integrated, and where some dominant group has then sought to challenge the minority. It seems more than likely that the more Protestants in Northern Ireland see the potential for becoming a minority their fears of that will intensify rather than diminish.

So my point is that it does not matter whether you are talking about a national minority in terms of some minority nationality within the confines of a multi-national state - which I still maintain the Protestants are not - or whether it is a community/region with "social peculiarities" as Lenin describes it, the potential for a high-degree of self-government, federalism or whatever is conditional upon either of these groups being concentrated in a particular and definable area that is capable of sustaining such an adminitrative arrangement. I would also re-iterate my earlier point too. It is possible for say the Sioux nation to exist with Federal and national minority Rights within a UNited States, because they are a nation contained within the overall UNited States. Provided they are willing to give first loyalty to the United States vis a vis other States then their national rights do not conflict with that. It is impossible to have a nation that gives its allegiance to some other state outside the state of which it is a part, and to be granted full national rights ebcause their is a logical contraqdiction between the two. If Protetsants were a antional minority let's call them Ulstermen then giving them national minority rights would be logically consistent. You cannot possibly give them national minority rights as being British, however, for the reasons I have given before, any more than you could have Texas considering itself primarily a member of the US and yet being given minority rights within the EU. The same actually applies to Cyprus. Greek Cypriots will always give their primary loyalty to Greece and Turkish Cypriots to Turkey, Cyprus will always come a poor second. It would in fact be better to formalise the division of the island and incorporate both into Greece and Turkey, especially within the context of the overall context of the EU when Turkey is admitted.

Finally, on Parliamentary democracy. I think the difference between us is this. I retain the analyis that the world is still in a transitional epoch i.e. it is ripe for socialism. The job of Marxists is to work on that basis and to develop those forms appropriate for socialism, not to accommodate to capitalism soimply because it appears to have had a new lease of life - one that is largely the fault of marxists. My approach is similar to that of the Transitional Programme, minus the focus on the Leninist Party, and top down view of socialist construction. So like the TP I would divide things into three spheres.

Firstly, the developed capitalist world. I have proposed elsewhere that we should adopt Marx's view about co-operatives and joint-stock companies being transitional forms on the road to socialism, and the potential for workers to use credit to expand co-operatives to cover the whole economy. I have argued that the existence of large workers pension funds etc. gives the potential for such development. Marx basically took this model from J.F. Bray but his idea is minus Bray's utopianisim, he and I recognise the need for political struggle alongside this. Workers cannot simply buy out capitalism, but they can develop and strengthen their own position within capitalism to make the battle easier. The domination of the working class by bourgeois demcoracy means that Marxists have to work within its confines to win workers away from it, but Marxists can also do that by developing other forms of workers democracy such as factory committees, neighbourhood committees, and through the extension of co-operatives, and using pension funds to buy up majority stakes in strategic companies and putting these funds and companies under democratic control can begin to further undermine bourgeois demcoracy and enhance workers democracy. It will in the end require a political revolution to suppress the inevitable reaction by the bosses, the slaveholders revolt.

Secondly, in the developing economies where no such large reserve of workers funds exist but where no overewhelming support of bourgeois democracy exists, Marxist can focus directly on developing workers democracy in the form of peasant committees, community committees, and factory committees where the goal is to assert the interests of the working class and peasantry, and through workers control secure greater power for the working class. The aim would be to transform the workers control into an inevitable struggle for ownership of those factories, or at the least for the workers in these factories to integrate their activities and develop production in the interets of the workers whilst still in the ownership of the bosses. The gradual integration of these factories into larger conglomerates etc.

Finally, in repect of the remaining Stalinist States such as Cuba I would argue that the demand for Parliamentary demopcracy is a reactionary demand not a progressive one. The workers constitutionally have the right to form Soviets and to act democratically through them. A democratic demand is for their right to actually make these workers committees democratic. The property is supposed to be the workers property, so in order to break down the power of the state and the bureaucracy the workers should demand that where possible the factories be turned into co-operatives under the direct ownership and management of their workers, and where not possible for example in national industries such as railways, power supply etc. ownership should be in the hands of a workers board made up of democratically elected workers representatives. Attempts at centralised planning should be scrapped in favour of market relations, but with the workers of each factory and industry working with open books and voluntarily integrating its activities and plans with those of other factories and industries so that a plan evolves organically and within the confines of what is feasible and controllable without the need for armies of bureuacrats and planners.

This latter applies in the other two scenarios as the basis of developing a socialist economy in contradistinction to the statist planning of Leninism - which Lenin himself had largely forsworn by the time he died.

That I think is the difference. I think socialism is possible now, and the task of Marxists is to think laterally about the forms and structures we can build now as part of transforming the working class, and placing within its consciousness the fundamental ideas of socialism. You seem to have become convinced of the stability of capitalism and the need to adopt bourgeois norms, such that the working class operates within those norms for a longer term perspective.

Arthur Bough


And Against the Government

It is not just the Occupation and militias that the Labour Movement need to oppose. It is the Government too. That Government is not just a puppet of the Occupation more a string puppet than a glove puppet, but it is also the constitutional representation of the political Islamists both Sunni and Shia. It is in particular a constitutional cover for the militias attached to the Shia parties.

The idea that these Shia parties were somehow not really political Islamist at all that they could be seen as in some way bourgeois Parliamentary organisations even if of a nasty variety has already been blown out of the water. The main leader Sistani has called for gays to be murdered, and the followers of his party have been busy putting that into practice, alongside increasing attacks on women etc. The attacks by this government on civil society such as the sequestration of union funds demonstraes clearly the nature of these parties and this government, and its direction of travel.

Marxists have no excuse for not knowing where that direction of travel ends up because we have seen it before in Iran, and there too Marxists for too long gave credence to the claims of Khomeini not to really want an Islamic state.

See also:

Lessons of the Iranian Revolution

Arthur Bough


Sistani etc

Arthur

"The idea that these Shia parties were somehow not really political Islamist at all that they could be seen as in some way bourgeois Parliamentary organisations even if of a nasty variety has already been blown out of the water".

I think you're referring in particular to an exchange we had a while back. I don't disagree with your main point in this post - that the workers' movement needs to oppose the government, which is, predominantly, a reactionary Islamist government linked to Iran. (And it would need to oppose it even if it was liberal).

But I do still think we need some sense of gradation and nuance in assessing the various Islamist forces in Iraq. Sistani, for instance, who doesn't have a party by the way, is a different beast to SCIRI, which is different to the Mahdi Army, which is different to the Dawa Party; and all of them are quite different to the Sunni-sectarian 'resistance'. Sistani and the Dawa Party are on the more 'bourgeois constitutional' end of the spectrum. Muqtada's movement seems to me the closest analogue to fascism.

My point in our earlier discussion was that it is wrong to see the new government as already like Khomeini's. It is more contradictory than that; there are counterveiling tendencies (eg the Kurds, for one thing). The elections were an expression of a mass desire for democracy. That the Islamist militias are very nasty indeed and have a frightening amount of power in the government/state apparatus (such as it is) is not in dispute. Of course SCIRI etc want an Islamic state (I think Sistani is different on this score: he wants Islamic law, because he is after all a Muslim cleric. But he is from an explicitly anti-Khomeini wing of Shi'ism which is opposed to clerical control of the state. On one level that's a subtle distinction, perhaps. But I don't think, if you look at Sistani's role since the occupation began, that he can be seen as simply pushing for an Islamic state. On the contrary: it was he who called the first mass demonstrations for elections when the US didn't want there to be any).

There is not an Islamic, Iran-style state yet, though, and it would be a mistake to declare that battle over.

(As a matter of interest, do you have a link for the thing about Sistani and gay men? To be clear, this is not because I doubt it's true! I'd just like the info.)


The Iraqi regime

Clive, the point I made above, and which I made in the linked post is that what Marxists should be looking at is the direction of travel. The same things you say about Sistani were siad by the Left of Khomeine, taking at face value his words that he also didn't want an Islamic state etc.

I accept that there are differences between these different parties and organisations and of course it is right to analyse those differences, but my main point is that these parties and organisations whatever nuanced differences there are between them are all Islamist, and from the experience of Iran we know where that leads. The very nature of Islamism as a political force is that it represents clerical fascism, and already we see some of that in the actions of the Government in its attacks on Trade Unions.

The fact that Sistani does not have his own Party as such seems really to matter very little. The Catholic Church in Ireland didn't have its own Party either. If you can control the State via the implementation of Sharia Law, and an Islamic Constitution you do not need your own Party per se, just as the bourgeoisie by setting the ideological and legal limits within which the capitalist state operates do not need a single Party of their own, but can allow the semblance of democracy through pluralism. And as I pointed out previously, of course Sistani wanted elections, he knew his supporters would be the dominant force in those elections. The Government may be a puppet of the Occupation for the simple reason of the military might of the Occupation and the fact that it sets the agenda, but that does not mean that those within the Government or those that control it from without such as Sistani do not want to cut the strings being pulled by the Occupation. Democratic credentials involve more than just calling for people to vote. The provos do that too, and Hitler was elected.

In relation to Sistani and the attacks on gay men. I do not have a link to that. However, a few weeks ago Peter Tatchell was on Newsnight discussing this with Sistani's representative. Peter made the point that Sistani's supporters were acting on this call. Yes, after a campaign against that the comments were withdrawn from Sistani's website, but the call had still been made, and as Peter said there had been no outright statement from Sistani retracting these comments and calling on people not to undertake such attacks.

Arthur Bough


Illusions

Arthur, it is quite frustrating that in this discussion - as before - you interpret what I say about Sistani, and other political forces, as having illusions in them, as the left did in Khomeini. I do not. For instance, Hassan Juma'a and the leadership of the oil workers' union appear to have illusions in Sistani; they are wrong to have them, and I agree entirely with comments in Solidarity to this effect. Of course we should not, for instance, support votes etc for those political parties close to Sistani.

I am not suggesting any kind of alliance with Sistani; that he is to be regarded as a friend of the workers' movement or the left, or treated as an anti-imperialist; or anything else analagous to the left's attitude either to Khomeini or anyone else you might consider analagous (the KMT, say; Sinn Fein; whoever).

There is a difference, though, between a clerical leader who calls mass demonstrations in demand of the vote, and groups of murdering Sunni sectarian thugs who are opposed to elections at all. If you can't recognise that difference - for fear of spreading illusions - I think you are in trouble politically. It is a matter of fact that Sistani has a different conception of the relationship between the clergy and the state than Khomeini. Of course that doesn't mean he's our friend.

There is a very real danger of sectarian civil war right now in Iraq. It is absolutely true, as you say, that there are forces within the government who appear to be fomenting such civil war - it would seem that the Mahdi army was responsible for the recent massacre in Jihad... It will be interesting to see what role Sistani plays.


I'm Sorry If I gave That Impression But .

Clive if I have given the impression that I believe you are arguing for support for Sistani then I apologise as that most cerrtainly was not my intention. However, I don't know how I could have given that impression because in my other post linked to above I made the point specifically that I was not accusing people of supporting Sistani - Workers Action did not call for support for Khomeini - but of not warning sufficiently of the danger he represents. The point I was making specifically in that other post was that in the case of Khomeini Workers Action took Khomeini at his word that he didn't want an Islamic State. As the WL article points out that was a big mistake. I am merely pointing out that taking Sistani at his word, concentrating on his support for the ballot whilst minimising opposition to his parallel support for the bullet - a bullet aimed at workers, gays, women and socialists - is to repeat that mistake. When you take him at his word that he has a different attitude to the relationship of the clergy to the state I think that mistake is clear. You may be right, but do you want to take the risk?

I cannot understand your fetish of support for or opposition to elections. If you were a Sunni and massively outnumered by Shia would you think that elections were a very good idea? If you were a Shia clerical leader and thought that given your overwhelmingly numerical superiority you were almost certain to get a majority in Parliament, and to be able to use that majority as a democratic cover for introducing all kinds of reactionary policies, and ultimately for the introduction of Islamic Law wouldn't you think that elections were a very good idea indeed?

In a situation like this for workers to see elections as in any way something they should welcome is to commit suicide. It is worse than had the Bolsheviks said the people have decided in the Constituent Assembly and said let's just give up the power - because at least under those conditions the Bolsheviks and the workers and peasants that supported them would still have had a considerable amount of power in the Soviets to have countered the bourgeois power of the CA. The only condition in which elections would be progressive in Iraq would be on the basis of the dominance of secularism, and if possible the existence of a Workers Party capable of standing candidates with at least some chance of success. IN the absence of that the only hope for workers in Iraq is to rely on their own strength such as it is, and hopefully the oil workers action may add to that, through the building of their own orgaisations in the workplaces and communities, to counterpose their own democracy, and to demand the support of the international labour movement in defence against the political islamists, and the occupation.

Thier chances are slim given the current state of the Labour Movement both in Iraq and internationally, but to give credibility to a reactionary Parliament still less to the credentials of the clerical fascists represented in that Parliament is to tie a noose around the neck of the Iraqi working class.

Arthur Bough


Elections...

I confess, Arthur, to being a bit shocked. I hadn't realised we were so far apart on this. Leave Sistani aside. The idea that the workers' movement shouldn't support elections because reactionary forces will win strikes me as almost unbelievably ultra-left. It was the position taken by the Worker-Communist Party, but as I understand it more on the 'giving legitimacy' argument (which you also touch on).

I would have thought that fundamentally the basic arguments which Lenin summarised in 'Left Wing Communism' apply. There was mass support for elections - so much so that people will risk death threats to vote. The idea that socialists, and the workers' movement they seek to influence, should stand aside, and indeed - you imply - denounce the elections, I think is very dangerous indeed. We can't 'give credibitility to a reactionary parliament'; in so far as it has credibility, it has it - not because of anything we say.

In Iraq, establishing a democratic system is surely an essential step. You might counterpose more radical democratic forms to the actual process which was underway, and of course be very critical of that process. But to simply 'oppose' and leave open the field, uncontested - I think that was a very serious mistake on the part of the WCPI (and one they're rectifying, badly, with the Freedom Congress, if I understand their position).

You will be in a better position to resist the reactionary parties which win the election, surely, if you have contested them in the first place.

I am appalled that you say "If you were a Sunni and massively outnumered by Shia would you think that elections were a very good idea?" Maybe this is a slip of the finger and you don't really mean it. But to reproduce sectarian divisions as a legitimate socialist reason to oppose elections...

This hasn't got anything to do with the Bolsheviks and the Constituent Assembly. I'm prepared to accept - just - that there are times when formal majorities aren't decisive, when for instance the active minority (if it's a very big minority) can hope to pull the passive middle ground behind it, and not call off its action just because it's a minority. And of course there are times when elections can be a diversion, and are intended as such.

In Iraq, not only is the Sunni/Shia division the faultline in growing civil war; the Sunnis' fear of Shia rule is an entirely reactionary fear dependent on them having been a relatively privileged group. Fear of rule by Shia religious parties is a different matter, and perhaps this is what you meant. But then that would be true for many Shia, too. And simply on a 'calculation': given that the secular Kurdish parties were going to hold the balance and resist Islamic law, etc, from a purely secular point of view it made sense to vote (for secular parties) and so limit the weight of the Islamist Shia bloc. (I'm not advocating a vote for bourgeois parties; I'm talking about being in the head of a 'Sunni' worried about clerical rule).

On Sistani, though. All right, we should be very careful, learn from our past mistakes. But I don't think Sistani is playing the role Khomeini played in the Iranian revolution. A large source of his authority - or maybe a demonstration of it - was shown by his ability to have the 'uprising' in Najaf *called off*, by mobilising tens of thousands of people. He was a voice, relatively speaking, for moderation, not Islamic extremism. (Incidentally, with Khomeini it wasn't really a matter of 'taking him at his word' that he didn't want an Islamic state: it was just wishful thinking. Khomeini's word could hardly have been more explicit. He was well-known in Islamic circles as the author of the theory of clerical rule, 'vilayet i faqih')

I don't think what is happening in Iraq, actually, is much like the Iranian revolution in other ways, either. *Obviously* we have to understand what the Islamists are: and some of them are outright Khomeini-ite (Sciri is very close to Tehran, and its militia was trained by the Iranians; Muqtada is a Khomeini-ite ideologically, though not so close to Tehran). But I can't see what's to be gained, in terms of analysis, by collapsing everything into one.


Cynical Politicians

“The idea that the workers' movement shouldn't support elections because reactionary forces will win strikes me as almost unbelievably ultra-left. It was the position taken by the Worker-Communist Party, but as I understand it more on the 'giving legitimacy' argument (which you also touch on).

I would have thought that fundamentally the basic arguments which Lenin summarised in 'Left Wing Communism' apply. There was mass support for elections - so much so that people will risk death threats to vote. The idea that socialists, and the workers' movement they seek to influence, should stand aside, and indeed - you imply - denounce the elections, I think is very dangerous indeed. We can't 'give credibitility to a reactionary parliament'; in so far as it has credibility, it has it - not because of anything we say.”

Clive, I think this is incredibly formalistic. Yes lots of people wanted to vote and risked their lives to do so. Most of these people are completely tied to the religious organisations, and there were widespread reports that when people went to vote they were asking their religious leaders who to vote for. How democratic is that? There is far more even to bourgeois demcoracy than just putting a cross on a piece of paper. If the elections and the Parliament has credibility because all of these people that remain dominated by religion went to vote, and the Labour Movement cannot diminish that credibility because of its own weakness that is merely a comment on the weakness of the Labour Movement not a reason to simply go with the flow. The differecne between us I think is this. You see the elction and the Parliament as merely being astep forward on the road to establishing some kind of bourgeois democracy even if a very limited one. If I agreed with you on that then I would not argue for a boycott of the elections. But I don’t see it like that, and I think history will bear me out. We will see. I see it more like the election of Hitler. I see it as the election of people who at the earliest opportunity will use the cover of elections, and a Parliament to introduce the most undemocratic practices, and we have already seen some of that. Rather like Hitler these “Parliamentary” parties maintain their own gangs of “brown shirts” that are if anything even more ruthless. Would you have wanted to give credibility to Hitler’s election, to Hitler’s “democracy”? After all millions voted there too under very adverse conditions?

“In Iraq, establishing a democratic system is surely an essential step. You might counterpose more radical democratic forms to the actual process which was underway, and of course be very critical of that process. But to simply 'oppose' and leave open the field, uncontested - I think that was a very serious mistake on the part of the WCPI (and one they're rectifying, badly, with the Freedom Congress, if I understand their position).

You will be in a better position to resist the reactionary parties which win the election, surely, if you have contested them in the first place.”

I disagree for the reasons given above. If the election is merely one in which after a contest a bourgeois Parliamentary party wins, even a right-wing one such as say Thatcher the confines of the struggle after that election remain within that of bourgeois liberal democratic norms, though of course a right-wing Government like that of Thatcher is also not averse to using extra-parliamentary force in the form of the state apparatus. Opposition to that can continue through normal democratic means, parliamentay opposition, industrial struggle etc. But where what you are talking about is parties and organisations such as the Nazis, or Khomeinite clerical fascists, or any other kind of fascist that merely use elections and parliament as a cover for their extra-Parliamentary activities then that is not the same thing at all. To say to workers that what we have here is a normal – more or less – bourgeois democratic situation is to invite them to put a noose around their own neck. If under such conditions are to use elections at all it should be only in order to expose that true nature of these fascistic organisations, and to warn workers of the consequences of their victory, to warn them to place no faith in such a Party and to build their own etxra-Parliamentary organisations to defend themselves aginst the attack on democracy, and upon them that these forces will inevitably unleash. It is far more important under such conditions for the workers to build their own alternative democracy as a means of strengthening their own organisation and defence than to woory about formal bourgeois Parliamentary norms, not because, unfortunately, they should as in 1917 bring these forward as an alternative state power, but on the contrary in order to prepare for the onslaught that they are about to face.

“I am appalled that you say "If you were a Sunni and massively outnumered by Shia would you think that elections were a very good idea?" Maybe this is a slip of the finger and you don't really mean it. But to reproduce sectarian divisions as a legitimate socialist reason to oppose elections... “

I think you have missed the point I was making. You were using the argument that Sistani argued for elections even when the Occupation wanted to defer them in support of the democratic credentials of Sistani. The point I was making is that, of course, Sistani wanted elections, he knew his supporters would be dominant. Had you been Lenin in 1917, and you won a huge majority in the Constituent Assembly, would you have then closed it down? I don’t think so. I merely made the argument that Sistani’s support for elections is then meaningless. To put the argument in reverse, let me frame it this way. Do you think that if the position were reversed and the Shia were the minority and the Sunnis were the large majority, would Sistani be so keen on elections then? So I was not at all suggesting this was a “socialist” reason for opposing the elections. The socialist reason for opposing them I have given above, what I was arguing was that your faith in Sistani’s democratic credentials appears to me ill-founded, and a little naïve.

I>“In Iraq, not only is the Sunni/Shia division the faultline in growing civil war; the Sunnis' fear of Shia rule is an entirely reactionary fear dependent on them having been a relatively privileged group. Fear of rule by Shia religious parties is a different matter, and perhaps this is what you meant.”

I don’t understand what you mean here. Everyday there are reports of Sunnis having been found in mass graves, or of having been found in torture cells where they have been taken by Shia militia, or often by government forces which overlap in great measure with the Shia militia. The Sunnis fear may be “reactionary” but it is certainly well founded isn’t it? Of course there are equally reports of Shia being murdered and tortured by Sunni militia or foreign fighters trying to stir up communal hatred. But that doesn’t change the very nature of the Sunnis fears. And there is a considerable difference. The forces killing and torturing the Sunnis, are now largely organised as the forces of the state. I think were I a Sunni, I would find it difficult to make the distinction that you do between being tortured by a Shia militiaman, or policeman attached to one of the Shia parties, or the Shia that support and elected those parties. That is not to take sides with the Sunnis in this developing Civil War, but your comment seemed to come very close to me to saying that the Sunnis should just get on with accepting the result of democratic elections in which they are the minority, and that their fear of a Shia majority represented in that Parliament is groundless. Clearly it is not, and in other such circumstances e.g. Ireland we recognise that national minorities fears are far from groundless, and that socialists should respond to them and draw up a programme accordingly that takes them into account.

“But then that would be true for many Shia, too. And simply on a 'calculation': given that the secular Kurdish parties were going to hold the balance and resist Islamic law, etc, from a purely secular point of view it made sense to vote (for secular parties) and so limit the weight of the Islamist Shia bloc. (I'm not advocating a vote for bourgeois parties; I'm talking about being in the head of a 'Sunni' worried about clerical rule).”
That may be true but it places too much faith in the formal bourgeois nature of the Parliament. Where I would agree though is that this creates the basis of an alliance. Lenin argued successfully in 1917 for the Bolsheviks to take seriously the national question in Russia, partly from a point of principle, but also from his standpoint as a practical revolutionary. If the Bolsheviks could key into the national grievances and demands of the national minorities within Russia it meant a strrengthening of the potential forces that could back up the meagre forces of the working class. An essential aspect of the programme of socialists in Iraq should be the defecne of the rights of the national minorities within the country i.e. the Sunnis, and the Kurds, and a demand for a Constitution that adequately protects those rights, whilst at the same time trying to forge the closest possible union within their own ranks of Sunnis, Kurds and Shia. (I realise that the Sunnis and Shia are actually religious groups not national minorities per se, but their greographic concentration gives them that characteristic.)

“On Sistani, though. All right, we should be very careful, learn from our past mistakes. But I don't think Sistani is playing the role Khomeini played in the Iranian revolution. A large source of his authority - or maybe a demonstration of it - was shown by his ability to have the 'uprising' in Najaf *called off*, by mobilising tens of thousands of people. He was a voice, relatively speaking, for moderation, not Islamic extremism.”

Clive, matbe its because having been a Councillor for quite a number of years and been around the wheeling and dealing, manouvring and thoroughly cretinours behaviour that goes on with full-time politicians I may be more cynical than you. When Blair persuaded Bush to go to the UN before attacking Iraq, why did he do that? Because Blair believed in the sanctity of the UN? Of course not. He did it because he thought he could get a second resolution, and with a second resolution the invasion they had already planned and intended to carry though would have the cover of legitimacy. Blair was just a more astute politician than Bush. Trouble was they couldn’t get the resolution. Why did Sistani want the uprising in Najaf called off? Because growing unrest looked like it would result in increased support for Muqtada, and the Sunni resistance. The result would have been a crackdown by the Occupation, huge bloodbath, the postponing of elections, more direct rule by the Occupation, attempts by the occupation to strengthen the position of its favoured secular politicians having lost faith in the ability of the Shia parties to deliver the goods. That would have been the last thing that Sistani would want with his eye on the crown, or at least his eye on being the Kingmaker. Nothing to do with moderation, or democratic credentials. Everything to do with being a cynical manipulative politician.

Arthur Bough


Couple of points

I don't have time to respond to the whole thing today; but I will make a couple of points.

Yes, as far as being murdered by the Mahdi army in Jihad goes - in the sectarian civil war now developing - Sunni fears are perfectly reasonable. I was referring to the period of the elections, when there was not yet a sectarian civil war, and when the Sunni 'resistance' called for a boycott with threats to kill anyone who voted. You're right that the fear of Shia domination, even then, was to some extent a fear of the militias (or, in so far as it's different, of the new state apparatus which the militias have 'infiltrated', if that's the right word).

But I think it is wrong to downplay the reactionary dynamic to Sunni-sectarian opposition to Shia rule. There is a Shia majority in Iraq. Any election, any democracy, will reflect that majority. To the extent that Iraqi society is sectarian, election results will be sectarian. To oppose any election because it will reflect the actual state of Iraqi society seems to me quite wrong.

For sure the Sunni-sectarian boycott of elections helped to polarise things, make the sectarian divisions worse. (As I understand it there are groups in the resistance who think so too - who think that policy helped stoke a sectarian civil war - and want to shift to a more political, ie less murderous, approach).

Compare the Kurds. The Kurds, too, would be in an inevitable minority in any national government. There was no Kurdish boycott of the elections. Not because they have any less to fear, on one level, from a Shia Islamist goverment. (They have less to fear, immediately, from Shia Islamist militias, but that might change and I'm sure they are aware of that). My point is that simply being in a minority in the face of a Shia majority is not enough to explain the attitudes of many Sunni.

I hope it doesn't need to be said that I think we should oppose all Shia chauvinism towards Sunni - and the workers' movement should not really accept these categories at all.

That both sides in a sectarian civil war are sectarian and reactionary doesn't mean that one side has not had a historical advantage and been relatively privileged. (Actually I think the historical position of Sunni and Shia in Iraq is quite complicated. But it's certainly true that under British rule the Sunni were privileged; and especially under Saddam they were also. Saddam made a big effort to stoke up the Sunni/Shia divisions. What's interesting though is that during the war with Iran, Iraqi Shia did not desert to fight with Khomeini. The current levels of sectarianism seem to be very recent indeed.)

On the elections. These were the first elections in Iraq in decades, assuming you count elections in the 1950s at all. Of course all the reactionary forces currently at work went into overdrive to their own advantage. I don't see how this could possibly have been otherwise. The evidence that very many Iraqis - not only those told what to do by tribal or religious leaders - saw the holding of elections as an event of great significance seems pretty powerful. The best thing would have been for the labour movement to have its own political voice. Without that, in a certain sense, there isn't much you can say in the elections, since there's nobody for whom you're calling for a vote. And sure, you say that whoever wins the workers must defend their organisations, rely on themselves, these guys aren't our friends and will attack us, etc etc.

But it would have been, it seems to me, far better for the WCPI, say, to have stood candidates - on an anti-sectarian programme, calling for basic economic demands, too - rather than simply denounce the whole thing as a sham. (You could stand candidates and *still* denounce it as a sham, for that matter). I suspect they didn't because they thought their votes would be derisory. But whether or not that is a legitimate calculation is a secondary matter to what attitude you take the holding of elections.

Millions of Iraqis voted. Despite death threats. Many of them, for sure, have been horribly disillusioned by the behaviour of the various politicians, their failure to get their act together, and so on. But I'm not sure that's not itself quite a bad thing: a society-wide attitude of cynicism towards democracy is not a bulwark against fascism.

I don't think the elections were comparable to the election of Hitler. This, I think, is where the dispute between us started last year, or whenever it was. I don't think Sistani is quite the same as Khomeini, let alone Hitler; and I thought that to see the election of the government as in effect the victory of fascism was wrong. I still do. I think there are important lessons from both Germany and Iran; but neither is the right paradigm for the situation since the elections.

There is a real problem that the government has no real authority at all, that real power lies in the hands of militias. This is one of the factors stoking the civil war; and the weaker the central government is, the worse that gets. The labour movement's only answer to that is to strengthen itself, fight sectarianism, etc - and so the oil workers' strike which began this thread is an immensely hopeful, positive step, even if it's a very small one. And I guess on that level, Arthur, there's no difference between us.

Of course Sistani makes cynical-politician calculations; and sure, the knowledge that he will be the power behind a Shia-majority parliament will lubricate his happiness with democracy.

But the occupation authorities didn't want to have elections. In fact they wanted a system which would give power to tribal and religious leaders - without proper elections - and in opposition to that Sistani called huge demonstrations demanding proper elections with one person, one vote. Whatever Sistani's calculations for it, the mass popular mood in its favour - which is what forced the occupation to hold elections - was, it seems to me, a good thing.

Similarly with outflanking Muqtada in Najaf. Sure, Sistani wanted to outflank Muqtada, etc etc. But that thousands responded to his call reflected a deep seated desire not to see Iraq plunge into the catastrophe Muqtada was bringing it to. Again, basically, I think, a good thing.

Sistani's role - measured in social forces, if you like, rather than his own calculations - I think has been, relatively, positive. He is a reactionary cleric, of course. But even on that scale, he's a relative moderate, compared to Sciri or the Sadrists. Sistani, for instance, doesn't have a militia to do his bidding. I'm not taking him at his word about anything. And I'm not disputing that Iraq is moving in a tragic direction. But the tragedy hasn't happened yet - or it's not finished, it's not over. There is still some reason - just - for hope.

Finally - sorry, I meant to be brief - I think there is a big general question about elections in a place where islamists are strong. Take Egypt. It's widely believed the Muslim Brotherhood would win proper elections. Should we therefore oppose them? It seems to me the workers' movement, and socialists, can't possibly hope to grow if they take that approach. In principle you could call for a general strike in the event of a Brotherhood victory, but I think if the workers' movement was strong enough to bring down a new Brotherhood government, they could bring down Mubarak...

The same basic problem arises, of course, with regard to Hamas. The fact is, they won the elections.

The general lesson of Algeria, I think, is that - whatever the labour movement could or should have done at the time of the elections - it would have been better to let FIS form a government and play out its considerable contradictions than to cancel the elections and plunge the country into a very bloody civil war. Maybe there would have been a civil war anyway. I think, though, probably not.

This is a big discussion. I'll leave it with one point, which is partly what our argument is about. There are Islamists and Islamists. The Turkish government is Islamist, but to deduce from this fact that it's victory was the same as Khomeini's would have been wrong. I don't think a Brotherhood victory in Egypt would be, either. And that has relevance to this discussion about Iraq.


Copme on Clive, Really?

“Yes, as far as being murdered by the Mahdi army in Jihad goes - in the sectarian civil war now developing - Sunni fears are perfectly reasonable. I was referring to the period of the elections, when there was not yet a sectarian civil war, and when the Sunni 'resistance' called for a boycott with threats to kill anyone who voted. You're right that the fear of Shia domination, even then, was to some extent a fear of the militias (or, in so far as it's different, of the new state apparatus which the militias have 'infiltrated', if that's the right word).”

Clive you know, probably better than I do the extent to which murders, kidnapping and tortue of Sunnis in reprisals for the years of Sunni domination were taking place long before the elections, and not just by Shia militias but also by the Shia dominated police and army. No way can you try to pretend that these attacks only occurred after the elections.
“But I think it is wrong to downplay the reactionary dynamic to Sunni-sectarian opposition to Shia rule. There is a Shia majority in Iraq. Any election, any democracy, will reflect that majority. To the extent that Iraqi society is sectarian, election results will be sectarian. To oppose any election because it will reflect the actual state of Iraqi society seems to me quite wrong.”

Is it wrong then to downplay the “reactionary” dynamic of protestant opposition to Catholic domination in a United Ireland? Is the AWL going to throw out its demand for a federal solution in Ireland recognising the legitimate fears of an entrenched Protestant minority, and simply tell them that they are a minority deal with it! The fact that SO recognised that problem of national minorities (especially of the working class in such minorities), and recognised the need to put together a programme that sought to deal with their legitimate concerns and rights was a step forward from the idiot anti-imperialism of much of the left. It would be a pity if it was to now step back from it in recognising the concerns and rights of Sunnis in Iraq.

“Compare the Kurds. The Kurds, too, would be in an inevitable minority in any national government. There was no Kurdish boycott of the elections. Not because they have any less to fear, on one level, from a Shia Islamist goverment. (They have less to fear, immediately, from Shia Islamist militias, but that might change and I'm sure they are aware of that). My point is that simply being in a minority in the face of a Shia majority is not enough to explain the attitudes of many Sunni.”

Clive, come on be serious. What did lenin say about the truth always being concrete. You know better than I do that the position of the Kurds is not at all comparable here to that of the Sunni. The Sunni were the former dominant community and face retribution from the Shia. The Occupation have thrown its weight behind the Shia (in particular) and the Kurds, partly because of the former and a concern to ensure no return of Ba’athism, and, of course with no little concern for the fact that all the oil is in either the Shia dominated South or Kurdish dominated North. The fact is, as you well know, that for the last ten years, even under Saddam, the protection given by the US and UK to the Kurds, especially in the no-fly zone, ensured that the Kurds were able to effectively set up their own autonomous region. In fact according to many observers, the Kurds have already de facto broken away from the rest of Iraq. They are signing oil deals with Norwegian and other Western oil companies for the development of new oil fields in defiance of the agreement on the ownership of oil wealth for instance. Given the importance of those Northern oil fields, and the links between at least some Kurdish organisations and the US it is highly probable that the Kurds would be able to rely on support from the US in the event of any attack from the Shia. In short, the position of the Kurds and Sunni are completely different. The Kurds can quite happily go along with the elections on the basis of effectively being free of any consequences in their own autonomous region. In fact the Kurds could in one sense be seen as doing what I have suggested for the working class. They have concentrated on building their own structrues within the Kurdish region, developing their own capacity to defend their own interests. Yes they have gone along with the elections, but it seems to me just that – they have gone along with them, gone through the motions.

“That both sides in a sectarian civil war are sectarian and reactionary doesn't mean that one side has not had a historical advantage and been relatively privileged. (Actually I think the historical position of Sunni and Shia in Iraq is quite complicated. But it's certainly true that under British rule the Sunni were privileged; and especially under Saddam they were also. Saddam made a big effort to stoke up the Sunni/Shia divisions. What's interesting though is that during the war with Iran, Iraqi Shia did not desert to fight with Khomeini. The current levels of sectarianism seem to be very recent indeed.)”

Just as the Protestants in Northern Ireland have been relatively privileged. So what? We have to deal with the present not the past.
“On the elections. These were the first elections in Iraq in decades, assuming you count elections in the 1950s at all. Of course all the reactionary forces currently at work went into overdrive to their own advantage. I don't see how this could possibly have been otherwise. The evidence that very many Iraqis - not only those told what to do by tribal or religious leaders - saw the holding of elections as an event of great significance seems pretty powerful. The best thing would have been for the labour movement to have its own political voice. Without that, in a certain sense, there isn't much you can say in the elections, since there's nobody for whom you're calling for a vote. And sure, you say that whoever wins the workers must defend their organisations, rely on themselves, these guys aren't our friends and will attack us, etc etc.”

I can only go on the basis of what I read or see on TV. The fact is that from all of the TV reports in particular it seems to me that these elections had very little to do with democracy. Not only did very many people get told, or asked their religious or tribal leaders what they should do, but many more had no real comprehension of what the whole thing was about. As you say probably none of the people voting had experienced an election before. Yes it would have been very nice had their been a large well organised labour movement in Iraq, capable of standing candidates in every area, better still had they had the ability to protect those candidates from the probability of being murdered by the Sunni and Shia militias for having dared do so. Had that been the case, and with the possibility that such a Labour Movement could have in the run up to those elections used its position within the working class to explain what democracy was all about, to have explained to those voting what they were voting for then the situation would have been different. It might still only have been more like Germany in 1933 where a large well organised Labour Movement existed and was able to reasonably contest the elections, but yes under those circumstances standing candidates would have been the right thing to do. But unfortunately, that was not the case, and we have to deal with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

“But it would have been, it seems to me, far better for the WCPI, say, to have stood candidates - on an anti-sectarian programme, calling for basic economic demands, too - rather than simply denounce the whole thing as a sham. (You could stand candidates and *still* denounce it as a sham, for that matter). I suspect they didn't because they thought their votes would be derisory. But whether or not that is a legitimate calculation is a secondary matter to what attitude you take the holding of elections.”

“I don't think the elections were comparable to the election of Hitler. This, I think, is where the dispute between us started last year, or whenever it was. I don't think Sistani is quite the same as Khomeini, let alone Hitler; and I thought that to see the election of the government as in effect the victory of fascism was wrong. I still do. I think there are important lessons from both Germany and Iran; but neither is the right paradigm for the situation since the elections.”

But only, I think, because of the factor of the occupation which is acting as a limiter. Just look at what is happening surreptitiously. Take all the reports about the position of women in government, or even working for the occupation etc in contact with government representatives, where they are being told they must wear the veil etc. are being frozen out, and threatened where they do not, and even threatened with rape and murder. This is the action of a democratic government? Even a reactionary democratic government? This doesn’t give concern at the direction in which this government will quickly move once the occupation is no longer there to act as a break on its drive towards the establishment of Sharia Law? And what kind of a democratic state, even a reactionary one is consistent with the domination of Sharia law?

“There is a real problem that the government has no real authority at all, that real power lies in the hands of militias. This is one of the factors stoking the civil war; and the weaker the central government is, the worse that gets.”

Problem for who???? Its not a problem for the dominant political parties that control these militias. You may as well say that it was a real problem for Hitler’s Government that real power lay in the streets with the Brown Shirts, or that this stoked vuiolence with the forces on the streets of the Communists and Social Democrats. You may as well have said several years ago that it was a real problem for Sinn Fein in control of Derry Council that real power in the Communities was being exercised by the Provos. And of course there will come a point – call it the Reichstag fire moment – when the situation will become such that order will be demanded. A strong leader and strong government will be required. I wonder who will provide that strong leadership and government? Can you guess? And then the full force of the state will be used behind that strong leader to restore order at whatever cost.

“The labour movement's only answer to that is to strengthen itself, fight sectarianism, etc - and so the oil workers' strike which began this thread is an immensely hopeful, positive step, even if it's a very small one. And I guess on that level, Arthur, there's no difference between us.”

I agree, but what the Labour Movement in Iraq needs now is a Lenin (for all the disagreeemnts I have with Lenin). It needs a practical revolutionary politician capable of making strategic decisions. The Iraqi working class, like the Russian working class, is small and weak. Lenin overcame that by making alliances – the smytchka, the alliance with the national minorities – and thereby gave the working class a chance of victory. In Iraq what is required is a chance of not being totally destroyed, but the same principles apply.

“But the occupation authorities didn't want to have elections. In fact they wanted a system which would give power to tribal and religious leaders - without proper elections - and in opposition to that Sistani called huge demonstrations demanding proper elections with one person, one vote. Whatever Sistani's calculations for it, the mass popular mood in its favour - which is what forced the occupation to hold elections - was, it seems to me, a good thing.”

Yes the occupation wanted a typical comprador regime. Sistani saw their was no advantage for him in that, and used populist methods to get what he did want. I can see nothing good about getting elections that help to elect and legitimate a nascent fascist regime.

“Similarly with outflanking Muqtada in Najaf. Sure, Sistani wanted to outflank Muqtada, etc etc. But that thousands responded to his call reflected a deep seated desire not to see Iraq plunge into the catastrophe Muqtada was bringing it to. Again, basically, I think, a good thing.”

Good that a bloodbath didn’t happen then, yes, but not something I am going to give Sistani credit for, because the result that it means a strengthening of his position and ability to control a Parliament dominated by clerical-fascists is most definitiely bad.

“Sistani's role - measured in social forces, if you like, rather than his own calculations - I think has been, relatively, positive. He is a reactionary cleric, of course. But even on that scale, he's a relative moderate, compared to Sciri or the Sadrists. Sistani, for instance, doesn't have a militia to do his bidding. I'm not taking him at his word about anything. And I'm not disputing that Iraq is moving in a tragic direction. But the tragedy hasn't happened yet - or it's not finished, it's not over. There is still some reason - just - for hope.”

Maybe its in the definition, but I’m afraid I find your statement that Sistani does not have a militia rather hard to accept. When someone can issue a fatwa on their website saying that gays should be murdered, and straight away gays start being murdered on the streets, that seem pretty much to me like having something like a militia that can put you ideas into practice.

“Finally - sorry, I meant to be brief - I think there is a big general question about elections in a place where islamists are strong. Take Egypt. It's widely believed the Muslim Brotherhood would win proper elections. Should we therefore oppose them? It seems to me the workers' movement, and socialists, can't possibly hope to grow if they take that approach. In principle you could call for a general strike in the event of a Brotherhood victory, but I think if the workers' movement was strong enough to bring down a new Brotherhood government, they could bring down Mubarak...”

Different situation isn’t it? As I said above about Germany there was a large well organised Labour Movement. Despite the lunacy of the Third period and equal lunacy on the side of the Social Democrats there was a possibility that workers parties could form a majority. There was certainly a possibility they could prevent Hitler obtaining a majority – and of course in fact they did. But even in that case what would you have been saying. You would have been pointing out the nature of the Nazis, you would have pointed out what a victory for them would mean, and what the working class needed to do in the event that they won. I cannot see what possible benefit there is for the working class in making a fetish of bourgeois democracy in a situation such as Iraq or possibly Egypt where the the Labour Movement has little chance of winning, yet the forces of clerical fascism have a good chance of winning. It is merely to give the fascists the benefit of a democratic veneer. It is the opposite of what Trotsky talks about when he says that the Bolsheviks needed to make it look as though the insurrection was in response to an attack by the bourgeoisie, or that the presentation of the insurection in presneting the Congress of Soviets with a fait accompli made it more certain that the Congress would decide to take the power, and in agreeing to take the power that gave legitimacy and democratic cover for the action the Bolsheviks intended to take whether or not the Soviets took the power – i.e. if the Soviets had not taken the power the Bolsheviks had decided to by-pass them and base themselves on the factory committees where they had a majority.

“The same basic problem arises, of course, with regard to Hamas. The fact is, they won the elections.

The general lesson of Algeria, I think, is that - whatever the labour movement could or should have done at the time of the elections - it would have been better to let FIS form a government and play out its considerable contradictions than to cancel the elections and plunge the country into a very bloody civil war. Maybe there would have been a civil war anyway. I think, though, probably not.

This is a big discussion. I'll leave it with one point, which is partly what our argument is about. There are Islamists and Islamists. The Turkish government is Islamist, but to deduce from this fact that it's victory was the same as Khomeini's would have been wrong. I don't think a Brotherhood victory in Egypt would be, either. And that has relevance to this discussion about Iraq.”

I wouldn’t want to be an active socialist under an established Hamas government, nor a woman or gay. It wasn’t healthy being a Trade Unionist in Turkey during the 1980’s. Its pretty risky even being a writer in Turkey even now, let alone being Kurdish. Given the choice of allowing fascists or neo-fascists to have state power or not under the cover of democracy, I definitely choose not.

Arthur Bough


Less drunkenly...

I don't mean to home in on something throwaway here. But maybe it illuminates an underlying point of contention. Arthur - do you think the labour movement in Turkey should have not participated in, denounced, opposed, etc the last (and presumably, therefore, the next) elections in Turkey?

You're right that Turkey is still far from a perfect bourgeois democracy (I know bourgeois democracies aren't perfect, but you know what I mean). Yes, Orhan Panuk was put on trial for denouncing the Turkish record with the Kurds. Yes, the Kurds still don't have national self-determination, and only this year tensions spilled over again into violent confrontations between Kurdish demonstrators and the Turkish army.

But Turkey is more democratic, I would argue, than it was in the 1990s - if only because the government wants to join the EU. In central Istanbul, at least, there are fewer women in hijabs than there are in Hackney, and in my understanding although there are campaigns to get women to wear the hijab (which was banned in the 1920s), these are certainly not violent ones, as in Iraq. In fact much of Istanbul is prett much like anywhere in Europe. A gay Turk told me last year when I visited Istanbul he thought the government was very good. (He probably isn't very political, but his boyfriend certainly is, if that's relevant). There are openly gay bars in Istanbul which are not troubled, as far as I know, by the police. The Western part of Turkey is widely regarded as one of the most culturally vibrant places in Europe/west Asia.

It is certainly more democratic than it was when Turkey was a dictatorship!

The general point here is that the government in Turkey is moderate-Islamist, constitutional-Islamist, or whatever you want to call it. Anyone arguing that Turkey is currently on the verge of fascism, fascists have state power under cover of democracy, following in the footsteps of Iran, or whatever, would I think be very seriously off-beam.

I'm not suggesting that Iraq is the same as Turkey, or making any direct parallels at all. But I think it does reveal that Islamists come in different shapes.

It seems to me beyond argument that the elections in Turkey were/are legitimate even if the Welfare Party wins them (and - briefly successful - attempts to suppress them should have been opposed). Election victories by more extremist Islamists are more difficult. But again, take Egypt. Elections take place in Egypt, but they're basically rigged - so Mubarak has won all of them since he came to power after Sadat's assissination. The Brotherhood remains illegal, although it effectively does have some voice in elections, one way or another (through front organisations, election pacts, etc). The Brotherhood renounced violence some time ago. Isn't it a democratic demand - if we're in favour, as surely we should be, of free elections, to unban the party likely to win them?

A Brotherhood government would be bad for workers and socialists. But would it be worse than the government they've got now? If it really was fascism, even as against a repressive in-effect-dictatorship with some of the trappings of bourgeois democracy - yes. But if the election of the Brotherhood (and maybe they wouldn't win, btw, maybe making them legal would reveal they are less popular than pundits think) was on the back of a democratic breakthrough, wouldn't the dynamic be different?

At a certain point, surely, if the vast mass of a society wants a reactionary government, there's only so much you can do to stop it. What would you do? One option, a la Algeria, is to cancel elections and deny the popular will altogether. That, as I have said, resulted in an incredibly bloody civil war, and it's hard to believe that if FIS had formed the government things would have been worse.

Briefly on the Sunni-Shia split in Iraq, and to amplify what I wrote last night. I do think the situation at the time of the elections, simmering civil war notwithstanding, is different to now, with the sectarian civil war now underway. And I think the concern of many Sunnis not to be ruled by Shia was more fundamental - then - than a concern not to be killed by the Mahdi army. That's what motivated the boycott, and was certainly the basic motivation of the reactionary Sunni insurgency.

I don't think there is a democratic, 'progressive' programme which concedes collective rights for the Sunnis - some sort of federal structure, or whatever. Of course they have religious rights. (And I don't see any reason to oppose in principle the Iraqi provinces, within some of which Sunnis have a majority, which I guess gives some de facto local autonomy). But anything which enshrines Sunni and Shia as collective (as in pseudo-national) groups I think is unambiguously reactionary. These are religious sectarian categories.

There will be, demographically, a Shia majority in any elections in Iraq. The task is to get people to move beyond these categories, not to enshrine them.


One slightly drunken response

I will (and this time I really keep it brief) only comment on one thing - though I think it underlies a broader dispute. The Sunnis are not comparable to the Irish Protestants. Not every religious-sociological schism is in effect a national conflict. The Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq is not a national conflict. It is a religious-sectarian-communal conflict. The Sunnis have been, historically, broadly speaking, priveleged - and necessarily, therefore, as a sociological entity. But they are neither an ethnic, nor a national, group/minority/whatever. All references to Ireland are therefore in my view irrelevant.

All right, second point. I don't think you have actually addressed my point about elections at all.


I've only just caught up

I've only just caught up with this discussion, and it is far too long to engage with in the depth it probably deserves.

But I have to take exception to Arthur's comments about elections. I don't see how it is a "fetish" to include in an assessment of various political forces their attitude to elections. It seems eminently sensible to me.

This comment in particular - "In a situation like this for workers to see elections as in any way something they should welcome is to commit suicide" - is absurd. I'm struggling to think of *any* scenario in which having elections (as opposed to, erm, not having elections) would not be progressive "in any way".


Brief reply To Clive and Janine

Firstly, to respond to Janine's points. Whilst I disagree with lenin on many things, I agree with many of the points he makes in "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky". I also disagree with a quite a few of the points he makes there as well, but that's another matter. But one of Lenin's main thrusts against Kautsky who in criticising the actions of the Bolsheviks in 1917/18 did "fetishise" elections, is that there is no such thing as "pure" democracy. You cannot separate out democracy from class rule. It is either bourgeois democracy or workers democracy. As socialists we are in favour of using bourgeois demcoracy in so far as it furthers the interests of workers but we make no fetish out of it, we recognise not only its limitations within the confines of the normal operation of that democracy, and the domination of the bourgeois state and ideology, but we also recognise that in the event that such a "democracy" should threaten the rule of the bourgeoisie they would simply sweep it away. It makes no sense therefore to fetishise it, it is a tactical decision, not a decision of principle.

So for example, where Janine says she is struggling to think of any scenario in which having elections would not be progressive I would give the obvious example of the elections to the Constituent Assembly, one of central themes of the argument between Lenin and Kautsky. Yes the elections went ahead, though I suspect that had Lenin felt able or reealised just how badly they would lose he would have tried to stop them, but in the event they were as good as cancelled because the Bolsheviks simply closed it down. And quite rightly because rather than fetishising elections they put the interests of the working class first. They recognised that the Constituent Assembly if allowed to proceed would have hung the working class, because the compromise parties and the bourgeois parties would have simply used the election as the cover for a counter revolution.

In answer to Clive. Congratulations on the film by the way. Yes of course there are nuances between Islamic states. There were differences between Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy too, and there were certainly differences with Franco's Spain in later years and Caetano's Portugal. But these differences do not change the overall dynamic of such regimes. It is far easier for such regimes that base themselves on totalitarian measures (e.g. Franco and Caetano) or authoritarianism with a cloak of democracy e.g. Turkey to quickly move towards a harder type of regime when required than a normal bourgeois liberal democracy, for obvious reasons. But as I said above the question of whether to stand in elections or to support the calling of elections is a tactical decision not one of principle. Depending upon the strength of the working class in any particular case, depending upon the strength of the fascist or proto-fascist organisations a range of options are available from outright opposition to complete endorsement and participation. The crucial question is what best furthers the interests of the working class in the particular instance. The truth is always concrete.

In Germany in 1933, it would obviously have been lunacy for the left not to have stood, but even then in doing so as I have said previously they would have needed both to have set out clearly the limitations of those elections. Firstly, the likelihood of the consequences of a Nazi vistory, and secondly the consequences of a socialist victory i.e. an attempt to undermine such a government by the bougreoisie, greater reliance by the bourgeoisie on the fascists combined with the use of the state apparatus etc. But as far as I can see nothing like that could be argued for Iraq. Had socialists tried to stand candidates they would have likely been cut down both by the Sunni Islamists and by the Shia islamists. Given the intensity of the growing communal divide the almost guaranteed derisory vote they would have recieved would simply undermined any credibility they might have been able to have built, whilst legitimising the victory and policies of the Islamists. If I am wrong about that, then there may have been a tacticl basis to have stood (but I don't think so), and only then to have set out the nature of the islamist parties, and the danger that a government formed by these parties would present i.e. the ability to use legitimately state power to effectively push through anti-democratic measures e.g. the banning of trade unions as a prelude to the establishment of a sectarian clerical fascist state.

In relation to your argument re. Algeria you may be right. On the same basis may be the Bolshheviks should have avoided the Civil War by letting Kolchak walk into St. Petersburg in August 1917, and remove the government in the hope that people would see what he was like and then reject him. But then they had had several centuries of something like that which was what led them into a revolution in the first place. As Lenin says to Kautsky its rather difficult being a revolutionary if at every stage you want to avoid violence, it rather removes all the revolutionary aspects of Marxism and turns Marx into a pacifist reformist. After all I don't recall Marx making a fetish of the need for elections during the Paris Commune.

I simply canjot understand your position in rejecting the idea that the Sunnis (and Kurds and Shia for that matter) should not be afforded minority democratic rights. That seems to fly completely in the face of everything the AWL and its predecessors have been arguing for the last 20 years. Nor can I undertsand the basis of your argument of rejecting the comparison with the Protestants in Northern Ireland on the basis that the Sunnis and Shia are religious not national minorities. Since when did Protestantism become a nationality???? The situation seems to me to be very similar. The Sunnis were a relatively privileged minority, so were the Northern Ireland Protestants. The Protestants fear that they will suffer as a minority in a Catholic dominated United Ireland. The Sunni fear they will suffer in a Shia dominated Iraq. The answer in Ireland is not to give in to the reactionary demands of Protestants to resist a United Ireland but to propose a United Ireland with a federal regime that guarantees (as far as anything can be constitutionally guaranteed) the minority rights of the protestants, and to argue for the greatest unity between the Protestant and Catholic working class against clericalism, and for a socialist Ireland, or at least a Workers Government. Surely the same applies in Iraq to oppose the reactionary demands of Sunnis for their privileges to be maintained, but to guarantee their rights as a minority within a fairly well defined geographical area through the establishment of a federal government, and to fight for the greatest possible unity of workers across all religions and none against clericalism, and for at least the establishment of a secular democratic republic. You seem to believe that the elections are all about establishing this latter. I don't. I don't see how this enshrines the divisions between Sunni and Shia any more than arguing for federalism in Ireland enshrines divisions between Catholics and Protestants. Maybe you were as you say suffering a bit from the alcohol on that latter point and didn't think it through.

I also don't know exactly what point about the elections you think I have not addressed. If you could clarify I will do my best to oblige.

Arthur Bough


Arthur ...

Surely Lenin's point was that there was a better form of democracy avilable - Soviet democracy. Where is the better form of democracy in Iraq? And more to the point, those "resistance" groups that opposed the elections in Iraq did not do so in the name of Soviet democracy, but of no democracy.


No, He Didn't

Actually, no Lenin's point against Kautsky was not that there was a better form of democracy available - Soviet Democracy. He was arguing against Kautsky's fetishisation of "democracy" as a pure category. Don't forget that between April and October Lenin had got the Bolsheviks to drop the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" twice because it would have meant handing power over to the compromise parties who had already in the Provisional Government handed power over to the bougreoisie, who in turn had handed it back to the aristocracy. During those periods Lenin argued that the Bolsheviks base themselves instead on the factory committees where they had a majority. The Bolsheviks would have done the same thing had the Congress of Soviets decided not to take the power the Bolsheviks had already secured through the insurrection. In short Lenin was a revolutionary for whom democracy was merely a tool to be used to advance the position of the working class. That was why he was happy to exclude the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie from that democracy if needed not as a matter of principle but as a matter of tactics i.e. in some countries/situations the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie might be allowed to participate.

As far as the reasons the "resistance" groups have for opposing democracy I couldn't give a shit really. They can argue their own case I'm certainly not going to. I am only interested in puting forward the case as to why workers should not have been drawn into the charade of elections whose only purpose under the circumstances was to hand over state power to a bunch of clerical fascists, restrained only by the immediate interests of the occupation that stand above them for now pulling the strings, and who when the time is right will use the cover and legitimacy of state power to crush the workers and any other democratic forces within Iraq, just as Hitler did in Germany, Mussolini did in Italy, and Khomeini did in Iran.

Arthur Bough


Protesants and Sunnis

The AWL's position on the Protestants, surely, is that they are, in effect, a national minority - who don't want to be part of a united Ireland because they don't see themselves as Irish. Were they purely a religious group, I don't think we would take the same view.

The Sunnis are not a national minority. As I said, not every religious schism is in fact a national conflict. Nor other sorts of divisions. Would you have supported federalism in South Africa?

You appear to be saying - comparing Algeria to Kornilov - that you would have supported the Algerian military cancelling the elections to avoid FIS coming to power. You don't say explicitly one way or the other, and you say nothing explicit, for instance, about Egypt. I have raised a general point about Islamists and elections, and I don't think you've addressed it.

I think, myself, that to have supported a military dictatorship against an Islamist electoral victory would have been wrong, shall we say. I have explained why, and your answer to my argument simply seems to me inappropriate sarcasm about 1917.

I think to see the Turkish government as simply - what? biding its time before it reveals its true fascist character? - is to seriously misread what is happening in Turkey, which is bending over backwards to make itself acceptable for EU membership.