Workers' Liberty

By Clive Bradley

George W Bush says the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq will go ahead at the end of June, and is seeking a United Nations resolution to that effect. UN representative al-Akhdar al-Brahimi is already choosing a caretaker government which will hold power until elections are held - by the end of January 2005 at the latest.


Many questions remain unanswered about this "transfer". Legally, sovereignty is already held by Iraq. Foreign troops will remain: currently their numbers are being increased (especially as junior partners in the coalition withdraw), and the US - in addition to changing its occupation HQ into the largest embassy in the world - has been constructing large military bases. A key question for the interim government is whether it will have control over the occupation troops (and the power to ask them to leave). Tony Blair has said yes; US spokespeople have been more equivocal. But the current plan will give the new Iraqi government control over the country's oil.

The interim government seems set to be headed by veteran secular nationalist Adnan Pachachi (despite earlier threats to exclude members of the existing Governing Council), and a Shi'a scientist who was opposed to Saddam's nuclear programme.

But in the weeks leading up to the formal abolition of the Coalition Provisional Authority, US proconsul Paul Bremer has issued numerous laws which will in practice, it would seem, restrict the authority of the new government. New commissions have been created, which take on the powers of old ministries. According to al-Khalifa: "US and Iraqi proxies will serve multiyear terms and have significant authority to run criminal investigations, award contracts, direct troops, and subpoena citizens." (16 May).

Bush has been anxious to reassure world and American public opinion that the transfer is on track, in the wake of a series of public relations disasters in Iraq. Following the scandal of Abu Ghraib, US forces attacked a wedding party in the western desert, killing over 40 people; despite claims that they were retaliating against insurgents' fire, it seems clear that party guests, including children, were killed.

On top of that, the Pentagon's long-time favourite, Ahmed Chalabi, has been at the centre of several scandals - financial (his home was raided on the orders of an Iraqi judge), and political: his well-known links to Iran are now thought to have influenced the intelligence he gave to the US in the run-up to war. Chalabi's Iraq National Congress was a major source of intelligence regarding the yet-to-be-found weapons of mass destruction.

But the biggest obstacle to the transfer of authority is the fighting which continues to rage across Iraq. Fierce fighting has taken place in the southern cities of Najaf, Kufa and Kerbala between American forces and the Army of the Mahdi of Muqtada al-Sadr. Al-Sadr's forces have withdrawn from Kerbala, but heavy fighting continues in Najaf. In both cities, the "shrine" mosques were damaged. In Najaf, bullets sprayed the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

The US in fact seems to be conducting two policies simultaneously regarding al-Sadr. In Baghdad, negotiations with the Army of the Mahdi seem to have led to a ceasefire, while in the southern cities ceasefires have been rejected, short of al-Sadr giving himself up to the authorities to be tried in connection with murder. It is not clear that this is a coherent policy, so much as ad hoc decisions on the spot. There have even been suggestions that the US wants to integrate the Sadrist militia in the Iraqi security services, along the lines of what they recently negotiated in Fallujah (where Ba'thists and "resistance" fighters have taken over much of the control of the town) - but so far that would seem a long way off.

The general aim of the occupation is to disarm the Army of the Mahdi, one way or the other, before the end of June. Military defeat of it seems unlikely to achieve this end, however. According to a recent poll, Muqtada al-Sadr, until recently a marginal figure outside certain areas, is the second most popular political figure in Iraq, after Sistani. Previously, the most popular politician was the leader of the Shi'ite Da'wa Party, another of whose members, Ezzedin Salim - "rotating" president of the IGC - was assassinated in May.

This does not mean that al-Sadr is universally popular, by any means. Rival Islamist currents have begun to organise counter-demonstrations, including in Najaf. His movement was founded by his father, who was killed by Saddam five years ago; clerical leaders of that movement are said to be opposed to the adventurism of Muqtada, but unwilling to say so publicly for fear of the violent thugs who support him. 500 tribal leaders this month visited Sistani offering to defend him after the damage to his home - which would be, for sure, defence against the Sadrists.

Sistani has called for all combatants to withdraw from the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala - meaning the Sadrists as well as the US. He also called for Shi'a to gather at mosques in their own areas to protest at the fighting. But Sistani, although he is the most important Shi'a cleric in Iraq, with enormous authority, does not have an organised movement to counterpose to the Sadrists.

For now, those who do - mainly the Iran-backed Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution - don't have the confidence for an all-out fight (although allegedly SCIRI's Badr Brigades number up to 20,000), and in any case are not a progressive alternative.

Secular and working class forces are, on the whole, keeping their heads down. Our solidarity can help give them the confidence to speak out against both occupation and clerical reaction.