FORUM



Encouraging critical thinking

VERY much agreed with the drift of Thomas Carolan's article on "The left we have and the left we need" (WL 40), but I felt that it implied an unresolved question.

The "standard", "instinctive" politics of the far left which grew up in the late 1960s and the early '70s were, for reasons of political circumstance which Carolan describes, inclined towards ultra-leftism, populism, Third-Worldism, and rainbow-liberationism in place of patient working-class organising.

Yet in Britain, unlike many other countries, the Maoists who most extravagantly reflected those inclinations were weak. The major far-left groups of the last thirty years — the SWP, Militant (and, for the early part of the period, the WRP) — explicitly opposed most facets of the "standard" far left politics. They opposed, not comprehensively and consistently, and quite often by excessive and sectarian negation, but they opposed.

All those groups had their own sectarianism. Yet sectarians can do useful educational work despite themselves. Over the years, tens of thousands of activists have received a political education in the SWP, Militant, or WRP, and then rejected the group's sectarianism and gone on as trade-union or Labour Party activists.

Why haven't they brought elements of Marxist education and criticism into the movement sufficient cumulatively to create a culture very different from the "standard" or "identikit" far left? Why is it that on many issues — Ireland, for one — a quick look at the broad left of the labour movement would make you think that the major ideological influence was not the larger groups, but the comparatively puny IMG/Socialist Outlook current?

I think there have been three reasons.

First, much of the groups' criticism of elements of the "standard" culture has not been reasoned analysis. Rather, it has been the retort: "That's all very well, but the real answer is to build the revolutionary party... to promote militant workers' struggles... to build the Marxist current predestined to lead the broad labour movement..." To the politics of the "standard" culture have been counterposed abstract fetishes, essentially centred on the self-promotion of the revolutionary group rather than broad political perspectives for the working class.

When activists become disillusioned with the group and its fetishes, naturally they tend to gravitate to what they already believe is "all very well".

Secondly, in so far as there has been ideological content to the groups' criticisms, it is generally a matter of insisting on a particular emphasis within an eclectic culture, rather than developing an all-round dialectical alternative. Almost anyone active on the left, for example, will subscribe to two general ideas about Ireland: sympathy with the general historic aims of Irish nationalism and republicanism, and support for working-class unity. When the SWP and Militant have enticised the "standard" far-left culture, they have done so not by dissecting those

general ideas and integrating their elements into a rounded view, but by dogmatically emphasising the "working-class unity" strand. Activists freed from the constraints of "the line" can swing back towards the nationalist pole without feeling that they are abandoning the idea of working-class unity or doing any more than discarding an arbitrary and dogmatic emphasis.

Thirdly, the eclectic culture survives, with contradictions unresolved and unchallenged, in large part because of the increasing lack of real debate on the left.

Yet reason tells us that there must be large elements of counterpoint — of submerged critical thinking — within the "standard" left culture. Observation tells us that, too: a serious discussion on, say, Ireland, or Europe, in the trade unions or the Labour Party often reveals that the apparent "left consensus" is nowhere near as homogeneous as it seems.

By working hard at analysis, education, and promoting debate, we, round *Workers' Liberty*, can do a lot to bring that submerged counterpoint to the surface.

Martin Thomas

US Labour Party debate:

A long way to go

AST year's US elections showed how timely was the founding of the US Labor Party in June 1996; they also show how far we still have to go. The AFL-CIO (the US TUC) poured \$35 million into supporting Democratic candidates. Even among the minority of union leaders who support the Labor Party, leading figures such as Bob Wages and Adolph Reed gave reluctant support to Democrats as the 'lesser evil', though this undermines the Labor Party's attempt to become an independent pole of attraction for those disillusioned with the Democrats.

Though the Labor Party has a programme which is popular with union members, it had virtually no profile in the elections, at least partly because its non-electoralist strategy left it with little to say.

The current leadership of the Labor Party, based around organiser Tony Mazzochi and the affiliated unions, favour a 'softly-softly' approach focused on winning union affiliations without unions necessarily breaking from their existing political allegiances. The Labor Party has decided not to undertake electoral activity for the next two years and not to support any other candidates officially. While this is partly a reflection of the Labor Party's current weakness, it also allows unions and individuals to support anyone they like — most usually Democrats.

The leadership's strategy side-steps the issue of political independence, central to the Labor Party's reason for existing. It may hold the Labor Party together in the short run, but the history of previous attempts to set up a labor party shows that independence will eventually become a life or

death issue.

If the Labor Party does not have a clearly distinct identity, why support it? And how might its programme conceivably be carried out? As long as the Labor Party does not directly challenge the established parties, its political action is either purely propagandist or comes down to lobbying and pressurising established politicians. A Labor Party supporter, a trade unionist representing municipal workers, encapsulated the problem: "We can't afford to abstain from the electoral arena. As public workers, so much of our wages, hours and working conditions are dealt with legislatively. We don't really have a choice but to find some way to have an influence in that arena". The absence of a Labor Party presence forces such workers to look to the election of "good" Democrats, thus undermining the Labor Party.

Can Marxists active in the Labor Party provide a coherent and non-sectarian alternative to the leadership's strategy? While the Trotskyist left in the US is small and fragmented, it can have an influence out of proportion to its size.

To do so, of course, they must first participate in the Labor Party and build it as their own party. The years of isolation of the far left in the US have created a range of sectarian attitudes to the labor party question. Some counterpose building a revolutionary organisation to building a labor party, as if they were mutually exclusive. Some say that a labor party is only a real labor party when it adopts a fully revolutionary programme. These attitudes build, rather than break down, the obstacles to fusing Marxist politics with the real labour movement; in effect, they demand that the working class first of all recognise the claims of this or that sect to its leadership before the class can begin to move. If this approach could be successful, there would be no need for a labour party in the first place.

The foundation of the Labor Party reflects the fact that the more advanced sections of the unions are beginning to move to an independent political position. It is necessary for Trotskyists to talk to these people, to seek to cement this first step forward, and to take people beyond the Labor Party's current politics and strategy where necessary. The Labor Party, if it is truly democratic, can become a forum where ideas can be argued out and tested in practice. Given the present-day reality of the US labor movement, there is no short cut, which will enable a revolutionary organisation to skip over this stage by recruiting raw militants in large numbers. Even the CIO upsurge of the 1930s followed a split in the official unions and, despite the gains the Trotskyists made then through their participation in the strike movement, they remained a small minority in the labor movement.

Another sectarian objection to work in the Labor Party focuses on its domination by trade union bureaucrats as demonstrating that it is a waste of time, will never fight, is a roadblock etc, etc. But the trade unions are run by bureaucrats, too! Only anarchists would conclude we should not work in the unions.

How the Labor Party will turn out is not given from the start and will depend on the balance of forces within it. Abstention will only aid the bureaucrats. It took 20 years for the British Labour Party to make a definitive break with the Liberal Party. The semi-abstention of the British Marxists from the party helped ensure that when Labour did finally make that break, it was not the Marxists who dom-

EORUM



Detroit newspaper strikers fight the cops. The Labor Party needs to found itself on these kinds of struggles

inated, but the right-wing reformists and conservative trade union leaders.

Scepticism from those more sympathetic to the Labor Party project tends to take the form of saying that it is likely to fail because the conditions are not right. Naturally, it would be better if the Labor Party had been born out of a massive upsurge of militancy and trade unionists were confident and winning victories. However, to argue that the Labor Party cannot possibly develop without such an upsurge is to misunderstand the relationship between trade-union and political organisation. There is no set sequence of stages dictating that a labor party can only follow a rise in economic militancy. In fact, the logic has often been the opposite. Exposure of the limitations of economic militancy, or legal and governmental obstacles to trade union action, may spur the unions towards politics as they demonstrate that generalised action at the level of society as a whole, as well as at the workplace, is necessary to achieve their demands.

Equally, it is wrong to dismiss the Labor Party on the basis of a cold calculation that not many union leaders will support it officially. While support from top union leaders is important, to see it as all-important reduces the question of the Labor Party's success to diplomacy at the top of the movement, ignoring the pressure that can be brought from below. The absence of support from the top may slow down the growth of the Labor Party initially and make organisation more difficult, but if activists within unions start winning the political battle it will provide a much firmer foundation in the future than endorsements in which the rank and file remain passive.

There are already groups of Labor Party supporters working together in a number of unions and the issue has been raised at a number of union conferences. Building the Labor Party means taking politics directly into the unions, raising the issue of why political representation is necessary and why it must be independent of the bourgeois parties. There is now a great opportunity to argue these issues out as a living question, rather than in the abstract as in the past. If there is a real objective need for and move towards political organisation in the unions, opposition from the top will not in the end be decisive.

Some activists in the Labor Party see it as "just another arena of activity" alongside other activities - including other 'Third Party' initiatives, such as the New Party or the Greens which might go to make up a Rainbow Coalition; they also tend to see the working class as "just another" group of the oppressed. But the presence in the Labor Party of the unions, with their roots in the workplace, makes the Labor Party qualitatively different from these other initiatives, even if we leave aside the fact that the Labor Party has a much clearer working-class programme. The Labor Party is not just part of an amorphous collection of good causes which left activists should get involved in, but should be a focus through which those other activities become integrated into labor movement activity. This in turn requires that the Labor Party be seen to take up the struggles of other oppressed groups and is responsive to their needs.

The concern expressed by some activists about the Labor Party being dominated by affiliated unions is misplaced as long as the unions' participation in the Labor Party is democratic and representative of the union members' views. Once unions affiliate to a labor party, the issues of union and labor party democracy become inextricably intertwined. It will not be possible to have a democratic Labor Party without democratic affiliated unions. But equally it will be impossible to have a Labor Party at all without the unions.

The precise balance between the unions and local chapters [branches] and the structures through which this is expressed are a secondary issue as long as both wings have a reasonable input into what is decided. But exclusion or (as has happened) minimal representation for the local activists is likely to be both undemocratic and counter-productive when they form a large part of the active Labor Party membership.

Marxists should be loyal, but not uncritical members of the Labor Party, seeing its development as of central importance for the class as a whole. They should not just see it as a pool from which to recruit to their own small groups. They should build the Labor Party by taking it into unions, communities and other campaigns. One of the most positive aspects of the Founding Convention was the way in which it was taken for granted that the Labor Party would actively support union struggles such as the Detroit newspaper workers' strike. This can be built on to make the Labor Party an outward-looking organisation that wins people by showing the relevance of independent political action to their own needs and struggles.

It will be necessary to argue for politics and strategy opposed to those of the current leadership when their views are hindering the development of the Labor Party. If caution doesn't have that effect, then it is sectarian to criticise it on the grounds that it comes from bureaucrats. And passive denunciations, whether from outside or inside the Labor Party, are likely to have little influence on the course of events, however satisfied they may make those who make them. Marxists should apply a united front approach to work within a political party made up of many different political currents and views.

Those who share this way of working within the Labor Party are scattered across a number of currents or are members of none. They must begin to work together as a caucus to maximise their impact, to assess the possibilities for work in the Labor Party and to provide a basis for regroupment of the Marxist left.

The foundation of the Labor Party, despite its weakness, provides great opportunities for the American left. We are now in a period of transition in which the precise form, strength and content of the party will be decided. The Labor Party is still sufficiently flexible to allow Trotskyists to make a constructive contribution to its outcome. Whether

they do or not may be decisive for its long-term existence.

Bruce Robinson

Don't ban fox hunting!

OCIALISTS should not support the ban on fox hunting which is currently being debated in Parliament.

Though it is easy to understand the gut class hatred towards the landed gentry which attracts left-wingers to the idea, the truth is that such a law would be profoundly unjust as it would discriminate against one "cruel" sport, while leaving other equally cruel sports — not to mention the carnivorous eating habits of the majority of the population — entirely untouched.

Let's first look at the argument about the special cruelty of fox hunting. Horses are put down after a bad fall in the Grand National. Falconry involves the forced starvation of the bird until it is released on a real life killing spree, while angling involves "playing" the fish by pulling it forcefully out of its watery lie in a primitive tug of war. If the fish isn't killed it is often very badly damaged from poor handling resulting in the loss of its protective slime.

All field sports inevitably involve violence to animals. That is because field sports are based on what was once a natural necessity for all of us: hunting. Hunting is by definition cruel, it is part of the assertion of human supremacy over the other members of the animal kingdom. Human beings have a right to hunt, just as they have the right to do lots of things that the majority may disapprove of, for instance smoking. The idea that there is an unbreachable gulf in cruelty between say fishing and fox hunting, because the fox is a higher animal, strikes me as fairly arbitrary. In any case, the argument about the animal's purported feelings is surely an argument for vegetarianism, not for restricting the methods of killing such beasts.

In fact, I suspect that if most people thought about the violence needed to despatch the cow or a pig they've just eaten for tea and which arrived in a nice cellophane and plastic package (did you know pigs can beat monkeys in conditioned response tests?) then they would probably become vegetarians at least for a few weeks. But people don't. Instead, we get morally confused and hypocritical campaigns like the drive to outlaw people watching dogs chasing after and killing foxes.

I don't like the idea of fox hunting, I wouldn't go fox hunting myself, but I can't see why we should prevent people from doing it, especially if we are to continue poisoning and killing foxes as a legitimate form of "pest control" because they might eat the animals destined for our bellies.

If people want to upset the landed gentry then they should support the campaign for public access to and ownership of the great private estates and rivers.

Bob Yates

OUR HISTORY

Luxemburg and Leninism

By Leon Trotsky

FFORTS are now being made in France and elsewhere to construct a so-called Luxemburgism as an entrenchment for the left centrists against the Bolshevik-Leninists. This question may acquire considerable significance. I wish to touch here only upon the essential features of the question.

We have more than once taken up the cudgels for Rosa Luxemburg against the impudent and stupid misrepresentations of Stalin and his bureaucracy. And we shall continue to do so. Our defence of Rosa Luxemburg is not, however, unconditional. The weak sides of Rosa Luxemburg's teachings have been laid bare both theoretically and practically. Certain tendencies make use only of the weak sides and the inadequacies which were by no means decisive in Rosa; they generalise and exaggerate these weaknesses to the utmost and build up a thoroughly absurd system on that basis.

There is no gainsaying that Rosa Luxemburg passionately counterposed the spontaneity of mass actions to the "victorycrowned" conservative policy of the German Social Democracy, especially after the revolution of 1905. This counterposition had a thoroughly revolutionary and progressive character. At a much earlier date than Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg grasped the retarding character of the ossified party and trade union apparatus and began a struggle against it. Inasmuch as she counted upon the inevitable sharpening of class conflicts, she always predicted the certainty of the independent elemental appearance of the masses against the will and against the line of march of the officialdom. In these broad historical outlines, Rosa was proven right. For the revolution of 1918 was "spontaneous", that is, it was accomplished by the masses against all the provisions and all the precautions of the party officialdom. On the other hand, the whole of Germany's subsequent history amply showed that spontaneity alone is far from enough for success. Hitler's regime is a weighty argument against the panacea of spontaneity.

Rosa herself never confined herself to the mere theory of spontaneity. Rosa Luxemburg exerted herself to educate the revolutionary wing of the proletariat in advance and to bring it together organisationally as far as possible. In Poland, she built up a very rigid independent organisation. The most that can be said is that in her historical-philosophical evaluation of the labour movement, the preparatory selection of the vanguard, in comparison with the mass actions that were to be expected, fell too short with Rosa; whereas Lenin — without consoling himself with the miracles of future actions — took the advanced workers and constantly and tirelessly welded them together into firm nuclei, illegally or legally, in the mass organisations or underground, by means of a sharply defined program.

Rosa's theory of spontaneity was a wholesome weapon against the ossified apparatus of reformism. By the fact that it was often directed against Lenin's work of building up a revolutionary apparatus, it

"She was much too realistic in the revolutionary sense to develop the elements of the theory of spontaneity into a consummate metaphysics."

revealed — to be sure, only in embryo — its reactionary features. With Rosa herself this occurred only episodically. She was much too realistic in the revolutionary sense to develop the elements of the theory of spontaneity into a consummate metaphysics. In practice, she herself, as has already been said, undermined this theory at every step. After the revolution of November 1918, she began the arduous labour of assembling the proletarian vanguard.

Let us again attempt to apply the conflict between spontaneous mass actions and purposeful organisational work to the present epoch. What a mighty expenditure of strength and selflessness the toiling masses of all the civilised and half-civilised countries have exerted since the World War! Nothing in the previous history of mankind could compare with it. To this extent Rosa Luxemburg was entirely right as against the philistines, the corporals, and the blockheads of straight-marching "victorycrowned" bureaucratic conservatism. But it is just the squandering of these immeasurable energies that forms the basis of the great setback of the proletariat and the successful fascist advance. Without the slightest exaggeration it may be said: the whole world situation is determined by the crisis of proletarian leadership. The labour movement is today still encumbered with huge rem-



nants of the old bankrupt organisations. After the countless sacrifices and disappointments, the bulk of the European proletariat, at least, has withdrawn into its shell. The decisive lesson which it has drawn, consciously half-consciously. from bitter expe-

riences, reads: great actions require a great leadership. For current affairs, the workers still give their votes to the old organisations. Their votes — but by no means their boundless confidence. On the other hand, after the miserable collapse of the Third International, it is much harder to move them to bestow their confidence upon a new revolutionary organisation. That's just where the crisis of the proletarian leadership lies. To sing a monotonous song about indefinite future mass actions in this situation, in contrast to the purposeful selection of the cadres of a new International, means to carry on a thoroughly reactionary work.

The crisis of proletarian leadership cannot, of course, be overcome by means of an abstract formula. It is a question of an extremely prolonged process. Not of a purely "historical" process, that is, of the objective premises of conscious activity, but of an uninterrupted chain of ideological, political and organisational measures for the purpose of fusing together the best, most conscious elements of the world proletariat beneath a spotless banner, elements whose number and self-confidence must be constantly strengthened, whose connections with wider sections of the proletariat must be developed and deepened - in a word, of restoring to the proletariat, under new and highly difficult and onerous conditions, its historical leadership. The latest spontaneity confusionists have just as little right to refer to Rosa as the miserable Comintern bureaucrats have to refer to Lenin. Put aside the incidentals which developments have overcome, and we can, with full justification, place our work for the Fourth International under the sign of the "three L's", that is, under the sign not only of Lenin, but also of Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

RAVIEWS



Eclectic socialism and Ireland

HIS booklet (Ireland the Promise of Socialism) which is published by Socialist Democracy (Irish section of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International), makes the less than modest claim: "This book represents a lot, not least two years work by each of the authors... [and] the experience of our members, stretching back over 30 years... Finally, it represents our understanding of the collective experience of working-class struggle... over the past two centuries."

But, alas, two years of literary endeavours, 30 years of political campaigning, and 200 years of class struggle have produced only a dismally turgid piece of writing, largely devoid of even a semblance of political and intellectual coherence.

Whether it is dealing with Stalinism, the EU, or Ireland, this poncif offers a pot pourri of contradictions, warped further by a Byzantine concept of anti-imperialism

Stalinism is described as "a completely irrational system that was bound to fail." (The international political current [Mandelism] to which the authors belong struck a distinctly less critical note about Stalinism prior to its collapse.) At the same time the former Stalinist states are defined as "degenerate workers' states". (In fact, the authors mean "degenerated or deformed workers' states".)

Stalinism, claim the authors, "fell under the economic and political offensive of imperialism." As a consequence, its collapse has been "felt as a major defeat" by the workers' movement. But why the workers' movement should regard the collapse of "a completely irrational system" which banned all forms of working-class organisation as "a major defeat" is left unexplained.

The pamphlet moves on to the European Union. The authors refrain from calling for Irish withdrawal from the European Union. This represents a step forward (albeit an unexplained one) from earlier Mandelite calls for withdrawal by "their" various nation states. But given the authors' rabid anti-Maastricht diatribe and their idea that the process of European integration is no more than the creation of "a united European imperialism", it is difficult to see why the authors do not advocate

Irish withdrawal.

Particularly quaint is the authors' line on the European Parliament: "Its bureaucratic and undemocratic nature must be exposed, (but) not in order to demand its reform. We have no illusions in a European capitalist parliament, any more than we have in a national one."

But surely, while having no illusions in national parliaments, socialists *do* campaign for their reform? Or is Socialist Democracy advocating that we in Britain should abstain from demanding abolition of the House of Lords and the monarchy?

Then total incoherence on Ireland, According to the authors:

"In the internationalist capitalist system Ireland is a small semi-colony utterly subordinated to imperialism... The national debt is not just an economic drain but a political weapon of control by imperialism and local capitalists... The specific form of national oppression suffered by Ireland — partition — is the specific political framework and mechanism through which imperialism exploits the whole island."

Southern Ireland is deemed to be a semi-colony because its economic development has been shaped by "the primacy of imperialist capital", whilst Northern Ireland's colonial status is derived from the existence of "British rule in the North" and its "occupation by the British army". In fact, if by imperialist is meant, even in part, international investment in Ireland then the fact remains that it is not mainly *British* investment. Make sense of this if you can!

If Southern Ireland is a semicolony, how can it simultaneously be a full member-state of the European Union, enjoying the same rights as all other member-states? And how can it pursue an independent foreign policy, as it has for over sixty years? How many other "semi-colonies" can Socialist Democracy list which remained neutral during the Second World War? And if the relationship of Northern Ireland to Britain is reduced to simply one of colonialism and occupation by a foreign army, then what economic or military interest does Britain have in the heavily subsidised and strategically irrelevant Northern Ireland statelet?

Apart from some truisms about women's liberation (good), defence of the environment (good), class collaboration (bad), and sectarianism (bad), the booklet is a sorry hotchpotch of fashionable eclectic leftism — and proof that eclectic leftism is long

past its bury-by date.

Stan Crooke

More years of self-justification

IM Higgins is a highly literate, witty and intelligent man. No surprise then that his book (More Years for the Locust) about his days in the International Socialists displays all those qualities. It is also thoroughly self-serving and frequently dishonest.

Take just one example: writing about the expulsion of the AWL's forerunner, the Trotskyist Tendency (TT), Higgins states that IS/SWP guru Tony Cliff acted bureaucratically and should have defeated the TT in debate. The clear implication is that this was the course that Comrade Higgins and his co-thinkers advocated at the time. Well, if they did they kept remarkably quiet about it. Jim and his friends were actually at the forefront of the baying mob calling for the TT to be unceremoniously booted out. When I read the section of the book that describes the TT it seemed vaguely familiar: I dug out my old IS internal bulletins and, sure enough, there was an article by Jim's erstwhile chum Duncan Hallas putting forward precisely the same 'critique' of the TT that appears in Jim's book and in much the same language. Hallas's article was the "theoretical" justification for the expulsion.

I was not, in fact, a member of the TT but did fall foul of Cliff's version of "Healvite centralism" four years later, in 1975. That was when the "Left Faction" (whose politics on most questions were largely based upon the TT's) was up for the chop. Largely coincidentally, Jim and his friends (then trading as the IS Opposition) had fallen out with Cliff at the same time as us and the realisation was dawning upon them that we all faced the same fate. Suddenly, they became very concerned about internal democracy and even agreed to some joint "defence" meetings with us. I can distinctly remember one of them remarking with jocular candour that under other circumstances they would be pushing for our expulsion.

Jim's entertaining foray into revolutionary history also displays his characteristic ambivalence towards Cliff and the so-called "IS tradition". Jim will have no truck with any criticism of the roots of IS and the theory of "state capitalism" that allegedly underpins it and he seems remarkably relaxed about the junking of state capitalism's one-time complementary theory, the "Permanent Arms Economy". He is completely dismissive, for instance, of the entirely reasonable suggestion that Cliff's version of "state capitalism" was largely derivative. To admit that would be to admit the possibility of Comrade Cliff being anything less than a brilliant, thoroughly original theoretical thinker. Higgins also seems to have made a highly selective reading of Cliff's writings (under the name of "Rock") in New International on the subject of Palestine.

lim's basic argument is that Cliff betrayed Cliffism and, in doing so, squandered the small but important gains that IS made within the industrial working class in the early '70s. Now, it is perfectly true that the IS destroyed its working-class base in the course of the grandiose project to transform itself into the Socialist Workers' Party in 1975. But why? Jim offers no serious answer and, worse, doesn't even attempt to do so. There are some passing references to Cliff's legendary impatience and to the cult of youth that superseded the dogged workerism of the early '70s. But this doesn't amount to any sort of explanation (let alone analysis) of what went wrong. That would involve an examination of Cliff's entire attitude towards industrial recruits (patronising glorification while they were useful, contemptuous dismissal when they weren't) which, in turn, would necessitate a fundamental critique of the IS tradition. Jim cannot do that for the very simple reason that it would have to be a pretty devastating exercise in self-criticism.

There are many amusing (and some moving and sad) stories in this book. As I had no personal involvement with most of them I cannot vouch for their accuracy or otherwise. But those episodes that I was involved in (albeit in a very minor and insignificant way) I know to be described in a one-sided, factional and often downright dishonest way.

Buy this book, laugh with it, and weep with it. But don't believe a word of it unless you've checked the facts with someone who has a better memory and is less factionally motivated than comrade Jim Higgins.

fim Denbam **More Years for the Locust** is published by the International Socialist Group, £5.99